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Abstract 
‘Relationship Satisfaction’ is highly valued within the socio-political language of 
modern coupledom, and its perceived absence is understood as anxiety-provoking and 
may prompt partners to self-refer to couples therapy.  The psychological literature on 
the topic is vast, but tends to focus on asserting intra-psychological explanations as a 
way of ‘objectively knowing’ and ‘improving’ couples’ attempts at ‘doing’ satisfying 
relating.   The present thesis expands the empirical work on relationship satisfaction by 
drawing on social constructionism and phenomenology to highlight the ways in which 
the taken-for-granted assumptions of popular discourse shape the possibilities for ‘being 
satisfied’ within heterosexual relationships. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven couples therapists from Relate 
and were analysed using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) in order to expose the 
role and power of therapy in the construction of ‘satisfying relating’.  Furthermore, 
thirteen interviews were conducted with ‘lay people’ who self-identified as being in a 
‘long-term heterosexual’ relationship.  The transcripts were analysed twice using a 
novel ‘twin focus’ approach which included FDA and Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA) to map the complex relations between the private-subjective, the 
interpersonal, and the social life worlds of ‘satisfied’ partners. 
Commonalities between the two FDAs are presented and theorised in terms of the 
discursive cycle of knowledge.  This suggests that certain ways of thinking about, and 
‘doing’ relationship satisfaction are sustained and recycled through the prescriptions of 
therapy, yet therapists have limited awareness of their role in this discursive norm-
setting mechanism.  However, variations are also presented which suggest there is 
multiplicity and resistance which is not captured by the theoretical account of the 
‘cycle’.  The IPA presents relationship satisfaction in terms of a range of experiential 
depths and qualities which signify in ways that sometimes elude talk.  This ‘richness’ is 
missing from the mainstream literature and cannot be captured by a focus on discourse 
alone.  Finally, insights from all three analyses shed light on relationship satisfaction as 
a fluid relational process which is always-already enmeshed in broader discursive 
frameworks, and which is experienced as the dissolving of partners’ lifeworld 
boundaries.  The benefits of these re-conceptualisations are presented for academic 
psychology and the practice of couples therapy.
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1. 
Introduction to the thesis 
 
1.1 An outline of my research purposes, aims, and key terms 
This qualitative research is about the phenomenon of satisfaction in long-term, 
heterosexual relationships.  By ‘heterosexual’ I mean the types of relationship that are 
typically considered as involving ‘husbands-and-wives’ or ‘girlfriends-and-boyfriends’, 
that is, relationships that are often described as ‘more than friendships’, but I make no 
assumptions, or prescriptions as to the role that sex or marriage plays in these 
relationships.  Similarly, I do not specifying a period of time which constitutes ‘long-
term’, but rather, I allow the participants to decide whether or not they identify their 
relationship as ‘long-term’.  Moreover, when I first started this research (and I now 
recognise this was a huge assumption) I anticipated that when people spoke of 
relationship satisfaction, dissatisfaction would implicitly be part of their narrative.  The 
meanings of the two are dialectically intertwined (Erbert & Duck, 1997), and I believed 
it made sense to anticipate a meaningful relationship satisfaction which was not distinct 
from the discourses and preoccupations of relationship dissatisfaction.  I rejected the 
distinction of relationship satisfaction and dissatisfaction as dichotomous cognitive-
emotional states, because I believed this approach was limited in what it could tell us 
about the topic.  Therefore, in this thesis I use ‘satisfaction’ as a ‘catch-all’ term, which 
incorporates the various different meanings and processes that are associated with it in 
the literature - including being satisfied, not being satisfied, being dissatisfied, and not 
being dissatisfied
1
.   
 
The purpose of this project was twofold. Firstly, I wanted to challenge the types of 
mainstream
2
 research that attempted to define and predict relationship satisfaction and, 
in doing so, advance our conceptual and theoretical understandings of the topic by 
presenting a twofold re-conceptualisation of relationship satisfaction as (i) a social 
construction; and (ii) as a subjective phenomenological experience.  I was not interested 
                                                 
1 I only distinguished between these terms if I was recounting literature or participants’ accounts in which a 
distinction was produced. 
2 By “mainstream” I refer to research which takes a realist, positivist, essentialist approach to research and knowledge.  
That is, universal truths exist about the world independent of the socio-historical context, and these truths are 
‘discovered’ through the research process. 
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in trying to delineate and fix the meaning of ‘relationship satisfaction’, but rather, I 
wanted to ask how it was possible for relationships to be talked about as satisfying; 
what characterised the lived experience of a satisfying relationship; and in what ways 
did relationship satisfaction function as a meaningful intersubjective relational process?  
In order to achieve these aims I conducted in-depth interviews with members of the 
general public (i.e. ‘lay’ people) about the topic of relationship satisfaction and analysed 
the resulting transcripts twice, using a novel twin theoretical perspective which was 
informed both by ‘macro’ (i.e. Foucauldian) social constructionism and by 
interpretative phenomenology.  
 
The second purpose of this research was to make recommendations for the field of 
couple therapy in order to improve the quality of care that couples receive when they 
experience their relationship as dissatisfying and seek therapeutic help.  Therefore, I 
hoped to demonstrate the role of couple therapy in the norm-setting mechanisms which 
permitted certain ways of being relationally satisfied whilst closing down alternatives.  
To address this purpose I interviewed couple therapists from Relate
3
 about their 
understandings of relationship satisfaction, and analysed the transcripts from a 
Foucauldian perspective.  I then looked for areas of commonality, overlap, and variation 
between the lay and professional ‘expert’ understandings to see the ways in which the 
practice of couple therapy challenged or reinforced commonly-held assumptions in 
order to highlight if the relationally dissatisfied subject was rendered ‘problematic’ and 
‘pathologised’.   
 
In the following sections of this chapter I will fully outline my thesis, but firstly I wish 
to reflect and offer a little explanation as to why I chose to research the topic in the 
ways outlined above. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 ‘Relate’ are the largest provider of couples and sex therapy in the UK. 
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1.2 A reflexive account of my research decisions 
 
1.2.1 Encountering social constructionism and phenomenology - Questioning my 
previous certainty 
My interest in the topic of relationship satisfaction stemmed from taking an elective 
module - ‘The Psychology of Close Relationships’ – at the University of East London in 
2006.  When I started the module I thought I had a fairly clear idea of what constituted 
an intimate, heterosexual relationship and, therefore, what relationship satisfaction was 
“all about” - what it referred to, and how it was managed by intimate partners.  I saw 
relationships as being something that two individuals had freely chosen to be in (like a 
vessel of some kind) in order to fulfil certain innate needs or desires such as intimacy, 
personal support, and to feel accepted and validated for whom they are.  Having 
previously completed a degree in biochemistry I thought that whilst some of these needs 
were applicable to both men and women, there were some well-established gender 
differences. For example, men normally needed more sex, whereas women normally 
needed more comfort and support, and were normally better when it came to talking 
about feelings because they were innately more emotional than men.  I also thought that 
relational partners were free to choose how they behaved and acted out their intimate 
life, that is, how they did their relationships, and that doing good communication was 
the key to a good, satisfying relationship.  Having talked extensively with my friends 
about relationships over the years, it appeared that these views were fairly common (and 
I still find it easy to ‘default’ back to them).  Having also researched the mainstream 
academic literature on relationship satisfaction I can confirm that these ideas are highly 
prevalent there too (See Chapter 2 for a detailed literature review).  However, over the 
course of completing the Psychology of Close Relationships module, the module leader 
(and now my Director of Studies), Dr. Aneta Tunariu, introduced me to two theoretical 
frameworks - social constructionism and phenomenology - which led me to question my 
hitherto taken-for-granted assumptions about intimate relationships. 
 
1.2.2 The Social Construction of Relationships: From essential absolutes to fluid 
constructions 
The beliefs I held about relationships (as outlined above) were based upon a realist, 
essentialist view of the world and the knowledge that we have about it.  That is, the 
belief that universal truths about the world existed and that through a process of 
Chapter 1.   Introduction to the thesis 
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experimental research we could discover and know these truths.  Mainstream research 
underpinned by this realist experimental framework regards language as a transparent 
medium, passively describing our thoughts and emotions and therefore conceptualises 
the psychological ‘self’ (including its ‘personality’ and experience) as existing 
independently and predating the words used to describe it.  From this perspective 
relationship satisfaction is usually researched with self-reporting structured 
questionnaire approaches, which essentialise the concept as a relatively invariable state 
originating from the individuals in the relationship.  When I first started studying the 
psychology of close relationships I had no reason to doubt this approach.  However, I 
did begin to question it when I encountered social constructionism.     
 
Social constructionism argues that our knowledge about any phenomena, including 
‘relationship satisfaction’, is not waiting to be discovered in the form of universal 
absolutes; rather, it is constructed through language and is specific to a given time and 
place.  In this way, it challenges essentialist theoretical frameworks and argues that our 
concepts do not exist independently of language, but are made possible through its use 
(Burr, 2003).  Thus, the personal world is social (Milardo & Wellman, 1992; Unger & 
Crawford, 1996), and relationships do not simply reflect innate biological 
predispositions, but also the ways in which a society construes itself and reacts to larger 
social forces (Gergen, 2009).  I found these ideas particularly surprising when I first 
encountered them because I had always considered ‘intimate relationships’ to represent 
our most inner, private worlds - distinct from, and ‘unsullied’ by the world around us.  
Encountering social constructionism allowed me to appreciate that the knowledge about 
relationship satisfaction that is ‘revealed’ by realist experimental research is always-
already embedded in broader social systems of thought that are historically and 
culturally located (Gergen, 1978; Rose, 1989; Foucault, 1990; Danzinger, 1994; 
Richards, 1996).  Research informed by these ideas shifted from attempting to ‘reveal’ 
underlying psychological constructs and states to focusing on the use of language.  This 
is why I became interested in exploring the ways in which relationship satisfaction was 
talked into being. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two forms of social constructionist theory and research 
(although this distinction should not be drawn too literally): ‘micro’ social 
constructionism, which informs Discursive Psychology and focuses on peoples’ situated 
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language use in their interactions (e.g. Shotter, 1993; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Billig, 
1991); and ‘macro’ social constructionism which draws heavily on the work of Michel 
Foucault and explores the broader linguistic and social structures available in a given 
place and time (e.g. Foucault 1972, 1977, 1978; Parker, 1999; Willig 1997, 1999a; Rose 
1989, 1990; Hollway, 1989; Kitzinger, 1989; Ussher, 2000).  Both approaches are 
concerned with mapping the ways in which phenomena are constructed through 
‘discourse’.  However, whilst discursive psychologists refer to discourse as the situated 
inter-subjective use of language-in-interaction, macro social constructionism 
conceptualises ‘discourse’ as a linguistic framework (the set of statements, 
representations, meanings, metaphors, images, practices etc.) which has the power to 
produce a particular version of a phenomenon, and which makes possible certain ways 
of acting and experiencing (e.g. Henriques et al., 1984; Willig, 1999a; Parker, 1999).  
When people use language this is not a manifestation of some private, internal, essence 
(e.g. their ‘personality’ or ‘attitude’), but rather the mobilisation of the discourses 
available in their culture at that time and so the meaning of their talk stems from this 
discursive context (Harre and Gillet, 1994).  In this way, discourses function as 
conceptual frames of reference available to a linguistic community in an historical time, 
against which speech is interpreted and objects and events come into meaningful 
existence through their representation in discourse (Burr, 2003).  It is this latter 
theoretical conception that informed my research and, unless indicated otherwise, it is 
what I am referring to when I speak of ‘discourse’ in my thesis. 
 
Foucault (1988) argued that discourses not only produce the objects of our knowledge, 
but also govern how a topic can be talked and reasoned about (Hall, 2009).  Discourses 
dictate the ways in which ideas are put into practice, thereby regulating (privileging and 
marginalising) certain forms of conduct (Hall, 2001).  In this way, discourses and the 
knowledges they produce are intimately tied up with power and Foucault was 
fundamentally concerned with this relationship (Burr, 2003).  According to Foucault 
(1972) some discourses (depending on the historical time and culture) come to be 
accepted as the ‘common sense’ or ‘true’ way of understanding a phenomenon, and 
these ‘privilege’ certain (acceptable) ways of acting and being, whilst marginalising (or 
pathologising) alternatives.  As briefly outlined in my assumptions above (see also 
Chapter 2), in terms of coupledom, factors that have been identified as important for 
relationship satisfaction include the fulfilment of innate needs, and a sense of being 
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supported, known, and accepted through a process of mutual care.  Adopting a social 
constructionist perspective, I now argue that the importance and value of these concepts 
lies in the fact that they have become the ‘normal prescriptions’ for satisfying 
relationships in Western culture in the early 21
st
 Century.  These constructions permit 
and make possible certain kinds of intimate relationships and privilege/warrant personal 
satisfaction in ‘modern’ 4  long-term intimate relationships in certain ways, whilst 
pathologising alternatives.  In this way, they regulate how we behave and how we come 
to know each other and ourselves, and thus, from a Foucauldian perspective discourses 
are intimately tied to power relations.  As Foucault (1977) stated: 
 
“There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations” (p.27) 
 
Foucault conceived of ‘power’ functioning not as a repressive force, but through the 
internalisation of discursive norms and prescriptions, such that individuals ‘police 
themselves’ through self-surveillance and monitor and shape their behaviour according 
to prevailing standards of normality.  For example, he argued that the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
Centuries saw the rise of several institutional and cultural discourses (e.g. 
industrialisation, and the rise of psychology) which produced the individualised 
‘modern’, Western subject, who is understood as ‘containing’ personality traits, beliefs, 
attitudes, and who can freely choose to act upon these (Rose, 1989).  This ‘disciplinary 
power’ is all the more potent because it is freely subjected to, thereby masking its 
mechanisms in the form of the ‘common sense’ choice (Foucault, 1977).   
 
However, because multiple discourses can surround any given phenomenon, power is 
not uni-directional.  Each discourse offers alternative constructions with different 
possibilities for action.  Therefore, dominant discourses are continually subject to 
resistance and contestation.  Foucault saw power and resistance functioning in 
dialectical opposition, each defined in the light of the other; the implicit power in one 
discourse only discernible via the implicit resistance in another discourse (Hall, 2009).  
Therefore, for each one of us, there are a myriad of discourses continually inter-weaving 
to produce our identities and subjectivities in certain ways (e.g. in terms of gender, age, 
sexuality, socio economic status).  As a result, the process by which we are continually 
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 Defined as post ‘sexual revolution’ (circa 1960s-1980s) couple relationships 
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constituted and re-constituted is ridden with tension and conflict as we attempt to 
negotiate the positions that are made available to us through discourse.   
 
The media play a huge part in this norm-setting mechanism, and the dominant ideas 
about relationships that we take for granted can be seen everywhere – magazines, TV, 
films, adverts, advice columns, music and literature (Hawkes, 1996).  In a similar way, 
researchers who study relationships and relationship satisfaction are also inundated with 
these same cultural messages.  They are not outside of, or immune to, the influence of 
the social world.  We are born into a shared system of meanings, which are always-
already prescribing the ways in which we can, and should, understand and experience 
the world.  As Cushman (1991) argued, culture not only delineates the topics which 
‘warrant’ further study, but also the ways in which the topics should be ‘properly’ 
studied, including outlining the types of data, and the processes of data collection and 
analyses that are valid.  Thus, the dominant mainstream psychology is reproduced and 
reinforced by culture because psychology’s predictions and findings appear to be 
necessarily correct from the outset.  Therefore researchers may consistently ‘find’ 
support for the common sense view because, as ‘experts’, they are actually part of the 
norm setting mechanism which constructs our dominant understandings about 
relationships in the first place (Duck, 2011).  In this way the discourses of social science 
filter into, and are recycled in, everyday life (Billig et al., 1988; Rose, 1989); thereby 
shaping the ways in which partners’ understand and experience relationship satisfaction.   
 
Against this background I subscribe to the Foucauldian perspective that the practice of 
psychology, and its prescriptions for ‘mental health and well-being’, function as a form 
of social control by compelling individuals to engage in self-reflection (self-surveillance) 
and to talk (confess) all problems away (e.g. Ingleby, 1985; Rose, 1985).  In addition to 
psychological research the other ‘psy’ technologies, such as the practices of psychiatry 
and psychotherapy, also function as crucial components of the norm-setting mechanism 
(Rose, 1989).  For example, Kleinplatz (2001) has outlined how dominant 
understandings of relationship satisfaction can manifest in professional therapeutic 
contexts, whereby taken-for-granted social norms are recycled as if they were neutral 
categories.  In this way, professional and lay understandings can cyclically reinforce 
dominant ideas of how partners ‘should’ live (Nicholson, 1993).  This complexity 
highlighted the need for grounded, contextualised research on relationship satisfaction. 
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Informed by social constructionist and Foucauldian theoretical perspectives I argued 
that mainstream research did not appreciate that the private and public worlds were 
intertwined and imbricated, and therefore the broader social and linguistic context in 
which partners’ understood and evaluated their relationship satisfaction was largely 
ignored (e.g. Rose, 1989; Duck, 2011).  Therefore I proposed to advance the theoretical 
and conceptual understandings of relationship satisfaction by exploring both couple 
therapists’ and lay peoples’ talk about relationship satisfaction to see how the concept 
was constructed through discourse, how these conceptions shaped the possibilities for 
being satisfied and for doing satisfying relationships, and to see how these professional 
and lay understandings functioned within the broader social norm-setting mechanisms.  
In order to achieve this I interviewed lay people and couple therapists about their 
understandings of relationship satisfaction and then analysed their talk using 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis.  I chose to look at these datasets rather than, for 
example, analysing the relational self-help literature, because I also had an interest in 
exploring the lived experience of relationship satisfaction.  This leads me onto the 
second theoretical framework which informs my thesis – phenomenology. 
 
1.2.3 Phenomenology: Exploring the Subjective Lived Experience of Relationship 
Satisfaction 
As mentioned earlier, whilst taking the ‘Psychology of Relationships’ module I was 
introduced not only to social constructionist theory, but also to phenomenological ideas.  
Broadly speaking phenomenologists share a concern with the experience of ‘being 
human’ and exploring what it is like.  The first theorist of phenomenology – Edmund 
Husserl – was interested in how individuals experienced their conscious awareness of 
phenomena, and coined the term ‘intentionality’ to describe the way in which 
experience or consciousness is always experience or consciousness of something.  He 
famously urged phenomenologists to ‘go back to the things themselves’.  That is, to 
analyse the experiential content of our consciousness before we have assimilated that 
content into our pre-existing systems of meaning
5
 (Husserl, 1927, as cited in Smith et 
al., 2009).  Thus, for Husserl, doing phenomenology involved ‘bracketing’ our take-for-
granted assumptions about the world, in order to focus on our perception of it.  In 
                                                 
5
 A theoretical call that was challenged by many (including Husserl’s student Martin Heidegger) as 
impossible.  
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contrast, Husserl’s student, Martin Heidegger (1962/1927, as cited in Smith, Flowers 
and Larkin, 2009), argued that it was not possible to ‘get outside’ of our interpretative 
frameworks, and saw phenomenology as a hermeneutic, that is, interpretative 
endeavour.  Heidegger’s interest lay in the ontological question of human existence and 
the way in which the world appeared to us and was made meaningful through our 
actions and relationships.  He used the term ‘Dasein’ (‘there-being’) to describe the way 
in which human experience was uniquely situated because we are ‘thrown into’ a pre-
existing world of people, objects, language, and culture.  These features of our world 
afforded the embodied, intentional actor a range of experiential possibilities, which 
were grounded physically (i.e. what was possible) and intersubjectively (i.e. what was 
meaningful).  Thus, human being-in-the-world was always temporal, perspectival, and 
in-relation-to something. 
 
Similar to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty (1962, as cited in Smith et al., 2009) emphasised 
the interpretative and situated characteristics of experience, but where Heidegger 
focused on the worldliness of existence, Merleau-Ponty emphasised our embodied 
relationship to the world and how this gives primacy to our individually situated 
experience.  His interest in embodiment and subjectivity are particularly pertinent to 
interpersonal relationships, with Merleau-Ponty (1945, as cited in Langdridge, 2007) 
describing them as a “double being”.  He argued that our perception of the ‘other’ 
begins from our embodied perspective, and therefore our relationships always start from 
a position of difference.  Consequently, even though we can observe and empathise with 
the ‘other’, we can never fully share or understand their experience because it arises 
from their own unique, embodied position in the world.  Intentionality is therefore 
always personal to the body-subject.  The importance of relating-to-others to our 
experience of being human was also highlighted by Jean-Paul Satre (1956/1943, as cited 
in Smith et al., 2009) who extended Heidegger’s project of existential phenomenology.  
Sartre emphasised human being, not as a pre-existing static entity, but rather a 
continuous process of becoming in which human consciousness is action-oriented.  We 
are engaged in projects in the world and these projects inevitably involve encounters 
with others who are engaged in projects of their own.  Thus, Sartre argued that our 
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perceptions of the world are primarily shaped by the presence of others
6
 and our 
engagement with projects in the world is contingent upon the presence or absence of 
other people and our relationships to them.   
 
When I encountered these ideas I found them refreshing as I had often felt that the 
dominant, questionnaire approaches to researching relationships missed out on the 
richness and variation that characterised my own and, I presumed, other peoples’ 
experiences of intimate relationships.  As noted by Gergen & Walter (1998): 
 
“Because of the traditions of writing inherited from the professional past, we often find 
it necessary to adopt and employ discourses that seem strangely alien to the experiences 
that brought us into the field. The languages often seem abstract, dispassionate and 
convoluted – required more for purposes of professional acceptability than by the 
vicissitudes of life itself. [...] Because of the demands of our traditions of representation, 
our attempts to communicate about relationships often seem drained of vitality – stiff, 
passive and disengaged” (p.110-111).  
 
Phenomenology allowed me to appreciate that ‘experience’ was a complex meaning-
making process, which involved a continually developing intentional process that was 
unique to our situated and embodied relationship to the world.  This is what first led me 
to want to look at the lived experience of relationship satisfaction.  However, as my 
understanding of social constructionism and phenomenology developed, I realised that 
phenomenology could also address a limitation of solely conceptualising relationship 
satisfaction in discursive terms: a limitation stemming from the ways in which 
subjectivity and experience are discursively theorised.   
 
From a social constructionist approach, the traditional view of a unitary, self-contained, 
pre-social individual was replaced by a socially produced, continually changing, and 
fragmented ‘self’.  The ‘self’ no longer resided in the brain, but was an effect of 
language, discursively produced.  We are not the result of some inner, essential nature, 
but rather, our identities arise from the linguistic and discursive structures in which we 
are embedded.  In order to explain how identity and subjectivity are produced some 
social constructionist scholars employed the concept of ‘subject positions’ (Gergen, 
                                                 
6
 He illustrated this point with two examples in a section called ‘The Look’ in his book ‘Being and Nothingness’ 
(1956/1943).  In the first, he wrote about walking in a park and becoming aware of another person who consequently 
took ‘centre stage’ in Sartre’s perceptions – he could no longer experience the park for himself, in its own terms, due 
to the presence of the other.  In the second example he described being caught secretly looking through a keyhole, 
and his subsequent feelings of guilt and shame only making sense within this interpersonal context; his self-
consciousness only becoming apparent as he realised he was the object of another’s gaze.   
Chapter 1.   Introduction to the thesis 
11 
 
2009; Harre, 1986).  Subject positions are made available to us through discourses when 
they address us as particular kinds of people (as partner, lover, husband, wife etc.).  At 
any given time multiple discourses position people in different, often conflicting, ways 
and our option is to either accept these positions or try to resist them.  For example, in 
relation to my thesis, discourses (as cultural formulations) about satisfying  
relationships construct their subjects as certain types of people and not others (e.g. good 
enough partner, ‘normal’, ‘abnormal’), and open up subject positions which cannot be 
avoided (e.g., ‘the care taker of my partner’s needs’).  Once one accepts, or is unable to 
resist a particular subject position, they are “locked into the system of rights, speaking 
rights and obligations that are carried with that position” (Burr, 2003, p.111).  We then 
come to understand and experience ourselves in the (potentially empowering or 
oppressive) terms that are made available through occupying a subject position.  As 
Willig (1999) stated “individuals are constrained by available discourses because 
discursive positions pre-exist the individual whose sense of “self” (subjectivity) and 
range of experience are circumscribed by available discourses” (p114).  However, some 
social theorists still argued that this does not adequately address the issue of our 
subjectivity (e.g. Burr, 2003; Cosgrove, 2000; Willig, 2001; 2007; 2011) and I agreed 
with them.   
 
Social constructionism dissolves the essentialist, humanistic self, but it does not provide 
an alternative account which offers its explanatory function (e.g. Parker, 1999; Burr, 
2003), e.g. why do people choose to accept or resist certain subject positions?  This has 
left an “empty person”7, yet we feel as though we have a ‘personality’ and experience 
emotions, motives and desires.  Furthermore, researchers drawing on ideas from 
multiculturalism and feminism criticised the lack of attention to embodiment, and 
highlighted that even though experiences could be socially deconstructed they 
continued to have a ‘real’ felt actuality for the individuals in the relationships.  For 
example, demonstrating the socially constructed quality of concepts such as ‘gender’ 
                                                 
7
 In his later works Foucault (1984; 1986) began to outline a theory of oppositional agency based on an ‘ethics of the 
self’ which operated through individuals’ ongoing self-critique and experimentation via “an historical analysis of the 
limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them” (p.50).  As McNay (2009) 
states: “This relation to self is in no sense a recovery of authentic experience or an assertion of genuine identity, 
rather it is a luminal process which seeks to explore ways of being beyond the already known.  It is anti-experiential 
and an anti-subjectivist creation; an experimentation with the possibility of going beyond what seems natural or 
inevitable in the self” (p.67).  However, McNay (2009) also pointed out that Foucault’s “later response of an ethics of 
the self seems to fall back into [the state domination vs individual autonomy] dualisms and thus fails to convincingly 
answer the problem” of individual agency (p.74). 
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and ‘race’ did not preclude the very real experience of oppression experienced by 
women and ethnic minorities.  From a social constructionist perspective the body was 
understood as a discursive ‘text’, but this offered little more than a reframing of the 
traditional mind-body dualism; except, now, bodily experience was explained not as an 
effect of the mind, but as an effect of discourse.  As Grosz (1994) pointed out:  
 
‘[…] in feminist terms at least, it is problematic to see the body as a blank, passive page, 
a neutral “medium” or signifier for the inscription of a text […] one and the same 
message, inscribed on a female or male body, does not always or even usually mean the 
same thing or result in the same text’ (p156).   
 
In dealing with this, feminist scholars frequently turned to the work of Foucault who 
demonstrated the way in which our bodies, particularly our sexualities and gender, are 
shaped by the disciplinary power inherent in wider processes of political and economic 
control.  However, as argued by Burr (1999), even when the intention was to reclaim 
the ‘material body’ and validate participants’ accounts of their embodied experience 
(e.g. Ussher, 1997) a Foucauldian approach still privileged the power of discourse to 
produce and give meaning to bodily experience, and gave us little understanding about 
the different ways in which individuals engaged with discourse.  
 
Informed by these critiques, I took the position that more could be explored about the 
subjective richness of experiencing oneself as a dis/satisfied partner, beyond the reifying 
role of language or the tyranny of discourse, to allow a closer look into the ‘humanness’ 
of experiencing these phenomena.  There are further nuances and dimensions of 
psychological experience, say of experiencing satisfaction in one’s intimate 
relationship, that are difficult to articulate and as Willig (2007) noted, “seem to involve 
[one’s] entire being, in a pre-reflective kind of way [and] seem to be about more than 
the use of language” (p.210).  For example, our sexual experiences offer ways in which 
one body ‘knows’ another body that are difficult to express in thought or language, and 
in this way can be regarded as ‘extra-discursive’ (Burr, 1999).  Similarly, existential 
theorists (e.g. Ratcliffe, 2010) have recently focused on the embodied quality of our 
‘feelings’ and argue that we experience certain ‘existential feelings’, understood 
through embodied metaphors (e.g. feeling weighed down, or light on our feet), which 
demarcate what is intentionally possible for us.  That is, our ‘existential feelings’ shape 
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the ways in which we come to experience the world, and we make sense of these 
experiences primarily in terms of our embodied being-in-the-world.   
 
Works such as this emphasised that whilst the embodied quality of experience could 
never be fully captured, it should not be overlooked either.  In Radley’s (1995) words, 
the ‘body eludes discourse, not because of its physicality per se, but because it signifies 
in ways that discourse cannot adequately embrace’ (p12).  Radley argued that the body 
was not confined to its discursive production and suggested that phenomenology could 
offer a way of conceptualising the body-as-meaningful, without resorting to cognitive 
explanations, or seeing it as simply a product of discourse.  Like social constructionism, 
phenomenology shares the postmodern critique of knowledge claims based on 
‘objective reality’ (Gavey, 1997), and they both reject the notion that relationship 
satisfaction exists a-priori and can be known through objective measurement.  However, 
phenomenology views experience, including embodied experience as the foundation 
from which meaning is constructed, and appreciates “[...] the radically experiential 
nature of ‘reality’ [...] to recognise that ‘reality’ is not primarily mental or material but 
rather experiential” (Cosgrove, 2000, p.255).  Drawing on these ideas, my thesis 
contended that a phenomenon continued to exist even after its social constructedness 
had been demonstrated.  In other words, even though relationship satisfaction was 
constructed through discourse, there continued to be a subjectively felt actuality to 
individuals’ experiences, and therefore discourse alone was limited in what it could tell 
us about this subjectivity.  In response to this limitation I proposed that phenomenology 
could offer a possible way of ‘reclaiming’ subjectivity and experience from the ‘tyranny’ 
of discourse.   
 
This led me to the second aim of the thesis which was to conduct a twin focus analysis 
on lay people’s talk in order to map the ways in which relationship satisfaction was 
constructed and policed through discourse, and also to map the ways in which 
participants made sense of their subjective experience of relationship satisfaction.  
Several researchers have explored alternatives or extensions to discursive work, which 
allowed for the study of embodiment and subjectivity (e.g. Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; 
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Radley & Taylor, 2003; Gillies et al., 2005; Willig, 2011)
8
, but in this thesis I proposed 
that Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (Smith et al., 2009) could offer a potent 
way forward.   Therefore, the second aim of the thesis was operationalised by analysing 
a single data set (of lay peoples’ talk) using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(IPA) and then using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA).  Whilst, FDA permitted 
something important to be said about the contours of experiences that might be made 
available, or limited, by certain discourses and subject positions, it could not (and did 
not aim to) have anything to say about the phenomenologically grounded awareness of 
an encounter (Willig, 2001; 2007).  In contrast, IPA focused on the felt actuality of 
relationship satisfaction experienced by participants in a given context and time. 
 
In this way, my thesis contended there was much to be gained from exploring both the 
social constructedness and the phenomenology of relationship satisfaction as this 
allowed me to shine two different, yet potentially complementary analytical lights on 
the topic (Colahan, Tunariu & Dell, 2012 – See Appendix A).   Furthermore, I argued 
that this approach could address the mainstream limitation of conceptualising 
relationship satisfaction in terms of partners’ individualised, psychological capacities 
and thereby shed light on relationship satisfaction as a relational phenomenon. 
 
1.2.4 Relationship Satisfaction as a relational process 
In Western culture, the fundamental, indivisible unit of the socio-economic order is 
conceptualised in terms of the ‘individual’ (Willig, 2012). Thus, it is very difficult to 
think, research, and write about close relationships without reference to these terms.  In 
the mainstream psychological literature, dominant interpretations of what it means to be 
relationally satisfied are characterised by an individualistic orientation – even when 
couched within ostensibly ‘relational’ theories (e.g. intimacy as an interpersonal process 
emphasises the individual capacities of partners to do intimacy in satisfying ways).  
However, I argue that this position has failed to appreciate relationship satisfaction as a 
relational process, and I agree with Gergen & Walter (1998) that a relational process is 
a necessary condition for discourses of individualism:  
 
                                                 
8 Hollway & Jefferson (2000) drew on psychoanalysis; Radley and Taylor (2003) used photographs that participants 
had taken to prompt and facilitate discussions; Gillies et al (2005) asked participants to paint pictures to visually 
represent embodied experience; Willig (2011) drew on phenomenological approaches.  
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“[…] an ontological prior; it is out of relationship that we develop (or not) a discourse 
of individual actors (with private minds and emotions), and come to agreements about 
what actors do (or do not) possess in the way of a psychological interior.” (p.113). 
 
In an attempt to theorise individual functioning as inseparable from social process, 
several researchers (e.g. Shotter, 1993; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Baxter & 
Montgomery, 1996; Erbert & Duck, 1997) have drawn on Bakhtin’s (1981) proposal 
that personal life is dialectially constituted.  Bakhtin (1981, 1986) conceptualised 
relationships as a phenomenon of relating, encapsulated by the following propositions:  
(1) Relating is ongoing and not static; (2) It is a transactional, interpersonal process of 
managing contradictions; (3) The process involves goals and rules which refer to the 
past, present and (planned or imagined) future of the relationship (e.g. Berscheid & Reis, 
1998; Brehm; 1992; Harvey & Pauwels, 1999); (4) It is contextual and this context, like 
the relating, is always on-going and fluid.  Thus, the way in which partners engage with 
themselves and each other is dynamic, already ongoing, and always shaped by what 
each of them does.  In line with this, I argued that relationship satisfaction is always 
discursively mediated and indebted to the norms of the local (lay, self-help and to some 
extent professional / therapeutic) culture. It also always involves a series of fluid, 
already-ongoing, transactional interpersonal processes between self-and-self, self-and-
other, and other-to-self. In arriving at this conceptual framing I adopted the position that 
both social constructionism and phenomenology could shed light on this relational view. 
 
Both social constructionism and the relational view appreciated the ways in which 
linguistic resources and practices were intertwined with, and part of both ‘being’ and 
‘doing’ intimate relationships.  Moreover, the relational view included criticality, and 
could compliment social constructionism because it accepted that a relationship was 
relative, contextual, changeable, and subject to the linguistic resources and social 
practices that dominate at a given time.  Gergen & Walter (1998) described this as 
“individual epistemology [being] abandoned in favour of social epistemology” (p.113; 
see also Gergen 1994).  Similarly, existential phenomenology (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.8, page 44 for a detailed discussion of these ideas) highlighted that relational 
processes, and the subsequent experiences of relationship satisfaction, were shaped by 
partners’ capacities to experience themselves and their partners as agentic subjects, to 
avoid objectifying each other, and to take responsibility and ownership for their 
engagement with the world and their ways-of-relating.  Therefore, I proposed that a 
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further theoretical benefit of adopting social constructionism and phenomenology was 
that both theoretical positions were inherently relational and could therefore shed light 
on relationship satisfaction as a relational process. 
 
1.3 A brief recap 
I appreciate that I have just outlined several different theoretical perspectives which 
underpinned my thesis, and so it may be helpful at this point to clarify and summarise 
what I wanted to achieve:  Due to the limitations of existing research on relationship 
satisfaction this research explored the concept from (i) a social constructionist 
perspective and (ii) a phenomenological perspective.  In addition to these, it explored 
the role of couple-therapy as part of the norm-setting mechanism surrounding 
relationship satisfaction.  Now this presented me, as a researcher, with a challenge 
because these approaches did not seamlessly fit together in terms of epistemology.  To 
address this challenge I proposed a solution (see also Chapter 3) based on 
methodological pluralism, which I referred to as an ‘and/and’ approach to research. It 
functioned as the overarching theme of my thesis, and is illustrated with a short 
anecdote: 
 
An ex-colleague of mine often referred to me as ‘a qualitative person’ which always 
struck me as a limiting way of viewing the world.  My first degree was in Biochemistry, 
and I did not forget or reject everything I learned simply because I encountered and 
appreciated the role of language, context, history, and culture in the ways knowledges 
were produced.  I had even heard ‘qualitative colleagues’ refer to each other as 
‘Phenomenology people’ or ‘Discourse people’.  I believed both approaches could offer 
insights, so why should I have had to choose either one or the other?  I did not want to 
‘declare my allegiance’ to a specific epistemological/methodological camp.  This 
anecdote was not meant as a political statement to lay bare some perceived underlying 
prejudices - I use it to simply illustrate a tendency to see the world in terms of Cartesian 
dichotomies.  I could appreciate the attraction in their conceptual simplicity – partners 
in an intimate relationship were either ‘satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’, ‘non-distressed’ or 
‘distressed’, ‘doing it right’ or ‘doing it wrong’.  However, my thesis rested upon a 
move away from dichotomies – in terms of how I understood my topic of interest, 
relationship satisfaction (as outlined in my opening paragraph), and also how I planned 
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to research it.  So I shifted from an ‘either/or’ dichotomous approach to research to what 
I called an ‘and/and’ approach.   
 
1.4 The ‘and/and’ approach 
The theoretical call for using ‘mixed-methods’ is not new, with scholars outlining the 
benefits of mixed qualitative methods (e.g. Coyle, 2010; Gergen, 1999; Frost, 2009, 
Willig, 2012a), and others highlighting the benefits of mixing quantitative and 
qualitative methods (e.g. Tunariu & Reavey, 2003, Yardley & Bishop, 2008).  It is a 
theoretical call that I subscribed to in this research, however it had to be rigorously 
managed because my different analytical aims were based upon different 
epistemological foundations.  I understood that I could not simply mix-and-match as I 
pleased without careful consideration (e.g. Chamberlain, 2012); after all, my thesis had 
to demonstrate epistemological coherence.  However, as Willig (2012a) notes: “[…] in 
recent years qualitative psychologists have begun to question the assumption that due to 
the presence of epistemological difference between qualitative methodologies 
researchers are compelled to choose between them, and methodological pluralism has 
emerged as another option” (p.159).9  Similarly, I believed that different approaches 
could co-exist – that I could ‘wear’ different sets of epistemological/theoretical lenses to 
view, and learn about, relationship satisfaction in different ways.  I did not propose to 
wear these different sets of lenses at the same time, but I proposed that it was perfectly 
fine, even beneficial, to employ these different sets of lenses one-at-a-time.  I felt that I 
could take off one set of theoretical lenses, ‘freeze’ that particular view (theoretical 
conception), and then ‘free myself’ by wearing a different set of lenses and gaining an 
alternative insight.  This position reflected Holstein and Gubrium (2000) who argued 
that instead of trying to theoretically integrate different perspectives, “qualitative 
researchers should engage in a process of shifting between perspectives as they move 
through a cycle of interrogation of the data, temporarily deferring one perspective only 
to return to it again a little later” (Willig, 2012, p.161, emphasis added).10  
 
I would, in effect, straddle the different epistemological positions associated with my 
different perspectives (See Chapter 3 for further outline of my epistemological position).  
                                                 
9
 For example, Langdridge (2007) uses a range of different narrative approaches in his Critical Narrative Analysis; 
Frost (2009) has also used a range of narrative methodologies on a single dataset. 
10
 However, whilst Holstein and Gubrium (2000) used a metaphor of shifting gears, I used the metaphor of wearing 
different lenses. 
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In doing so, I stood by the claim that there was no single ‘truth’ regarding relationship 
satisfaction, and thus my aim was to simply remain curious and open, and to shift the 
way in which relationship satisfaction had so far been conceptualised.  Therefore, I 
adopted the two conceptual lenses outlined above in order to map contextual features of 
relationship satisfaction, which had not been fully appreciated within the literature in 
order to achieve a different possible way of understanding the process called 
‘relationship satisfaction’.   In doing this, the thesis proposed an ‘and-and’ (as opposed 
to an ‘either-or’) approach in terms of epistemological considerations and theory 
development and proposed that social constructionism and phenomenology could 
coexist in the one thesis.   
 
This ‘binocular’ approach (see also for example, Langdridge, 2007) required tolerance 
of overlap, uncertainty, and possibly contradiction between the different conceptual 
lenses.  To allow the full unfolding of one analytic journey at a time I had to 
temporarily suspend my other conceptual interests, but I took the position that both 
analytic interests continued to exist in parallel, and I did not devalue or ‘dissolve’ either 
one in favour of the other.  To achieve this in an empirical research project required 
epistemological reflexivity (Willig, 2012b) so that I maintained transparency and clarity 
in my approach to the methodologies.  In this way, the and/and approach required a 
deliberate, yet ‘relaxed’ awareness, as well as ownership and accountability, of the 
position I took (See Chapter 3 for full discussion). 
 
To summarise, in the above sections I started by reflecting on the taken-for-granted 
assumptions I held about relationships prior to my PhD, and how my views were 
changed when I was introduced to social constructionism and phenomenology.  Social 
constructionism demonstrated the role of language in rendering ‘relationship 
satisfaction’ thinkable, knowable, and possible, and highlighted the way in which 
‘expert’ professional understandings of a concept could come to inform, and be 
mobilised in everyday ‘lay’ talk.  This led to the first aim of the thesis; to use 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis to map the ways in which relationship satisfaction was 
constructed in couple therapists’ and lay peoples’ talk, and to look for overlap and 
variation.  Following this, I outlined the way in which phenomenology could address a 
limitation of mainstream research, which could not be addressed by solely looking at 
discourse; that subjectivity, embodiment, and experience were not adequately addressed, 
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and this led to the second aim (and the ‘and/and’ proposal) of the research: That social 
constructionism and phenomenology could co-exist, and this was operationalised by the 
twin-focus-analysis of IPA and FDA on lay peoples’ talk.  Finally, as a continuation of 
the ‘and-and’ philosophy of the thesis, I also advocated that both social constructionism 
and existential phenomenology could shed light on a relational view of relationship 
satisfaction.    
 
Having presented the topic, aims, and theoretical foundations of this research project, I 
now present a chapter-by-chapter outline of the rest of my thesis and the argument I will 
develop. 
 
1.5 Outline and Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review of Relationship Satisfaction 
The objective of the next chapter is to present and critically discuss the psychological 
and couple therapy literatures on relationship satisfaction through the ‘twin lenses’ (i.e. 
‘and/and’ approach) of social constructionism and phenomenology.  Part 1 deconstructs 
the ways in which psychological and therapeutic research has endeavoured to produce 
relationship satisfaction as a singular, fixed, and ultimately knowable state.  It broadly 
outlines the dominant social psychological theories which account for the 
‘psychological architecture’ of relationship satisfaction including, amongst others: 
attachment, social exchange, intimacy, conflict and communication management, and 
the subsequent satisfactions and subjectivities associated with these theories.  The 
critique is contextualised by the socio-historical conceptual condition of knowing 
relational satisfaction through the Western pre-occupation with personal need fulfilment.  
In line with the ‘and/and’ approach proposed as the conceptual backdrop to my thesis, 
the chapter then ‘theoretically breaks’ and Part 2 explores potential phenomenological 
characteristics of relationship satisfaction by turning to existential works and 
phenomenological research into intimacy.  These ideas are not deconstructed (in the 
same way as Part 1 of the chapter), and this is one example of where I have to ‘freeze’ 
one analytical interest, in order to gain insight from the other. 
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Chapter 3 - Research questions, methodology and methods 
Chapter 3 reflexively outlines the way in which the ‘and/and’ philosophy of the thesis 
was operationalised and translated in order to address the aims of the thesis, whilst 
maintaining both epistemological and methodological coherence.  The three empirical 
studies are outlined along with their associated research questions beginning with the 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis of professional, couple therapists’ talk, before moving 
onto the twin-focus-analysis of lay-peoples’ talk whereby an FDA and an IPA were 
conducted on a single data set.  Information concerning the participants, the data 
collection process, and the ethical procedures are also included.  The epistemological 
position of the thesis is fully explicated, and the chapter proceeds to reflexively describe 
the analytical procedures that were undertaken to produce the IPA (Smith et al., 2009) 
and FDA (Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine, 2008), and also outlines the pragmatic 
difficulties of undertaking the twin-focus-analysis, and the practical steps I employed to 
navigate these (see also Colahan, Tunairu and Dell, 2012, in Appendix A).  Here the 
emphasis is on the potential complementarity of the interpretations from the different 
methodological approaches, not on their seamless and unproblematic integration.  Given 
that Chapter 3 is highly reflexive it is primarily written in the first person. 
 
Chapter 4 – Couple therapists’ constructions of relationship satisfaction 
A key premise of Chapter 4 is that the institution of couple therapy is a crucial 
component of the social, norm-setting mechanism with regards to what constitutes 
satisfying and dissatisfying (or distressed) intimate relating (e.g., Weeks, 2002; Szasz, 
1990, Tiefer, 1995; Kleinplatz, 2001).  This study explores couple therapists’ 
productions of relationship satisfaction and the associated power that operates through 
these productions in order to critically interrogate the contribution that couple therapy 
makes to the “cycle of knowledge” (Nicholson, 1993) with respect to ‘satisfying 
relating’.  An FDA (informed by Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008) of seven couple-
therapists who work for Relate is presented.  Research questions that guide the study 
include:  How is relationship satisfaction and dissatisfaction conceived by couple 
therapists? What constitutes a therapeutic goal or success with regards to relationship 
dissatisfaction?  Are there tensions between the therapists’ positions and their clients’ 
positions?  The FDA presented here illustrates the ways in which relationship 
dissatisfaction is rendered problematic across the couple therapists’ talk.  These 
constructions enable certain dissatisfied subject positions for clients, and warrant the 
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prescription of satisfying technologies-of-self which operate at the level of inter-
subjective relational practices.  These practices are put forward as relational ‘skills’ that 
need to be taken up and invested in by dissatisfied clients in order for them to be 
repositioned as satisfied, but they are mobilised and promoted uncritically, and there is a 
risk that they could be taken up and recycled dogmatically. 
 
Chapter 5 – Laypeople’s constructions of relationship satisfaction 
Chapter 5 presents an FDA interpretative reading of the transcripts from semi-structured 
interviews with twelve lay people (members of the general population) who were each 
in long-term relationships, but not with each other (i.e. the study did not use dyadic 
data).  The analytic aim is to map out lay peoples’ discursive constructions of 
satisfaction in their intimate long-term relationships, the social practices warranted by 
these, the subject positions made available, and the implications for power of these 
productions.  This also allows for an exploration of the overlap between these 
constructions and the couple therapists’ accounts in Study 1.  In addition, the analysis of 
Study 2 also focuses on the discursive resources being mobilised and the range of 
“subject positions” thus opened, which allows links to be drawn with Study 3 (IPA of 
lay talk).  Research questions which guide Study 2 include:  How do lay people talk 
about relationship satisfaction? What broader cultural discourses get mobilised? When 
does it make sense for participants to talk about relationship satisfaction in a certain 
way?  What subject-positions are made available and what modes of being satisfied do 
these enable?  Again, extracts from the interviews are provided to illustrate two 
discursive constructions of relationship satisfaction.  The FDA produced two dominant 
constructions of relationship satisfaction, and these make available different ‘modes of 
subjectification’ which operate through intersubjective practices to sustain a range of 
satisfied and dissatisfied ‘versions of self’. 
 
Chapter 6 – Laypeople’s experiences of relationship satisfaction 
Chapter 6 presents, discusses and illustrates the dominant master themes generated by 
the IPA of the same transcripts (interviews with twelve members of the general 
population) that were analysed using FDA in Chapter 5.  Research questions that guide 
the study include:  How do participants experience satisfaction in their relationships?  
How do participants know when they are satisfied?  How do participants manage 
tensions and contradictions arising through their descriptions and observations?  
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Extracts from the interviews are presented to illustrate three Master Themes which 
present relationship satisfaction as a fluid ongoing relational process with a range of 
phenomenological depths and qualities that signify in ways (e.g. affective and embodied 
ways) that sometimes elude talk.  In this way, the IPA presents a richness that is missing 
from the mainstream literature, and which cannot be captured by a focus on discourse 
alone. 
 
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Discussions 
This chapter brings together the interpretations from the three empirical analyses in 
relation to the thesis’ research questions.  All analyses are re-introduced back into the 
literature and their conceptual implications are outlined in terms of the ‘and/and’ focus 
on discourse and phenomenology.  Commonalities are presented between the two FDAs 
and discussed in light of the discursive cycle of knowledge.  In addition, points of 
overlap are presented between the lay FDA and IPA.  Finally, all three analyses shed 
light on the fluid relational quality of relationship satisfaction.  This ‘re-telling’ of the 
story of relationship satisfaction in relation to the thesis’ aims and rationale 
demonstrates the thesis’s original contribution to knowledge.  Furthermore, the chapter 
evaluates the ‘and/and’ approach to undertaking a research project using the criteria for 
evaluating qualitative research as outlined by Yardley (2008) and Willig (2012b).  It 
reflexively considers potential avenues for future research, both in terms of the topic 
and also the ‘and/and’ approach and the associated ethical implications.  The chapter 
ends with a personal reflection on the process of completing this thesis. 
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2. 
Literature Review of Relationship Satisfaction 
 
This chapter critically reviews the ways in which Relationship Satisfaction has been 
constructed in the vast mainstream psychological, and couple therapy literatures.  These 
knowledges have laid the conditions for a privileged, gendered, psychologised 
relationship satisfaction, which is contextualised by the socio-historical conceptual 
condition of knowing relationship satisfaction through a Western pre-occupation with 
individual choice and personal need fulfilment.  This has produced a conflicted satisfied 
subject who is simultaneously governed by an ethic of self-fulfilment, and an ethic of 
partner-fulfilment which warrants gender–specific relational practices.  The second and 
smaller part of the chapter ‘breaks’ (theoretically speaking) from a focus on mapping 
the discursive constructions of relationship satisfaction, and turns towards an 
examination of its phenomenology.  This is an instance of the and/and approach to the 
research and, therefore, the ideas presented in this section - from phenomenology and 
existentialism - are taken at ‘face value’, as opposed to being critically reviewed11.  
Therefore, there is a ‘tonal’ shift between the two parts of the chapter.  The reason for 
adopting this approach is that Part 1 critically evaluates existing mainstream 
psychological and therapeutic research on Relationship Satisfaction and problematizes it 
from a Foucauldian point of view, which is pertinent to Studies One and Two (the FDA 
of couple therapists and lay people respectively).  In contrast, in Part 2, I am not 
reviewing or deconstructing literature on the topic of Relationship Satisfaction itself, 
but rather I am presenting phenomenological and existential research in preparation for 
Study Three (the IPA of lay talk).  Whilst I accept that the existential literature is 
socially constructed I am presenting it here as a framework within which to locate and 
expand my IPA study.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11 This does not equate to my uncritical acceptance of all existentialist thinking; rather, my purpose (in line with the 
and/and philosophy of the thesis) is to draw on specific theoretical strands which I believe can shed light on the topic 
of relationship satisfaction: as a subjective lived experience, and as a relational process. 
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Part 1 
2.1 The privileging of relational satisfaction: A satisfaction of health & wellbeing 
The mainstream psychological research discursively privileges relationship satisfaction 
as a cognitive-affective state which is vital for psychological and physical health and 
well-being (e.g., Cohen, 1988; Gurung, Sarason & Sarason, 2001; Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996; Drigotas, Rusbult, Wieselquist, & 
Whitton, 1999) and which insulates individuals from challenging life events (e.g., Coan, 
Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006; Treboux, Crowell, & Waters, 2004).   
In contrast, relationship dissatisfaction has been rendered problematic vis-à-vis its 
cyclically-reinforcing association to a number of negative physical and emotional 
effects (Sprenkle, 2012) including: increased risk of destructive conflict patterns 
(Gottman, 1998), suppression of the immune system (Kielcot-Glaser, Malarkey, Chee, 
Newton, Cacioppo, Mao & Glaser, 1993); increased production of stress hormones, 
chronic illness (Kiecolt-Glaser, Bane, Glaser, and Malarkey, 2003; Shields et al., 2012); 
anxiety, loneliness (Beach, Jouriles, & O’leary, 1985; Sadava & Matejcic, 1987), and 
depression (Beach and Whisman, 2012; Weissman, 1987; Whisman & Bruce, 1999) 
with its associated symptomology of sadness, irritability, and diminished sexual interest 
(Beach, 2001).   
As a result, the relationally dissatisfied subject has been diagnostically positioned as 
being likely to have poorer psychological and physical health, and less able to function 
socially with their friends and families, or at work (Clements, Cordova, Markman, & 
Laurenceau, 1997; Flora & Segrin, 2000; Whisman and Uebelacker, 2006).  In this way, 
relationship dissatisfaction is rendered problematic beyond the couple-dyad as it is 
constructed as a state that is also detrimental to individuals’ broader relational networks 
and also to their economic capacity
12
.   
Furthermore, relationally dissatisfied  subjects are positioned as more likely to break-up, 
and research has constructed the experience of ending a relationship as being amongst 
the most psychologically problematic, stressful and life-changing events faced by 
individuals (Miller & Rahe, 1997) and their families (e.g., Reiss & Rusbult, 2005).  
                                                 
12
 For example, it has been estimated that 11 million employees take sick leave each year due to problems with their 
couple relationships and this costs the UK taxpayer £13bn, and the broader economy £15bn (Black and Frost, 2011). 
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Moreover, relationship dissolution has been rendered economically problematic vis-à-
vis its cost to the UK economy (estimated as £44bn in 2012; The Relationships 
Foundation, 2013).  In these economic constructions relationship dissatisfaction 
represents a problem for broader society, and this has warranted Government 
intervention.  For example, in 2011 the British Coalition Government committed £30 
million for the period 2012-15 (Department for Education, 2013) to fund trials of 
relationship support interventions in an effort to pre-emptively satisfy relationships 
deemed to be at risk of ‘dysfunctional’ relating.  Thus, relationship dissatisfaction is 
rendered problematic in current academic, public and therapeutic discourses both in-
and-of-itself, and also through its construction as a precursor to relationship dissolution 
with its economic implications.  Therefore, achieving and maintaining relationship 
satisfaction has attained a privileged status in contemporary Western neo-liberal culture.  
This privileging discursively operates through the dominant psychological explanation 
of relationship satisfaction as a state of individual need fulfilment. 
2.2 Contemporary Western Relationship Satisfaction: The fulfilment of partners’ 
innate needs 
 
“[R]elationship satisfaction always reduces to whether needs are being satisfied or not” 
(Shaver & Hazan, 1984, as cited in Hazan & Shaver, 2004, p165) 
 
“[Relationship satisfaction involves] one’s position in the relationship, a partner’s 
meeting of one’s needs, and level of contentment with one’s relationship” (Hendrick, 
1988, as cited in Emmers-Sommer, 2004, p.402) 
 
The above extracts exemplify the dominant construction of relationship satisfaction in 
the mainstream social psychological literature as a cognitive-affective evaluation of the 
extent to which partners’ needs are fulfilled within the context of their relationship (e.g. 
Le & Agnew, 2001; Patrick, Knee, Canevello & Lonsbary, 2007; VanderDrift & Agnew, 
2012).  Social psychologists long proposed that people possessed a variety of innate, 
gendered, psychological needs, which varied in strength between individuals (Murray, 
1938, as cited in Prager & Buhrmester, 1998) (see Appendix B for details of these 
‘innate’ needs).  These needs, it was argued, had to be fulfilled if partners’ were to 
avoid serious consequences.  As Prager and Buhrmester (1998) argued: 
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“What distinguishes needs conceptually from wants or desires are the deficit states (e.g. 
hunger and loneliness) that can result from unfulfilled needs.  These states of 
deprivation […] may therefore account for the close linkages found […] between need 
fulfilment and psychological well-being.” (p.466) 
 
It is these “deficit states” that render relationship dissatisfaction problematic and 
privilege relationship satisfaction in the mainstream psychological literature.  In this 
way, psychological knowledges have functioned (and continue to function) as parts of 
broader regulatory regimes of governance, which have the power to position individuals 
as satisfied or pathologically dissatisfied (Foucault, 1972).  However, these knowledges 
have been constructed against a backdrop of Western cultural norms, values and 
practices (including, for example, religious and economic discourses) about what is 
important and appropriate in terms of doing satisfying relationships.  Therefore, it is 
important to highlight the discursive contexts in which psychological knowledges about 
relationship satisfaction and dissatisfaction have been produced; contexts which have 
privileged the couple relationship and individual personal choice and fulfilment. 
 
2.3 The rise of relationally satisfying, individual need-fulfilment: A brief history of 
how relationship satisfaction became an imperative 
 
2.3.1 From the Anglo-Saxons to the Sexual Revolution: Satisfying obligations 
Prior to the 17
th
 Century ‘intimate coupledom’ as it is currently understood did not exist 
in any meaningful way.  The Anglo-Saxons and early British tribes viewed marriage as 
a tool for strategic diplomacy, and means of building peaceful trading relationships.  By 
the 11
th
 Century, and with the increasing social differentiation of wealth, marriage 
became a means for parents to advance their own wealth and power by marrying their 
children into families of higher status. Daughters, who were seen as the property of their 
fathers, were sold into marriage to husbands whom their father thought suitable enough.  
By the late 16
th
 Century, religious institutions had begun to exercise increasing power 
over marriage, with the Catholic Church proclaiming marriage to be one of God’s seven 
sacraments (Coontz, 2005); one in which women were compelled before God to obey 
their husbands. These examples illustrate the dominance of patriarchy and the gendered 
inequalities that have run throughout the history of intimate heterosexual relationships 
and, many would argue, continue today (See Section 2.3.2).  Therefore, far from being a 
demonstration of freely chosen love and commitment between two individuals, for 
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much of history marriage was a combination of religious obligation and a parental 
concern of economic advancement.  ‘Relationship satisfaction’, if it was even 
considered by the individuals in the relationship, represented something drastically 
different to the contemporary focus on personal fulfilment.  Reflecting instead parental 
economic gain and enactment of religious dogma, and was likely experienced in terms 
of partners’ fulfilling their obligations to family and church.  
 
Once married, husbands and wives lived out their marriage in a communal physical 
space in front of family and acquaintances with, at most, a curtain of some kind dividing 
the ‘home’ space, and behind which they would engage in ‘private’ activities as ‘a 
couple’, including sexual activity.  It was only later, from the 17th century onwards, that 
a historically specific sense of the private ‘home’ laid the condition for couple intimacy 
and ideas of boundaries, seclusion, containment and security.  The ‘home’ became a 
particular thing, acquired ontological status and came into meaningful existence. It 
created a fundamental division between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’.  Privacy became 
privileged, and the seeds were sown for doing coupledom and intimate monogamy - 
which was understood as satisfying and secure - whilst other types of relating became 
equated with the ‘public’ realm.  This ever-increasing stratification of relational-life 
continued into the 19
th
 Century, whereby the discourses of marriage produced a 
‘sexualization of love’, which kept ‘meaningful’ sex in the home and between married 
partners (Seidman, 1991).  This was the site for satisfying relationships and sexual 
exclusivity became the marker of what made the couple-dyad ‘unique’ and ‘special’.   
 
With the rise of the industrial society from the 19
th
 Century onwards, the couple was 
seen as the foundation of the family and was understood as being the ideal social unit to 
meet the demands and requirements of modern industrial society.  Thus, the family - 
built upon a stable marriage - became the signifier for the moral health of society, and 
the lynchpin of civilisation, social order and cohesion (Weeks, 2007).  Marriage was 
privileged as the normal and essential space for ‘satisfying’ relating.  A space which, 
feminists subsequently argued, structured relationships, intimate life, and identities 
along heteronormative lines (Rich, 1985; Richardson, 1996), and privileged the interests 
of men and undermined women’s autonomy (Rosa, 1994; Robinson, 1997) (See section 
2.3.2 for further discussion).   
 
Chapter 2.  Literature Review of Relationship Satisfaction 
28 
 
In the wake of the social upheaval of World War II, from the 1940’s onwards new 
forms of relating began to emerge supposedly based on greater equality, choice and 
mutual satisfaction (Weeks, 2007).  The concept of the ‘companionate marriage’ based 
on greater equality and sharing had emerged as an ideal in the post-war years (Finch & 
Mansfiled, 1991), with some studies suggesting it reflected a broader egalitarian social 
progress within the context of intimate life (e.g. Bott, 1957; Rosser and Harris, 1965; 
Gorer, 1971; Young and Willmott, 1975, all as cited in Gillies, 2003).  Similarly, 
Hollway (1984) argued that from the post-war years onwards, there was a shift from the 
dominant ‘To have and to hold’ discourse, which privileged marriage and ‘respectable’ 
monogamy, to what she termed the ‘Permissive’ discourse, which normalised sexual 
liberation and free choice.  One of the most significant drivers of this ‘sexual revolution’ 
came about with the introduction of the pill in the 1970’s and the subsequent decoupling 
of sex and reproduction which, for the first time, gave women (and men) unprecedented 
control over their bodies and fertility (McLaren, 1999; Cook, 2005).   
 
In light of social changes such as these, the couple-relationship came to be constructed 
as a personal relationship (rather than a warranted social institution) in which there 
were higher expectations for satisfying, companionate interactions, and a recognition 
that satisfaction was not inherent, but had to be cultivated and sustained (e.g. Askham, 
1984).  Thus, the quality of relationships became a paramount concern for partners and 
theorists (Jamieson, 1999) and, overtime, a view of ‘the couple’ was fostered which 
privileged mutually fulfilling, satisfying relationships.  This was theorised as reflecting 
a shift in the Western social order towards a ‘reflexive modernity’ – driven by the 
process of post-industrialisation; in particular, the breakdown of traditional frameworks, 
and the individualisation of social life (Gillies, 2003).     
 
The processes of detraditionalisation, it was argued, gave rise to a diversity and plurality 
of social meanings which resulted in a constant shifting of the meanings and practices 
that produced intimate life.  As a result, it was argued that individuals were now 
compelled to engage in a conscious process of biographical construction, and to 
reflexively ‘create themselves’ through their daily choices and decisions (e.g. Giddens, 
1991; 1992; Weeks, 2007).  From this ‘transformative’ perspective, Giddens (1991) 
proposed that a new type of ‘pure relationship’ had emerged, supposedly based on  
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choice and equality, entered into for its own sake, contingent on partners’ experiencing 
sufficient satisfaction, and maintained through mutual self-disclosure.   
 
Generally speaking, the detraditionalisation thesis offered an optimistic view of the 
impact of social changes on intimate relationships and partners; seeing progress as 
having led to new possibilities for fulfilling relationships based on mutual satisfaction 
and trust, instead of contractual obligation.  For example, Plummer (1995) saw the 
potential for new forms of emancipation, and Weeks (2007) argued that we were seeing 
the growth of equality and respect in couple relationships, and acceptance of 
alternatives – a view of ‘confluent’ intimacy (e.g. Pahl, 2000; Giddens, 1991, 1992).  
Partners were positioned as ‘free’ to generate their own relationship rules with many 
forms of satisfying relationships being lived and expressed.  These perspectives 
constructed a satisfying ethic of self-determination in which partners’ choice, agency, 
and actively earned trust functioned as the cornerstones of satisfying relating.  However, 
the notion that satisfying relating had become a site of negotiation - contingent on 
partners’ self-direction was hotly debated, with many questioning the supposed 
satisfactions of equality and freedom posited by the contemporary notion of the choice 
relationship (e.g. Elliot and Lemert, 2006; Gillies, 2003).  These challenges arose on 
two broad fronts: the first was based on feminist theoretical works which drew attention 
to, and challenged, the supposed innate role of gender in intimate life, and the second 
challenge was based on a deconstruction of the commercial notions of ‘free choice’ 
which had come to permeate modern coupledom.  Each is discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
2.3.2 Enduring inequality – A pragmatic satisfaction of managing ingrained 
gender roles 
Against the background of the ‘sexual revolution’, feminist works began to emerge in 
the 1970s which re-theorised the normative dimensions of couple relationships, 
including what it meant to be satisfied, as forms of knowledge through which gendered 
power inequalities operated and persisted.  From this perspective, relationships and their 
associated satisfactions were understood as discursive practices; satisfying processes 
that partners did, rather than structures they were in (Finch and Mason, 1993; Morgan, 
1996; 1999), and these processes frequently pivoted around gendered roles and 
injunctions which empowered men over women (Jackson & Scott, 2004).  The 
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‘autonomous rational man’ and the ‘relational emotional woman’ were deconstructed as 
social prescriptions (rather than scientific descriptions of natural, innate tendencies), 
which were rooted in broader post industrial revolution economic assumptions about the 
roles of men and women in the workplace and the home (Hare-Mustin, 1978).  Thus, for 
feminists, concepts such as ‘relationship satisfaction’ were understood not as inevitable 
dyadic interactions shaped by partners’ gendered emotional and behavioural tendencies, 
but rather as representing socially ‘permitted’ (either implicitly or explicitly) ways of 
doing gender and satisfying relationships.  Feminists argued that discourses of female 
‘life success’ constructed heterosexual romance and coupledom as the principle goal for 
women (Greer, 2007), with the ‘summit’ of heterosexual coupledom and, in particular, 
marriage being the point where their stories ‘ended’ (Gilbert & Walker, 1999).  Such 
narratives afforded women limited agency or subjectivity outside of heterosexual 
coupledom, and therefore they were understood as ‘innately’ more relational13, in need 
of greater intimacy and closeness, and therefore in a paradoxical position of less power 
in terms of the communicating dyad.   
 
In challenging the democratisation thesis feminists questioned the extent to which 
traditions had been shed over time (Heelas et al., 1996), and argued that relationship 
satisfaction was still intertwined with traditional roles and values. For example, 
relationship satisfaction was theorised in the mainstream literature as intrinsically 
gendered.  Men and women were positioned as having different underlying needs and 
consequently driven by these needs to relate in pre-determined, gender-specific ways.  
These constructions continued to privilege and empower men because they presented 
women’s relationship satisfaction as depending on their partners’ behaviour to a greater 
extent than men’s satisfaction (which was constructed as more independent of their 
partners’ actions) (e.g. Kessler, Werner-Wilson, Cook & Berger, 2000).  Moreover, 
many feminists pointed to the continued significance placed on relational roles and 
obligations, and ingrained power relations and identities in prescriptions of satisfying 
relating (e.g. Gillies et al., 2001; Ribbens McCarthy et al., 2003).  For example, Jackson 
and Scott (2004) argued that whilst there may have been some shifts in the ways in 
which couples do heterosexuality, these shifts were by no means necessarily 
underpinned by egalitarianism or mutual self-disclosure.  Whilst the discourses of 
                                                 
13 This construction of women as innately more relational is repeatedly mobilised across the mainstream 
psychological literature and I will flag it, as and when it appears. 
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‘disclosing intimacy’ resonated publicly, they offered selective partial accounts, which 
masked the complexity and contradictions of couples’ lived experience of satisfying 
relationships. For example, Jamieson (1999) found little evidence of either 
individualisation or democratisation operating in satisfying relationships.  Rather, 
satisfaction appeared to rest on partners’ ability to negotiate the gendered division of 
relational labour (e.g. Robinson, 1997), and couples appeared to be mobilising a 
pragmatic relationship satisfaction far removed from the satisfaction of mutual self-
disclosure, choice and need fulfilment (see also Weeks et al., 2001).   
 
The discourses of democratisation constructed a private egalitarian satisfaction that was 
independent from broader social inequalities and constraints, and which obscured the 
significance of gendered power relations and the relationship between discursive 
structures and intersubjective dynamics.  From a feminist perspective the foundations of 
satisfying monogamous coupledom (exclusivity and possession) were understood as 
simultaneously impairing both partners’ individual autonomies, as well as depleting 
wider social relationships (e.g. Firestone, 1970) because the individualistic expectation 
of monogamous coupledom compelled partners to build their satisfying relationships 
around each other, with each individual representing ‘half-of-a-pair’.  In this way, 
feminists claimed that attention was drawn away from broader political and social 
struggles by a focus on privatised, monogamous coupledom because it had become the 
“yardstick by which we measure the rest of our emotions” (Comer, 1974, p.219).  This 
discursive privileging of the couple relationship led to a concomitant emphasis on 
partners making the ‘right’ choices in their intimate lives, yet this ‘free’ choice was 
challenged as an illusory upshot of broader processes of commercialisation that had 
permeated and produced contemporary intimate life. 
 
2.3.3 The illusion of choice?  A manipulated relationship satisfaction 
Whilst it was generally agreed that individuals had become less constrained in their 
choice than previous decades (Weeks, 2007), several theorists (e.g. Hawkes, 1996, 2004; 
Hochschild, 2003a, 2003b) argued that the satisfying ‘freedom to choose’ was an 
illusion; made possible through the opportunities opened up by new forms of 
consumption in late modernity.  Under neo-liberalism, individual autonomy and self-
responsibilisation were discursively theorised as forms of regulation, not freedom 
(Foucault, 1979; see also Weeks 2005), which morally compelled individuals to become 
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“entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping their own lives [and relationship satisfactions] 
through the choices they [made] among the forms of life available to them” (Rose, 1999, 
p230).  However, this “elaborate and sophisticated form of subjectivity / subjectification 
[did] not [...] lead to the abandonment of governance; rather it substitute[d] self-
governance as the principal form of social regulation” (Weeks, 2007, p.130).  Hence, 
the relationally satisfied subject was ‘forced to be free’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995; 
Rose, 1999; Smart and Neale, 1999), yet this autonomous isolation brought with it an 
anxiety about making the ‘right’ lifestyle choices.   
 
Relationship satisfaction represented something that partners had an individual moral 
right to receive and an individual moral duty to give.  In this way, as Foucault (1977) 
outlined in his account of ethical subjectivities, the satisfied subject was produced 
through their actions and this compelled modern partners to pay close attention to their 
own and each other’s performance as satisfying relational partners and legitimised them 
making demands of each other that would not be made in, for example, friendships 
(Jackson & Scott, 2004; Weeks, 2007).  Therefore, some theorists argued that, through 
the individualised ethic of self-interest and choice, late capitalism and its associated 
economic rationality had corrupted couple-relationships such that relationship 
satisfaction represented a ‘symptom’ of a self-obsessed consumer culture (Hawkes, 
1996; Hochschild, 2003a).  The authority of individualised choice had become 
‘internalised’ by the subject, sanctioning particular ways of being-satisfied and doing 
satisfying-relating.  Contemporary partners (and particularly women e.g. McNay, 2000) 
were simultaneously compelled to live their own lives, whilst also taking care of each 
other’s wellbeing, leading to conflicting satisfactions of autonomy and co-dependence – 
each supposedly vital to the individuals in a relationship.  Thus, satisfaction in modern 
coupledom was simultaneously produced by two ‘ideal’ narratives: the first being 
heterosexual romance, with its gendered practices, subject positions and power 
imbalances; and the second being one of non-gendered equality, and mutual reciprocity 
(Crawford, 2004).  Both narratives came to be reflected in the ‘type’ of relational 
research conducted by psychologists. 
 
2.3.4 The continuing privileging of relationship satisfaction 
Despite theoretical challenges such as those outlined in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, couple-
relationships remain the discursively privileged relational site (e.g. Perlman, 2007; 
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Weeks, 2007).  The pervading view in contemporary Western culture is that everyone 
wants to be, and should be, in a couple relationship (e.g. Choi and Bird, 2003), such that 
they represent the relationships that “matter most, to most people” (Hinde, 1997, 
p.XX
14
).  Commensurately, this privileging of the couple-dyad has privileged 
relationship satisfaction as a hetero-cultural imperative, and normative discourses 
maintain and reproduce central ‘satisfying’ values of individual free choice and mutual 
need fulfilment.  As a consequence, the success of relationships has increasingly been 
evaluated in terms of partners’ sense of personal fulfilment and emotional satisfaction, 
and their ability to manage intimacy to facilitate their ‘development’ as a couple and as 
two individuals (e.g. Cherline, 2004; Giddens, 1992).  Because relationship satisfaction 
came to be privileged as “an important, complex and multiple-determined aspect of 
intimate romantic relationships” (Meeks, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1998, p.768), 
identifying variables which predicted relationship satisfaction, and shaped inter-
subjective interactions for the better, became a longstanding goal of relationship 
researchers (Charania & Ickes, 2007; Lebow et al., 2012). 
 
2.4: The Psychological Quest to Define and Categorise Relationship Satisfaction 
and the Satisfied Subject 
During the 1960s and 70s, prevailing heteronormative models of the family and 
marriage focused on elucidating the governing norms of gendered roles and duties, and 
obligations of reciprocity (Gillies, 2003).  Such debates around the structure and 
function of marriage were underpinned by an implicit ideology that promoted and 
sanctioned certain ways of doing ‘satisfying’ relationships. However, in the 1980’s 
academic work shifted its focus away from relationship structures and functions, and 
turned to couples’ interpersonal interactions (Finch and Morgan, 1991) in order to 
theorise and understand relationship quality and satisfaction.  Relationship satisfaction 
was often used synonymously with other relational constructs e.g. relational or marital 
‘quality’ (Fincham & Bradbury, 1987), ‘adjustment’ (Long & Andrews, 1990), ‘well-
being’ (Acitelli, 1992), ‘functioning’ (Honeycutt & Godwin, 1986), or ‘success’ (Glenn, 
1990).  However, attempts were made in the literature to distinguish between the 
different terms.  For example, it was argued that whilst ‘adjustment’ referred to 
relationship behaviours, satisfaction referred to people’s subjective feelings about their 
                                                 
14
 Quote is taken from the Preface of Hinde (1997) in which the page numbers are in Roman numerals 
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relationship (Hendrick, 2004) and represented “a subjective evaluation by each 
relational partner of the quality, or happiness level, within an intimate relationship” 
(Erbert & and Duck, 1997, p. 194).    In this way relationship satisfaction became one of 
the most frequently researched topics in the field of close relationships (Fincham, Beach 
& Kemp Fincham, 1997) and was discursively privileged in the academic literature as 
“a central construct, both in the field of basic relationship research and in the marital 
treatment literature, serving as a cornerstone for […] understanding […] how 
relationships and marriages work” (Funk & Rogge, 2007, p.572).   
  
This new ‘science of relationships’ aimed to discover the ‘laws’ of intimate 
relationships and their inevitable consequences for better relationship functionality and 
intervention (e.g. Kelley et al, 1983; Berscheid, 1999), and this period saw a concurrent 
rise in the uptake of couple therapy.  Critical theorists such as Burns (2000) highlighted 
the economic power of such knowledges because, along with discourses of romanticism, 
they helped to sustain traditional, heteronormative relational structures (such as 
marriage) in which women stayed at home and worked for free.  The mainstream search 
for, and focus on, generalizable ‘laws’ led to a consensus that the best way to 
operationalise and gather data on relationship satisfaction was through self-report scales 
(Funk & Rogge, 2007); a psychometric approach that continues to dominate the 
mainstream literature today.  Most of the psychometric scales required participants to 
provide subjective evaluations of their relationships, with a typical item being:  “How 
satisfied are you with your relationship?”  However, a central and ongoing dispute arose, 
based on competing constructions of relationship satisfaction as an evaluation of the 
whole relationship versus an evaluation of specific aspects of the relationship.   
 
Those who favoured a conception of relationship satisfaction as an evaluation of 
specific components argued that global measures “did not provide much information 
beyond the fact that a couple is distressed” (Fowers, 1990, p.370) and could not lead 
researchers to the sources of satisfaction (Drigotas and Rusbult, 1992).  This theoretical 
approach had the most impact on the ways in which satisfaction came to be 
operationalised, and it underpins the three most widely used measures of relational 
satisfaction: the Dyadic-Adjustment Scale (DAS, Spanier, 1976); the Marital 
Adjustment Scale (MAT, Locke & Wallace, 1959); and the Marital Satisfaction 
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Inventory (MSI, Snyder, 1979)
15
.  In contrast, those who explicitly favoured a global 
conception of relationship satisfaction argued that it was “likely to represent the final 
common pathway through which marital maladjustment is expressed” (Fincham & 
Bradbury,1987a, p.800; Jacobson, 1985), and Crosby (1991) claimed that this view of 
marital satisfaction was the most ‘accurate’ and ‘useful’ from the perspective of clinical 
practice
16
.   
 
However, in spite of the specific-vs-global debate, the prevailing view in the 
mainstream literature was that the “psychometric foundation [was] reasonably solid” 
(Gottman & Levenson, 1984, p.71).  This was based on the fact that the scores on the 
different measures were highly intercorrelated, and differences in item content were 
statistically relatively unimportant (e.g., Heyman et al., 1994), with Gottman (1979) 
claiming that “different operations designed to measure marital satisfaction converge[d] 
and formed one dimension” (p.5).  This theoretical position was (and continues to be) 
underpinned by realist, essentialist assumptions which constructed ‘relationship 
satisfaction’ and the ‘satisfied subject’ as objects which could be defined, measured, and 
known through the process of experimental research.   
 
In particular relationship satisfaction tended to be treated as the dependent variable – a 
state or consequence of the relationship and on rarer occasions as the independent 
variable, usually as a way of assessing broader appraisals of life satisfaction (Glenn, 
1990).  Researchers generally attempted to determine the level of satisfaction at Time 1 
in relation to some other variable (Duck, 1994)
17
.  This meant that satisfaction was used 
                                                 
15 The Dyadic-Adjustment Scale (DAS, Spanier, 1976) has 32-items and became the most widely cited measure; 
designed to distinguish between married and divorced spouses, it was extensively used in the marital treatment 
literature (Christensen et al., 2004).  The second most used measure of relationship satisfaction was the 15-item MAT 
and, like the DAS, was developed to distinguish between ‘distressed’ and ‘well-adjusted’ relationships (Funk & 
Rogge, 2007), and the two scales had significant overlap with 12 items nearly identical.  Moving on, the MSI 
included 280 items (Fincham et al., 1997), but has been used far less than the other two measures.   
 
16 This viewpoint gave rise to measures such as the Quality of Marriage Index (QMI, Norton, 1983), the 7-item 
Relationship Assessment Scale (RAS, Hendrick, 1988) and the 3-item Kansas Marital Satisfaction Scale (KMS, 
Schumm et al., 1986).  However, these scales were used far less than the DAS and MAT.  In response to these 
‘difficulties’ in ‘objectively quantifying’ relationship satisfaction, Funk and Rogge (2007) conducted a detailed 
analysis of the eight most popular measures of relationship satisfaction and subsequently developed the Couples 
Satisfaction Index (CSI). 
 
17 Researchers incrementally included or excluded “variables” that might potentially influence satisfaction in close 
relationships (E.g. leisure activity patterns (Holman & Jacquart, 1988; Smith, Snyder, Trull, & Monsma, 1988), 
household division of labour (Benin & Agnostelli, 1988; Suitor, 1991; Yogev & Brett, 1985), family life and/or child 
care issues (Blair, 1993; Steinberg & Silverberg, 1987), employment and work related issues (Blair, 1993; Rotheram 
& Weiner, 1983; Vannoy & Philliber, 1992), and gender roles and expectations (Fowers, 1991; Langis, Sabourin, 
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as a focal point for understanding relational issues based on representations of 
interaction that projected a completely static characterisation onto the relationship (and 
partners) on the basis of one snap-shot measurement, and assumed that change over 
time could ultimately be predicted, traced, and generally understood (Duck, 1994).  
Furthermore, the individual psyche of respondents was seen as the source of behaviour 
and action in relational interaction, and therefore the satisfied subject of social 
psychology was seen to possess satisfaction.   
 
However, these assumptions failed to appreciate the ongoing and fluid relational nature 
of relating, and the fact that relational change might not necessarily follow stable or 
predictable patterns.  Psychological research has been dominated and arguably limited 
by a duality of self-other in which individual experience, or ‘personality’, is separate 
and distinct from social influence.  This position does not appreciate the ways in which 
communicative interaction between self and other creates conditions of relationship 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction (e.g. Shotter, 1989).  Partners make communicative 
choices based on their unique history together, but these choices serve to alter, and 
make possible or constrain, future interactions.  Therefore, as Baxter (1994, p.26) 
argued, the self is not a fixed unitary entity, but an ongoing “fluid process of becoming” 
in which dimensions of self are constructed and reconstructed through time.  What 
happens in a relationship is not owned by one person or the other, but is a product of the 
relational system which is constituted in and through discursive processes.  In particular, 
the broader socio-historical conditions in which the relationship is situated, and the 
everyday talk that occurs within the relational context (Duck, 1994; 2011).   
 
Thus, the knowledge that was supposedly revealed by psychometric scales was always, 
already located in a social reality that was determined by systems of thought that were 
culturally and historically specific (Gergen, 1978; Rose, 1990; Foucault, 1990; 
Danzinger, 1994; Richards, 1996).  The fact that the very term ‘satisfaction’ was 
typically used to classify the status of relationships in light of an ideal or standard, and 
to also scientifically categorise and differentiate satisfied or non-distressed couples 
(who were somehow ‘doing it right’) from dissatisfied or distressed couples (Erbert & 
                                                                                                                                               
Lussier, & Mathieu, 1994; Lye & Biblarz, 1991; Rotheram & Weiner, 1983), and therefore a very fragmented picture 
of what influenced satisfaction and dissatisfaction was presented.   
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Duck, 1997), meant that what was being looked for, and how results were interpreted, 
was not independent from the social order.  The whole research process, from the very 
beginning, was shaped by a-priori, hetero-romanticised beliefs, expectations, and 
practices, which pivoted around ideations of relationship satisfaction as integral to 
partners’ health and well-being (Finn, 2012, Fletcher, 2008).   
 
The psychological knowledges produced through this ‘top-down’ approach to 
understanding relationship satisfaction constructed relationship satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction as an either-or duality, which failed to appreciate their dynamic interplay, 
or how each fed into the other
18.  This dualistic construction privileged the ‘ideal’ 
relationship and ‘positivity’ as a relational goal (Duck and Erbert, 1997).  In this way, 
psychological systems of knowledge and power constituted, sustained and governed 
individuals at the level of the personal (Rose, 1996), and ethically compelled couples to 
function in a state of satisfied mutual fulfilment.  This governance came to operate 
through the dominant psychological theories of relationship satisfaction, because “all 
major relationship theories contribute […] by defining an overarching need or set of 
needs that motivate interpersonal behaviour” (VanderDrift & Agnew, 2012, p.229).  In 
particular, two theoretical strands now dominate mainstream psychological productions 
of relationship satisfaction: Attachment Theory and Interdependence Theory.  These 
psychological knowledges present different underlying needs, and produce two 
conflicting discursive constructions of relationship satisfaction: ‘A satisfaction of 
support and acceptance’ and ‘A satisfaction of economic utility’.  These are critically 
discussed in the following sections (2.5.1 and 2.5.2) of the chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Some researchers attempted to operationalise relationship satisfaction in such a way that dissatisfaction (or 
‘negative emotions and interactions’) was also given equal concern.  For example, Karney & Bradbury (1997) 
developed the 15-item Semantic Differential (SMD), which assessed satisfaction along 6-point scales between 
adjective pairs (e.g., good-bad, enjoyable-miserable).  Furthermore, Fincham et al., (1997) suggested that marital 
evaluations should be seen as involving two dimensions – Positive marital quality (PMQ) and Negative marital 
quality (NMQ).  Instead of a distressed vs non-distressed dichotomy of marital quality, this constructed a four-
category typology – Happy (High PMQ, low NMQ), Distressed (Low PMQ, High NMQ), Indifferent (low on both), 
and ambivalent (high on both).  They argued that this approach had links to previous research that had explored both 
positive and negative dimensions of relating (e.g. Rollins & Feldman, 1970; Gilford & Bengston, 1979l; Marini, 1976; 
Johnson, White, Edwards, and Booth, 1986), and which suggested that satisfaction and dissatisfaction in personal 
relationships were not polar opposites.  However, these approaches still rested upon the problematic assumptions that 
relationship satisfaction, and the satisfied subject could be measured and known. 
 
Chapter 2.  Literature Review of Relationship Satisfaction 
38 
 
2.5 The Dominant Theoretical Accounts of Relationship Satisfaction 
 
2.5.1  An Attachment Satisfaction of Support and Acceptance 
Attachment theory is one of the dominant approaches within the mainstream literature 
which attempts to explain how partners interact, how relationships function, and how 
this shapes relationship satisfaction.  Stemming from Bowlby’s 1930s psychodynamic 
research, our relational needs and experience of satisfaction, came to be theorised as 
being determined by the way in which we relate to our primary care giver (usually our 
mother) during infancy and childhood (Bowlby, 1969; 1978).  Bowlby theorised that 
children possess an evolved biological mechanism to seek proximity to their care giver 
in order to foster a sense of safety and security.  Care-giver availability and 
responsiveness were consequently seen to foster emotional stability in children, whilst 
separation was believed to promote delinquency.  For Bowlby, healthy mother-child 
attachment ensured the wellbeing and positive adjustment of both child and parent in a 
responsively affectionate, permanent and exclusive dyadic relationship, thereby 
producing a ‘potential danger’ in women’s shifting social roles at that time (Finn, 2012; 
Rose, 1996).  Once again, such knowledges functioned to reinforce traditional gender 
injunctions in which women’s social roles were defined in terms of their roles in dyadic 
relationships i.e. as ‘housewife’ and ‘mother’.   
 
Underlying Bowlby’s approach were the theoretical constructs of the safe haven and the 
secure base.  ‘Good’ mothering was understood as providing a ‘safe haven’ of comfort 
and support in the face of potential threat, and also acting as a ‘secure base’ from which 
to go out and explore the world, safe in the knowledge that one could return to this 
location of stability and certainty when necessary.  Bowlby theorised that the extent to 
which individuals’ needs for security and comfort were met during infancy shaped their 
“internal working models” of attachment relationships.  These models contained beliefs 
about the self and others: whether or not the self was worthy of care and attention, and 
whether or not others were responsive and emotionally available when needed.  Once 
formed, it was argued that these working models were relatively stable, operated 
automatically and unconsciously (Shaver, Collins & Clark, 1996; Collins & Read, 
1994), and continued to influence how individuals expressed and regulated their 
relationships into and throughout adulthood (Bowlby, 1988; Bretherton, 1985, 1987).   
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Bowlby’s project for a psychology of attachment was based on the model of the natural 
sciences, which continued what Toulmin and Leary (1985) called the “cult of 
empiricism”.  Underpinned by positivistic presuppositions, it sought to provide a 
‘universal’ explanation of an ahistorical psychologised subjectivity.  Following this line 
of reason, in 1978, Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall proposed that there were three 
types of ‘attachment style’ – ‘secure’, ‘insecure avoidant’ and ‘insecure ambivalent’.  In 
1987, Hazan and Shaver published (what would become) a seminal paper in which they 
conceptualised romantic love as an attachment process, and this cemented the role of 
attachment theory in the literature on close relationships.  This work was extended by 
Bartholomew & Horowitz in 1991 who made the distinction between four adult 
attachment styles: ‘secure’, ‘fearful’, ‘preoccupied’, and ‘dismissing’.  Each 
conceptualised via individual differences along two underlying dimensions: anxiety and 
avoidance (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991, Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998; Crowell, 
Fraley, & Shaver, 1999; Fraley & Waller, 1998).  Again, these dimensions were 
understood in terms of individuals’ ‘cognitive’ working-models-of-self and working-
models-of-others-respectively.  Thus, over time, ‘attachment theory’ and its associated 
typologies of ‘attachment styles’ was extended from the mother-child dyad to 
encompass ‘affectional bonds’ in all close relationships.   
 
This laid the discursive grounds for a ‘satisfying’ diagnostic categorisation of the 
relational subject according to their cognitive attachment architecture; one in which a 
‘secure psychology’ was clearly privileged as the foundation of ‘satisfying’ relating 
(e.g., Banse, 2004; Shaver & Hazan, 1993, Collins & Read, 1990; Brennan & Shaver, 
1995; Hammond & Fletcher, 1991; Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994; Pistole, 1989), because 
‘secure individuals’ were positioned as possessing “the general characteristics and 
interpersonal skills necessary for the development and maintenance of intimate 
relationships with others” (Collins & Feeney, 2004, p.174)19.  Simultaneously and in 
contrast, attachment discourse also produced a dissatisfied and dissatisfying ‘insecure’ 
subject who perceived others as unreliable, inconsistent, and non-committal, and was 
therefore either ambivalent towards others, or pre-occupied by anxious thoughts of 
abandonment and being unloved (e.g. Bartholomew, 1990; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 
1991; Collins & Read, 1990; Feeney, J. A., & Noller, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987).  
                                                 
19 I argue that this dominant production of the satisfied subject possessing a satisfying cognitive architecture and 
associated satisfying relational skills is mobilised repeatedly throughout the psychological literature. 
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These knowledges exemplified Foucault’s normalising process in action, and in this 
way the ‘insecure’ subject was made to be a ‘pathological subject’, whose capacity to 
cause relationship dissatisfaction was greater even than the ‘secure’ subject’s capacity 
to cause satisfaction (Feeney, 2002).   
 
However, this construction contained within it a paradoxical, contradicted satisfied 
subjectivity.  On the one hand, an individual’s capacity to experience relationship 
satisfaction was represented in terms of their intra-psychic, innate, and relatively stable 
attachment style.  Yet at the same time the subject was also positioned in-relation to 
others, and this produced a malleable ‘attached subjectivity’, which could be shaped by 
the attachment style and behaviours of the relational partner (e.g. Kane, Jaremka, 
Guichard, Ford, Collins, & Feeney, 2007).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the relationally-
secure partner was positioned as a source of satisfaction for their partner because they 
were represented as being skilled at interpreting nonverbal behaviours and feelings 
(Noller & Feeney, J.A., 1994) and being more sensitive and responsive to needs, whilst 
avoiding engaging in excessive care or displaying negativity (e.g. Collins & Feeney, 
B.C., 2000; Feeney, J.A., 1996; Kunce & Shaver, 1994).  Again, this remobilised the 
dominant construction of satisfaction as need fulfilment attained through ‘positive’ 
interaction.  In contrast, the ‘insecure partner’ was positioned as a source of reduced 
satisfaction for their partner, and this was frequently along gendered lines.  For example, 
being in a relationship with an ‘insecure partner’ was constructed as more detrimental to 
women’s satisfaction than men’s (Frazier, Byer, Fischer, Wright, and DeBord, 1996; 
Collins et al.; 2002), although other researchers presented the opposite pattern (e.g. 
Banse, 2004; Feeney 1994; Collins & Read, 1990; Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994).  Thus 
‘attachment styles’ theorised relationally-satisfied subjectivity in an abstract 
decontextualised timeless space wherein the relational-subject was constant, self-
contained, unified (Morawski, 1994), and independent from social or historical 
circumstances and always-already problematised. 
 
However, instead of seeing the core attachment concepts of the safe haven, secure base 
and internal working models as natural components of relating, I argue that they are 
products of already dominant discourses constructing satisfying childhood and 
parenting as sites of stability and certainty.  Thus, the discourse of attachment did not 
unproblematically describe relationships and relationship satisfactions, but rather 
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actively prescribed them and the nature of psychological and relational dissatisfactions.  
Cleary (1999) argued that in light of the Western ‘cult of individualism’, “attachment 
theory strikes an intuitively solid note with us in that it reflects back to us our own 
cultural assumptions about the nature of the psyche” (p.34).  In this way, through its 
extension to all close relationships and the elucidation of ‘attachment styles’, doing the 
affectional bond ‘correctly’ became an effective form of governance, not only for 
mothers, but for everyone (Rose, 1990).  (Due to word count restrictions, please see 
Appendix C for further discussion). 
 
However, research has brought into question the ‘inevitable’ need for secure attachment 
with individuals’ self-classifying themselves across ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’ types 
(Brennan, Clark & Shaver, 1998; Feeney, 1999).  For example, Finn (2012, p.612) has 
argued that this “erraticism” in attachment styles “can be seen as a function of the 
cultural division between the private and public subjectivities of modernity that involves 
both autonomy and dependence” which gives rise to competing standards for attaining 
self and relational satisfactions (see also Cancian, 1987; Giddens, 1992; Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 1995).  So, individuals must fulfil their own needs in order to be satisfied, 
yet this can only be achieved in relation to another in an ongoing dialectical process of 
negotiation and compromise.   This tension between satisfactions of the ‘self’ versus 
satisfactions of the ‘relational’ emerges to a greater extent in the second dominant 
construction of relationship satisfaction, which is informed by a social exchange 
theoretical perspective of cost-benefit analysis: ‘relationship satisfaction as economic 
utility’. 
 
2.5.2 A Satisfaction of Economic Utility and Investment 
In the late 1950s, American social psychologists developed an interactional perspective 
to account for and explain marital longevity which, given the perceived social ‘threats’ 
of ‘free love’ and the increasing divorce rate of the early 1960’s, had become an issue of 
heightened political and socio-economic importance (Finn, 2012).  Having noticed that 
unhappy relationships often endured, researchers turned towards the new paradigm of 
Interdependence Theory, which theorised partners’ inter-subjective interactions as 
pivoting around their perceived costs and benefits; an economic discourse that is now 
highly prevalent in the West (e.g. Burr, 2003; Willig & dew Valor, 1999, as cited in 
Smtih, 2008).  Rather than the unconscious, emotional satisfactions of support and 
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acceptance made possible by relational ‘safe havens’, researchers turned to the 
conscious satisfactions of economic utility and cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Today, Interdependence Theory has become the most prominent theoretical perspective 
in the psychology of close relationships and, along with attachment theory, strongly 
influences the practice of couple therapy (Johnson & Lebow, 2000) (See Section 2.7.1 
and 2.7.2).  It has been argued that this dominance was facilitated by “the emergent neo-
liberal political emphasis on economic and personal freedoms that [were] to be attained 
by individual autonomy, enterprise and choice” (Finn, 2012, p.613).  Interdependence 
Theory stemmed from Social Exchange Theories (SET), which drew on evolutionary 
theory
20
 to argue that the exchange of rewards and punishments underpinned all social 
interactions.  Kelley (1983) proposed that for a relationship to remain satisfying, the 
perceived overall benefits obtained from being in the relationship needed to consistently 
outweigh any associated costs for both partners, relative to their internal expectations 
and also their available alternatives (conceptualised as the ‘comparison level’) (Rusbult, 
Arriaga, and Agnew, 2001), although some have argued that ‘actual’ outcomes were 
always stronger predictors of relationship satisfaction than outcomes relative to 
comparison levels (e.g. Dainton, 2000; Morrow & O’Sullivan, 1998; Rusbult, Johnson, 
& Morrow, 1986; Ruvolo & Veroff, 1997; Sternberg & Barnes, 1985).  Regardless, the 
focus of satisfaction remained on a cost-benefit analysis of relational outcomes. (Due to 
word count restrictions, please see Appendix D for further discussion). 
 
This conceptual move away from the internal working models of attachment theory to a 
focus on conscious, rational, economic exchange, opened a discursive space in which 
partners’ commitment (measured as a conscious decision to stay together) could form 
the basis from which to assess and manage, or ‘work at’, their relationship satisfaction 
by employing the maintenance behaviours outlined by psychological ‘experts’ (See 
sections 2.6 and 2.7).  However, there was a tension in this notion of the committed 
potentially-satisfied subject, free to assess and choose, yet still compelled to pursue 
                                                 
20 From an evolutionary psychological perspective, intimate partners were constructed as having an innate biological 
need to pass on their genes, and consequently they also had a need to feel certain of their partner’s fidelity (for men to 
ensure paternity, and for women to ensure the provision of resources) (e.g. Shackleford and Buss, 1997).  As such, 
individuals were ‘hard-wired’ by evolution to constantly monitor and evaluate the reproductive costs and benefits of 
their relationship.  Thus, from this theoretical perspective, relationship satisfaction came to be understood as a 
‘warning system’, whereby being dissatisfied suggested that individuals were at risk of incurring reproductive costs 
within the context of their relationship (Shackelford & Buss, 1997).   
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culturally-sanctioned relational conduct (Finn & Malson, 2008; Finn, 2012, Lawes, 
1999).  The satisfied-subject, in the process of ‘working at’ their relationship, was 
positioned as serving autonomous, self-interest, whilst simultaneously occupying a 
position of doing co-dependency and unconditional care. 
 
It has been suggested that this tension led to the rise of ‘cool’ emotional strategies 
(Heath and Potter, 2005) because contemporary partners felt easily disposable, 
simultaneously eager to relate and yearning for a connection, but wary and cautious of 
being related to (Elliot and Lemert, 2006).  Hochschild (2003a,b) argued that this 
‘commercialising’ of all intimate life impeded altruistic and caring tendencies, set back 
the early feminist hope for a more equal society, and that the individualism which 
characterised modern relationships was leading to the dissolution of the human bond: 
 
“The commercial spirit of intimate life is made up of images that prepare the way for a 
paradigm of distrust. […] The heroic acts a self can perform, in this view, are to detach, 
to leave, and to depend on and need others less. […] The ideal self doesn’t need much, 
and what it does need it can get for itself. Added to the idea of a curtailed “me” is the 
idea of a curtailed “you”. So a no-needs me relates to a no-needs you, and a paradigm of 
caution is stationed between us” (p. 24) 
 
This presented a striking counterpoint to the attachment oriented view of relationship 
satisfaction as mutual fulfilment of acceptance and support.  Private life was constituted 
as both a source of comfort and pleasures, but also a region for emotional isolation, with 
the modern ‘satisfied’ subject simultaneously positioned as achieving satisfaction and 
need fulfilment through relating, whilst also compelled to remain distant and isolated; 
the self-satisfying, autonomous individual.  Thus, the dominance of social exchange 
theory and attachment theory discursively produced a conflicted satisfied-subject who 
was compelled by conflicting obligations towards self and other.  The two discursive 
frameworks, however, converged in the way in which they both produced a satisfied-
subject who was morally obliged to be aware of, and fulfil, their partner’s innate needs.  
Thus, psychological notions of what it meant to trust one’s partner and be trusted by 
them became paramount in mainstream constructions of relationship satisfaction 
(Charania & Ickes, 2007, Wieselquist et al., 1999), and this shall be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
 
Chapter 2.  Literature Review of Relationship Satisfaction 
44 
 
2.5.3 The trusting, satisfied subject 
Originating from exchange theories, ‘trust’ (like satisfaction) was conceptualised in 
psychology as a measurable attitude or disposition of the individual (e.g. 1980; Rempel, 
Holmes & Zanna, 1985; Boon, 1994), and the following essential components of trust 
were theorised: 
 
“(1) predictability, or belief that the partner’s behaviour is consistent; (2) dependability, 
or belief that the partner can be counted on to be honest and reliable; and (3) faith, or 
conviction that the partner is intrinsically motivated to be caring – belief that the 
partner’s motives go beyond instrumental bases for benevolence” (Rusbult, Arriaga, and 
Agnew, 2001, p.376) 
 
Conceptualised in this way, satisfied partners were constructed as knowing they could 
rely on each other to consistently and predictably meet each other’s needs, and engage 
in pro-relationship acts (Holmes & Rempel, 1989).  Congruent with this, research 
presented trust as being associated with satisfaction via open communication and the 
voicing of needs (Holmes & Rempell, 1989; Rusbult & Zembrodt, 1983) and promoted, 
and was promoted by, self-disclosure and the development of intimacy (Reis & Shaver, 
1988).  In Foucauldian terms, the dyadic trust that was necessary for a satisfying 
monogamous relationship operated as a policing technology.  Both partners were aware 
of and had trust in (if only implicitly) their own and each other’s moral obligation to 
consistently work towards mutual need fulfilment.  Thus, individuals’ knowledge of the 
trust that their partners had in them functioned as a form of self-surveillance (Foucault, 
1986, 1990) and warranted the enactment of appropriate, satisfying inter-subjective 
behaviours.  Therefore the accepted, dominant psychological knowledges served as 
forms of governance, and produced normative standards, which occluded other 
possibilities (e.g. Wetherell, 1995; Rose, 1990; Hollway, 1989) and produced the 
satisfied-subject who was compelled to be relationally skilled, whilst the unskilled 
subject was at risk of doing dissatisfying relating.   
 
Conceptualising interpersonal skills deficits as potential risk factors became well 
established in the mainstream psychological literature (Lawrence et al., 2008), because 
“partners often differ[ed] in their willingness and ability to support one another’s needs 
and to provide the type of support that promote[d] one another’s welfare and 
relationship satisfaction” (Kane, Jaremka, Guichard, Ford, Collins & Feeney, 2007, 
p.536).  This ‘difference’ in partner’s ‘willingness’ or ‘ability’ to perform relational 
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skills vis-à-vis need fulfilment provided the discursive conditions of possibility for 
relational subjects to be positioned as satisfied or dissatisfied.  The emphasis on 
relational skills was exemplified by Lawrence et al., (2008) who reviewed the literature 
on close relationships across multiple disciplines (including social and clinical 
psychology, family studies, sociology, and communication studies) and identified five 
types of dyadic behaviour that were theorised as producing long-term marital 
satisfaction: Emotional closeness and intimacy; Interspousal support; Communication 
and conflict management; Sensuality and sexuality; and Decision making and relational 
control (due to word count restrictions, please see Appendix E for a detailed review of 
the literature that enables these five categories).  
 
2.6 Mastering the satisfying relational skills – the turn to therapy 
Taken together, the psychologisation of relationally satisfying skills privileged ‘positive’ 
dyadic interactions characterised by psychological notions of closeness, intimacy and 
mutual knowing, and have come to reflect the ‘transformative’ position outlined in 
Section 2.3.1.  The ‘ideal’ satisfying couple relationship has been constructed as 
characterised by equality, reciprocity and ‘free choice’ (Allan, 2008; Cherlin, 2004; 
Giddens, 1992; Weeks, 2013).  Relationships are understood as being entered into for 
what they can bring to both individuals and pivot around mutual self-disclosure, 
openness, trust and equality, and a willingness to negotiate with each other.  However, 
once the ideal relationship became privileged, ‘positive’ satisfying interaction became 
teleologically important (Erbert & Duck, 1997), and constructions of relationship 
satisfaction were based on a rigid premise of closeness, bonding, and togetherness, as 
opposed to an ongoing process that also involved negativity, conflict, and 
dissatisfaction
21
.  However, if the basic ideological foundations of each partner in an 
intimate relationship were predicated on the ideal relationship, then attaining that ideal 
became an impossible task because it was inevitable that tensions and contradictions 
                                                 
21 Researchers such as Gottman (1993) recognised the need for ‘negative’ interactions between couples, but, again, 
this constructed partners’ interactions in terms of simple, positive-negative, either/or dualities, and missed the 
complexity and dynamic interplay of relating.  Notions of what it means to have satisfying relationships are 
constructed and reconstructed through the ongoing dialogue with others – a process, that requires both unity and 
division, agreement and opposition (Erbert & Duck, 1997).   
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would emerge between what Rawlins (1983) has described as the dialectic of the ideal 
and the real
22
.     
 
Thus, Rose (1990) argued that the psychologisation of intimate life has produced a 
neuroticisation of social intercourse, whereby individuals’ interpersonal relationships 
constituted key functional elements in their personal happiness and social efficacy, such 
that all manner of social problems (whether frustration in the home or workplace, or 
dissatisfaction with a partner) came to be understood as caused by an inability to relate 
effectively to others.  However, help was at hand via professional technologies, which 
constructed psychological ‘defects’ and ‘inabilities’ as ‘treatable’ if individuals acquired 
the knowledge and skills that were made available through psychology and its 
associated practises of psychotherapy.  As Hillman (1975) argued, whilst the ancients 
turned to mythology, we turned to the ‘psy-technologies’ of psychotherapy and 
psychiatry (Rose, 1990), which function as expert authorising technologies that 
normalise the satisfied subject and the practices of the satisfying relationship.   
 
2.7: Couple Therapy: Recycling the Confessional Satisfaction of Mutual 
Understanding & Acceptance 
Couple therapy
23
 has steadily grown in recognition and acceptance over the last 30 
years (Christensen, Baucom, Atkins & Yi, 2010), yet it still remains a stigmatised 
practice for the ‘pathologised couple’.  Lebow et al. (2012) claim that many couples 
who would benefit from therapy do not seek it out (see also Markman & Rhoades, 
2012), whilst of those who do, many frequently do not engage with it for a beneficial 
length of time
24
.  In spite of this, couples who find themselves experiencing relationship 
problems increasingly refer themselves for couple-therapy to address dissatisfying 
relationships (e.g., Crowe & Ridley, 2008; Lebow et al., 2012).  This is reflected in the 
fact that, in Britain alone, Relate (commonly regarded as established experts of intimate 
                                                 
22 This dialectic referred to the tension that friends experienced when trying to manage the opposing forces of the 
cultural expectations and ideals of ‘friendships’ and the ‘actual reality’ of those relationships.  I argue that the same 
dialectical tension operates in productions of intimate coupledom too. 
23 The term ‘couple therapy’ replaced the more limiting, and historically located ‘marital therapy’ during the Family 
Therapy Movement, although the two are often used interchangeably in the therapy literature. 
 
24 In particular, research has suggested that husbands are more reticent to engage in therapy, but when they do, their 
levels of satisfaction increase faster than their wives’ (Doss, Atkins, & Christensen, 2003).  Thus, men’s engagement 
in the therapeutic process is presented as the strongest predictor of therapeutic success, because women are positioned 
as being prepared to engage more readily with all forms of therapy (Lebow et al., 2012; see also Knobloch-Fedders et 
al., 2004).  
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and close relationships) provide over 220,000 hours of couple therapy to over 150,000 
people a year, and current dominant discourses present Couple Therapy as a technology 
that ‘quantifiably works’25.       
 
Gurman & Fraenkel (2002, p199) stated that couple therapy was “long on history, but 
short on tradition”.  From the 1930s to the early 1960s, clergy or social workers 
provided atheoretical instruction on how to make marriage work (Broderick & Schrader, 
1981), emphasising couples’ legal and social obligations, along with the ‘inherent 
values’ of family life.  Thus, relationship satisfaction was understood in terms of 
partners’ moral obligations to family, church, and state (See also Section 2.2.2).  
‘Therapy’ was short-term, explicitly prescriptive, and rarely conducted with both 
partners present.  In fact, it was not until the end of the 1960s that seeing the couple 
together became the preferred format (Olson, 1970) signalling the recognition (at least 
implicitly) that relationship satisfaction involved intersubjective processes that could be 
perceived and experienced by each partner in different ways.   
 
By the mid 1960’s psychoanalysis and psychodynamic approaches had been adopted, 
and the therapist-as-rational-expert searched for the relational “truth” by deciphering 
partners’ irrational perceptions.  Here, relationship dissatisfactions were constructed in 
terms of repressed un-articulated desires.  This positioned and empowered the therapist 
as the key agent of change, with no recognition of the potential for couple-led 
progression (Dicks, 2011).  However, Psychoanalytic couple therapy was soon 
overtaken by the rise of the Family Therapy Movement (Gurman & Fraenkel, 2002), 
and the work of family therapists dominated relational therapy until the mid-1980s 
when ‘couple therapy’ as a distinct entity began to re-assert itself through new 
therapeutic practices.  
 
2.7.1 The Satisfying Social Exchange Practice of Integrative Behavioural Couple 
Therapy 
By the mid-1980s couple therapy established itself with the emergence of Behavioural 
Marital Therapy (BMT) (Jacobson & Margolin, 1979; Jacobson & Martin, 1976), which 
                                                 
25 For example, Shadish and Baldwin (2003) produced a meta-analysis of six earlier meta-analyses, and reported an 
effect size of 0.84 for couple therapy – this presented a couple receiving therapy as having ‘better’ outcomes than 84% 
of couples not receiving therapy.   
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compelled partners to explicitly identify and enact satisfying behaviour changes 
according to structured agreements (Halford, 1998).  Supposedly based on Jackson’s 
(1965) concept of the martial ‘quid-pro-quo’, which emphasised the need for partners to 
acknowledge the (unarticulated) ‘ground rules’ within their relationship, BMT actually 
represented a fundamental misconception of the concept as an equitable economic 
exchange (Gurman & Knudson, 1978; Segraves, 1982; Gurman & Fraenkel, 2002).  
Thus, BMT produced a relationship satisfaction of economic utility, which mirrored 
broader theoretical developments in Social Exchange Theory.   
 
The satisfying practices and regimens prescribed by BMT also privileged ‘positive’ 
interactions, and focussed on ‘improving’ partners’ inter-subjective skills, because 
unresolved conflict discursively signified relationship dissatisfaction.  Hence, the 
therapist’s authorising role was to teach satisfying communication and problem-solving 
skills.  Later, BMT introduced a disciplinary ‘self-regulation phase’ (Halford, Sanders, 
& Behrens, 1994) in which individuals were compelled to reflect on and alter their own 
behaviour to be in line with what was deemed ‘normal’ mutually satisfying behaviour; a 
self-policing practice made all the more potent by its representation as a form of 
personal ‘empowerment’.  However, the focus of BMT remained on couples developing 
better communication and problem solving strategies as the underlying mechanisms for 
any therapeutic successes (e.g. Shadish & Baldwin, 2005).  As it evolved, BMT came to 
resemble Integrative Behavioural Couple Therapy (IBCT) (Christensen et al., 1995; 
Jacobson & Christensen, 1996; Christensen & Jacobson, 2000); a “third wave” 
behavioural approach, which went beyond the typical cognitive-behavioural strategies, 
and emphasised partners’ mutual private emotions, mindfulness and acceptance.  Today, 
IBCT is one of the dominant forms of couple therapy, and it is constructed as a 
satisfying practice via its capacity to improve communication, change behaviour around 
target problems, and promote acceptance of target problems (e.g. Doss, Thum, Sevier, 
Atkins, and Christensen, 2005; Sevier et al., 2008).  However, it is a practice which 
does not question the conditions of possibility through which relational ‘problems’ are 
rendered thinkable and knowable, and therefore sustains dominant constructions of what 
it means to be in, and do, satisfying relationships.  This recycling of psychological 
knowledges that construct relationship satisfaction is also evident in the other dominant 
form of couple therapy: the humanistic, Emotion Focussed Therapy. 
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2.7.2 The Satisfying Attachment Practice of Emotion Focussed Therapy  
At the same time that BMT was emerging (based on social exchange), the rise of 
attachment theory also lead to the development of Emotion Focussed Therapy 
(Greenberg & Johnson, 1986, 1988; Johnson, 1986, 1996; Johnson & Greenberg, 1995).  
Taking an attachment perspective towards adult relationships (e.g. Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2007), EFT constructed therapeutic success in terms of partners’ abilities to express 
their attachment needs and be more responsive to each other’s needs (Johnson & 
Zuccarini, 2010).   
 
Furthermore, EFT drew on humanistic concepts that valued emotion as a vehicle of 
change and ‘self-actualisation’.  These assumptions owed much to the work of Satir 
(1978 as cited in Gurman and Fraenkel) whose work on partners’ psychological health 
had theorised relational dissatisfaction as the result of restricted intimacy and individual 
growth.  Thus, underpinned by humanistic assumptions of attachment, EFT recycled the 
satisfaction of mutual support and acceptance.  From this perspective, treating relational 
distress required the therapist to help partners access and express unacknowledged 
feelings and mutually accept each other’s relational needs and emotional experience 
(Johnson, 1999).  The therapist functioned rather like a confessor, and represented a 
model of ‘good’ communication, highlighting unspoken relational rules and fostering 
emotional expression.   
 
This focus on partners’ cognitive capacities to relate in a satisfying intimate way was 
also explored by Murray Bowen whose constructs and terminology came to pervade the 
modern practice of multi-generational therapy more than any other theoretical approach 
(Gurman and Fraenkel, 2002).  Bowen believed that all psychological problems had 
relational causes, and introduced the concept of differentiation within self and from 
others, with the former a prerequisite for the latter.  Poor differentiation was theorised as 
leading to defensiveness, discounting of one’s partner, and conflict whilst adequate 
differentiation allowed simultaneous autonomy (via self-validation) and intimacy in 
both the ‘relational’ (Schnarch, 1991) and ‘sexual’ realms (Lobitz & Lobitz, 1996). 
From this perspective the therapist functioned as a detached ‘coach’ and their focus was 
on elucidating the facets of each partner’s inner ‘self’ that prevented them from intimate 
relating; a mode of satisfying subjectification that still privileged the practice of mutual 
intimacy.  Thus, a fixed and knowable ‘satisfied’ subject was produced and rendered 
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governable through the internalisation of the practices of intimacy, which compelled 
partners to be ‘open’ and ‘honest’.  In this way, the institution of therapy left no space 
for ‘silence’ in the satisfied relationship. 
 
Today, EFT research still produces a satisfaction of interpersonal skills, and warrants 
emotional self-disclosure as the underlying satisfying regime, with the implication that 
couples who reveal vulnerable emotions to each other in therapy improve significantly 
on measures of relationship satisfaction (Meneses and Greenberg, 2011).  This 
privileging of ‘emotional expression’ as the route to relationship satisfaction is also 
evident in other less widely practiced therapies (e.g Coping Oriented Couples Therapy), 
which teach partners to self-disclose concerns, provide reciprocal support, and refine 
this via mutual feedback (Bodenmann et al., 2008).  However, this focus on emotional 
expression was to be challenged by other theorists who focussed on the role of power 
dynamics in producing the dissatisfied subject. 
 
2.7.3 The Therapeutic Acknowledgment of the Role of Power in Relationship 
Satisfaction 
Theorists had focused on the role of ‘traditional’ (not productive) power and control in 
producing dissatisfied couples (e.g. Haley, 1964), and problems were understood to 
arise when a couple’s localised power structures were too rigid or not explicit enough.  
However, it was also believed that the manifest ‘problems’ actually served functions 
within the dyad, and therefore resistance to change was inevitable.  From this 
perspective, planned, pragmatic present-focussed interventions were designed to 
facilitate partners’ acknowledgment and articulation of power structures in order to 
disrupt their problematic behaviour (Gurman and Fraenkel, 2002).  Whilst this work 
saw an explicit acknowledgment of the impact of power in relationships, inequality was 
still understood as localised; a property of the dissatisfied couple that was under their 
‘control’ and could potentially be changed for the better.  However, the focus on 
relational power and control was to come to the forefront of several theoretical and 
therapeutic movements which were to highlight the inherent social-embeddedness of 
power inequalities in all relationships, and also in the practices of couple therapy.  
These theoretical movements included feminism and multiculturalism and are discussed 
in the following section. 
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2.7.4 Power, Feminism & Multiculturalism Challenges to Couple Therapy 
From the late 1970s to mid-1980s, the fundamental assumptions of couple and family 
therapy were challenged on several theoretical fronts.  Feminist therapists outlined how 
satisfying relationships were enacted and understood according to historically and 
culturally embedded beliefs concerning who, and what, men and women should be and 
do.  In this way, gender was inextricably tied up with power (defined in terms of 
oppression, not production), and delineated individuals’ capacities for action and 
subjective experience (e.g. Goldner; 1985a,b, 1988; Hare-Mustin, 1978, 1987; James & 
McIntyre, 1983, 1989; James & MacKinnon, 1990; Avis, 1988, 1989; Libow, Raskin, & 
Caust, 1982l; Walters, Carter, Papp, & Silverstein, 1988).  Thus, the two partners were 
likely to have systematically different experiences of their relationship due to prescribed 
relational expectations and differential access to power (Walters et al., 1988).   In terms 
of the therapeutic process, feminists demonstrated that it was frequently guided by 
normative gendered assumptions.  For example, the ‘paternalistic’ hierarchical position 
of the therapist and the un/intended reinforcement of gendered roles as a solution to 
relational problems (Hare-Mustin, 1978).  Furthermore, Goldner (1985b) referred to 
women’s paradoxical position in couple therapy because they were positioned as 
responsible for both the emotional monitoring and management of the couple.  Women 
were seen as the initiator of therapy as well as the nurturer of their partner’s continued 
therapeutic engagement.   
 
Along with the emergence of feminist theory, multiculturalism also highlighted the 
impact of both partners’ race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, social class, and age 
etc. in producing normative prescriptions about how they should do satisfying, intimate 
relationships.  Furthermore, depending on how these ‘characteristics’ were valued (i.e. 
privileged or oppressed) within the broader social context, they positioned and shaped 
the subjective experience of individuals in different ways.  Thus, theorists (e.g. Falicov, 
1995) argued that it was important for the therapeutic practice to take account of these 
contextual features, and this might involve the couple taking the role of ‘experts’ to 
inform the therapist about their specific cultural context, thereby destabilising the 
authorising power of the therapist-as-expert. 
 
The emergence of these critical works highlighted the way in which relational theories 
and therapeutic practices did not inherently emerge from relationships, but were 
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constructed, and that this construction took place within a broader political, economic, 
and moral context (Goldner, 1985; Hare-mustin, 1978; Walters et al., 1988).   Thus, 
feminist and multicultural theories challenged therapists to acknowledge the impact of 
broader social forces on the couple by calling into question the ‘essential’ nature of 
‘demographic traits’ such as ‘gender’, ‘race’, and ‘social class’, and also the 
psychological constructs such as ‘attachment styles’ and ‘intimacy’.  Instead, these 
constructs were shown to be historically and culturally located, and productive of 
individuals and relationship satisfaction (rather than descriptive of some underlying 
characteristics), and laid bare the crucial role of couple therapy in either recycling or 
challenging these taken-for-granted productions.   
 
Over the past few decades this type of critical research has impacted significantly on the 
practice of couple and family therapy (e.g. Watzlawick, 1984; Anderson & Goolishian, 
1988; Hoffman, 1990; Epston & White, 1992; Fraenkel, 1997).  There has been a move 
away from observation and mechanistic interventions (Hoffman, 1990) based on 
generalising theoretical accounts, in favour of a focus on the unique experiences and 
meaning making of the couple (e.g. Fraenkel, 1995; Freedman & Combs, 1996a,b, 2000; 
Neal, Zimmerman, & Dickerson, 1999; Zimmerman and Dickerson, 1993a,b, 1994).  
The therapist’s position has shifted from ‘expert’ to ‘collaborator’ who, with the couple, 
explores the meanings they produce about their relational problems, and how their 
language limits or constrains them (e.g. Hudson & O’Hanlon, 1992; Zimmerman & 
Dickerson, 1994).  However, some theorists (e.g. Tiefer, 1988, 2002) suggest that a lack 
of awareness of this role has remained in the practice of couple therapy.  Thus, whilst 
feminists acknowledged that facilitating clients’ clarity from the subjective position of 
each client was beneficial (rather than prescribing what partners should do) they argued 
that therapists should accept the impossibility of moral neutrality.  Instead , they should 
work to increase awareness of normative prescriptions and decrease the possibility of 
indirectly colluding with client-held ideological positions, and recycling gendered 
relational discourses that pathologised partners and limited what was possible in terms 
of doing satisfying relationships.   
 
However, despite these critical shifts, and notwithstanding a few notable exceptions (e.g. 
Boyd-Franklin, Kelly, & Durham, 2008; Chambers, 2008; Falicov, 2003), research into 
couple therapy has remained largely focussed on white, heterosexual North Americans 
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and Europeans (Sprenkle, 2012).  Thus, whilst the couple therapy literature highlights a 
need to ‘address culture’ in research, it also acknowledges that culture-specific methods 
are lacking from the couple therapy literature, and very few studies are even 
demographically balanced (Lebow et al., 2012).  Moreover, mainstream couple therapy 
research is still endeavouring to uncover universal laws, independent of socio-historical 
conditions that govern relationships and the practice of therapy.  The dominant 
assumption appears to be that different models of couple therapy work, not because of 
unique characteristics specific to each type, but rather because of underlying shared 
factors.   
 
2.7.5 The ‘Underlying Laws’ of Successful Couple Therapy 
There have been several attempts to elucidate the underlying principles governing all 
forms of successful couple therapy.  This has been exemplified by Lebow et al., (2012), 
who have argued that effective couple therapy needs to address (directly or indirectly) 
universal, “transcendent aspects of relationships such as attachment, exchanges, skill 
building, attributions, biology, and personal histories” (p.158).  One prominent set has 
been offered by Christensen (2010, cited in Lebow et al., 2012), who presented five 
transcending principles of successful couple therapy which included:  
 
“(a) dyadic conceptualization challenging the individual orientation view that partners 
tend to manifest, (b) modifying emotion-driven maladaptive behaviour by finding 
constructive ways to deal with emotions, (c) eliciting avoided, emotion-based, private 
behaviour so that this behaviour becomes public to the partners, making them aware of 
each other’s internal experience, (d) fostering productive communication, attending to 
both problems in speaking and listening, and (e) emphasizing strengths and positive 
behaviours” (p.157). 
 
 
Thus, the authorising knowledges of couple therapy continue to privilege a construction 
of relationship satisfaction as the enactment of ‘correct’ interpersonal behaviours, which 
are dependent on partners possessing suitably satisfying cognitive-architectures that 
facilitate mutual confession and self-surveillance.  From this perspective of ‘underlying 
principles’, therapeutic approaches that lack direct empirical evidence, but which share 
many common features with EFT, TBCT and IBCT are constructed as potentially 
beneficial ‘by proxy’.  Such examples include ‘integrative problem-centred therapy’ 
(Pinsoff, 2005), ‘sound marital house therapy’ (Gottman, 2008), and ‘affective-
reconstructive therapy’ (Snyder & Mitchell, 2008).  The ‘general laws’ of couple 
therapy were mirrored in the work of Chenail, St. George, Wulff, Duffy, Wilson-Scott 
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& Tomm (2012) who conducted a qualitative meta-synthesis of clients’ conceptions of 
couple therapy.  Five themes emerged as representing successful couple therapy: 
 
“(a) clients’ commitment to change, motivation, and inner strength; (b) clients’ 
recognition of therapists’ efforts to cultivate hope, to enhance expectations, and to 
provide opportunities to change; (c) clients’ appreciation of the relationship or alliance 
they have with their therapists; (d) clients’ preconceptions and expectations for their 
therapy’s usefulness; and (e) clients’ acknowledgement of their treatment process and 
outcomes and identification of their relationships between in-therapy actions and out-of-
therapy change” (Chenail et al., 2012, p.256). 
 
Missing from this list is an acknowledgement of the multiplicity and fluidity of meaning 
in the therapeutic space.  There is no appreciation by mainstream researchers, therapists, 
and clients of the operation of broader social scripts in the construction and privileging 
of certain modes of ‘satisfying’ relating.  These discourses also prescribe, warrant and 
operate through specific therapeutic practices.  The intertwining of professional and lay 
understandings of therapy illustrates the ways in which the discursive technology of 
couple therapy, along with the psychological knowledges ‘discovered’ by mainstream 
research, function as key components of the norm-setting mechanism that shapes the 
accepted norms and moralities surrounding relationship satisfaction (Ussher and Baker, 
1993), and informs and recycles the taken-for-granted everyday ‘common sense’ 
prescriptions concerning how satisfying relationships should be done (Nicholson, 1993).  
Individuals are positioned within diagnostic categories, but these ‘psychological 
conditions’ are not just ‘personal events’.  They are inherently social too (Crawford & 
Unger, 2004) and imbricated with broader social and political power.  Thus, 
psychological discourses do not unproblematically describe relationships and 
relationship satisfactions, they actively prescribe the nature of our psychological and 
relational satisfactions, as well as the ways in which the practice of therapy conceives of 
and attempts to address relational problems.  The pedagogic regimes of the therapeutic 
technologies extol the need for individual partners to “do their part” and work on 
themselves in order to increase the likelihood of their relationship being “healthy” and 
“happy” (Markman & Rhoades 2012, p.195).  Thus, the ‘emancipatory’ couple 
therapies are forms of regulation themselves, ‘distracting people from engaging with the 
wider social issues in favour of an inward turn to the self’ (Furedi, 2004 p203) - a turn 
to a confessional self that must confess to every other self (Elliot and Lemert, 2006; 
Plummer, 1995, 2003) in order to achieve mutual fulfilment of innate needs and 
relationship satisfaction. 
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In line with the and/and philosophy of the thesis I now ‘break’ theoretically from the 
critical deconstruction of relationship satisfaction in the psychological and therapeutic 
literatures and turn, instead, to explore possible facets of its phenomenology. 
 
Part 2  
2.8 The Phenomenology of Relationship Satisfaction 
Whilst relationship satisfaction has been constructed as “a subjective evaluation by each 
relational partner of the quality, or happiness level, within an intimate relationship” 
(Erbert & and Duck, 1997, p. 194), I have found no research exploring the 
phenomenological richness of this lived experience.  However, as indicated in the above 
extract, the primary ‘phenomenological’ characteristic of relationship satisfaction that is 
articulated in the mainstream literature is predominantly that of ‘happiness’.  
Psychological research has long argued that relationship satisfaction predicts happiness 
to a greater extent than other types of satisfaction (e.g., Glenn & Weaver, 1981), and 
this line of reasoning has formed the basis of the some of the most persuasive arguments 
for researching relationship satisfaction.  This was exemplified by Hinde (1997) who 
stated that research on satisfaction in close inter-personal relationships was highly 
valuable “not just as an intellectual enterprise, but because of its potential impact on 
human happiness” (p. xvii).   
Dating back to antiquity, the quest for happiness was argued to be ‘universal’.  Plato 
believed that everyone desired happiness, and Aristotle concluded that every other goal 
in life (e.g. wealth, power, health) was valued because of its capacity to make 
individuals happy, and the “right to pursue happiness” was famously enshrined in the 
American Declaration of Independence as an inalienable right of man (sic) (Silberman, 
1985).  Solomon (1993) argued that experiencing emotions, such as ‘happiness’, 
provided ‘the meaning of life’ because they allowed individuals to judge the 
favourability of actual or possible states of affairs, and therefore provided grounds for 
action.  This ‘meaning of life’ was a framework of value and significance grounded in 
lived experience (as opposed to being relative to some extra-experiential standpoint) and 
therefore, from the mainstream perspective, relationship satisfaction has provided the 
same framework of meaning and grounds for action as happiness.  This experiential link 
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also extended to the ways in which individuals were advised to achieve happiness and 
relationship satisfaction.  For example, McGill (1967, as cited in Silberman, 1985) 
outlined the following guidelines for achieving happiness:  
“[…] by rational thinking and the development of propitious human relationships; by 
cultivating love and goodness; exercising autonomy of will and purposeful intelligent 
behaviour; by engaging in creative activity; by stoic fulfillment, limitation, or 
elimination of desires; by avoidance of painful affects, wishes, and aspirations; […] by 
self-realisation, self-actualisation, self-expansion; by developing to the whole and ideal 
man (sic) […].” (Silberman, 1985, p.458). 
These practices for the attainment of happiness came to be reflected in contemporary 
productions of relationship satisfaction; especially the privileging of happiness as an 
‘ideal’, and the notions of exercising autonomy, holding ‘realistic’ expectations and 
engaging in humanistic processes of self-realisation, and self-actualisation.  
Furthermore, similar to the dominant construction of relationship satisfaction as need 
fulfilment, Silbermann (1985) argued that ‘happiness’ came from the satisfaction of 
needs.  Thus, the phenomenological link between relationship satisfaction and 
happiness became well established in the contemporary psychological literature such 
that the two were often presented as affectively synonymous. 
However, other theoretical work has suggested that the two were not conceptually or 
phenomenologically interchangeable.  For example, Michalos (1980) stated that 
different (i.e. phenomenologically distinct) ‘types’ of satisfaction could be distinguished 
on the basis of different affective characteristics.  He referred to McKennell’s (1978, as 
cited in Michalos, 1980) work which suggested the following four ‘types’ of satisfaction 
could be experienced:  1) A ‘Satisfaction of Achievement’ characterised by feelings of 
satisfaction and happiness; 2) A ‘Satisfaction of Resignation’ characterised by feelings 
of satisfaction and unhappiness (akin to the ‘resigned commitment’ implicit in 
interdependence theory See Section 2.5.2); 3) A ‘Satisfaction of Aspiration’ in which 
individuals were dissatisfied but happy; 4) and a ‘Satisfaction of Frustration’ 
experienced as dissatisfying and unhappy.  Conceptual work such as this suggested that 
the experiential relationship between satisfaction and happiness was more complex than 
a simple one-to-one approximation.  Whilst such work permitted a certain multiplicity 
of meaning in the experiences of satisfaction, it still conceived of satisfaction in terms 
of rigid, static experiential categories in which partners were ‘located’, rather than as a 
fluid, ongoing experiential process. 
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One way in which this experiential variety was accounted for was by theorising 
‘happiness’ as an emotion, and satisfaction as a mood (e.g. Solomon, 1993; Goldie, 
2002) - an experiential distinction that was too simplistic.  The traditional conception of 
emotions was that they were intentional
26
 states with specific objects, whilst moods 
were understood as intentional states with generalised objects (e.g. Solomon, 1993; 
Goldie, 2002).  From this view happiness was understood as an intentional emotion with 
a specific object, whereas relationship satisfaction was experienced as a generalised, 
intentional mood.  This mirrored the mainstream psychological conception of 
satisfaction as a ‘global’ evaluation of one’s relationship (see section 2.4).  In contrast, 
the mainstream accounts that conceptualised satisfaction in terms of specific relational 
evaluations implicitly maintained the phenomenological conception of relationship 
satisfaction as an intentionally specific emotion (akin to happiness).  Given the ongoing 
(and unresolved) ‘global satisfaction-vs-specific satisfaction’ arguments in the literature, 
it appeared that the ‘experiential framework of meaning’ of relationship satisfaction was 
richer, more nuanced, and more fluid than traditional ‘emotion-mood’ dichotomies 
allowed for.  This phenomenological richness of certain feelings (such as satisfaction) 
was considered further in Ratcliffe’s (2010) account of ‘existential feelings’.   
Ratcliffe (2005; 2010) agreed with Solomon’s (1993) position that experience and 
thought were structured by a felt sense of belonging to a meaningful world that 
mattered.  However, he argued that there was a phenomenological difference between a 
sense of the ‘world-experienced-as-meaningful’ and the experience of emotions and/or 
moods, which he saw as being experienced in the world.  Ratcliffe (2005, 2010) drew 
on Heidegger’s theoretical work on the ontological capacities of human-being and 
argued that a sense of participating in a ‘world-as-meaningful’ was neither an 
intentional state, collection of intentional states, or a generalised intentional state.  
Instead, it was a pre-intentional background to these states, which shaped the range of 
intentional emotions that could conceivably be experienced.  He called these pre-
intentional backgrounds ‘existential feelings’ and argued that they were 
‘phenomenologically deeper’ than emotions.  This mirrored one of Heidegger’s earlier 
claims regarding the ontological capacities of human-being; that individuals always find 
                                                 
26 I adopt a phenomenological conception of intentionality, which takes intentionality to be the directedness of 
experience, as opposed to conceiving of it as a non-phenomenological ‘aboutness’ of some object or situation.  For 
me, the phenomenology of emotion is inextricable from the intentionality of emotion. 
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themselves in a particular state of mind, or mood, from which they take a position in the 
world, yet which, for the most part, they largely ignore.  From this perspective, 
existential feelings such as relationship satisfaction were a phenomenologically deeper, 
pre-intentional state that made possible certain intentionally-specific emotions (such as 
happiness) and intentionally-generalised moods.  Ratcliffe illustrated this 
phenomenological depth by drawing on Heidegger’s (1962, 1995) work on the different 
experiential levels of boredom. 
 
Heidegger had distinguished between three levels of boredom: 1) being ‘bored by’; 2) 
being ‘bored with’, and 3) being ‘boring for one’.  When ‘bored by’ a given ‘thing’, that 
‘thing’ had failed to interest an individual, but their boredom was experienced within a 
space of other possibilities which they might not find boring (e.g. waiting for a train, but 
having a book to read, or shops to look in).  When ‘bored with’ a situation, the 
possibility of their not being bored was absent in advance, and the whole situation was 
experienced through their sense of boredom – the individual was, experientially 
speaking, in the boredom (e.g. waiting for a train at a quiet station with no alternative 
sources of interest).  However, the individual could still conceive of other situations in 
which they might not be bored; the sense of boredom was not all-encompassing.  This 
was the key difference between being ‘bored with’ and the deepest experience - being 
‘boring for one’.  Here, when ‘boring for one’, the sense that there was any alternative 
way of being-in-the-world was absent from the individual’s experience; their entire 
world was experienced through their boredom
27,28
.    For Ratcliffe, the traditional 
understanding of emotions, such as happiness, reflected experiences at the level of 
‘bored by’, whilst the pre-intentional existential feelings equated to the deeper 
experiential levels of ‘bored with’ and ‘boring for one’, and this reflected the 
phenomenological quality of feelings such as satisfaction.  This depth meant that 
existential feelings, such as relationship satisfaction, could be phenomenologically 
inconspicuous, and reflect what Strasser (1977) called: 
 
                                                 
27 Perhaps a more conceptually accessible example of an experience this deep is depression.  It is not a case that 
depressed individuals temporarily feel a ‘little out of sorts’ – the sense that they could once more be happy is 
experientially inconceivable to them.   
 
28 Ratcliffe (2010) proposed a further experiential level – ‘personal boredom’ – which he situated between ‘bored 
with’ and ‘boring for one’.  Here, the experience of boredom encompassed all aspects of the individual’s own life, 
and therefore was experienced as deeper than ‘bored with’, but it was still only experienced as their own boredom and 
therefore was not as phenomenologically deep as ‘boring for one’. 
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“[…] the attunements to which we pay no heed, we least observe – they attune us in 
such a way that we feel as though there is no attunement there at all, as though we were 
not attuned in any way at all – these attunements are the most powerful” (p68). 
 
Given their phenomenological depth, Ratcliffe proposed that we come to ‘know’ and 
experience existential feelings through our bodily feelings.  He distinguished between 
bodily feelings in which the body was the exclusive object of the experience, and bodily 
feelings through which other phenomena were perceived (i.e. where the body 
functioned as the agent of perception, as opposed to the object of it).  It was this latter 
conception that Ratcliffe associated with existential feelings.  Therefore, a theoretical 
account of ‘relationship-satisfaction-as-an-existential-feeling’ would suggest that 
relationship satisfaction might be experienced primarily through partners’ embodied 
being-in-the-world. 
 
Whilst no research has been conducted to explore this, there are parallels with 
phenomenological research exploring narratives of ‘intimacy’ in coupledom (e.g. 
Helgeson et al., 1987; Register and Henley, 1992).  Register and Henley’s (1992) 
research on the phenomenology of intimacy presented themes of intimate embodiment, 
which suggested that there were aspects of experiencing intimacy that were 
unarticulated, and involved a qualitative experiential shift in the perception of sight and 
tactility; such that participants felt that they experienced their most intimate moments 
through a mutual look or touch, rather than through articulating their experiential worlds 
to each other.  In fact, verbal self-disclosure was largely absent from the participants’ 
experiential accounts; a particularly pertinent theme given the overwhelming focus on 
communication skills and mutual self-disclosure as the ‘vehicle’ for intimate satisfying 
relationships (see also Jamieson, 1999).  Instead, participants spoke about their 
awareness of their embodiment changing – e.g. ‘noticing’ butterflies in their stomachs.  
Thus, Register and Henley’s account suggested that the process of intimate relating 
involved partners’ embodied sensations qualitatively changing, and their awareness of 
their embodied engagement in the world increasing.  Furthermore, participants 
described intimacy as the removal or merging of experiential boundaries (both physical 
and psychological) along a spectrum from a “crack in the boundary to the full removal 
of it” (Register and Henley, 1992, p.474).  This ‘disruption’ of partners’ life-worlds was 
experienced either via the breaking of one life-world into another, or by allowing / 
permitting one life-world into the other, or a combination of both.  This was 
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experienced in a range of ways, including as a union and the loss of personal isolation; 
as a transformation and creation of something new; and, contrastingly, as potentially 
threatening and intrusive.   
 
The phenomenological tension of this autonomy-connection dialectic had been well 
explored in existential theoretical works, and was summed up by the philosopher John 
MacQuarrie (1972) who stated that “[…] no polarity of human existence is more deeply 
pervasive of our being than the polarity between the privacy and community of 
existence” (p.103).  From an existential perspective, existence is understood in terms of 
individuals engaging in ongoing, situated sense-making ‘life projects’ through which 
the world acquires meaning.  These ‘projects’ are not understood as a ‘set of plans’ 
presented by some ‘antecedent self’.  Rather, they represent already embedded modes of 
engagement or being-in-the-world that, in a sense, also ‘reveal’ individuals to 
themselves.  This is because the ways in which an individual engages in their life 
reflects their ontological capacity to reflect on their state of mind, understand their 
present and future possibilities, and make sense of these potentialities through the act of 
discourse (van Deurzen, 2009).  However, because individuals are not alone in the 
world they are also ‘revealed’ in the projects of others, and therefore their ontological 
sense of self became a function not only of their own plans, but also a consequence of 
relating, or ‘being-for-others’ (Sartre, 1957).  In his seminal 1923 work ‘I and Thou’, 
Martin Buber (2008) outlined how relating to others was a fundamental constituent of 
existence because the very use of the word “I” implicitly recognised “Thou”, from 
which “I” distinguished itself.  As Macquarrie (1972) stated “[p]rior to either ‘I’ or 
‘Thou’, taken separately, is ‘I-Thou’, the social or communal reality which makes 
selfhood and individual personality possible”.  Thus, from this perspective, couple 
relationships are acknowledged as phenomenological sites of ontological tension in 
which partners “live in each other’s subjective contexts of meaning” (Schutz, 1970, 
p.167). 
 
The suggestion that intimate relationships are a site of experiential, dialectical-tension 
has been well explored by radical phenomenologists (e.g. Laing and Esterson, 1970; 
Laing, 1971) who challenged idealised conceptions of the family and coupledom.  On 
the one hand, relationships could be experienced as sites of ontological security with 
partners maintaining a sense of themselves as autonomous secure beings capable of 
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relating to each other (as one human being to another) in a potentially satisfying way - 
what existentialists referred to as being-with-others.  Alternatively, relationships could 
be experienced as sites of ontological insecurity, in which individuals could feel 
dependent on their partners for their sense of being and therefore threatened with the 
loss of their identity.  Trapped between two poles, one of complete engulfment by their 
partner versus one of complete isolation from their partner, and unable to experience a 
third satisfying possibility of experiencing relating as an ongoing, fluid dialectic of 
autonomy-and-connection (Laing, 1971). 
 
The role of relational dialectics in shaping relationship satisfaction was further explored 
in later mainstream psychological works (e.g. Erbert and Duck, 1997), which illustrated 
a good (albeit atypical) example of mainstream theoretical work which took a relational 
view of relating (i.e. relating as an ongoing fluid process).  Three ‘supra-dialectics’ were 
regularly presented in research on dyadic interactions including: autonomy-connection 
(e.g. Baxter & Simon, 1993), stability-change, and openness-closedness (Baxter, 1993; 
Baxter & Erbert, 1999; Erbert, 2000).  Some research argued that managing the 
dialectical processes of autonomy-connection and openness-closedness was most 
important for the experience of couple satisfaction (Baxter & Erbert, 1999; Erbert, 
2000).  This research suggested that the phenomenology of relationship satisfaction 
would involve both poles of each dialectic, the experience of each pole only meaningful 
in light of the other (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Blatt & Blass, 1996; Gilligan, 1982; Guisinger 
& Blatt, 1994; Ryan & Deci, 2000).  Again, this implied that satisfying relating was 
characterised by a far more varied and contingent phenomenology than the mainstream 
focus on ‘positive interactions and feelings’ allowed for.  Instead, the phenomenology 
of relationship satisfaction involved the ongoing negotiation of dialectical 
contradictions faced by two individuals when they came together and related, such that 
they could engage in a mutually authentic ‘being-with-others’29 , as opposed to an 
inauthentic ‘being-for-others’.   
 
Heidegger’s concept of ‘authenticity’ was central to existentialist thinking.  Whilst 
‘science’ was governed by norms of ‘truth’; and ‘morality’ was governed by norms of 
                                                 
29 This position was echoed in the relational concept of ‘differentiation’ whereby better-differentiated partners, it was 
argued, could experience more intimate connection before they felt controlled or as if they were losing themselves in 
their relationship (Bowen, 1974; Lobitz & Lobitz, 1996).   
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‘good’ and ‘right’; ‘existentialism’ was understood as being governed by norms of 
‘authenticity’.  Authenticity referred to a condition of self-making whereby an 
individual actively committed to their various ‘life projects’ as opposed to simply 
‘occupying’ them.  For Heidegger, this involved the ontological capacity to understand 
one’s being-in-the-world through a process of reflection, self-reflection, and openness to 
the future in order to grasp the possibilities available (and unavailable) and experience 
one’s life as meaningful.  Thus, an authentic life did not refer to a complete, 
‘discovered’, pre-given ‘whole’, but rather, reflected an individual’s ability to construct 
a life-narrative of integrity, in which they experienced themselves as the agentic author 
of their own life story, rather than being dictated to by the world (e.g. Nehamas, 2007; 
Ricouer, 1992).  In this way, authenticity did not distinguish between ‘correct’ and 
‘incorrect’ life narratives but, rather, represented a condition of self-making in which 
the individual ‘succeeded’ in ‘making themselves’ rather than being a function of the 
roles they found themselves in.  Whilst the inauthentic individual merely occupied their 
role, the authentic individual had committed to ways of being and acting, and had 
actively taken up the ethics of that role.   
 
Prager and Roberts (2004) argued that an explication of the nature of intimate relating 
between two selves should include phenomenological experience and the notion of an 
“authentic” self.  Buber (2008) had elaborated on the ways in which individuals were 
able to relate by distinguishing between authentic ‘I-Thou’ and inauthentic ‘I-it’ 
relating (both in terms of relating to oneself, and also to another).  This involved 
processes experienced at three relational levels (i) self-relating-to-self; (ii) self-relating-
to-other; and (iii) self-perceiving-other-relating-to-self.   
 
If individuals related to themselves as an ‘it’ then they experienced themselves as an 
object that contained emotions and needs and, in doing so, absolved themselves of 
subjective responsibility and agency; the consequence of which, was that they looked to 
another individual to take care of them.  Similarly, if an individual related to their 
partner as an ‘it’, they engaged in a process of depersonalisation which objectified their 
partner and disregarded them as an agentic subject possessing their own needs and 
feelings.  In effect, the individual made their partner an object solely for their own 
projects and, in this way, negated any relational obligation they had to be responsive to 
their partner’s needs and feelings.  The partner would, phenomenologically speaking, be 
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displaced from the subject-position from which they experienced their world (and 
relationship) as meaningful.  That is, they would experience a feeling of dissatisfying 
‘alienation’ from their own life-projects, and their subjectivity draining away because 
(through being objectified) they would experience themselves in terms of the other 
individual’s projects.   
 
In contrast to this existentially dissatisfying ‘it’ relating, if individuals related to 
themselves as an ‘I’ then they took up a committed, authentic position which 
acknowledged their own agency, needs, and restrictions, and took responsibility and 
ownership of these in a deliberate way.  Similarly, if an individual experienced their 
partner as a ‘thou’ then they saw their partner as a subject with agency and their own 
unique needs and desires, and this mode of relating allowed for openness and flexibility.  
Bakan (1966) referred to this as a “communion” between self-and-other, an authentic 
way of relating as subjects committed to the life-project of their relationship, and the 
existentially satisfying experience of being-with-each-other.  Thus, Buber (2008) 
highlighted the benefits of a habit of satisfying awareness of self and other characterised 
by the mutual acknowledgement that the relationship involved two subjects, and two 
subjective realities coming together and then moving apart in an ongoing, authentic, 
dialectical process.   
 
Thus, ‘authenticity’ provided and recognised a sense of agency in terms of individuals 
having the ability to make (potentially) satisfying choices in their lives and relationships.  
Whilst existence had many pre-existing constraints (what Heidegger referred to as 
‘facticity’) individuals were theorised as having the ability to co-constitute their world 
and experience
30
.  However, this ‘freedom’ was not a humanistic account based on 
idealised notions of choice
31
.  The experience of ‘freely’ and authentically committing 
to a project was always historically and culturally situated, and shaped by the 
possibilities available in a given time and place.  As Heidegger claimed, we are ‘thrown 
                                                 
30 This is in contrast to Sartre’s radical ‘transcendent’ freedom in which he argued that whilst social and historical 
‘possibilities’ existed, they never fully determined choice. 
 
31 Heidegger’s philosophy was not the basis for enthusiastic humanism.  In fact, as outlined by van Deuzen-Smith 
(2002) some of “the human potential movement is based on a simplistic interpretation of Heideggerian and Sartrian 
notions taken to their most absurd degree of self-assertiveness and voluntarism.  Heidegger did not intend such a 
humanistic stance and he continuously pointed out that people were merely channels of being.  His account was a 
concrete counterbalance to idealistic notions of freedom and choice” (p.42) 
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into the world’, not a historical, social, or political void.  From this perspective, facticity 
meant that our choices and commitments were always contextualised within broader 
social and political struggles; they fitted into pre-existing frameworks of meanings, 
norms and practices that were largely unquestioned, and which functioned as a form of 
collective identity.  In this way, for Heidegger, discourse was the ‘house of being’, as it 
was the means by which individuals made sense of the world and their place in it.   
 
Given this, an ‘authentic existence’ could not negate the broader socio-historical and 
political aspects of that existence.  Social relations took place within institutions which 
privileged and denoted power to certain ways-of-being, and therefore not all ‘life 
projects’ were equally powerful, agentic, or achievable.  This was famously illustrated 
in the seminal work, The Second Sex, in which Simone de Beauvoir (2012) 
demonstrated that social norms were male-defined, and therefore women occupied a 
historical and institutional site which ‘objectified’ them.  Thus, for women, all life-
projects were constrained by a gendered institutional ‘look’ which defined them as ‘the 
other’, as “not man” but “woman”.  In contrast, men were not subjected to the same 
governance, and therefore they experienced themselves as ‘human’, as ‘normal’ 
subjectivity.  Thus the experience of being-with-others and the process of engaging in a 
satisfying authentic-way-of-being did (and does) not take place on equal terms for 
everyone.  In this way, Heideggerian notions of facticity somewhat complimented the 
Foucauldian concern with discursive power.  However, despite an appreciation of the 
socio-historical context, existentialist accounts of being and subjectivity conceived of 
them as articulated and grasped through discourse, not produced through discourse.  
That is, from an existential perspective, existence preceded discourse.  Thus, by 
drawing on ideas from existentialism (such as ‘authenticity’) researchers (myself 
included) turned to what social constructionism would call ‘grand narratives’.  From a 
reflexive point, this is where I have to turn to my ‘and/and’ approach to the thesis.  It is 
one aspect where I cannot seamlessly and unproblematically make social 
constructionism and existential phenomenology compatible, and that is why this chapter 
needed to be presented in two separate parts.  
 
In conclusion, no research has been conducted exploring the lived-experience of 
relationship satisfaction.  Whilst traditionally associated with feelings of happiness, I 
have drawn on existential theoretical works on ‘moods’, and the ontological and 
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dialectical processes of relating, and phenomenological research on intimacy, to suggest 
that the lived-experience of relationship satisfaction is more nuanced and complex than 
has so far been outlined in the psychological academic literature.  Furthermore, this 
experience is inextricably tied up with dominant, institutionalised discourses which are 
available in a given time and place.  Therefore, this thesis contends that it is beneficial 
to explore both the lived experience and the discursive framework through which 
relationship satisfaction comes to have meaning.  The way in which this theoretical call 
is operationalised is the focus of the next chapter. 
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3. 
 
Research questions, methodology and methods 
 
This purpose of this Chapter is to fully articulate the epistemological and 
methodological decisions taken in the research
32
.  It will then outline the methods that 
were used to operationalise the aims of the research, and the decisions taken at each 
stage of the process to ensure the research was rigorous, epistemologically valid, and 
ethical.  It is crucial that a researcher explicitly articulates their “frame of reference and 
their (personal, theoretical, emotional, conceptual) investments in the research” (Willig, 
2012a, p.41).  These will, in some way, have shaped the interpretation of the data, for 
example what was considered important to ask in the interview and to pay attention to 
in the interpretative process, and what ‘felt’ important to present as their interpretation.  
In line with this theoretical call, this chapter is extremely reflexive and therefore I have 
chosen to write in the first-person to illustrate my experience of conducting the research, 
and to take ownership of the interpretative decisions that I made (with guidance from 
my supervisors) during this process.  The chapter begins by reiterating the aims of the 
research
33
. 
 
3.1 A Re-cap of the Research Aims 
The research had two overarching aims: 
(i) to explore the ways in which relationships satisfaction was constructed by 
lay people and couple therapists, and the ways in which these productions 
overlapped or varied;  
(ii) to map the phenomenological, subjective experience of lay satisfaction, as 
part of a twin-focus-analysis that attempted to bridge the material-discursive 
dichotomy 
Both aims involved theory generation in terms of re-theorising relationship satisfaction 
as a socially constructed phenomenon and as an experiential phenomenon.   However, 
                                                 
32 A methodological paper – Colahan, Tunariu and Dell (2012) - outlining the twin focus analysis was peer reviewed 
and published last year and forms the basis of the sections of this chapter which refer to the twin focus analysis.  The 
paper can be found in Appendix A. 
33 This Chapter is heavily influenced by the theoretical work presented in Smith, Flowers & Larkin (2009) and Willig 
(2012a) and both texts are referenced extensively. 
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the second aim also involved methodological pluralism (e.g. Frost et al., 2010) in terms 
of using two different qualitative methodologies to analyse a single dataset in order to 
shine two distinct, but complimentary, ‘analytical lights’ on the topic, whilst not 
violating the epistemological assumptions of either approach. 
 
3.2 Operationalising the research aims 
The research aims were translated into three empirical studies: 
 
Study 1 
Study one used Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) to explore seven Relate couple 
therapists’ talk about relationship satisfaction and the issues facing clients’ who 
presented with relationship dissatisfaction.  Findings from this study, along with those 
from Study 2 addressed the first aim of the thesis.  Research questions for Study 1 
included: 
a) How was relationship satisfaction and dissatisfaction constructed by couple 
therapists?   
b) How were these constructions deployed by couple therapists to understand their 
clients’ who presented with relationship dissatisfaction?   
c) What were the implications of these constructions for intimate partners’ actions, 
practices, subjectivities, and associated power relations? 
 
Study 2 
Study Two was a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis of twelve lay-people’s talk about 
relationship satisfaction.  It formed the first half of the twin focus analysis and explored 
lay constructions of relationship satisfaction.  The analysis from this study, along with 
the analyses from Studies One and Two, informed the first and second aims of the thesis 
respectively.  Research questions included: 
a) How was the notion of relationship satisfaction constructed in everyday 
commonsense understandings about long-term heterosexual relationships?   
b) How were these constructions used by lay people to understand their intimate 
relationships as satisfying or dissatisfying?   
c) What were the implications of these constructions for intimate partners’ actions, 
practices, subjectivities, and associated power relations? 
Chapter 3.  Research questions, methodology and methods 
68 
 
d) Were there areas of overlap between lay and professional understandings of 
relationship satisfaction? 
 
Study 3 
Study Three utilised Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) in order to map 
the ways in which twelve lay-people, that is, men and women from the general 
population, understood their subjective experiences of relationship satisfaction.  This 
study formed the second half of the twin-focus-analysis on lay experience and discourse, 
and the analysis informed the second aim of the thesis.  Research questions included: 
a) How did lay people come to know they were experiencing relationship 
satisfaction and / or dissatisfaction?   
b) What characterised these experiences, and how were they understood?   
c) Did any contextual features (e.g. gender) qualify these experiences? 
 
3.2.1 Reflecting on why I chose these methodologies 
Chamberlain (2012) recently cautioned qualitative researchers from taking an ‘off the 
peg’ approach when considering methodologies as he argued that this could lead to 
tautological rationales for adopting different approaches, and prevent researchers from 
fully engaging in the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological assumptions 
underpinning their research.  In my case, I initially chose FDA and IPA because these 
methodologies seemed appropriate for addressing the research aims.  However, my 
knowledge of them was extremely superficial when I started planning this research.  
Prior to conducting this PhD I had only conducted one qualitative study
34
 and I had no 
experience of using either FDA or IPA.  Therefore, on reflection, my mindset towards 
qualitative research back then was very much ‘off-the-peg’, and I approached both 
methodologies as if they were simply suitable ‘tools for the job’.  However, in the 
process of undertaking this research I had to engage (struggle) with the underlying 
principles and assumptions of both approaches for two reasons.  Firstly, on a pragmatic 
level, I needed to ensure that I understood them and could apply them in a way that was 
appropriate (i.e. in line with their underlying principles) and which allowed me to 
adequately address the research aims.  Secondly, because I was taking a pluralistic 
approach to the research on lay people’s talk, I had to reflect on the epistemological and 
                                                 
34 A small, 1500 word, abridged grounded theory case study for my Psychology Graduate Diploma at the University 
of East London. 
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practical implications of this decision on a deeper level.  In terms of epistemology, I had 
to consider and articulate an epistemological position which would allow me to 
accommodate both methodologies with different epistemological assumptions in a way 
that was coherent at the thesis level (see Section 3.3).  In terms of practical decisions, I 
had to consider how I would operationalise my pluralistic approach at each stage of the 
research process from preparing for data collection, to collecting the data, analysing it, 
and then presenting my interpretations (see Section 3.5).   Thus, in the process of 
undertaking this research, I shifted from an ‘off-the-peg’ attitude towards methodology 
to a position of critical engagement, which has subsequently made me a more reflexive 
and ethical researcher, and one who is more aware of and comfortable with the claims 
and limitations of their research. 
 
3.3 A pluralistic approach: negotiating the epistemological challenge of the twin-
focus-analysis 
Delineated by distinct analytic foci, FDA and IPA were able to shed light on the topic of 
relationship satisfaction in different ways and this was the purpose of the twin analytic 
focus.  It had the benefit of allowing the exploration of the interplay between language, 
culture and experience.  However, this presented me with an epistemological challenge 
because the two methodologies rested upon different epistemological assumptions.  
Whilst IPA and FDA both “concern themselves with the role of meanings, collective 
meaning (patterns of commonality), and individualised meaning (patterns of variability) 
in constituting subjective realities, they do so in different ways” (Colahan et al., 2012, 
p.49).  They theorise language in different ways, and therefore make different 
assumptions about what the data represent, what the role of the participant and the 
researcher are, and the types of knowledge that are produced by the analyses.   
 
“FDA has a stronger and more direct empirical commitment to social constructionism 
than IPA typically has (Smith et al., 2009).  FDA represents the speaker’s narratives and 
associated realities as constructed through discourse, and seeks to map dominant 
patterns of collectively shared meanings deeply indebted to a local culture” (Colahan et 
al., 2012, p.49).  Thus, rather than conceiving of the respondent as giving voice to their 
inner experiential reality, FDA investigates and understands subjective experience 
through discursive concepts (Harper, 2012).  The “role of the researcher is to draw 
attention to the constructed nature of social reality and to trace the specific ways in 
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which particular phenomena are constructed through discourse and to reflect upon the 
consequences of this for those who are affected [i.e. positioned as ‘partner’, ‘lover’, 
‘satisfied’, ‘dissatisfied’ etc.] by these social constructions” (Willig, 2012a, p.71).  In 
this way, the discourse analyses of narratives about relationship satisfaction involved a 
critical mapping of the “bodies-of-knowledge that constitute [relationship satisfaction] 
in a wider cultural environment [that] might be accessed” (Larkin, 2006, p.109).  That is, 
my role as the researcher required me to produce knowledge “about the processes by 
which particular kinds of ‘knowledge’ and ‘understandings’ [of relationship satisfaction] 
are produced” (Willig, 2012a, p.112). 
 
In contrast, IPA as a methodology attempts to map the experiential life-worlds of the 
respondents and explicate their meanings as they signify to the participants.  In the 
process of conducting an IPA, the researcher attempts to gain insight into the 
respondents’ psychological life-worlds by engaging in a “double hermeneutic” (Smith, 
1996).  Therefore “IPA knowledge-claims are provisionary, relative and always a 
contextualised function of the researcher’s interpretations of the participants’ own 
interpretations as they reflect and try to make sense of their experiences within research 
settings” (Colahan et al., 2012, p.50).   The participants’ use of language in the 
interview setting is therefore understood as part of the experience itself, and the 
researcher pays close attention to the nuances and emphases of meaning that the 
respondent produces through their use of language.  In this way, “IPA draws more on 
ideas from the symbolic interactionism of George Meade
35
 and aims to articulate themes 
representing the speakers as individuals with hermeneutic agency and, importantly, with 
individualised, psychological life-worlds” Colahan et al., 2012, p.49-50).  As Cosgrove 
(2000) notes: 
 
“A phenomenological approach to subjectivity also offers an alternative to traditional 
theories that rely on asocial conceptions of the individual, but it is an alternative that 
privileges a conception of agency.  Especially insofar as it is indebted to existentialist 
philosophy, it emphasizes the importance of the individual’s lived world and 
interpersonal realm in the construction of identity; it stresses the importance of the 
structural unity of (or mutual relationship among) experience, body and environment, 
which is referred to being-in-the-world.” (p.258) 
                                                 
35 For Meade “Individual selves and mental processes arise in a social context, and the content of thought and 
selfhood is to be understood in the light of the meanings which are available within the culture in which the person is 
immersed. [However] Having developed the capacity for mind and self as a result of interaction, the individual is 
then able, relatively autonomously – albeit in a continuing social context – to develop selfhood and personal 
tendencies of thought. […] People are constructed and are also constructors.” (Ashworth, 2008, p.17-18) 
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Thus, in an IPA the respondent assumes the role of an autobiographer, and the language 
they use to describe their experience is seen to provide a means of access to allow the 
researcher to interpret their experience.  However, this does not mean that IPA views 
language as a purely representational medium.  IPA principles are sympathetic to social 
constructionism in that there is an appreciation that participants’ narratives are always-
already situated within, and therefore shaped, limited and enabled, by language and 
practices (Smith et al., 2009).  As Willig (2012a) states: 
 
“Although socio-economic structures and socio-cultural practices condition […] 
configurations of the self, it is language that captures them and allows us to internalize 
them, thus structuring our subjectivities in particular ways.  It seems that language […] 
constitutes ‘the home’ within which we ‘dwell’ (Heidegger, 1993, p217) and which 
makes us who we are.” (p.64) 
 
However, IPA does not have the same critical, deconstructive aims as FDA, and is 
therefore subscribes to a less singular empirical translation of social constructionism.    
 
The way in which I chose to navigate these contrasting epistemological commitments 
within my thesis was by adopting a position which moved away from the more 
relativistic (radical) forms of social constructionism, and echoed theoretical work (e.g. 
Cosgrove, 2000) which recast the ‘discursive subject – agentic subject’ dichotomy.  I 
argued that whilst individuals are not free to use language as they wish (to transcend 
discourse), they are also not completely determined through discourse.  Drawing on 
Cosgrove (2000) who cited Butler (1995), I viewed agency not as a personal attribute, 
but a space of possibilities made available through discourse – a “horizon of agency” 
(p.137) within the discursive domain in which individuals have the capacity to inter-
subjectively shape and co-produce meaning – to negotiate signification and engage in 
re-signification.   
 
In this way, “the linguistic and social fabric of any given community acts as a 
framework for potentially individualised productions of meanings and offers socially 
valued formulations, which, when taken up are subject to becoming taken-for-granted 
“habits of thought” (Parker & Shotter, 1990).  However, in turn, such psychologically 
generated habits of thought contribute to, or challenge, the very system where they were 
created (namely to the system of dominant discourses, associated practices, gendered 
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injunctions, and so on)” (Colahan et al., p.50).  Thus, social and physical arrangements 
can be involved in providing the conditions-of-possibility for the emergence of 
discourses without determining them, as Willig (1999) puts it, “[c]onditions of life, as 
experienced by the individual through discourses, provide reasons for the individual’s 
actions.  It follows that from a non-relativist social constructionist point of view, 
meanings are afforded by discourses, accommodated by social structures and changed 
by human actors” (p.44).   
 
Thus, I did not claim that there is an unambiguous one-to-one matching between 
language and experience.  I acknowledged that the experience of relationship 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction was always grounded within prevailing cultural 
understandings about intimate relationships, and these were always-already prescribing.  
However, a series of distinct structural conditions-of-possibility
36
 were also required for 
‘relationship satisfaction’ to possibly unfold in meaning and experience in certain 
ways
37
.  Therefore, I also took the position that individuals have some agentic capacity 
(within a limited range of discursive and structural possibilities), and that their 
experience of relationship satisfaction would not become less real to them once its 
social construction had been established through theory (e.g., Ussher, 1997; Tunariu, 
2003; Walkerdine, 1986).   
 
Whilst this epistemological position allowed me to ‘straddle’ the epistemological 
demands of both FDA and IPA at the thesis level, I also wanted to theoretically 
demonstrate that the insights produced by the two analyses could be presented in a 
complementary way which would “serve both sets of analytic foci (IPA and FDA), as 
well as the thesis’ overall research questions” (Colahan et al., 2012, p.51).  In order to 
meet this challenge I drew on current discussions on the role of hermeneutic theory in 
qualitative research (e.g. Willig & Stainton-Rogers, 2008; Willig, 2012a). 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Including, for example, material (embodied), intersubjective (relating to someone as a partner), cognitive (inchoate 
anxiety which an individual is attempting to articulate), or social (linguistic access to certain communal views but not 
others) conditions (e.g., Harré, 1998) 
 
37 This position shares some common epistemological ideas with critical realism (e.g. Willig, 1998; 1999).  Critical 
realism theorises “a structural reality to the world […] which in some way underpins, generates or ‘affords’ our ways 
of understanding and talking about it” (Burr, 2003, p.96) 
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3.4 Hermeneutics – The turn to interpretation in Qualitative Research 
Hermeneutics refers to the process of interpretation. Whilst the original focus was on 
the interpretation of biblical texts, hermeneutic theory broadened to encompass a much 
wider range of texts.  Today, social theorists have argued that hermeneutic theory is at 
the heart of the qualitative research process (e.g. Rennie, 2007; Willig, 2012a) and that 
this ‘turn to interpretation’ can offer much to contemporary psychology (Smith, 2007).  
Ricoeur (1970 cited in Langdridge, 2007) outlined two broad interpretative positions: 
the hermeneutics of empathy, and the hermeneutics of suspicion.   
 
The hermeneutics of empathy is an interpretative process which takes place from within 
the phenomenon as it manifestly presents itself.  Therefore, a hermeneutics of empathy 
remains grounded in the data, and places extensive restrictions on the extent to which it 
draws on theoretical concepts from ‘outside’ of the text.  Thus, an empathic 
interpretation is concerned with ‘amplifying’ meaning instead of re-constructing it 
through alternative theoretical concepts.  An empathic interpretation does seek to move 
beyond description, but it seeks to ‘add’ by clarifying and elucidating meaning that is 
implicit in the material
38
.  In contrast to the hermeneutics of empathy, the hermeneutics 
of suspicion traditionally referred to an interpretative process which attempted to ‘reveal’ 
the hidden or ‘true’ meanings within a text.    However, in social research, the 
hermeneutics of suspicion came to refer to the interrogation of a text via a theoretical 
framework from outside of the text.  Based on a more critical view of language and the 
role of the speaker/author, the hermeneutics of suspicion assume that what is 
encountered are “surface level manifestations of underlying processes and structures 
that generate them” (Willig, 2012a, p.13) and therefore draws on external theoretical 
perspectives to deconstruct the social-structure of talk (Smith et al., 2009).  Thus, a 
hermeneutics of suspicion presents ‘deeper’ explanatory interpretations, “informed by a 
set of given concepts whose usefulness and validity are presupposed” (Willig, 2012a, 
p.12).  Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) articulate this as the injection of “critical social 
                                                 
38 This does not mean that the interpretation offers a ‘truer’ or ‘more real’ meaning than what is manifestly present, 
rather, it attempts to:  “[…] shed light on that which is foregrounded by illuminating the background against which it 
is set.  It is a question of pointing to parts of the picture (perhaps less obvious, somewhat obscured ones) as opposed 
to introducing entirely new ideas or concepts into it” (Willig, 2012a, p14).  Therefore, the empathic interpreter: “[…] 
attempts to illuminate that which presents itself by paying special attention to its features and qualities, by making 
connections between them and by noticing patterns and relationships.  Looking at the material from different angles, 
zooming in an out, foregrounding different parts of the whole as well as moving between a focus on parts and a focus 
on the whole [...]” (Willig, 2012a, p.13). 
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theory into the hermeneutical circle to facilitate an understanding of the hidden 
structures and tacit cultural dynamics that insidiously inscribe social meanings and 
values” (p.288). With the upshot that “[w]hat seems natural and self-evident should be 
problematised via insight (the hermeneutics of suspicion) and critique” (Alvesson & 
Skoldberg, 2009, p.167).  In this way, the hermeneutics of suspicion shares common 
aspects with Foucault’s work which, inspired by Nietzche’s genealogical method, 
attempted to “search for the shameful, fragmented origin behind societal phenomena, 
whose origins have become mythologised, with the passing of time, as noble rationality 
and unambiguous clarity” (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009, p.130)39.   
  
IPA is explicitly hermeneutic and primarily operates within a hermeneutics of empathy.  
It focuses on the content of participants’ talk and aims to reconstruct the 
speaker/author’s experience in their own terms.  Whilst phenomenology is concerned 
with the whole spectrum of experience from pre-reflective to reflective, it is important 
for the IPA researcher to make a distinction between spontaneous “intuitive reflections” 
and “formal, or phenomenological reflection”.  The latter is a necessary condition 
required of both the participant and the researcher during the process of conducting an 
IPA.  The process of reflection is not a simple binary and Smith et al., (2009) argued 
that there are different layers of reflection that we engage in.  They illustrated the 
breadth in the following way: 
 
“Layers of reflection  
1) ‘Pre-reflective reflexivity’.  Sartre argues that even in the most immediate flow experience, there 
is a minimal level of awareness, as we are ‘conscious of being conscious’ (1956/1943: 11).  
Walking down the country lane, I have this minimal level of awareness which does not interfere 
with the flow of experience and would not even be registered by me as awareness. 
 
2) ‘The reflective “glancing at” a pre-reflective experience’.  This involves intuitive, undirected 
reflection on the pre-reflective, as when we engage in daydreams, imagination and memory.  
Walking in the lane, I become aware of the warmth of the sun on my left shoulder and am 
reminded of swimming in the Mediterranean the year before. 
 
3) Attentive reflection on the pre-reflective.  My leg starts to ache and I begin to wonder what is 
wrong.  Is this a recurrence of the injury I had three months ago, which meant I had to stop 
running, and led to many painful sessions with the physiotherapist?  If so, what does it mean is 
happening to my body and does it have implications for other aspects of my life?  ‘Experience’ 
becomes ‘an experience’ of importance as it is registered as significant and requiring attention. 
 
4) ‘Deliberate controlled reflection’.  This is phenomenological reflection.  Later on in my office, I 
decide to reflect on the morning’s events.  I deliberately mentally replay the sequence of events 
and conduct a formal analysis of the content of my pre-reflective reflections on those events.  
My analysis represents a phenomenological reflection on my spontaneous reflection on what has 
happened to me.”  (Smith et al., 2009, p.189) 
                                                 
39 This paragraph is adapted from Colahan et al., (2012) p.52. 
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The process of conducting an IPA involves two people – the participant and the 
researcher - and it is the researcher who attempts to enter into the participant’s 
reflective cycle, and facilitate additional experiential reflections.  As they have gone 
through life the participant will, of their own volition, have reflected on their significant 
experiences in ways that are represented by layers 2 and 3 above.  Subsequently, when 
they are interviewed, they will convey some of this previous reflection to the researcher 
(typically it is ‘layer 3’ material which forms the content for an IPA).  However, the 
researcher will also be attempting to trigger and facilitate new reflections on the topic; 
some of these reflections will, again, be at layers 2-3 and be relatively unselfconscious, 
but some will represent a more conscious, active reflective engagement i.e. the type of 
phenomenological reflection outlined in layer 4.  So it is the researcher’s role during the 
interview to draw the participant’s awareness to their previously unselfconscious 
reflection, such that it becomes the focus of their new conscious reflection.  In this way, 
the transcript of the participant’s talk represents a record of their layered reflections, and 
the researcher then subsequently engages in their own consciously reflective (i.e. layer 4) 
phenomenological analysis of the participant’s talk.  This is what is meant when IPA 
theorists speak of the researcher engaging in a ‘double hermeneutic’.  In other words, 
the researcher, in conducting the IPA, is attempting to make empathic 
phenomenological sense (layer 4) of the participant’s attempts to make sense (layers 3 
and 4) of their own life experiences.   
 
However, “Smith et al., (2009) state that IPA can take a centre-ground position in 
relation to the hermeneutics of empathy and suspicion (see also Smith, 2004; Larkin, 
Watts & Clifton, 2006) as long as the focus remains on elucidating the meaning of 
experience.  This does not involve adopting the critical, deconstructive aim of the 
hermeneutics of suspicion; but rather, incorporating what Smith et al., (2009) called a 
hermeneutics of ‘questioning’.  So whilst the IPA researcher wants to empathise with 
the participant’s experience, and to ‘put themselves in their shoes’, they also want to 
examine the experience from other angles and ponder the meaning-making of the 
participant.  The IPA research process starts with a hermeneutics of empathy, but may 
become more questioning.  However, this questioning is always driven by the content of 
the text itself, rather than an external theoretical framework” (Colahan et al., 2012, 
p.51).  For example, I chose to incorporate ideas from existentialism into my IPA, but 
the analysis did not start with these theories.  I introduced them later on (See Section 
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3.6.3) in an effort to offer a deeper interpretation of what my participants’ were 
experiencing (See Chapter 6), not an explanation of why they described their 
experiences in the way that they did.  Of course, I cannot unproblemmatically lay claim 
to having conducted a theory-free IPA.  The theoretical foundations of IPA draw on the 
works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3), but 
the process itself began with an acceptance of the participants’ accounts as they 
signified to them.  Thus, whilst IPA may involve a hermeneutics of questioning, it is 
clearly a different interpretative process to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion (Smith 
et al., 2009). 
 
In contrast to IPA, I argue that FDA involves a hermeneutics of suspicion – not because 
it claims to reveal a hidden ‘truth’, but because it interrogates the data with an external 
theoretical framework in order to demonstrate the workings of discourse.  As Willig 
(2012a) states: “[...] there is interpretation in discourse analysis […] because discourse 
analysis is based on a particular interpretation of the meaning of language itself, of its 
function and its position in human experience and action.  In discourse analytic research, 
therefore, interpretation enters the picture at a very early stage [...]” (p.39).  Through the 
hermeneutics of suspicion, FDA looks beyond participants’ subjective meaning-making 
to consider the social structures through which, and for which, their meaning-making is 
made possible.  FDA can provide a sceptical, critical view of the broader social context, 
and prevent the researcher from falling into the trap of culturally-shared ‘common-sense’ 
meanings (Tunariu & Reavey, 2007).   
 
Ricouer (1996) argued that a combination of both hermeneutic positions was necessary 
to produce satisfactory insight into a phenomenon.  He argued that a dialectic of 
empathy-and-suspicion, between understanding-and-explanation encompassed the 
process of interpretation.  This call was mirrored by others recently who also favoured 
incorporating both hermeneutics of empathy and suspicion (see Langdridge, 2007; 
Rennie, 2007).  Smith et al., (2009) have argued that “it makes sense to present the two 
readings separately so that the reader can see the different analytic leverage [that] is 
going on” (p.106).  The twin focus analysis presented here represented a way of 
operationalising both of these theoretical calls.  FDA provided an interpretation that was 
more ‘top-down’, interrogating the text via theoretically-driven categories of meaning.  
In contrast, the IPA provided an interpretation that was more ‘bottom-up’, thoroughly 
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exploring the text in its own terms first of all, and only later did it incorporate other 
theoretical ideas in order to facilitate the understanding of the text. 
 
3.5 Procedure
40
 
Given the fact that I subscribe to the theoretical position that all qualitative research 
involves interpretation, it was important to note that interpretation did not simply start 
with the analyses of the transcripts - it played a role at every stage of the research 
process (Willig, 2012a).  It was important for me to reflect on how this influenced the 
decisions I made when conducting the research, and I discuss my experiences and 
decisions throughout the procedural section of the chapter. 
 
One other point to note is that whilst I made the decision to present the studies in this 
thesis in the order of (i) FDA of Therapists > (ii) FDA of Lay People > (iii) IPA of Lay 
People, I actually conducted the studies in the opposite order.  I discuss these decisions 
in more detail in sections 3.6.1 and 3.7, but for clarity I wish to flag that the procedural 
section is written in a way which reflects the order in which I conducted the research. 
 
3.5.1 Obtaining Ethical Consent to Conduct the Interviews
41
 
Obtaining ethical clearance involved separate processes for the Lay People (Studies 
Two and Three) and for the Couple Therapists (Study One). 
 
Lay People 
Obtaining ethical clearance to interview the lay people for Studies Two and Three 
required the preparation and submission of ethical documents to the University of East 
London ethics committee.  These included: An information sheet outlining the 
background and purpose of the research (see Appendix F), and how I planned to 
                                                 
40 Please note, due to word count restrictions, the detailed discussions of several procedural stages have been moved 
to the Appendices.  These points will be flagged in the text. 
41 Reflexive Note: At the time when I completed the ethics procedures outlined in Section 3.5.1, I did not fully 
appreciate or consider the role of ethics in the qualitative research process beyond the data collection stage.  However, 
as my understanding of qualitative research grew and I conducted the analyses, I began to appreciate the importance 
of reflecting on the ethical implications of the interpretations I was producing, and the power relations between me 
and the participants.  My role as a researcher gave me power to position my respondents and author their accounts in 
ways that they might not recognise or indeed agree with.  I discuss these ethical points in more detail in section 3.5.4 
and throughout section 3.6, but wish to flag that this was one way in which I was changed by the research process; I 
began to engage with the ethical process at all stages and at a level which went beyond simply getting permission to 
conduct my research. 
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conduct the interview process in an ethical way (see Section 3.5.4 for further 
discussion); a consent form for the participants to take part in the interview process (see 
Appendix G); and a consent form for the participants agreeing for their interview 
transcripts to be used in the research (see Appendix G).  These documents outlined 
participants’ right to withdraw, and that confidentiality would be assured.  Following 
submission minor amendments were suggested by the UEL ethics committee.  These 
comments were actioned and the documents were re-submitted and accepted by the 
Ethics committee (See Appendix I
42
). 
 
Couple Therapists 
Obtaining ethical clearance to interview the couple therapists for Study One required the 
completion of a two stage process.  The first stage involved meeting the ethical 
requirements of the UEL ethics committee, and the second stage was meeting the ethical 
requirements of the Relate institute research ethics committee.  For the first stage, the 
same ethical documents were prepared as outlined above for the Lay People and 
approved by the UEL ethics committee (see Appendices G & H).  For the second stage, 
these documents were sent to the Relate research ethics committee along with a copy of 
the interview schedule, and an additional Relate-specific ethics form, which outlined the 
purpose of the research in detail and also indicated that Relate would not have 
ownership or any claim to the research data or ‘findings’.  Once these documents had 
been accepted by the ethics committee (see Appendix J), the Director of the Relate 
Institute forwarded the details of my research to the managers of the London Relate 
centres.  The managers from these centres forwarded the details of my research to their 
therapists, and those willing to take part contacted me directly. 
 
3.5.2 The Interview Schedules 
Lay People 
As with any qualitative work, the epistemological position and theoretical framework 
adopted influenced the formulation of the interview questions (as well as the interview 
style – see Section 3.5.4).  Seeing that I was simultaneously adopting two different 
interpretative positions (one of empathy and one of suspicion) for the lay people, the 
interview schedule needed to be designed in a way such that it would permit the 
                                                 
42 The Ethical Clearance in Appendix E applied to all studies 
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collection of data that were suitable for both IPA and FDA.  Therefore, the selection of 
questions for the lay interviews was based upon my commitment to remain open and 
curious towards the participants’ experiences (in order to collect the rich 
phenomenological accounts necessary for IPA (e.g. Smith et al., 2009), whilst also 
eliciting productions of relationship satisfaction as a discursive construct.   Moreover, I 
had to be careful that I did not include leading questions which might reflect my own 
taken-for-granted intellectual and personal assumptions (see Section 3.5.4).  Thus, the 
set of questions devised to guide, but not to restrict, the interview conversations featured 
open-ended questions which tried to tap into the analytic foci of both FDA and IPA.  
For example questions such as ‘What do you understand by the term relationship 
satisfaction?’ were followed by ‘How do you know when you’re satisfied?  What does it 
feel like?’ (See Appendix K for full details of the interview schedule).  The aim was to 
encourage as much narrative, as much reflection as possible, and to prompt the 
participants to describe their internal life-world (for IPA), whilst noting points of 
tension in their accounts (particularly useful for FDA). 
 
Couple Therapists 
Similar to the lay people, an interview schedule was developed for the couple therapists, 
consisting of open-ended questions which were used as a guide to facilitate 
conversation, rather than to dictate it.  However, in the case of the therapists’ talk, I was 
only conducting an FDA and therefore, in some ways, I found designing the interview 
schedule for therapists less complex.   The questions all focussed on relationship 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction as concepts, and I did not include any questions designed 
to elicit phenomenological descriptions.  The participants were initially asked how they 
would describe the notion of relationship satisfaction, and what it meant to be in a 
satisfying relationship.  Next they were asked how relationship dissatisfaction got 
presented within the therapeutic context, and what constituted a therapeutic goal in 
relation to dissatisfaction.  Lastly they were asked whether any tensions arose between 
their professional and personal views, or between their views and those of their clients 
(See Appendix L).   
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3.5.3 The Participants 
Lay People 
Thirteen
43
 members of the general population agreed to be interviewed about their 
understandings and experiences of relationship satisfaction.  The participants, eight 
women and five men, aged between 23 and 41 years (with a mean age of 31 years) 
responded to an advert inviting people who were in a ‘long-term, heterosexual 
relationship’ to talk about their views on relationship satisfaction.  The adverts were 
placed around the University of East London Stratford Campus, and also emailed to 
friends and colleagues who, in turn, forwarded them to their acquaintances.  All of the 
respondents were based around London.  Eleven were white British, one was mixed-
race (British and Nigerian), and one was Bosnian.  Their professions included office 
workers, solicitors, teachers, students, project managers, researchers, and housewives.  
At the time of the interviews they all self-identified as being in long-term, heterosexual 
relationships, which ranged from one to twelve years.  Eight of them shared a home 
with their partner and five lived with friends in shared accommodation.  In addition, 
whilst they all had experiences of relationship dissatisfaction and relationship 
dissolution, at the time of the interviews all of them considered themselves to be in 
relationships that were satisfying. 
 
Couple Therapists 
Seven Relate couple therapists agreed to be interviewed about their understandings of 
relationship satisfaction and dissatisfaction.  The participants, all women, aged between 
44 and 66 (with a mean age of 55 years) responded to an advert circulated to the 
London Relate Centres inviting couple therapists to talk about their views on 
relationship satisfaction.  All of the respondents were based around London, and all 
seven were white British.  They had been providing therapy from between 2.5 to 20 
years (with a mean average of 11 years).  Most of the therapists’ practice of couple 
therapy was informed by a mix of therapeutic models, and they incorporated theoretical 
ideas from psychodynamics, cognitive-behavioural therapy, and systemic therapy.   
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Although thirteen interviews were conducted, the audio recording of one of them was corrupted and so I could not 
transcribe it.  Therefore, the FDA and IPA were conducted on the remaining twelve interviews. 
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3.5.4 Conducting the interviews 
Whilst interview schedules had been designed for both the lay people and couple 
therapists, the aim was to capture the richness and complexity of participants’ meaning 
making and so the schedule was used as a guide to facilitate conversation, rather than to 
dictate it.  The questions were not always asked in the same sequence, and additional 
lines of thought or questions were pursued as they arose.   
 
Lay people 
After the participants indicated they were interested in taking part they were sent a 
detailed information sheet by email outlining the purpose of the research and the 
interview process (see Appendix F).  If they subsequently agreed to take part in the 
research a convenient time and place was scheduled for an interview.  The interviews all 
took place between December 2008 and May 2009 in the participants’ homes, except 
for one, which took place on the UEL Stratford Campus, and they lasted between 45 
minutes and one and a half hours.   
Before each interview the participants were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix 
G) indicating they had read the information sheet and they were voluntarily willing to 
take part in the interview, and they were reminded of their right to withdraw at any time.  
Moreover, due to the potentially sensitive nature of the topic, I reassured the 
interviewees that they did not have to answer any questions they did not want to, and 
that anonymity would be ensured.  Following the interviews the participants were given 
a second consent form (see Appendix G) giving permission to use their comments in the 
research.  They were also given the option of being sent a copy of the interview 
transcript to review before the analysis, but none of the participants wanted one (please 
see Appendix M for a reflexive account of the interviews with the lay people). 
Therapists 
Similar to the lay-people, once the couple therapists indicated they were willing to take 
part in an interview a convenient time and place was scheduled to speak.  The semi-
structured interviews were conducted with the therapists at the Relate centres where 
they worked, and they lasted between 1 hour and 90 minutes.  All the interviews took 
place between February and May 2010.   
Chapter 3.  Research questions, methodology and methods 
82 
 
Again, before each interview the therapists were asked to sign a consent form (see 
Appendix G) indicating they had read the information sheet and they were voluntarily 
willing to take part in the interview, and they were reminded of their right to withdraw 
at any time.  I advised the therapists that they did not have to answer any questions that 
they did not want to (although I was not asking them any questions about their personal 
relationship experiences).  Following the interviews the therapists were asked to give 
consent to their comments being used in the research (see Appendix G).  They were also 
given the option of being sent a copy of the interview transcript to review before the 
analysis, but like the lay-people, none of the therapists wanted one (please see Appendix 
N for a reflexive account of the interviews with the therapists). 
3.5.5 After the Interviews 
Part of the qualitative research process (particularly phenomenological research) is the 
notion of the researcher reflecting on and ‘bracketing’ the assumptions and pre-
conceptions they bring to the research process.  Willig (2012a) states that this “[…] 
does not mean erasing them; rather, it involves a process of recognising their effects, of 
interrogating them, of being suspicious of them and, as a result, being able to hold them 
more lightly and more flexibly” (p.98).  However, Smith (2007) draws on Heidegger’s 
work to highlight the way in which a researcher may not be aware of their pre-
conceptions, and that these may only become visible through the analytic process.  This 
was certainly the case for me, possibly because it was the first time I had conducted 
qualitative analyses, and at the time of conducting the interviews I did not know what 
preconceptions I was bringing to the research process.  In an attempt to reflect on and 
manage my assumptions, I kept a reflexive diary (see Appendix O) after each of the 
interviews.  Immediately after each one I would write down any thoughts or feelings I 
had about how the interview had gone.  These notes were initially in simple lay terms 
(rather than consciously trying to couch them in ‘appropriate’ technical terms), which I 
then went back to and discussed with my Director of Studies.  This process helped to 
highlight some of the assumptions I was bringing to the research process (please see 
Appendix P for reflexive examples of how this process worked). 
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3.5.6 Transcribing the interviews 
Transcription involves many decisions by the researcher and is an interpretative act in 
and of itself (e.g. Kvale, 1996; Dilley, 2004).  The transcription protocol represented 
theoretical assumptions about which facets of the text were considered important, and 
thereby shaped the possibilities of the subsequent analyses that were conducted and the 
interpretations that were produced (e.g. Emerson and Frosh, 2004).  Broadly speaking, I 
produced a ‘de-naturalized’ transcript, which had been relatively ‘cleaned’.  This was 
because I was primarily interested in (1) the meaning of the content (IPA); and (2) the 
macro discursive structure of the content (FDA).  That is, I was not focusing on the 
micro situated language use of the respondents.  I acknowledge that the situated context 
(including the dynamics and power relations of the interview; respondents’ attempts to 
represent themselves in certain ways; and my decisions to pursue certain avenues and 
not others) would have inevitably shaped the process of data collection and my 
consequent feelings and decisions about the interpretative process.  However, these 
were not my primary focus.  Thus, all the interviews (lay people and couple therapists) 
were digitally audio recorded and transcribed (soon after each interview took place) by 
me using the transcription protocol outlined in Appendix Q, with all participants given a 
pseudonym.  Whilst quite laborious, the process of transcribing the data was very useful 
as it embedded me within the participants’ accounts and ensured I was familiar with 
their narratives for the following stages of the analyses. 
 
 
3.6 Conducting the Analyses 
 
3.6.1 Lay People – The Twin Focus Analysis – Deciding on an interpretative 
sequence 
One of the key decisions that I had to make when I conducted the twin focus analysis on 
lay peoples’ interviews was the procedural sequence in which I conducted the IPA and 
FDA.  Whilst this seemed like a pragmatic decision at first, it soon became clear that the 
decisions I made had a theoretical basis, and had implications for the ways in which I 
balanced the different interpretative foci whilst I worked through the various phases of 
the two analyses.  
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In terms of the sequence of analyses, in my case I felt more comfortable and confident 
starting with the empathic IPA.  As Willig (2012a) has stated “Although ‘empathic’ 
interpretation is not easy and is a skill that needs to be deployed and practised, it does 
not require familiarity with existing theories” (p.14).  In contrast, the suspicious FDA 
required a technical understanding of language-use being structured into coherent 
discourses which, whilst I ‘understood on paper’, I had not actually applied in practice 
as an interpretative framework.  Therefore, I took the position that searching for these 
system-like linguistic ‘packages’ of metaphors, assumptions, and ideas would be 
facilitated by engaging in the IPA first.  When I approached the IPA I felt I had a 
‘looser’ more open gaze towards the complex, initially undifferentiated, thematic 
patterns as they emerged as units of meaning; whether these were articulated as 
concept-understandings, phenomenological descriptions or hermeneutic preoccupations 
that held personal significance for the speaker.  I felt that this provided me with a 
detailed ‘close up’ understanding of the text, from which I could subsequently proceed 
to interrogate it from the ‘distanced’ analytic point of FDA.  Again, as with all of these 
pragmatic decisions, whilst I chose to conduct the IPA first, other researchers could 
choose to start with the FDA
44
 to provide a ‘panoramic view’ of the prevalent linguistic 
constructions of objects and events, which could also raise familiarity and aid the 
researcher to navigate the text when subsequently viewing it through the lens of IPA
45
.   
 
However, whilst I conducted the complete IPA before the FDA, the first stage of both 
analyses were conducted simultaneously. 
 
3.6.2 Conducting the first stage of Studies Two and Three simultaneously 
The first phase of analysis for both IPA and FDA involved a detailed line-by-line 
deconstruction / coding of the interview transcripts.  Therefore, in the case of the twin 
focus analysis on lay people’s talk, I decided to conduct this first phase of analysis for 
both the IPA and FDA in parallel (See Appendix R for full explanation as to why I took 
this decision).   
 
                                                 
44 See, for example, Willig (2011) who presents a discursive, then phenomenological (not IPA) mapping of the 
experience of being diagnosed with cancer. 
45 This is because the twin focus approach took the position that language and experience are deeply intertwined, and 
therefore the sequence of the analyses could be conducted in either way. 
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This process was conducted on each interview in turn and began with me reading and 
re-reading the transcript to ensure I was familiar with the content.  Once familiar, the 
transcript was prepared in a three column table, with the interview in the central column.  
The left hand column was then used for the subsequent detailed coding of the transcript.  
The coding process involved me systematically ‘un-packing’ the content of each 
interview.  This meant I made a concerted effort to not take anything for granted in the 
transcript, but attempted to clearly break down, in detail, what was being expressed and 
clarify any ambiguous comments.  For example, if a respondent said something like 
“…it’s like this…”, I would make sure that I clearly traced and identified the object to 
which they were referring (See Appendix S).   
 
This initial encounter with the texts often felt like I was stumbling in the dark, and I 
frequently felt very unsure or reticent when making notes in the left hand column.  I was 
concerned whether or not I was ‘doing it right’, and wanted to ensure that I was not 
simply paraphrasing the transcript.  I felt like I did not want to ‘miss anything’, so I 
spent excessive amounts of time trying to peel back the layers of taken-for-granted 
meaning, struggling through three pages of transcript a day, and when I finished coding 
all of the interviews I felt extremely relieved.   
 
3.6.3 Completing the IPA of Lay Talk 
 “To generate different kinds of interpretation requires not just the application of 
different analytic strategies but also the adoption of a different stance towards the data” 
(Willig, 2012a, p.147).  In the initial stage I tried to adopt a stance that would allow me 
to conduct a line-by-line deconstruction of the text that could simultaneously form the 
basis of the IPA and FDA (for the lay).  In the second phase of analysis, this coding 
from the first phase was revisited (along with the text) in light of two things:  1) a 
deliberate focus on the IPA informed research questions and analytic foci and 2) a 
simultaneous relaxed awareness about the research questions and analytic foci of the 
FDA.   
 
Thus, interpretative coding/structuring of units of meaning and initial themes were 
noted in the right hand column of the table, primarily for the IPA, but also for the FDA.  
These were written in two different formats to distinguish between them (See Appendix 
S).  From this position the process of ‘relaxed awareness’ allowed me to attempt to 
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suspend my attention on one analysis to allow the full unfolding of the other analysis.  
There was a deliberate focus on one analysis, while the second analysis was considered 
from a position of relaxed awareness.  In this second stage, I did not solicit the 
hermeneutics of suspicion, but remained open to allow the interpretative stories to 
unfold.  This allowed me to conform to the IPA process in an inductively rigorous way 
whereby the themes could be interpreted, whilst also facilitating the initial stages of the 
FDA.   
 
Once this second phase was complete, the IPA and FDA analyses became completely 
separate, and the IPA continued through the stages of analysis as outlined by Smith et 
al., (2009).  Recurrent themes were produced along with illustrative extracts.  These 
were compiled in a new document (See Appendix T) which was then analysed for 
higher order themes, guided by three things: i) points that appeared relevant and 
significant to the participant; ii) points that appeared to be highly recurrent; and iii) 
points that addressed the research questions.  Thus, the preliminary themes became sub-
themes, and sub-themes with similar overarching content were ‘clustered’ into three 
Master Themes, and each one was given an appropriate descriptive label to illustrate the 
conceptual nature of the component sub-themes.  These master themes and sub-themes 
were recorded in tabular form (See Appendix U), along with indicative quotes from the 
transcript (with page and line numbers) to illustrate each sub-theme, and also to ensure 
that the integrity of what the participants said was preserved.   
 
Whilst this account might suggest that the process was a simple, linear one, it was 
actually a circular, iterative process with much back-and-forth between the different 
stages, which involved the adoption and discarding of many different themes and 
interpretations.  This process involved many discussions with my Director of Studies 
and much personal deliberation before I reached a ‘final’ interpretation of each 
participant’s narrative.  These stages were repeated for all interview transcripts, and 
whilst I attempted to approach each interview with an open mind, the influence of 
preceding analyses were often easily foregrounded in my mind (please see Appendix V 
for a reflexive account of conducting the IPA). 
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3.6.4 Completing the FDA of Lay talk 
Once I had completed the IPA, I returned to the FDA, which had been left since the 
second phase of the IPA.  Thus the coding and other purposeful notes from the first two 
phases were revisited through the lens of the FDA research questions and analytic foci, 
and a relaxed awareness of the IPA findings that had just been completed.  I now 
focussed principally on the FDA and the analysis was guided by Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine’s (2008) framework for Foucauldian Discourse Analysis.  Therefore, the 
analysis focused on looking for, and mapping the following: 
 
i. Problematisations: I looked across the transcripts to see “under what circumstances 
and by whom [were] aspects of human being[s] [e.g. relationship dissatisfaction] 
rendered problematic” and the “moral domains or judgement[s]” upon which they 
were based (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008, p.101). 
ii. ‘Technologies of Power’ which were “located beyond [the] text, and refer[ed] to an 
assemblage of knowledge, instruments, persons, buildings and spaces which act on 
human conduct from a distance” (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008, p.102). 
iii. Subject Positions made available through certain constructions of relationship 
satisfaction.  How these positions made available certain rights and speaking duties 
for the satisfied or dissatisfied-subject. 
iv. ‘Technologies of the Self’ and associated processes of ‘subjectification’, which 
referred to instances where individuals exercised power over themselves “by acting 
on themselves within a particular moral order and according to a more or less 
conscious ethical goal” via “specific practices of self-regulation” (Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008, p.103).  That is, I looked for the practices-of-the-self which the 
satisfied subject or the dissatisfied subject were compelled to engage in and with, in 
order to produce and take-up different ‘versions of self’ (e.g. Wetherell & Edley, 
1999). 
 
Interpretative points relating to the four analytic foci above (and informed by the initial 
detailed coding) were noted in the right hand margin of each of the interviews (e.g. See 
Appendix S).  This process was repeated for all of the interview transcripts, and then the 
dominant (i.e. most prevalent) examples of the above analytic foci were recorded in a 
separate document and illustrated with extracts from the interview transcripts (e.g. See 
Appendix W).  In this way, an analysis of the entire body of data was conducted to 
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arrive at an overall discursive mapping of the topic.  Again, this was an iterative process 
and many ideas and hunches were adopted and discarded along the way (please see 
Appendix X for a reflexive account of conducting the FDA of lay talk).  
 
3.6.6 FDA with the Couple Therapists 
The analytic process for conducting the FDA with the therapists mirrored the approach I 
took for the lay people except I did not have the parallel phenomenological focus.  
Therefore, the initial coding phase was conducted purely for the FDA, and during the 
later stages of the analysis I did not find myself slipping into a parallel empathic-
interpretative attitude (e.g. See Appendices Y and Z).  I found the FDA with the couple 
therapists more accessible because I had experience and more confidence in applying 
Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine’s (2008) theoretical framework following the FDA of lay 
people’s talk.  Moreover, the couple therapists more readily discussed relationship 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction as concepts in-and-of-themselves (although their 
emphasis was more on relationship dissatisfaction and the practices of the dissatisfied 
subject – see chapter 4), and this meant I found it easier to ‘see’ problematisations and 
technologies of power being produced in the therapists talk compared to the talk of the 
lay people.  Again, this was probably due, in part, to the fact that I did not ask couple 
therapists about their personal experiences of relationship satisfaction, and therefore the 
data that were jointly produced contained less phenomenological descriptions than the 
lay people’s accounts (please see Appendix AA for an ethical reflection on the FDA of 
therapists’ talk). 
 
Once the analyses from the three studies were completed, I then had to decide how to 
present my interpretative readings. 
 
3.7 Presenting the Analyses 
Whilst I conducted the analyses in the order of Lay IPA > Lay FDA > Therapists FDA, 
I made the interpretative decision to present the empirical chapters in the opposite order.  
This was because, having adopted Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine’s (2008) framework 
and engaged / struggled with the theory and the analyses, I felt like I was producing a 
coherent narrative, but one that made more sense when presented from ‘Top-down’ to  
‘Bottom-up’.  That is, one which started with the broader discursive structures (e.g. 
problematisations, technologies, and subject positions, processes of subjectification), 
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and then moved onto subjective experience.  This felt like the presentation of a narrative 
that started from a point of distance and suspicion and gradually moved closer to 
examine the phenomenon from a ‘closer’, more empathic position.  Therefore, the 
interpretative narrative now begins in Chapter 4 with the FDA of Couple Therapists’ 
talk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4.  Couple therapists’ constructions of relationship satisfaction 
 
90 
 
4. 
 
Couple therapists’ constructions of relationship 
satisfaction 
 
Partners experiencing relationship dissatisfaction may choose to engage in couple 
therapy (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7) and they often report benefits from this practice in 
terms of increased relationship satisfaction (e.g. Shadish & Baldwin, 2003).   Critical 
theorists (e.g. Rose, 1989; Kleinplatz, 2001) have nonetheless also highlighted the need 
to examine the role that the institution of therapy plays as part of the norm-setting 
mechanisms that prescribe what is meant by ‘relationship satisfaction’, thus contributing 
to the socio-historical cycle of knowledge (e.g. Nicholson, 1993; Tieffer, 2005).  In line 
with this theoretical call, the present chapter offers the first empirical study of this thesis: 
a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis of couple therapists’ talk, which maps the ways in 
which they construct relationship satisfaction.   
 
4.1 Contextualising the Analysis – A brief reflection on the interviews with 
therapists 
Across the body of interviews with the couple therapists, relationship dissatisfaction is 
discursively produced as the phenomenon which they are “always looking at”. This 
emphasis is illustrated by Gwen
46
: 
  
Extract 1: 
Interviewer:  [In couple therapy] (.) does satisfaction, as a concept get (.) does it get 
thought about much?  Does it get considered much? 
Gwen:  No. 
Interviewer:  Really? 
Gwen:  I don’t think so, because we’re working with the negative all the time. 
Interviewer: Erm, so, if we take the flip of that (.) is dissatisfaction something that’s 
Gwen:  yeah, we’re always looking at the dissatisfaction, we’re always looking at 
dissatisfaction.  Erm, and [“What’s satisfaction?”] it’s not a question that people ask 
very much, and [researchers] are obviously looking at (.) predictors of failure, 
predictors of distress all the time.   
(Gwen, 60 year old, white Scottish therapist, with 20 years experience.  Pg10, lines 455-
468) 
 
                                                 
46 To ensure anonymity, all participant names are pseudonyms. 
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In particular, the conversations focus on the ways in which relationship dissatisfaction is 
predominantly understood as a problematic, “negative” relational state (by both the 
therapists and their clients); a dualistic construction that is underpinned by research that 
produces dissatisfaction  in terms of categories such as “failure” and “distress”.   In 
addition the therapists talk about the ways in which they understand their clients’ 
patterns of behaviour as leading to, and sustaining dissatisfaction.  While all the 
therapists interviewed in this study are adamant that relationship dissatisfaction is a 
subjective, client-specific problem, there are incidences where they, themselves, 
produce a state describable as “relationship dissatisfaction” in negative terms.  Rather 
than, for example, as a potential platform for re-negotiating needs and subjective 
realities, which could lead to collaboratively derived new knowledges from, and about, 
each partner in the couple.  Their narratives tend to focus on highlighting the 
relationally satisfying skills and behaviours that they see as a core part of the treatment 
programmes and which underpin their therapeutic interventions.    
 
Overall, the concept of ‘relationship satisfaction’ is talked about far less explicitly.  
Rather, it comes to be known through the production of its discursive corollary - 
relationship dissatisfaction - as problematic (that is, through the absence of satisfaction - 
See also Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2).  It is also constructed through the satisfying practices 
and technologies-of-self warranted by the institution of couple therapy, which render the 
‘problem’ of relationship dissatisfaction manageable and the dissatisfied subject 
governable.   
 
The Foucauldian Discourse Analysis of the body of data generated with the therapists 
reflects this conversational path.  It will be presented in two parts and outlines and 
illustrates my discursive interpretation of the conditions of possibility which produce 
‘relationship dissatisfaction’ and the ‘dissatisfied subject’ as knowable and governable 
in certain ways.  In line with Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine’s (2008) framework (See 
Chapter 3, Section 3.6.4), Part 1 (Section 4.2) of my discursive interpretation begins by 
deconstructing the therapists’ accounts of relationship dissatisfaction as a problem, and 
maps the technologies of power underpinning these accounts (in particular, the ‘expert’ 
mainstream psychological knowledges), and the subject positions made available 
through constructions for the ‘relationally dissatisfied’ subject.  In Part 2 (Section 4.3), 
the analysis deconstructs the dominant therapeutic interventions presented by the 
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therapists as underpinning the practice of couple therapy.  More specifically, it maps the 
ways in which the therapists understand their clients’ behaviour as dissatisfying, the 
subject positions made available to clients through these constructions, and the 
satisfying technologies-of-self they warrant.  I argue that these are part of the processes 
of subjectification that operate at the level of ‘ethical problematisations’; by this I mean 
at the level of practices-of-the-self, which normalise certain types of satisfying 
behaviour.  In parallel with the assemblage of institutional practices and powers of 
couple therapy (including the role of the therapist and therapeutic space) these processes 
of subjectification function to produce a governable, ethical, relationally-satisfied 
subject;
47
 a ‘version-of-self’ (Wetherell & Edley, 1999) that dissatisfied clients are 
compelled to take up and invest in.  Table 1 below summarises the discursive 
constructions which are presented in this chapter. 
 
Table 1:  Summary of the Discursive Analysis of Couple Therapists’ Talk  
Discursive Constructions of Relationship 
Dissatisfaction 
Subject Positions 
Relationship 
Dissatisfaction as 
Problematic 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as an 
intolerable threshold 
 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as a 
state of poor physical health and 
psychological wellbeing 
 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as 
bad-example parenting 
 
Therapeutic 
modes of 
subjectification: 
Positioning and 
satisfying clients 
through couple 
therapy 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as 
Sexual Inactivity 
The Dissatisfied sexually non-
intimate subject 
The Dissatisfied sexually 
dysfunctional subject 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as 
Unfulfilled Needs 
The Dissatisfied Unfulfilled 
Hyper Critic Subject Position 
The Dissatisfied Unfulfilled 
Silent Partner Subject Position 
Relationship Satisfaction as 
“Awakened Relating” 
The Satisfied Awakened Subject 
 
                                                 
47 My analysis uses the following notation conventions: 
 Names I give to constructions, discourses, subject positions etc. are “italicised and in double quotation 
marks” 
 Quotes from participants are in “double quotation marks” but not italicised unless illustrating participants’ 
own emphases 
 Words of phrases that I do not take at face value, or which I am problematizing, are in ‘single quotation 
marks’  
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Before presenting my analysis, I wish to reflexively acknowledge that I make claims 
about the ways in which the respondents produce and reify certain constructions, 
practices, and subject positions.  However, in doing so, my analysis also functions to 
further reify these concepts through its status as academic knowledge.  Therefore, I wish 
to explicitly acknowledge that this analysis is, in itself, a discursive construction – 
produced by me as a way of interpreting the respondents’ talk about relationship 
satisfaction through the application of discursive and Foucauldian analytical concepts.  
Whilst I present a deconstruction of the talk that produces and sustains relationship 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction, I accept that my analysis is a form of knowledge 
production that could also be deconstructed. 
 
Part 1 
 
4.2 Problematizing Relationship Dissatisfaction 
Across the couple therapists’ talk, relationship dissatisfaction is presented as knowably 
problematic in three dominant ways; each of which positions and disempowers the 
relationally dissatisfied subject in different ways.  I call these constructions: 
1. “Relationship Dissatisfaction as a subjectively intolerable threshold” 
2. “Relationship Dissatisfaction as a state of poor physical health and 
psychological wellbeing” 
3. “Relationship Dissatisfaction as bad-example parenting” 
 
Implicit or explicit to all of these productions is the notion of relationship satisfaction as 
a favoured discursive site.  I present these three constructions in sections: 4.2.1; 4.2.2; 
and 4.2.3 respectively. 
 
4.2.1 Relationship Dissatisfaction as an intolerable threshold 
When constructed as “an intolerable threshold” relationship dissatisfaction is rendered 
problematic for, and by clients because it represents a relational state that has crossed a 
threshold which is understood as no longer “working” for them.  This construction 
produces a static, dualistic relationship dissatisfaction in which the couple are 
understood as being ‘stuck’ as a ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘distressed’ couple - no longer able to 
manage the everyday intersubjective processes of their relationship.  This positions the 
dissatisfied subjects as being on an unavoidable pathway to relationship dissolution and 
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at risk of incurring the associated ‘costs’, and losing the investment they have put into 
their relationship over the years.  Therefore, the “intolerable threshold” simultaneously 
functions to signify a “threshold of potential lost investment”, “a threshold of anxiety” 
and a “threshold of last resorts” which, having been passed, incites individuals 
classified as “dissatisfied” to engage with couple therapy.  The operation of these 
constructions is illustrated by Joan: 
 
Extract 2: 
“[…] we see the couples (.) they come when whatever has worked (.) ceases to work, or 
fails to work or hasn’t been working for a while, so they decide to do something about it, 
because it’s crunch time and it’s the last resort […] this is the last resort coming to 
Relate”. 
(Joan, 62-year-old, white British therapist, with 20 years experience.  Pg5, lines 202-
209) 
 
Across the therapists’ accounts, it is constructed as a pre-given that relationship 
dissatisfaction is framed and experienced as a problem by clients because they are 
presented as having chosen to engage with therapy in order to ‘rectify’ it.   In Joan’s 
extract, for example, she speaks of the threshold of relationship dissatisfaction as a 
“crunch time” which warrants engagement with couple therapy as a “last resort”.  In this 
way the ‘dissatisfied’ subject is produced as an ultimatum subject who, having passed 
an event horizon
48
 of dissatisfaction, is compelled to engage in couple therapy or face 
relationship dissolution.  This is a rigid, one-way construction which makes available 
only two courses of action for the ‘dissatisfied’ couple: either “come to therapy” or 
“lose everything”.  Other discursive possibilities are closed down and no other avenues 
for action are available to the dissatisfied couple when the “intolerable threshold” 
discourse is mobilised.  This mirrors Gwen’s comments in Extract 1 and presents couple 
therapy as the institutional space in which the ‘problem’ of relationship dissatisfaction 
is presented as manageable, and where dissatisfied subjects are made governable via 
their urge to “do something about” their relationship dissatisfaction.   
 
For the therapists, the “relationship dissatisfaction as an intolerable threshold” 
construction acts as a diagnostic tool to account for their clients’ decision to engage 
with couple therapy.  Whilst these constructions produce an active, agentic dissatisfied 
subject - insofar as they are positioned as having decided to engage in therapy - the 
                                                 
48 The term ‘event horizon’ comes from Astrophysics and refers to the gravitational boundary of a Black Hole.  Once 
this boundary has been crossed, nothing (including light) can escape the gravitational pull of the Black Hole. 
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therapeutic technologies of power operate through clients’ privileging the institution of 
couple therapy (Rose, 1989) as the only site in which their dissatisfaction can be made 
manageable, and through which they can be repositioned as satisfied subjects.   
Moreover, whilst not explicit, Joan’s production of the dissatisfied relationship 
“ceas[ing] to work” recycles connotations of the couple as an economic unit of 
production (see also Willig & dew Valor, 1999, as cited in Smtih, 2008), thereby 
constructing relationship dissatisfaction as a problematic state of non-optimal economic 
functioning.  These economic connotations, implicit in the production of dissatisfied 
relationships as having passed an “intolerable threshold”, reflect mainstream 
psychological accounts based on interdependence theory (Rusbult et al., 2004) and 
make visible the imminent loss of everything that clients have “invested” in their 
relationship.  This economic “threshold of lost investment” construction is also 
mobilised by Rebecca in order to make sense of the uncertainty and anguish with which 
her clients present: 
 
Extract 3: 
 “[…] they’re at a crisis point generally where (.) and it’s (.) people’s lives are 
crumbling in front of you (.) because, you know, you’ve invested years sometimes, 30 
years, you might have had children, the emotional investment (.) is absolutely huge and 
they’re at breaking point generally (.) the vast majority of people are, are at real crunch 
point […] they don’t know whether or not they can survive this, You know, “How 
much more can I take?”  You know, “It’s killing me”, you know this type of feeling […] 
you know, if you (.) hit a point, where you’re thinking “Well what was the point of all 
that?” you know, that could happen any time”. 
(Rebecca, 44 year old, white British therapist, with 7 years experience. Pg4, lines 159-
170) 
 
In Rebecca’s extract she also puts forward the construction of “relationship 
dissatisfaction as an intolerable threshold”, and uses the exact same “crunch point” 
terminology as did Joan.   Constructed in this way relationship dissatisfaction is 
problematic for the clients as it represents them having passed a “threshold of anxiety” 
- a condition of “crumbling” psychological anguish, “killing” them, and leaving them in 
a state of disempowered uncertainty asking “How much more can I take?”  However, 
simultaneously drawing on broader economic discourses, the relationally dissatisfied 
client is also positioned as desperate and potentially fatalistic.  Faced with losing the 
“huge” “investment” they have made in the relationship, in terms of “emotional 
investment” and also “children”, they are left in a position of questioning “What was the 
point of all that?”  (Rebecca’s production of the dissatisfying “intolerable threshold” 
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also hints at construction of relationship dissatisfaction as having a detrimental impact 
on children, but this is explored further in Section 4.2.3).  This shifting production of 
the dissatisfied couple as a site of “psychological anguish” and one of “investment 
awareness” once again demonstrates the multiplicity and fluidity of everyday sense-
making.  The couple relationship is constructed as a form of investment, with the 
associated expectations that both partners should receive something in return for their 
investment.  This discursive explanation mirrors other discursive work (e.g. Hochschild, 
2003; Willig & dew Valor, 1999 as cited in Smith, 2008) which has illustrated the 
dominance of economic discourses in producing and governing inter-subjective 
behaviour.  Relationship satisfaction is implicitly constructed as a process of mutual 
giving and receiving (a construction explored in further detail in Section 4.3.3) that 
prevents the “intolerable threshold” (and its associated costs) being reached.  In this 
way, the “intolerable threshold” is a relational construction which responsibilises one 
or both partners for their relationship dissatisfaction and prompts them into taking 
action by attending therapy.  Charlotte produces two distinct ways in which this 
prompting takes place: 
 
Extract 4: 
“[…] it can be (.) something disastrous from left field.  You know, the, erm, the nasty 
big secret (.) the person’s not who they thought they were etc. (.) or it can just be, erm, 
you know, the (.) the tipping point of all the dissatisfaction just gets [too much] (.) with 
no, with no erm, understanding from the other one that this is how you feel about it, that 
there is something that they can do, that it’s worth doing.  So (.) you know, I think there 
is a sort of spectrum of how dissatisfaction creeps in”. 
(Charlotte, 66 year old, white British therapist, with 14 years experience. Pg7, lines 
298-309) 
 
Charlotte puts forward two different ways in which the “intolerable threshold” can be 
reached, each with different implications for the power relations within the couple.  
Firstly, there is the sudden “disastrous” shock from “left field” such as a “nasty secret”.  
In this case, the individual with the secret is presented as holding more power as they 
occupy a position of knowledge, and it is the discovery of this “secret” knowledge that 
shocks their partner across their subjective “intolerable threshold” of relationship 
dissatisfaction.  In this example, the couples’ relationship dissatisfaction is primarily 
individualised and located within the partner who had been lied to, yet it is 
simultaneously collectivised as a discursive product of their partner’s actions.  In 
contrast to the sudden shock, Charlotte also mobilises a construction of the “intolerable 
threshold” being breached as a result of the gradual accumulation of “all the 
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relationship dissatisfaction”, and this construction represents a more ambiguous power 
relationship between partners.  Whilst there is not an obvious subject to blame (e.g. like 
the partner with the “nasty secret”), an “oblivious” dissatisfying partner is produced 
who has “no understanding” that their partner is dissatisfied, nor “that there is 
something that they can do” to address it, and therefore they are positioned as (at least 
partly) responsible for their partner’s dissatisfaction due to their relational ignorance.   
 
Operating through both of these constructions of the “intolerable threshold” is the 
notion of the dissatisfying relationship as a site in which partners do not fully know 
each other.  By contrast, relationship satisfaction is implicitly constructed as a site of 
open honesty, with no “secrets”; in which the relationally satisfied subjects are 
compelled to know and be known by each other. This recycles dominant discourses of 
romantic idealism which provide heightened expectations about the relationally satisfied 
couple, as well as discourses of ‘disclosing intimacy’ (Jamieson, 1998; Finn, 2012) as a 
route to satisfaction.  The upshot is that not knowing each other is presented as a 
relational practice which can lead to the “intolerable threshold” being breached by one, 
and then both partners.  Thus, through this relational construction, both partners are 
responsibilised and called into action because their way of relating is scrutinised vis-a-
vis the romantic and intimate imperatives to be ‘known’.  There is very limited 
discursive space available in which satisfied partners can occupy a position in which 
they can be understood as being able to retain aspects of their ‘selves’ as hidden.  
Instead, they are positioned as being compelled to open up and not withhold anything 
from each other and this reflects the satisfying prescriptions of mainstream 
psychological (e.g. Prager & Roberts, 2004) and therapeutic (e.g. Meneses & Greenberg, 
2011) research.  This form of governance is further sustained and warranted through the 
confessional technologies (Foucault, 1978) of the institution of couple therapy and its 
associated prescriptions for satisfying technologies-of-self which pivot around partners 
not withholding secrets from each other; a further example of the psy-complex (Rose, 
1989) in operation (see Sections 4.3. and 4.4 for further discussion). 
 
However, there is an element of tension for the therapists when mobilising the static, 
dualistic construction of “relationship dissatisfaction as an intolerable threshold”.  
This tension is outlined by Phillipa: 
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Extract 5: 
Phillipa:  “[...] the couple aren’t able to function […] the word that springs to mind (.) is 
disharmony.  (.) But that’s hilarious in itself because I’m asking couples to live with 
disharmony ordinarily.  That life isn’t all about harmony, that it’s light and shade (.) so 
(.) it’s funny to use the word disharmony […] So the erm (.) the satisfaction bit (.) I 
don’t own, I can’t answer that as my question in a funny sort of way, because […] I 
can’t do it for them.  So I think it’s a difficult question, because it’s not my question”. 
(Phillipa, 49 year old, white Welsh therapist, with 4 years experience.  Pg5, lines 234-
240) 
 
A tension appears for Phillipa when she sees relationship dissatisfaction as an 
“intolerable threshold” in which the “couple aren’t able to function” because she 
simultaneously normalises dissatisfaction (“disharmony”) as an inherent part of 
“ordinary” relating, and presents relationships as sites of “both light and shade”.  Hence, 
relationship dissatisfaction is here elaborated and framed as a relational practice that is 
simultaneously detrimental and normal.  This tension illustrates the way in which 
dualistic constructions breakdown at the interpersonal level in which behaviours and 
experiences are continuously constructed and re-constructed.  Seeing this tension in 
action once again illustrates the multiplicity and fluidity of everyday sense-making, and 
the social constructionist proposal that discourses are mobilised in dynamic and 
contradictory ways (Jackson & Scott, 2010).  However, as Phillipa shifts between these 
contrasting constructions, she attempts to manage the discursive tension by positioning 
her clients as the arbiters of their subjectively dissatisfying threshold.  In this way, she 
personalises relationship dissatisfaction as meaningfully problematic vis-à-vis the 
clients’ productions of themselves as dissatisfied subjects.  As Phillipa states, the 
“satisfaction bit” is “not my question”.  In this way, at this particular site in her 
narrative, Phillipa attempts to resist prescribing how relationship dissatisfaction is made 
problematic as a way of managing the tension between competing constructions of what 
constitutes relationship dissatisfaction.  Instead, her discourse empowers her clients by 
responsibilising them and positioning them as the ‘owners’ of their dissatisfaction (see 
Section 4.3.3.2 for further discussion of this satisfying mode of subjectification).   
 
Notwithstanding the conversational sites where therapists’ constructions of ‘relationship 
dissatisfaction as a client-defined problem’ (as exemplified by Phillipa) are observable, 
I argue that there are two dominant ways in which the therapists themselves primarily 
draw upon a formulation of relationship dissatisfaction as problematic.  Firstly, as “a 
state of poor physical health and psychological wellbeing”, and secondly as a practice 
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of “bad-example parenting”.  Once again, discursive tension manifests when therapists 
use these different constructions because they shift in terms of the ways in which they 
locate relationship dissatisfaction in the individual partners, or in the couple as a unit, or 
in broader familial relationships. 
 
4.2.2 Relationship Dissatisfaction as a state of poor physical health and 
psychological wellbeing 
Another dominant way in which relationship dissatisfaction is constructed by the 
therapists includes terms that draw on the realm of pathology, the body, and physical 
and psychological health.  This construction of “Relationship Dissatisfaction as a state 
of poor physical health and psychological wellbeing” positions the dissatisfied subjects 
as biological subjects liable to suffer poor health, and is underpinned by broader 
biomedical discourses frequently mobilised in mainstream research (Kiecolt-Glaser, 
Bane, Glaser, and Malarkey, 2003; Shields et al., 2012). This construction is illustrated 
by Phillipa: 
 
Extract 6: 
“[...] the couple aren’t able to function with enough […] it’s, the disharmony is bad 
enough that […] it’s a difficult phrase ‘couples can’t function’ – they can get through a 
day, they can do whatever, but (.) at the end of their day they don’t (.) have enough (.) 
enough of what they would call being positive.  [...] the levels of anxiety and distress 
are too high (.) for (.) enough satisfying functioning.  (.) It’s kind of tipped them (.) 
beyond (.) coping, you know (.) because part of it is (.) really not healthy for them any 
longer”. 
 (Phillipa, pgs5-6, lines 246-255) 
 
In Phillipa’s extract the couple’s relationship dissatisfaction is rendered problematic vis-
à-vis its construction as having a negative impact on the dissatisfied subjects’ 
psychological wellbeing.  In this way, the non “functioning” relationship signifies the 
couple’s failure to achieve mutually “positive”, “satisfying functioning”, and therefore 
the dissatisfied subjects are located in disempowered positions in which they experience 
“anxiety and distress” at levels which are “too high”; a relational state “bad enough” to 
“not [be] healthy for them any longer”.  This account mirrors mainstream accounts (e.g. 
Sprenkle, 2012) and pathologises the dissatisfying relationship.  It is also produced by 
Gwen who talks about a neuro-scientific experiment she has seen where individuals are 
administered small electric shocks: 
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Extract 7: 
“[…] if their hand was being held by their partner they felt less anxiety, but also less 
pain, physically less pain, and that was measured by what was going on in the brain.  So 
they’re finding out that relationships effect everything about us, even our ability to feel 
stress and pain, and that’s amazing, it’s extraordinary.  […] And all statistics around (.) 
you can predict (.) the number of infectious illnesses the other partner will have because 
of the effect of dissatisfying relationship, erm (.) and expressions of contempt actually 
affect your partner’s immune system”. 
(Gwen, pg5, lines 234-240) 
 
In Gwen’s extract, the dissatisfying relationship is constructed as a pathological state 
which impacts on partners’ “immune system[s]”, and the dissatisfied subject is again 
located in a disempowered position as a pathologised subject who is susceptible to more 
“infectious illnesses”.  In contrast, relationship satisfaction is produced as a favoured 
relational state of health and wellbeing; the relationally satisfied subject is positioned as 
a neurologically privileged subject who experiences “less anxiety” and “physically less 
pain” when exposed to stressors (Coan, Schaeffer and Davidson, 2006).  This 
representation of the satisfying relationship as a protective state, and the satisfying 
partner as protecting, is also articulated by Charlotte who simultaneously draws on 
broader humanist, and attachment discourses to discursively construct relationship 
satisfaction as a site of psychological healing and growth: 
 
Extract 8: 
“I think relationship satisfaction is (.) you know, it’s almost like (.) all the facets of, of 
your life, of which the relationship, although it’s only one, it’s a sort of overarching 
one, because it’s a very personal one.  Erm, and it’s almost like, erm (.) the relationship 
is, I mean (.) psychotherapists like me you may come across us using terms like a 
container in which people can (.) you know, sort of, erm (.) lick their personal wounds 
erm (.) be open and vulnerable, and at their best (.) there can be individual 
psychological growth through, erm, a good satisfying relationship really”. 
(Charlotte, pg3, lines 101-108) 
 
Underpinned by attachment discourses (e.g. Banse, 2004; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2005), 
Charlotte presents relationship satisfaction as an “overarching” empowered state of 
psychological wellbeing in which the satisfying relationship is understood as a site of 
security – a “container” – in which it is possible for partners to “lick their wounds”.  
This attachment framework is mobilised in parallel to a humanist construction of an 
empowered, individualised, satisfied subject who occupys a position in which they can 
achieve “psychological growth” and be “at their best” via the satisfying, and mutually-
actualising practices of being “open” and “vulnerable”.  Again, this construction 
warrants a satisfying mode of relating which compels partners to be “open” and 
“vulnerable” to each other (i.e. an intimate psychologised authority which produces and 
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compels a true inner self to be known in order to be relationally satisfied).  An upshot is 
that this discourse sustains relationship satisfaction as a relational process underpinned 
by the governance of the confessional (Foucault, 1977).  The humanistic concern 
demonstrated in Charlotte’s talk for clients’ psychological development and wellbeing 
is also extended to the children of the couple.  This is the focus of the third dominant 
way in which relationship dissatisfaction is constructed as problematic by the therapists 
– as a detrimental environment and poor pedagogical example for the children of the 
couple. 
 
4.2.3 “Relationship Dissatisfaction as bad-example parenting” 
When therapists mobilise the discursive construction of “Relationship Dissatisfaction 
as bad-example parenting”, relationship dissatisfaction is presented as something 
specifically problematic for couples who have children.  Echoing mainstream accounts 
(e.g. Cummings & Schatz, 2012), the clients’ dissatisfaction is constructed as a 
relational state which has a two-fold detrimental impact on their children.  Firstly, 
relationship dissatisfaction is understood as an environment that does not promote the 
children’s psychological wellbeing (in a similar way to that of the couple - see Extract 6 
above) and secondly, because it sets a bad pedagogical example to the children by not 
teaching them the satisfying practices and techniques-of-the-self, and therefore a 
cyclically perpetuating, “generational relationship dissatisfaction” is produced.  In this 
way, relationship dissatisfaction shifts from a dissatisfaction of the couple to a 
“dissatisfaction of the family unit”, and this shift functions as a further imperative (form 
of governance) for couples to achieve and maintain relationship satisfaction.  For the 
therapists, this construction is always produced if clients have children; however, it is a 
construction that clients reportedly sometimes mobilise and sometimes do not.  In the 
latter case, the institutional practice compels therapists to help couples recognise this 
discursive problem and responsibilise them as parents.  This is outlined by Rebecca and 
Rachael: 
 
Extract 9: 
“[…] when they come into counselling it’s about (.) maybe (.) exploring those choices 
of behaviour and what other ones would be more beneficial to them.  (.) Because 
generally they say “Well it’s not good that we’re not doing this, not good on the 
children, not good on us.” 
(Rebecca, pg6, lines 251-255) 
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Extract 10: 
“[…] you don’t want them to do is go away thinking “Oh, my goodness we’re 
damaging our children by this”, but what you want them to do is have some perception 
that (.) you know, your children will learn about how to be in a relationship by what 
they witness their parents do [...] being aware that the relationship between the parents 
will affect your individual children is an important thing.  […] Actually research shows 
that if you invest your energies into your own relationship your children will benefit 
more.  So actually working on the couple relationship is (.) as important, if not more 
important than working on your relationship with your children because if you and your 
partner have got a good relationship then the children will ultimately benefit anyway”. 
(Rachel, 51 year old, white British therapist, with two and a half years experience.  Pg5, 
lines 229-243) 
 
Rebecca’s extract illustrates how dissatisfied clients reportedly sometimes produce the 
construction of “relationship dissatisfaction as bad-example parenting” (as well as the 
“relationship dissatisfaction as a state of poor physical health and psychological 
wellbeing” construction) as they are positioned as coming to therapy already aware that 
their mode of relating is “not good on the children, not good on us”.  They are 
constructed as recognising their relational practices as ‘knowably problematic’ through 
this persuasive discourse, and this compels them to engage in the self-governing 
practices of “exploring” their “choices of behaviour” in an attempt to replace them with 
“other ones” that would be “more beneficial to them” and their children.  This practice 
of reflecting on problematic behavioural practices and replacing them with “more 
beneficial” ones operates through the technologies of power inherent to the institution 
of couple therapy and these are explored in more detail in section 4.3.  When the 
therapists (and clients) utilise the “relationship dissatisfaction as a problem of bad 
parenting” construction there is a discursive shift whereby the dissatisfied couple is 
collectivised as the dissatisfied family, and the relationally dissatisfied individuals 
occupy a dual subjectivity as both partners and parents.  However, implicit to the 
discourse is that occupying the position of satisfied parents is privileged and 
empowered, and this is constructed as being made available vis-à-vis clients’ ability to, 
firstly, occupy the position of satisfied partners and do satisfying relating.  This is 
reflected in Rachael’s comments that “if you invest your energies into your own 
relationship your children will benefit more.  So actually working on the couple 
relationship is (.) as important, if not more important than working on your relationship 
with your children”.  Thus, the satisfying couple relationship is promoted and warranted 
as the principal discursive site to “benefit” children, and the position of ‘satisfied 
partner’ is subjugated to that of ‘satisfied parent’.  Again, implicit to these constructions 
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is the notion of the ‘functioning family’, and the social-imperative to produce and 
maintain the ‘family-as-the-unit-of-society’ (e.g. Finn, 2012; Weeks, 2007). 
 
There is a point of tension for some of the therapists when they engage this construction 
of relationship dissatisfaction as a problem of bad-example parenting, and this further 
illustrates the dynamic, multifaceted nature of the therapists’ attempts to make sense of 
relationship dissatisfaction through language.  As illustrated by Rachel, whilst she states 
that it is “an important thing” for couples to be “aware” that their “children will learn 
[…] how to be in a relationship by what they witness their parents do”, she does not 
want to pathologise her clients and position them as being at fault or at blame and “go 
away thinking “Oh, my goodness we’re damaging our children by this”.  This 
production simultaneously ‘responsibilises’ the dissatisfied couple as “bad example 
parents” whilst absolving them of blame by positing them as not “being at fault” for 
their “damaging” parental practice.  This operates through broader attachment 
discourses (going back to Bowlby, 1969) by positioning the dissatisfied, bad-example 
partners as having never been taught by their parents how to relate in a satisfying way.  
This is illustrated by Gwen: 
 
  Extract 11: 
“Erm (.) and some people aren’t taught, or shown rather (.) by their parents how to 
negotiate, how to compromise.  If you grow up with parents who are, you know, 
disagreeing all the time, you, you’re not going to see how it’s done.  Erm, and first of all 
I think them having an understanding that it’s a process that, that you sort of learn, and 
they might have missed out on that at some stage (.) can be helpful in itself, it makes the 
whole thing less toxic if you know what I mean?  Erm, it’s not just bloody-mindedness, 
it’s, it’s actually just something they weren’t taught (.) and it makes them more (.) I 
think it makes them more willing to (.) to learn because they can see that (.) they’re 
doing the same thing to their kids.  Equally they’re, they’re not showing their kids how 
to (.) how to negotiate, how to compromise.  So often that’s a motivation for them to (.) 
to learn”. 
(Gwen, pg8, lines 378-389) 
 
Gwen’s narrative brings forth ideas from pedagogical ethics of dissatisfaction and so 
positions her clients as not warranting blame because they have never been “taught, or 
shown […] by their parents” the satisfying practices and technologies-of-self, such as 
“how to negotiate, [and] how to compromise”.  This illustrates the inherent tension 
when therapists use the “Relationship Dissatisfaction as bad-example parenting” 
discourse.  This tension is managed by Gwen through her presentation of it as “helpful” 
because it prompts clients to change, yet also de-pathologises their “toxic” position of 
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“bad-example parents” by repositioning them as not being responsible for their 
dissatisfaction through agentic “bloody-mindedness”.  Rather, their inability to do 
satisfying relating is understood as being “just something they weren’t taught” – a 
further example of the cyclical “generational relationship dissatisfaction”.  This 
produces relationship satisfaction as a pedagogical process of learning and repeating the 
requisite relationally satisfying practices, and this echoes mainstream research on the 
‘importance’ of intersubjective skills (e.g. Lawrence et al., 2008; see Ch2, Section 2.6).   
 
The power of this construction to govern clients operates through its capacity to position 
them as subjects with insufficient knowledge and skills.  This makes them “more 
willing to learn” the satisfying technologies-of-self under the guidance of the therapists 
so that they do not repeat the mistakes of their parents and “[do] the same thing to their 
kids”.  This is an example of Foucault’s “Pastoral Power” (Golder, 2007), which drew 
on the notion of the shepherd caring for their flock.  Here, the therapist occupies the 
position of the shepherd who cares for and guides their clients in the satisfying practices 
of the couple therapy.  In doing so they make available a discursive space in which the 
ethically satisfied neo-liberal subject is produced via the appropriation and 
internalisation of the relationally enskilling technologies of couple therapy.  These 
technologies operate through a productive governance of reflective “exploration”, 
“negotiate[ion]” and “compromise”, and represent a dominant discursive point-of-
convergence in the ways in which the therapists understand and position their 
dissatisfied clients, and prescribe certain satisfying practices of the self in order to 
manage the tension inherent in their constructions of relationship dissatisfaction as a 
relational phenomenon - simultaneously understood as a ‘problem’ yet also a ‘normal’ 
part of everyday relating.  These ‘satisfying’ modes of subjectification and the subject 
positions they make available for the clients are explored in further detail in Part 2. 
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Part 2 
 
4.3 Therapeutic modes of subjectification: Positioning and satisfying clients 
through the institution and practices of couple therapy  
The aim of Part 2 of the analysis is to deconstruct the therapeutic interventions that are 
prescribed by therapists in order to satisfy their clients.  In addition to the productive 
Pastoral Power which operates through the therapist-client relationship, the formal 
spaces and processes of couple therapy function as technologies of power (Foucault, 
1975) which oblige clients to enact satisfying therapeutic practices.  These technologies 
are illustrated by Gwen and Charlotte: 
 
Extract 12: 
“[…] people don’t understand it or how it works or (.) they often think that (.) I’m going 
to be the one with a magic wand, but actually they have to (.) open up and, erm, be 
honest, be reflective, let go of their defences a bit, and (.) put in the work.  (.) And it’s 
an expensive, erm, sort of option, […] anybody coming up has to pay […] so people, 
you know, they want to get value from it (.) they can be challenging to me, and I’m 
challenging back to them, and if they’re completely inert (.) about things (.) I will sort 
of, you know, put it to them, “Do you really want to come here, every week, and pay 
your money and not do some of the things that we three suggest you have a go at in the 
interim?” 
(Charlotte, pg4, lines 176-190) 
 
Extract 13: 
“I suppose what we’re providing is a safe structure for them to (.) air (.) these feelings, 
which seems so risky, for whatever reason.  Erm (.) but because there’s a structure of, 
it’s time limited - you’ve got an hour (.) you know at the end of it you can put it all 
down and go out and (.) resume your life.  There’s another person there who’s going to 
stop things going off at the deep end, which is the counsellor’s role really, you’re 
providing safe boundaries (.) for them to explore those feelings that it doesn’t feel safe 
to explore at home”. 
(Gwen, pg14, lines 652-661) 
 
As outlined by Charlotte, when couple therapy is understood as a process of monetary 
exchange and temporal investment the therapist embarks in therapeutic interventions 
that discursively serve to compel clients to engage in the satisfying practices of “honest 
reflect[ion]”, and put in the necessary “work” in order for them to get financial “value” 
out of their investment
49
.  This is demonstrated when she challenges her clients and asks 
them whether they “really want to come […] every week, and pay [their] money” and 
not engage in the satisfying practices mutually agreed upon by all “three” individuals in 
                                                 
49 This is an interesting example in which the construction of satisfaction in the therapeutic relationship parallels 
constructions of satisfaction in the couple relationship: both being understood as satisfactions of mutual investment. 
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the therapeutic context.  Similarly, Gwen constructs the therapeutic space as a “safe 
structure” with “time limit[s]” and “another person who’s going to stop things going off 
at the deep end”, and these spatial and temporal institutional technologies provide the 
“safe boundaries” in which clients can begin to employ the satisfying practices of 
“air[ing] […] feelings” that “it doesn’t feel safe to explore at home”.  Thus, the 
institution of therapy provides the discursive space and techniques through which the 
‘dissatisfied’ subjects can gradually be repositioned as satisfyingly enskilled, reflective 
and responsible.  One upshot is that the dissatisfied subjects are framed as being 
compelled to engage in a constant satisfying self-surveillance – an inner turn to the self 
(e.g. Furedi, 2004) - to fully appropriate the subject positions that are made available to 
them, and internalise the practices of the therapeutic institution in order to ‘rectify’ the 
dissatisfying ways of relating that they present with in therapy.   
 
Across the couple therapists’ talk, clients’ relational practices are constructed as 
behaviourally problematic in two dominant ways:  Firstly, the ‘dissatisfied’ subject is 
presented as a sexually inactive subject, and secondly, they are constructed as a subject 
who cannot negotiate mutual need fulfilment with their partner.  I present these 
constructions as: 
1. “Relationship Dissatisfaction as Sexual Inactivity” 
2. “Relationship Dissatisfaction as Unfulfilled Needs” 
 
Both constructions produce ‘dissatisfied’ subjects who are relationally un-skilled in 
some respect, and therefore understood as being in need of therapeutic intervention.  I 
argue that operating through all of the therapeutic interventions discussed in the 
following sections is a governance of the confessional (Foucault, 1975), and the 
relationally dissatisfied client is always, in some way, presented as a non-
communicating subject who is compelled to communicate (Plummer, 2003).  As there 
are different ways in which the alternative constructions are deployed to explain clients’ 
dissatisfaction and ‘treat’ it, there are subtle shifts in the way in which this governance 
of the confessional operates.  As a result, I argue that different subject positions are 
made available to both therapists and clients with subtly shifting speaking rights and 
obligations: 
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1. “Relationship Dissatisfaction as Sexual Inactivity” 
a. The “Dissatisfied sexually non-intimate subject” 
b. The “Dissatisfied sexually dysfunctional subject” 
 
2. “Relationship Dissatisfaction as Unfulfilled Needs” 
a. The Dissatisfied Unfulfilled “Hyper Critic Subject” 
b. The “Dissatisfied Unfulfilled “Silent Partner Subject” 
c. The Satisfyingly Fulfilled “Awakened Relating Subject” 
 
In the following sections I focus on these positions and practices to illustrate the claim 
that couple therapy is part of the mechanism of norm-setting which props up and reifies 
different versions of relationship satisfaction.   
 
4.3.1 “Relationship Dissatisfaction as Sexual Inactivity” 
A dominant construction put forward by the therapists is that clients’ lack of sexual 
intimacy discursively functions as the signifier (to both the clients and the therapists) 
that the client occupies the position of the relationally dissatisfied subject.  As Rebecca 
outlines: 
 
Extract 14: 
Interviewer:  “So dissatisfaction (.) I mean how does it get expressed then, 
dissatisfaction? 
Rebecca:  Well it, it could be dissatisfaction in that they’re continually arguing (.) it 
could be (.) there’s no intimacy in the relationship (.) that tends to be quite a big thing 
that the intimacy disappears, erm, 
Interviewer:  In what sense the intimacy? 
Rebecca:  Well their sexual relationship, you know, will (.) will just disappear (.) will 
be very infrequent”. 
(Rebecca, pg5, lines 230-244) 
 
This construction is underpinned by a view that satisfying relationships should be sites 
of sexual intimacy and therefore, as Rebecca states, if the practice “disappears” or is 
“very infrequent” it is “quite a big thing” and is frequently produced by clients as their 
presenting problem.  This construction mirrors mainstream work which presents sexual 
and relationship satisfaction as cyclically reinforcing (e.g. Sprecher & Cate, 2004) and 
illustrates Weeks’ (1995; 2007) claim that sexual activity has become a key signifier for 
the success of contemporary Western coupledom.  An upshot is that there is little room 
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for the practice of ‘celibacy’ in dominant narratives of relationship satisfaction.  Two 
contrasting discursive explanations of clients’ sexual dissatisfaction manifest across the 
interviews with couple therapists.  Each account differs in the extent to which clients’ 
‘sexual lives’ and ‘relational lives’ are understood as intertwined or distinct.   
 
At times it appears to be necessary for some of the therapists to present sex as 
embedded in clients’ broader relational contexts and, as a consequence, challenge their 
clients’ reported dissatisfying tendency of seeing the two as distinct.  At other times, 
some of the therapists present sexual dissatisfaction in terms of functioning bodies 
distinct from the broader relational context.  These positions operate in light of two 
different discursive authorities: a discourse of disclosing intimacy, and a discourse of 
biomedical dysfunction.  These shift the way in which relationship dissatisfaction is 
produced vis-à-vis clients’ presenting sexual dissatisfaction.  The first discursive 
authority presents clients’ sexual activity as totally embedded within their broader 
relational context.  When understood in this way, the clients’ lack of sex functions as a 
signifier for their relationship dissatisfaction and is symptomized as an upshot of their 
inability to maintain a sense of intimate connection and communication with each other 
(e.g. McCarthy, 2002).  In contrast, the second therapeutic construction separates the 
‘sexual’ from the ‘relational’ and is sustained by broader bio-medical discourses that 
pathologise clients’ lack of sexual intimacy in terms of individualised sexual 
dysfunction (e.g. Birnbaum et al., 2006) distinct from their broader relational context. 
 
4.3.1.1 The “Dissatisfied sexually non-intimate subject” 
When couple therapists produce the “Dissatisfied sexually non-intimate subject” they 
understand clients’ presenting problem of sexual dissatisfaction as discursively 
representing a symptom of the clients’ underlying lack of interpersonal intimate 
communication (e.g. Byers & Demmons, 1999; Cupach & Comstock, 1990).  This is 
illustrated by Joan: 
 
Extract 15: 
“[...] whether there is sex or isn’t (.) that’s often a sort of (.) er measures the temperature 
of the relationship.  So, if there are, say, communication difficulties and a couple aren’t 
speaking (.) so also not communicating sexually.  So once they start speaking and they 
understand each other, and they, then they feel more warmly towards each other then 
sex just falls into place”.   
(Joan, pgs15-16, lines 744-749) 
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Joan’s extract illustrates the claim that clients’ lack of sexual activity discursively 
functions as the signifier to both clients and therapists that there is something ‘wrong’ 
with the relationship because sex “measures the temperature of the relationship”.  
Presented in this way, Joan constructs the root ‘cause’ of the problem of clients’ sexual 
dissatisfaction as ‘actually’ stemming from a lack of intimate communication and inter-
partner connection.  The upshot is that the governance of the intimate confessional 
subordinates sexual practice to communicative practice, and dissatisfying sex is 
presented as a consequence of partners’ inability to talk to each other.  This reflects 
mainstream psychological accounts which produce sexual satisfaction as an upshot of 
relationship satisfaction (e.g. Sprecher & Cate, 2004).  In this way, developing and 
maintaining intimacy is promoted as the principle satisfying discursive function of 
clients’ relationships, and sex represents a ‘superficial’ manifestation of this ‘deeper’, 
more relationally satisfying intimate communication; such that once partners start 
“speaking and they understand each other” sex just “fall[s] into place”.  Thus, whilst a 
lack of sexual activity is frequently understood as one of the dominant problems that 
prompts clients’ to engage in therapy, and which they present with, it is not recognised 
as the underlying problem by therapists when they put forward this construction of the 
“Dissatisfied sexually non-intimate subject”.  Within this discursive framework, as 
Gwen outlines, it is the therapist’s role to intervene by ‘helping’ clients to appreciate 
this link between their sexual practices and their broader relational context: 
 
 Extract16: 
“[...] it’s getting both of them (.) to relate, to try and put sex in the context of (.) what 
they’re really looking for, which is a sense of closeness (.) a sense of connection […] 
you know, trying to get them to see it all as part of a pattern, and that your sex life is a 
reflection of your general relationship and not something separate that will (.) effect [...] 
the rest of your relationship. 
Interviewer:  [...] do couples (.) presenting with relationship dissatisfaction tend to (.) 
separate them, or see sex as (.) something separate from the relationship? 
Gwen:  Yes, yes (.) they do, I don’t know if couples do generally, I mean, of course 
because I’m seeing couples who are presenting with dissatisfaction [...] it would be 
interesting how happy couples see sex.  But certainly couples who are (.) trying to 
describe what’s wrong with their relationship, will often put it in terms of (.) “We 
haven’t got a sex life” (.) as if it were something separate”.   
(Gwen, pg3, lines 110-130) 
 
Here, Gwen reproduces the claim that sexual satisfaction is relationally embedded, and 
also produces clients’ practice of viewing their ‘sexual dissatisfaction’ as distinct from 
their broader relational context as ethically problematic.  In this way, she collectivises 
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her clients’ by positioning them and their sexual satisfaction as inherently relational - 
“really looking for […] a sense of closeness [and] connection” - and their sexual activity 
functions as one practice for achieving a relationally satisfying connection.  Gwen 
presents her clients’ sexual dissatisfaction as an upshot of their inability to appreciate 
the underlying intimacy-seeking nature of their sexual practice.  She constructs this as a 
frequently gendered problem to be challenged and addressed via the technologies and 
practices of couple therapy: 
 
Extract 17: 
Interviewer:  “[...] do you find there are differences across gender?  Fairly systematic 
ones? 
Gwen:  Mm, the sex one is a big division, and I think, you know, the original way that 
they conceptualise sex,  men and women (.) as I say, through the course of counselling 
they will often come to talk about it in the same terms eventually, but initially (.) erm, I 
think for men it’s, it’s a mechanism for expressing affection. [...] Whereas for women 
[...] it’s a response to how they feel generally about the relationship.  Erm (.) and so I 
suppose (.) it’s trying to get men to see that, you know (.) you [chuckles] use slogans 
like “foreplay begins at breakfast”.  […] Seeing it all on a kind of spectrum, which 
starts with [...] ritual acts of kindness like making cups of tea and saying “Did you have 
a good day at work dear?” erm, to sort of, everyday physical contacts like hugs and 
kisses, and going up through (.) sexual intercourse.  If you’re kind and loving to your 
wife throughout the day she will want to have sex with you at the end of the day”. 
(Gwen: Pgs 2-3, Lines 134-155) 
 
Gwen reproduces dominant, heteronormative sexual scripts (Capdevila, 2007) and 
constructs women’s sexuality as innately more relational - an indication of how close 
and connected they felt to their partner.  In contrast, men’s sexuality is understood as 
innately more instrumental – as a means of expressing affection distinct from the 
relational context - and an example of Hollway’s (1989) ‘Male Sex Drive’ discourse in 
operation.  Given the privileging of intimacy in the construction of the “Dissatisfied 
sexually non-intimate subject”, male clients are understood as occupying a problematic 
space where training and enskilling is warranted in order for them to appreciate the link 
between sexual satisfaction and relationship satisfaction vis-à-vis intimacy.  Thus, 
therapists’ use of this construction enables them to challenge male clients’ dissatisfying 
productions of the ‘male sex drive’ discourse whereby sex is understood as distinct from 
the relational context.  However, this challenge, which at first appears empowering, 
operates through pedagogical, behavioural techniques; a banality of satisfying sexual 
maintenance, in which in order for men to coax women into sex, the couple’s everyday 
processes of relating become sexualised in a process of self-governing “ritual acts of 
kindness”.  In this way, these prescriptions continue to reinforce the hegemonic, 
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heteronormative view of women-as-sexual-object (Hollway, 1989) whose sexual desire 
operates only in response to men’s (Ussher, 2005).   
 
In contrast to these accounts of satisfying sexual intimacy, the other dominant way in 
which sexual dissatisfaction is understood by therapists constructs the ‘sexual’ and 
‘relational’ realms as distinct from each other. 
  
4.3.1.2 The “Dissatisfied sexually dysfunctional subject” 
When this discursive construction is mobilised by couple therapists they dualistically 
present their clients’ sexual dissatisfaction as distinct from their relational 
dissatisfactions.  Instead, sexual dissatisfaction is understood in terms of physical 
“dysfunctions” free from the clients’ relational context.  Propped-up and sustained by 
broader bio-medical discourses, this sexual and relationship dissatisfaction of body parts 
warrants a different therapeutic approach – one of behavioural reinforcement and/or 
enskilling.  Joan illustrates this view in the following extract: 
 
Extract 18: 
Joan: “[...] there’s a whole range of (.) sexual dysfunction, which is, is not necessarily to 
do with the (.) relational aspects you know, so it needs to be (.) treated differently. 
Interviewer:  Can you give me some examples of those? 
Joan:  Erectile dysfunction, for example [...] there’s this thing called vaginismus […] 
but that is treated very, very differently (.) erm (.) it’s not counselling in the way that 
I’ve kind of described it.  It’s very behavioural [...] there’s a sort of educative kind of 
aspect [...] exercises are prescribed, so it’s a very different way of working.  Very 
structured, very behavioural. 
Interviewer:  Why is that kind of treatment much more structural, behavioural? 
Joan:  (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) Erm (.) (.) that’s a very good question […] sexual dysfunction erm 
[...] it’s not to do with erm (.) (.) (.) values, or, you know, those contextual things you 
were talking about [...] it’s about your body and how it works and [...] it can be about 
breaking down barriers, but it can also be about education because some people don’t 
know about, you know, or they haven’t tried this or that, and so it, you know, that’s part 
of the educative process”.   
(Joan: Pg 16, Lines 750-793) 
 
This biological, mechanistic construction is governed by the heteronormative, coital 
imperative such that treating dysfunctional body parts requires the “prescription” of 
gender-specific “exercises”: a pedagogical governance to produce sexually enskilled 
subjects who learn about things they “don’t know about […] or haven’t tried”.  This 
“educative process” further reinforces the construction of clients’ as mechanistic 
“sexually dysfunctional subjects”, and addresses the ‘problem’ through the practice of 
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“very structured, very behavioural” reinforcement and training.  Superficially, Joan 
presented this “treatment” as empowering clients through the “educative process” and 
its subsequent capacity for “breaking down barriers”.  However, a potential problem 
arises from this understanding because sex is constructed in terms of symptoms and 
heteronormative coital performance (Capdevila, 2007; Segal, 2000).  Here, we have a 
clear illustration of the way in which institutional therapy has the power to operate as a 
pathologising technology which privileges a certain type of sexuality, with little 
appreciation of the broader contextual factors that might be impacting on clients’ 
capacities to engage in, and experience sex (e.g. Kleinplatz, 2001). 
 
In summary, the positioning of the ‘dissatisfied’ subject as the sexually inactive subject 
highlights the way in which sex discursively functions as a key signifying practice for 
the satisfying relationship and the satisfied subject.  In the following section I propose 
that the second key behavioural signifier of relationship dissatisfaction is escalating and 
unresolved conflict, and I present this as an upshot of partners’ unfulfilled needs.  
 
4.3.2 “Relationship Dissatisfaction as Unfulfilled Needs” 
The principle way in which the therapists present relationship dissatisfaction is as a 
relational state where clients are unable to maintain mutual need fulfilment.  This 
account acknowledges the transactional and ongoing nature of meanings and 
(re)negotiations that takes place between partners.  The needs of each partner and how 
they are satisfied is constructed as depending on, and shaped by, the needs and actions 
of the other, and this mirrors and recycles the dominant mainstream psychological 
accounts of ‘relationship satisfaction as needs fulfilment’ (e.g. VanderDrift & Agnew, 
2012).  For the therapists, their clients’ relationship dissatisfaction is understood as a 
function of their inability to successfully manage this dialectic of mutual need 
fulfilment via the practice of successful intimate communication.  This is illustrated by 
Joan: 
Extract 19: 
“[Dissatisfaction is] when their needs are not met […] I mean it depends how the couple 
manage (.) different needs, and the question is are these needs (.) well first of all, are 
they expressed, and are they met?  One of the needs we’ll hear over and over again is 
erm, you know, the need to be heard and understood (.) alright, so (.) that requires (.) 
communication to be effective [...] when I ask “What do you want to be different?” or 
“What is the issue?” communication, being able to communicate better, being able to 
listen more, to be able to make myself understood more (.) all those kind of things is, is, 
is erm (.) something that I would regard as my role to facilitate” 
(Joan, pg1, lines 39-55) 
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In line with mainstream research (e.g. Emmers-sommer, 2004), within this construction 
of “relationship dissatisfaction as unfulfilled needs”, “effective communication” is, 
once again, presented as the defining satisfying practice for the dissatisfied subject to 
master.  Thus, the dissatisfaction of unfulfilled needs is constructed as functioning, not 
through partners’ refusal to provide need fulfilment, but rather through a production of 
them as unable to manage the dialectic of self-&-other’s needs through a process of talk.  
In Joan’s account, couple therapy provides the satisfying conditions of possibility 
through which the problem of poor communication can be addressed in order to 
“facilitate” partners’ mutual need fulfilment.  She understands partners as needing to be 
“heard and understood”, and therefore they are presented as recognising that the 
responsibility for their needs fulfilment depends on the actions of their partner.  
However, when Joan speaks of clients’ needing to “listen more” she also produces a 
need fulfilling ethic based on clients’ appreciating their role in fulfilling their partner’s 
needs.  This technical emphasis on listening and appreciating the ‘other’ produces a 
“satisfaction of egalitarian need fulfilment”.  It reflects the optimistic message of the 
‘modern, transformative intimacy’ outlined by Giddens (1991) in which relationships 
are entered into for their own sake, maintained through mutual self-disclosure and 
contingent on partners’ experiencing mutual  satisfaction.  This view was also recycled 
by Flo: 
Extract 20: 
“I think respect is the key (.) erm, I think communication (.) is a very vital key (.) and I 
think it’s being able to ask (.) to have your needs met (.) or be able to have your needs 
met, and also of you your husband’s needs, so instead of one, you know, it’s all about 
me, this is what I need, it’s about, you know, my husband or my wife are (.) you know, 
equal partnerships and ‘How can we both be happy?’  So it’s very much compromise, 
but I think (.) you (.) it’s hard to compromise without the respect (.) and without the 
really effective communication”.   
(Flo: 56 year old, white British therapist, with 12 years experience.  Pg4, lines 157-163) 
 
Constructed in this way, satisfaction of self-&-other’s needs warrants not only the 
articulation of self’s needs, but also an awareness and appreciation of the needs of the 
other so that individuals do not occupy a dissatisfying, selfish position of “it’s all about 
me”.  Flo uses this dominant construction as a way of understanding a particular 
dissatisfying problem that her clients’ frequently present with: not appreciating the need 
fulfilling role of their partner.  That is, clients are constructed as having a tendency to 
perceive the costs of fulfilling their partner’s needs whilst failing to recognise the need 
fulfilment they receive from their partners.  I argue that, once again, as with the 
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discourses of “Relationship satisfaction as bad-example parenting” and “Relationship 
dissatisfaction as Sexual Inactivity”, this dominant construction of “Relationship 
Dissatisfaction as Unfulfilled Needs” warrants and sustains prescriptive, normalising 
therapeutic interventions which make available a range of subject positions for the 
clients to occupy or resist.  I present three positions as: the “Dissatisfied Hyper Critic 
Subject”, the “Dissatisfied Silent Partner Subject”, and the “Satisfied Awakened 
Relating Subject”.      
 
4.3.2.1 “The Dissatisfied Unfulfilled Hyper Critic Subject Position” 
When positioned as the “Hyper Critic Subject” the relationally dissatisfied clients are 
constructed as being preoccupied with what they perceive their partners are not doing 
for them vis-a-vis their personal need fulfilment.  In terms of the satisfying dialect of 
self-&-other’s needs, the “Hyper Critic” is positioned as occupying a site of power in 
which they ‘know’ they are doing more for their partner in terms of need-fulfilment, and 
are blind to the need-fulfilling actions of their partner.  Although governed by an 
economic authority of cost-benefit analysis inherent in managing self and other’s needs, 
the “Hyper Critic” is presented as operating through a hyper surveillance of perceived 
costs, and is therefore compelled to blame and accuse their partner of not doing enough.  
This discursive blind spot is outlined by Joan: 
 
Extract 21: 
“Yeah (.) noticing things, you know, couples do things for each other, they come in the 
counselling room and then they blame each other, right, and then they’re sort of saying 
“I do this and this and this” and the other one will say “Well yes, and what about me?  I 
do this, this and this.”  And what has been absent is they just haven’t somehow 
appreciated, shown that they appreciate, that they’ve even noticed how much they’re 
doing for each other, you know, whatever it is that they are contributing (.) but their 
contribution just hasn’t felt appreciated enough, you know [...] that sort of 
encouragement, that positive feedback.  [...] we all need to feel appreciated (.) and it’s 
very evident to me in so many cases where what a couple need from each other is that 
demonstration of appreciation, and I think that is very, very often absent.  You know 
people take each other for granted (.) erm, and so on.  You know, just need to feel 
appreciated because it makes you feel valued (.) you know, and needed, but valued 
especially”. 
(Joan: pgs18-19, Lines 890-905) 
 
Joan highlights the way in which clients’ are constructed as frequently presenting for 
therapy whilst locked into the position of the “Hyper Critic”; here the discursive 
invitation to engage in blame, and failing to “appreciate” what their partner does for 
them.  Thus, the satisfying couple relationship is implicitly produced as a site in which 
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partners are entitled to, and need to feel valued and appreciated by each other.  That is, 
dissatisfied clients “need” to be positioned by each other as “valued” need-fulfilling 
partners (see also Chapter 6, Section 6.2).  One of the discursive functions of this 
construction, when mobilised by therapists, is as a professional tool to identify and 
make sense of clients’ internecine ‘tit-for-tat’ interactions.  When Joan states that the 
clients “haven’t even noticed”, she presents them as failing to “appreciate” that there are 
times when their partners actually do things for them.  Furthermore, the extract 
illustrates the way in which the “Hyper Critic” is not only blind to the actions of the 
other, but also refuses to hear the other’s claims of providing need fulfilment.  
Paradoxically, individuals are also constructed as being able to mobilise the speaking 
rights of the Hyper Critic as a form of defence against their partner’s hyper critical 
accusations.  When Joan says the clients ask “What about me? I’ve done this, this and 
this” they shift from being the object of hyper critical blame to the subject who blames 
by highlighting how much they have done for their partner.  Thus, the “Hyper Critic” is 
positioned as sustaining a skewed, lop-sided governance of the confessional, such that 
the subject is compelled to talk but not to listen.  Therefore, positioning their clients as 
“Dissatisfied Hyper Critic Subjects” enables the therapists to locate relationship 
dissatisfaction in the Hyper Critics’s practice of not listening.  This, it can be argued, 
serves to warrant and sustain a pedagogical therapeutic intervention in which the 
therapist teaches the Hyper Critic to listen to their partner.  This intervention is outlined 
by Rachel: 
 
Extract 22: 
“And so it’s that (.) hearing, listening (.) and then actually making sure that (.) what you 
heard is what that person really (.) meant.  Not putting your own interpretation on it, 
which is a negative interpretation (.) and then responding on that basis.  So people get 
into this totally vicious circle of (.) erm (.) everything the other person says they’re 
interpreting as negative so they snipe back, and so this person now is defensive back.  
And, and it, and what we’re trying to do is break that down, and, and let them see what 
it is they’re doing to each other. (.) And teach them how they can actually say “Oh what 
do you mean by that?” (.) Not confrontational, just like (.) “Oh, what do you mean by 
that?”  
(Rachel, pg11, lines 541-549) 
 
As presented by Rachel, in order to address the ‘problems’ of accusing and not listening, 
the pedagogical authority of the therapeutic practice legitimises the training of clients in 
prescriptive, enskilling behavioural techniques as a way of re-locating the   “Hyper 
Critic” to a position of a hearing, listening subject who is not “confrontational” and 
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who can ask “Oh, what do you mean by that?”  This egalitarian construction reflects 
therapeutic accounts of satisfied partners as expressive and responsive (e.g. Johnson & 
Zuccarini, 2010) and draws on notions of mutual respect and, in this sense, offers a 
more empowering position for both partners.  However, if taken-up and recycled 
uncritically, it potentially runs the risk of introducing simplistic notions of 
‘confrontation as a process to be avoided’ or ‘confrontation to be strictly managed’ (e.g. 
Wilhelm & Surra, 2001) - thereby compelling clients to constantly engage in a process 
of self-surveillance and self-censorship.  This is evident in the second subject position 
that is made available through therapists’ construction of “Relationship Dissatisfaction 
as Unfulfilled Needs”.  The therapists also talk about the way in which dissatisfied 
clients can occupy a disempowered position of silence where they are unable to speak 
and express their needs – a position that I call the “Dissatisfied Silent Partner Subject”. 
 
4.3.2.2 The Dissatisfied Unfulfilled “Silent Partner Subject” Position 
When the therapists position their clients as dissatisfied unfulfilled “Silent Partner 
Subjects” they construct their clients’ dissatisfaction as stemming from their inability to 
explicitly articulate their needs to each other.  As Gwen states: 
 
Extract 23: 
“[…] the ability to actually share and (.) say (.) what they need (.) honestly and openly 
to each other (.) has dropped off.  Usually it’s a sign that there’s something not being 
said, usually it’s a sign that one person might be quite angry underneath, but (.) either 
isn’t acknowledging it themselves or feel that they can’t raise it.  (.) So the work then is 
to try and (.) peel back the layers and, and find out what the underlying (.) resentment (.) 
or issue is (.) and get that (.) aired […] to explore it and find it, and bring it out into, into 
the open.  And that often unblocks their communication”. 
(Gwen, pgs13-14, lines 633-651) 
 
This position of silence is presented by therapists as either an upshot of partners feeling 
they cannot talk and/or as a potential symptomatic-signifier of a ‘deeper’ issue that is 
“not being said”; one that either has not been “acknowledged” to self or cannot be 
articulated to the other (see also Chapter 5, section 5.2.1.2).  In this way, the 
construction draws on broader humanist discourses that present relationships as sites in 
which individuals can and should be known through sharing “honestly and openly”.  
The “Silent Partner” is the disempowered unknown subject; their dissatisfaction 
maintained through an ethic of self-censorship – either through their inability to 
articulate their concerns to themselves, or through the silencing actions of their partner.  
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An upshot of this construction is that therapeutic technologies are warranted in order to 
“explore” and reveal the “Silent Partner’s” underlying problem by “bring[ing] it out 
into […] the open”.  Therefore, when put forward in this way, there is limited discursive 
space for a silent satisfied subject in the therapeutic interventions, and the ‘satisfied self’ 
is compelled to be a ‘confessional self’ (Elliot & Lemert, 2006; Plummer, 2003; Rose, 
1990).  This is unlike the “Hyper critic” position where self-censorship is actively 
prescribed. Some of the therapists simultaneously present the “Dissatisfied Silent 
Partner Subject” position as gendered and not gendered.  For example: 
 
Extract 24: 
“Yes, well, the factors could be (.) a gender thing, er, but it’s (.) it’s important not to 
generalise (.) too much, because (.) you know, I mean (.) I guess it’s well known that (.) 
generally women are more able to talk about their needs than men, but that doesn’t 
mean to say that, that it isn’t the other way round in (.) specific relationships, it can be 
absolutely the other way around, you know”. 
(Joan, pg3, lines 121-125). 
 
Joan’s extract illustrates the simultaneous mobilisation and resistance of gender 
injunctions for the “Silent Partner” subject position.  A gendered silence is produced in 
the sense that Joan is aware of normative prescriptions concerning differences in the 
tendency for men and women to articulate their feelings, such that “generally women 
are more able to talk about their needs than men”.  This account recycles well 
documented gendered emotion scripts (e.g. Duncombe & Marsden, 1993; Tingey, 1993) 
which construct men as being ‘innately’ more likely to occupy the “Silent Partner” 
position.  Couching men’s silence in these terms in effect absolves them of 
responsibility for inter-subjective communication, and positions women as the arbiters 
of the couple’s ‘emotion work’ (Hochschild, 2003).  However, Joan simultaneously 
resists this gendered construction and presents the practice of silencing one’s needs as 
non-gendered, such that “it can be […] the other way around” and either partner can 
occupy the “Silent Partner” position.  This illustrates the multiple discourses that 
therapists draw on when they produce the “Silent Partner” as a way of understanding 
clients’ relationship dissatisfaction.  There are economic discourses of mutual exchange; 
humanistic notions of being ‘known’ ; gendered accounts of emotional expression; and 
egalitarian non-gendered scripts of need-fulfilment.  As with the “Hyper critic” 
position, these discourses converge in the way in which they warrant prescriptive 
satisfying behavioural interventions that train clients to communicate in a satisfying way:   
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Extract 25: 
“(.) Erm (.) well, by drawing attention to it. (.) (.) By (.) erm (.) by encouraging the use 
of ‘I’ messages (.) we have this thing called ‘I’ messages rather than ‘you’ messages.  
So, you know (.) if you’re not satisfied (.) with something, alright (.) then saying that “I 
don’t like it when” or, erm (.) (.) “because” erm (.) and “I would prefer”, so you’re 
actually expressing your need, and your wish (.) and taking responsibility for that, rather 
than (.) erm (.) saying “You’re at fault” and pointing the finger (.) because immediately 
(.) because that doesn’t actually bring you what you need.  That antagonises (.) your 
partner is on the defensive, and it tends to exacerbate the problem, you know, and so 
you’re in the cycle, you get into these cycles”.   
(Joan, pg7, lines 325-334) 
 
In the extract above, Joan presents an enskilling practice, which operates through a 
behaviouristic governance of conditioned, rote learning.  Under the guidance of the 
therapist who “dr[aws] attention” to the couple’s dissatisfying communication practices, 
and “encourage[s] the use of ‘I’ messages”, the dissatisfied subject is gradually re-
positioned through the mobilisation of prescriptive satisfying technologies-of-self.  
Again, these processes of subjectification function through Pastoral Power (Foucault, 
1977), and the “Silent Partner” is gently encouraged to speak and “express [their] need” 
via the use of “I messages”.  This technique reflects dominant therapeutic accounts (e.g. 
Meneses & Greenberg, 2011) and is also presented as a route by which the “Hyper 
Critic” can avoid “pointing the finger” of blame and putting “their partner […] on the 
defensive”.  The couple are compelled to engage in these practices because through 
their enactment the individuals are reproduced as possessing the ability to break their 
dissatisfying communicative “cycles”.  Whilst potentially empowering, there is the risk 
that the intervention simply produces a subject who unquestioningly takes up a mode of 
relating in which ‘silence’ and ‘conflict’ are understood as simplistically dissatisfying.  
Moreover, relational constructions and therapeutic interventions that emphasise partners’ 
intersubjective skills can fail to acknowledge the role of couple’s broader relational and 
life contexts, and the social and cultural scripts which prop-up and sustain different 
ways of understanding and doing relationship satisfaction at any given time (Furedi, 
2004; Harre-Mustin, 1991).  Instead, attention is focussed on the individual partners’ 
contributions to each other’s need fulfilment.  However, in Extract 25 Joan also speaks 
of a therapeutic ethic compelling clients to reflect on and “take responsibility” for their 
own “needs[s]”.  Whilst only implicitly spoken of here, these reflective practices-of-the-
self underpin the third subject position that is made available through the therapists’ 
mobilisation of the “Relationship Dissatisfaction as Unfulfilled Needs” discourse – I 
call this position the “Awakened Relating Subject”.  
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4.3.3 The Satisfyingly Fulfilled “Awakened Relating Subject” Position 
The therapists produce a non-gendered satisfied “Awakened Relating Subject” by 
inviting their clients to sign up to the following two ideological propositions: 
1. Reject high idealism 
2. Accept oneself in order to satisfy oneself 
Each proposition is discussed and illustrated in turn. 
 
4.3.3.1 The “Satisfied Awakened Subject’s” rejection of high idealism 
When couple therapists prescribe this technology-of-the-self they challenge dissatisfied 
clients’ recycling of relational ideals, and compel them to engage in a satisfying practice 
of understanding and accepting the contextual reality of their relationship.  Through 
their reported mobilisation of broader discourses of romantic idealisation, dissatisfied 
partners are understood as locating themselves in positions of inevitable disappointed 
and disillusionment (Segal, 1990).  Therefore, the practice of rejecting high idealism 
invites clients to empower themselves and stop unfavourably comparing their 
relationship to idealised alternatives.  These alternatives are presented as including other 
peoples’ relationships, as well as previous times in the couple’s own relationship.  
Charlotte frames and illustrates this dissatisfying ‘tendency’ of her clients to mobilise 
romantic ideals when accounting for the ways in which they frequently present for 
therapy: 
 
Extract 26: 
“Er, they say really hard to quantify things like, erm, “We just want to be happy” or 
“We want it all to be like it was when we first met” which is a particularly unrealistic 
one. […] I try to disabuse them if they say something like “We want it to be like it was 
when we were first together”, because you can’t put the clock back […] [Also] it’s (.) 
you know, the sort of belief that everyone else in their street, in their place of work is, 
say, having a better sex life (.) and actually I always challenge that, I say “How do you 
know?”  
(Charlotte, pgs13-14, lines 601-627) 
 
In the extract above, Charlotte locates dissatisfied subjects’ relational practice as 
problematic because her clients are positioned as frequently failing to acknowledge their 
relationship as a process; instead, they reportedly often long to return to a previous 
idealised state which will “[...] be like it was when [they] were first together”.  Similarly, 
the dissatisfied subject is also presented as failing to face up to the reality of their own 
relational context.  Instead they have the “[...] belief that everyone else in their street [or] 
place of work is, say, having a better sex life”, and therefore they are positioned as 
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understanding their dissatisfaction as a comparative deficit in relation to other peoples’ 
imagined relationships.   
 
Charlotte mobilises the “satisfying rejection of ideals” construction as a way of 
challenging her clients’ taken-for-granted assumptions, and to re-position them as 
“Satisfied Awakened Relating Subjects”.  Through the rejection of clients’ comparisons 
to perceived alternatives, Charlotte promotes a satisfying technology of the self which 
pivots around a focus on the clients’ own relationships, needs and concerns.  For 
Charlotte, it is ethically important for her clients to recognise and accept the reality of 
their intimate life in order to satisfy themselves.  This discursive proposition represents 
a more open and possibly empowering mode of relating.  However, as with any 
construction, it further adds to the ‘rules’ which constitute what it means to be a 
satisfied or satisfying partner, and promotes a mode of self-surveillance that shifts from 
a focus on ‘ideals’ to a focus on ‘acceptance of realities’.  This satisfying governance of 
acceptance is also produced by Phillipa when she talks about clients coming to a 
realisation of what constitutes a “good enough” relationship for them: 
 
Extract 27: 
“It’s very tempting to always talk about the ‘good enough’.  But I think what it is (.) 
when I think of good enough I think of a client’s (.) it’s an acceptance of reality, their 
reality as they’ve created them (.) and understanding (.) that we, we’ve kind of arrived I 
always feel with clients when we have an awareness between the three of us that (.) they 
know where they came from and they know where they’d like to go to, and they know 
what they have.  So it’s a kind of acceptance of knowing all those (.) and (.) in marrying 
their possibilities up with their limitations”.   
(Phillipa, pg2, lines 81-88). 
 
On the face of it, the “good enough” relationship that Phillipa speaks of signifies an 
“understanding” and recognition by clients of their relationship as an ongoing process, 
and also their “acceptance” of their relational “possibilities” and “limitations”.  In this 
way, through the interventions of couple therapy, the satisfied subject is constructed as 
having faced the “reality” of their current situation and their possible futures instead of 
mobilising and fixating on unattainable romantic ideals.  This echoes long-established 
mainstream research which privileges partners having ‘realistic’ expectations (e.g. Aria 
& Beach, 1987; Larson, 1992).  However, this practice of satisfied “acceptance” 
requires individuals to engage in reflective surveillance of their relationship in order to 
‘know’ it as it ‘truly’ is (and was), and to also formulate a narrative in which the 
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ongoing process of their relationship is constructed as predictably knowable.  Therefore, 
this satisfying mode of subjectification - based on clients’ “acceptance” rests on a static 
notion of the relationship as fixed and knowable at any given time.  Therefore, once 
again, whilst this construction is a more open and potentially empowering discourse, it 
inevitably adds to the ‘rules’ of doing satisfaction, and risks being recycled 
dogmatically and uncritically.   
 
The imperative to engage in practices of reflection and “acceptance” also permeates the 
second ideological proposition that is mobilised by therapists when they produce the 
“Satisfied Awakened Relating Subject”.  
 
4.3.3.2 The “Satisfied Awakened Relating Subject’s” self-acceptance 
In contrast to the “Hyper Critic” and “Silent Partner” (both of whom are subjects who 
are constructed as focussing on the need-fulfilling role of their partner), when therapists 
produce the “Awakened Relating Subject” they draw on humanist discourses and view 
the subject as occupying a position of self-acceptance in which they fulfil their own 
needs as opposed to always looking to their partner for fulfilment.  In this way, the 
therapists construct the “Awakened Relating Subject” as a self-responsible subject who 
is presented as capable of recognising and managing the dialectical tension between 
independency and co-dependency inherent to the practice of mutual fulfilment of self-
&-other’s needs.  That is, the “Awakened Relating Subject” is constructed as occupying 
a position of satisfaction through their ability to do satisfying interdependent needs 
fulfilment.  This discursive framework warrants the counselling practice of inviting 
dissatisfied individuals to ‘relate to themselves’ in a satisfying way by acknowledging 
and taking ownership of their own needs and concerns within the context of their 
relationship.  This echoes common advice given across couple therapy that in order to 
relate to another in a satisfying way, one needs to relate to oneself in a satisfying way 
(e.g. Christensen & Jacobson, 2000).  This is illustrated by Charlotte and Rebecca who 
construct the importance of partners’ self-acceptance for their experience of relationship 
satisfaction: 
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Extract 28: 
“[…] one of the fundamental things about a relationship is that (.) if you’re not very 
good at having a relationship with yourself and, sort of, ok in yourself (.) you will run 
into all manner of difficulties having a relationship with somebody else, and if you look 
to the relationship to (.) prop you up or, you know, make up the gaps in yourself then 
it’s gonna be quite a limited relationship”. 
(Charlotte, pg7, lines 325-330) 
 
Extract 29: 
“[…] peace of mind’s about being able to say “I’m accepted for who I am (.) I don’t 
have to be anything else because not only am I accepted by my partner, but I accept 
who I am.”  Generally, if you tend to accept yourself you (.) project that out (.) and then 
others then tend to (.) accept you for who you are (.) because people, you know (.) think 
there’s elements of “I’m not good enough” (.) you know, “I’m not the wife I should be,” 
“I’m not the husband I should be,” (.) you know, “I’ve disappointed.”  So it’s about that 
acceptance of yourself I think, and getting that peace”. 
(Rebecca, pg4, lines 184-190) 
 
Both Charlotte and Rebecca implicitly produce a relationship satisfaction of intra and 
inter-partner acceptance, which echoes broader attachment notions of the couple 
relationship as a secure site of psychological wellbeing and growth stemming from 
positive conceptions of self and others (first outlined by Bartholomew & Horowitz, 
1991).  This construction operates through a satisfying governance-of-the-self based on 
partners’ own self-acceptance, and also their acceptance of each other.  Relating in a 
‘satisfying’ way is presented as being “about […] acceptance of yourself” because “if 
you tend to accept yourself […] others then tend to accept you”.  In contrast, individuals 
who think they are “not good enough” and who are “not very good at having a 
relationship with [themselves]” are further disempowered through being positioned as 
subjects who inevitably experience “all manner of difficulties having a relationship with 
somebody else”.  This is because the subject who considers themselves as “not good 
enough” is positioned as over-reliant on their partner and in need of the “relationship to 
prop [them] up” or “make up the gaps” in themselves, and this is understood by the 
therapists as ultimately leading to a “limited relationship”.  Thus, implicit to the practice 
of relationally satisfying self-acceptance is the need to acknowledge and take ownership 
for one’s own needs in the relationship.  Once again, this discourse potentially produces 
a more empowered subject, yet it still operates through a self-policing productive power 
(Foucault, 1975; Rose, 1990).  The satisfied subject has no option but to engage in self-
surveillance by monitoring their levels of personal need fulfilment, whilst also 
governing (i.e. limiting to an ‘appropriate’ level) the relational, inter-subjective 
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expectations that they place on their partner.  This process is talked about by Gwen and 
Charlotte: 
Extract 30: 
“[...] it’s about getting that balance right, how much can I do for myself, and how much 
(.) can I legitimately expect from my partner?  And sometimes (.) one partner might just 
[…] put all those needs out onto their partner, and it’s more, obviously, than one partner 
can (.) cope with.  (.) And I think it’s just an increasing problem of the way our society 
has gone, that (.) and the way we conceive of a couple now, that we tend to think that 
this one other person is going to be able to meet all our needs and one person can’t do 
that.  You know, so a lot of it is just about being realistic about what another human 
being can actually do for you, and how much you have to do yourself”.   
(Gwen, pg2, lines 60-70) 
 
Extract 31: 
“So it’s constantly a dance, and, and it’s the constant tension with the “What I want for 
myself”, and there’s a heck of a lot of that around, because “I’m worth it” and stuff, and 
this sort of, you know, babes in the wood, everything to each other.  And it’s how you 
manage that tension and, that, is really the secret to a satisfying relationship.  Because 
this is sort of dependency [draws two significantly overlapping circles], and if you get 
here [draws two separate circles] it’s independency, but actually, what you need to have 
is this sort of constant backwards and forwards of interdependency”.   
(Charlotte, pg7, lines 349-357). 
 
In Gwen’s extract she implicitly mobilises notions of the self-responsible, self-fulfilling 
neo-liberal subject (Hawkes, 1996; Weeks, 2007) and constructs the dissatisfying 
practice of clients’ “putting all [their] needs out onto their partner” and expecting their 
partner to “be able to meet all [their] needs” because “one person can’t do that”.  Both 
Gwen and Charlotte understand these practices as “increasing[ly] problem[atic]” in the 
current socio-historical context because of the availability of broader discourses which  
simultaneously privilege yet isolate the couple as a site of personal satisfaction (e.g. 
Beck & Beck-Gersheim, 1995; Hochschild, 2003; Jackson & Scott, 2004).  Thus, the 
therapists prescribe a relationally satisfying technology-of-the-self which operates 
through the practice of individuals acknowledging that they have needs that they must 
take responsibility for themselves and ask “how much can I do for myself, and how 
much can I legitimately expect from my partner?”  As Charlotte states “it’s how 
[partners] manage that tension […] that is the secret to a satisfying relationship”.  Thus, 
I present the “Satisfied Awakened Relating Subject” as occupying an empowered 
position in which they are capable of getting the “balance right” between receiving 
fulfilment from their partner and also fulfilling their own needs, and this self-
governance produces the satisfying “backwards and forwards of interdependency”.   
Again, Charlotte’s construction of satisfying interdependency presents a more 
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empowered position within the context of the discourse of “Relationship Dissatisfaction 
as Unfulfilled Needs”.  However, the risk of this construction being mobilised and 
sustained in a dogmatic way was illustrated when the therapists talked about the tension 
that sometimes arose when they prescribed the self-reflective practice of the “Awakened 
Subject”.  Their clients were often understood as resisting the therapists’ invitation to 
engage in the practice of self-reflection necessary for them to occupy the position of 
satisfying discovery.  Instead, the clients were constructed as often yearning for direct 
instruction about what they should do, but this was presented as a futile, ultimately 
dissatisfying practice by the therapists, and one that they resisted: 
 
Extract 32: 
“[...] it’s very hard because they’ll sit there and say “If only you’d tell us what to do!” 
[laughs]  And of course you’d love to tell them what to do, but you can’t, you mustn’t 
[laughs] […] It’s about them getting the understanding, feeling it in their gut, you know, 
otherwise nothing really will change [...] you know they have to struggle with it [...] and 
they have to, you know, find their way of (.) erm, articulating it”. 
(Gwen, pg24, lines 1159-1174) 
 
Extract 33: 
“So it, it sounds like a strange job […] but we are not directive.  It is about them 
exploring it […] if we are directive it would be 6 weeks, things are ok, and then they 
leave and everything’s gone horribly wrong again.  So, I think, hopefully they leave 
with the skills to communicate and, and keep up this exploration forever”. 
(Flo, pg12, lines 646-659) 
 
Both Gwen and Flo show an awareness of the power that operates through their position 
as an expert, and they resist this in order to take up positions where they self-
responsibilise and empower their clients as “Awakened subjects”.  However, these 
extracts also make explicit the upshot of failure if the two partners do not internalise the 
self-reflective practices of the therapeutic intervention.  If the clients do not “struggle” 
and “find their way of […] articulating” suitable satisfying practices then they are 
understood as running the risk of “everything go[ing] horribly wrong again”.  This 
construction opens out two options - either self-reflect or fail – and thereby functions to 
further justify the practice of couple therapy and to compel the clients to engage with 
the processes of subjectification that are made available to them so that, as Flo says, 
they can “keep up this exploration forever”.  This illustrates the role that couple therapy 
plays in the norm-setting mechanisms that prescribe the ways in which relationship 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction are produced, and the types of subject, practices, and 
interventions that are enabled and warranted through these.  As with any dominant 
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discourse, there is the risk that lay individuals presenting for therapy simply change one 
dogma for another and close down alternative ways of relating (Tiefer, 2005). 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has argued that relationship dissatisfaction is understood as problematic in 
several different ways across the couple therapists’ talk and this discursive frame 
(within which therapeutic interventions happen) makes available certain dissatisfied 
subject positions.  The institutional and pastoral power operating through couple 
therapy enables and warrants the prescription of satisfying technologies-of-self, which 
operate at the level of inter-subjective relational practices.  These interventions promote 
intimacy as the key satisfying practice and limit alternative behaviours (e.g. silence) as 
problematically dissatisfying.  They are put forward as relational ‘skills’ that need to be 
taken up and invested in by dissatisfied clients in order for them to be repositioned as 
satisfied.  I have argued that these practices present a mode of subjectification that is 
mobilised and promoted uncritically, and there is a risk that they could be taken up and 
recycled dogmatically due to the powerful role that the institution of therapy has in the 
mechanism of discursive norm-setting.  In the following chapter, the operation of 
‘intersubjective-practices-as-a-mode-of-subjectification’ comes to the fore in the 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis of lay peoples’ talk.  
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5. 
 
Laypeople’s constructions of relationship satisfaction 
This chapter presents the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) of lay-peoples’ talk, 
and explores the culturally embedded, taken-for-granted assumptions that inform lay 
peoples’ understandings of relationship satisfaction in long-term, heterosexual 
coupledom.  This analysis forms one half of the twin focus analysis outlined in Chapters 
1 and 3 (the other half is the IPA presented in Chapter 6) and, as with the FDA in 
Chapter 4, I acknowledge that it represents a form of knowledge production which, 
itself, could be deconstructed (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1).   
 
The FDA presented here shows a preoccupation by the participants with wanting to 
achieve a state described by them as satisfied.  The analysis also indicates a range of 
discursive practices (at the level of the couple) as a source through which ‘satisfied’ and 
‘dissatisfied’ ‘versions of self’ are made possible and taken up with subjective 
investment.  In this way, the analysis touches on earlier theoretical work (e.g. Wetherell 
& Edley, 1999) in that the production of ‘satisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’ selves is theorised 
as a method of self-presentation that involves investment in specific ‘satisfying 
practices’.  These practices are simultaneously understood as situationally-specific yet 
also dependent on broader social discourses which constitute Relationship Satisfaction.  
Through the respondents’ take-up and reproduction of these practices and discourses, 
they are ordered, disciplined, and subjectified as satisfied or dissatisfied selves.  In this 
way, the practices function as ‘self-formative’ or ‘onto-formative’ (Foucault, 1977).  
However, because multiple and contradictory accounts are available, the ‘versions of 
self’ are presented as plural and ongoing - “achieved through discursive work, 
constantly needing to be brought into being over and over again” (Wetherell & Edley, 
1999, p.352).   
 
Hence, the core focus of the chapter is on mapping these processes of subjectification 
including the ‘versions of self’ that are made available when lay people talk about 
relationship satisfaction.  In particular, the analysis offers an account of how these 
modes of subjectification enable and sustain ‘versions of self’ though the discourses and 
practices that are mobilised by respondents in relation to what it means to be satisfied or 
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dissatisfied.  These discursive constructions and the associated versions of self are 
summarised below in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Summary of the Discursive Analysis of Lay peoples’ Talk  
Discursive Constructions of Relationship 
Satisfaction 
Versions of self 
Relationship 
Satisfaction as a 
transactional 
obligation for needs 
fulfilment  
Satisfying the 
“Intimate 
Confessional” 
The monitor version of self 
The articulator version of self 
The diligent negotiator version of self 
The dissatisfied blamer version of self 
Satisfying Romantic 
Idealism 
The inevitably dissatisfied monitor version 
of self 
The effortless negotiator version of self 
Relationship Satisfaction as heroic, leap-of-
faith relating 
The Leap of Faith version of self 
The Heroic version of self 
 
As outlined above, across the lay peoples’ accounts I argue that two distinct 
constructions of relationship satisfaction are produced which underpin the processes of 
subjectification: 
i) “Relationship satisfaction as a transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” 
ii) “Relationship satisfaction as heroic, leap-of-faith relating”. 
Each is now presented and discussed in turn. 
 
5.1 “Relationship Satisfaction as a transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” 
When this discourse of “relationship satisfaction as a transactional obligation for 
needs fulfilment” is mobilised by lay-people, partners are ontologically represented as 
beings with innate needs, and their relationship discursively functions as the primary 
site in which many of these needs are met.  This construction mirrors the therapists’ 
account of “relationship dissatisfaction as unfulfilled needs” (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.3.2) as well as the dominant mainstream psychological accounts of relationship 
satisfaction (e.g. Emmers-Sommer, 2004; Hazan & Shaver, 2004; VanderDrift & 
Agnew, 2012), and maintains relationship satisfaction as signifying that partners’ needs 
are being met.  In contrast, relationship dissatisfaction is understood as the signifier for 
the problem of un-fulfilled needs (see also Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2).  This construction 
is produced across the body of interviews and is succinctly illustrated by Lisa and Ruth: 
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Extract 34:   
“Relationship satisfaction’s about (.) being content in the relationship, that you’ve both 
got (.) expectations and needs that (.) are being met".  
(Lisa, 31-year-old, white British, office worker, in her relationship for three years, and 
living with her partner.  Pg8, lines 395-396) 
 
Extract 35: 
“I suppose you can demand something off [your partner] a little bit as well, you know 
(.) “Can you do this for me?”; “I need you to do this for me”  
(Ruth, 29-year-old, white British, teacher, in her relationship for five years, and living 
with her fiancé.  Pg3, lines 116-117) 
 
Implicit, yet pivotal to this discursive construction is the notion of partners’ 
transactional obligation as part of signing up to a satisfying relationship.  Partners are 
constructed as having a right to expect their needs to be fulfilled by each other (“Can 
you do this for me?”), and also have a duty to fulfil each other’s needs, such that “both 
[partners] expectations and needs […] are being met”.  This mirrors other discursive 
work which has illustrated partners heightened expectations in terms of  ‘correctly’ 
enacting relational rights and duties (see for example, Hawkes, 1996; Nicholson, 1993; 
Tunariu & Reavey, 2007; Weeks, 2007).  This discursive privileging of mutual need-
fulfilment is illustrated by Lydia who presents the importance of her husband also 
experiencing relationship satisfaction:   
Extract 36:   
Lydia: “If I want to be satisfied do I think my husband needs to be satisfied as well?  
Yeah, I think so, yeah.  Because you can always tell if your partner’s not (.) feeling 
100%, not feeling satisfied, and that (.) wears off on you, definitely. 
Interviewer:  So that’s gonna influence (.) your own feelings of satisfaction? 
Lydia:  Yeah, and by contrast if that person’s able to be really joyful and not (.) 
burdened then that rubs off on you as well.  (.) So I guess you do kind of mould together 
in a lot of ways”.  
(Lydia, 31-year-old, white British, self-employed, in her relationship for five years, and 
living with her husband of two years.  Pg11, lines 511-520) 
 
Here, each partner is represented via a dual discursive subjectivity which 
simultaneously individualises them as autonomous beings with unique needs, and 
collectivises them as part of the couple (see also Finn, 2012) – constructed as ethically 
compelled by a governance of mutual need fulfilment (“If I want to be satisfied do I 
think my husband needs to be satisfied as well?  Yeah, I think so, yeah”).  In this way, 
the “Transactional Obligation” account of relationship satisfaction centres on the 
dialectic of self-and-other’s needs, and what individuals perceive they are not rightfully 
receiving or giving – and draws on broader neo-liberal, economic discourses of 
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egalitarian individualism (e.g. Giddens, 1991; Willig & dew Valor, 1999 as cited in 
Smith, 2008).  To be understood as relationally satisfied the ‘self’ gets positioned as 
having a duty to engage in a practice of satisfying its partner’s needs, but also expects to 
be satisfied in return.  This is a key example of the practices that prop up and sustain 
this mode of satisfying subjectification. 
This formulation of a ‘fulfilling’ and ‘fulfilled satisfied self’ is adopted by the majority 
of participants and is understood in light of two distinct, broader dominant discourses.  
The first discursive route operates through a governance of intimate communication by 
mobilising the authority of the confessional.  In contrast, the second mobilises broader 
discourses of idealised romanticism.  This reflects Crawford’s (2004) claim that 
satisfaction in modern coupledom is simultaneously produced by two ‘ideal’ narratives: 
one of egalitarian reciprocity and one of heterosexual romance. These prescribe 
different versions of self with different speaking rights and duties vis-à-vis managing 
the dialectic of self-and-other’s needs in the transactional obligation.  This tension 
perfectly illustrates the multiplicity and fluidity of discourse in action in everyday 
sense-making.  Each is now discussed and illustrated in turn. 
5.1.1 Transactional obligation Part 1: “Satisfying the Intimate Confessional” 
When the “Relationship Satisfaction as transactional needs fulfilment” construction is 
produced in light of the dominant discourse of the intimate confessional (Foucault, 
1977; Rose, 1989), relationship satisfaction centres around partners being presented as 
engaging in diligent, pragmatic, and egalitarian cost-benefit analyses of the extent to 
which their own, and each other’s needs are met.  Therefore this construction echoes 
both mainstream social exchange theoretical accounts (e.g. Johnson & Lebow, 2000) as 
well as discourses of transformed intimacy (e.g. Giddens, 1991; Weeks, 2007).  On the 
one hand, individuals are compelled to fulfil their own needs in order to be satisfied, but 
this can only be achieved in relation to their partner in an ongoing dialectical process of 
negotiation and egalitarian compromise (e.g. Giddens, 1991).   This process of 
subjectification can be discursively explained in terms of relationship satisfaction being 
constructed as requiring ‘work’.  This compels partners to engage in satisfying practices 
of the self which include reflective “monitoring” of their mutual levels of need 
fulfilment; “articulating” their needs or the aspects of their relationship that they are 
dissatisfied with; and “negotiating” a mutually acceptable compromise.   
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Within this discursive framework, partners are constructed as knowable selves through 
the practices of monitoring and communication.  This requires the satisfying practices 
of the confessional, and the pedagogical technologies of partners learning and 
developing the requisite communication skills.  Perceived transgressions of these steps 
are constructed as potentially warranting justified blame that one partner is being selfish 
or not meeting the agreed ‘rules’ of their relationship.  It is through these practices 
(which function as technologies-of-the-self) that a mode of subjectification is made 
available to partners which enables different “versions of self” (some of which are 
understood as satisfied, and others as dissatisfied) to be taken up or resisted.  When the 
“Relationship Satisfaction as transactional needs fulfilment” construction is produced 
in light of the dominant discourse of the intimate confessional, I argue that at least four 
overlapping “versions of self” are made available in which the need fulfilling ‘self-
other’ dialectic operates (sometimes in gendered ways).  I am going to focus on: “the 
monitor version of self”, “the articulator version of self”, “the diligent negotiator 
version of self”, and “the blamer version of self”.  For each of these “versions of self”, 
each partner simultaneously occupies a position of practicing (e.g. monitoring, 
articulating etc.) and being practiced upon (i.e. being monitored, being articulated to), 
and different power relations operate through these.  Each of these four “selves” is 
explained and illustrated in detail, beginning with “the monitor”. 
5.1.1.1 The “monitor version of self” 
The “monitor version of self” is constructed as being compelled to engage in a regime 
of monitoring both their own, and each other’s status of relationship satisfaction, by 
assessing the extent to which they are meeting their mutual duty as need fulfilling 
partners.  The “monitor version of self” is propped up and sustained by broader 
discourses of egalitarian economic individualism (that is, each partner has a right to 
receive and provide need fulfilment within the context of their relationship).  When 
partners take up the “monitor version of self”, they are constructed as viewing self and 
other as knowable through a regime of deliberate reflection and evaluation.  This 
discursive process reflects Foucault’s (1975) theoretical account of regimes of power 
producing subjectivities through their internalisation; a form of governance that 
disciplines subjects through compelling them to engage in diligent self-surveillance and 
self-governance (Weeks, 2005; 2007).  In terms of the “Transactional Obligation” and 
the dialectics of self-and-other’s needs, the self as monitor is understood as reflecting on 
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whether they and their partner are doing enough for each other, and they are 
simultaneously aware that this question is being asked of them.  In this way the 
“monitor version of self” is constructed as occupying a site of discursive power which 
enables them to ‘judge’ partners’ relational performance – a judgement directed by both 
partners towards self and other.  This process of monitoring is illustrated by John who 
presented an account about monitoring his own relational performance and whether or 
not he was “putting enough” into his relationship. 
Extract 37: 
“I feel, that, from time to time (.) have a few minutes and you just reflect on it you 
know?  And think is everything going well?  Am I putting my (.) bit into this?  Is there 
anyway that I could (.) improve what I’m doing?  Not by (.) being someone different, 
but just by (.) you know, am I putting enough into this?  (.) Is there anything I (.) we 
should be doing that we’re not doing?” 
(John: a 28-years-old, white English office worker, in his relationship for two and a half 
years, and living with friends. Pg 12, Lines 551-556) 
John’s extract illustrates the practices of self-monitoring-self and self-monitoring-other 
and echoes mainstream psychological accounts of equity theory in which relationship 
satisfaction is understood in terms of equitable costs and benefits (e.g. Adams, 1965 as 
cited in Guerrero, Anderson & Afifi, 2007).  John is presented as taking up the “monitor 
version of self” by reflecting on his subjective individual performance as a partner (“am 
I putting enough into this?”), and then whether he and his girlfriend are doing enough as 
a collectivised couple (“Is there anything [...] we should be doing?”).  This reflection 
can be understood as operating as a form of self-governance in light of the normative 
prescription of the need-fulfilling transactional obligation.  The need fulfilment of 
John’s partner is framed from the perspective of John’s personal performance in the 
relationship (e.g. “anyway that I could improve?”) rather than on whether or not his 
partner is fulfilled.  Hence, occupying the “monitor version of self” is promoted as 
crucial in constructing how satisfying or “well” his relationship is going.  The upshot is 
that the “monitor” represents a socially valued version of self because doing monitoring 
permits the subject to evaluate their relationship and understand themselves as the 
“satisfied monitor version of self”.  This warrants John’s take-up, investment and 
internalisation of the monitoring practice.  However, the risk is that the practice of 
monitoring ‘individual performance’ fails to recognise the broader social context and 
simply functions as a form of self-regulation (Finn, 2012) that recycles and sustains 
dominant, taken-for-granted assumptions regarding what partners “[...] should be doing” 
in constituting ‘satisfying relating’. 
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However, across the texts, the “monitor version of self” is discursively mobilised in 
conflicting ways vis-à-vis the satisfying “transactional obligation for needs fulfilment”.  
Whilst occupying the “monitor version of self” is framed as a crucial mode of 
subjectification for understanding and confirming one’s status as a satisfied subject, it 
also discursively operates as the signifier for relationship dissatisfaction.  This 
discursive tension is illustrated by John: 
Extract 38:   
“Am I a good boyfriend, am I a good girlfriend? (.) if you’re asking yourself the 
question then you’re already in a predicament.  If you’re not asking yourself the 
question then you’re a good boyfriend / girlfriend (.) I would say basically.  Or possibly 
not, maybe I’m slightly more conscientious (.) no, I don’t think so.  […] I think, behind 
that kind of genuinely satisfying relationship (.) I think you pretty much know (.) you 
know if what you’re doing is right or wrong kind of thing.  I think it’s just (.) as I say, if 
something’s wrong that’s when you start asking yourself that question.” 
(John, pg18, lines 849-865). 
 
Constructed in this way, John presents a “dissatisfied monitor version of self” who 
views the practice of monitoring as a sign of ‘dysfunction’ (“a predicament”) in the 
relationship i.e. as a sign of relationship dissatisfaction.  Thus, the speaking rights and 
duties of the “monitor version of self” shift according to the extent to which the self 
engages in the practice of monitoring.  This tension once again illustrates the fluidity 
and multiplicity of discourse in action, and the subsequent ‘rules’ and contradictions 
that speakers have to navigate in their processes of sense-making.  For John, occupying 
the position of the “monitor self” excessively (by frequently reflecting on one’s 
performance as a partner and asking “Am I a good boyfriend, am I a good girlfriend?”) 
signifies a transgression of the transactional obligation and this produces a “dissatisfied 
monitor version of self”.  I argue that the notions of ‘excessiveness’ in this construction 
implicitly draws on discourses of obsession and ‘madness’ and presents excessive 
monitoring as a dissatisfying practice of psychological pathology (e.g. Foucault, 1964).  
In contrast, occupying the position “from time to time” is privileged as socially valued 
(see also Extract 37) and empowers the “satisfied monitor version of self” – a subject 
who periodically checks that their transactional obligation is being upheld.  Across the 
participants’ narratives this mode of subjectification is frequently discussed in gendered 
terms.   In particular, across the women participants’ talk they construct themselves as 
monitoring their levels of need fulfilment to a greater extent than their male partners; 
both in terms of how they feel about their relationship overall, and also the extent to 
which they monitor specific aspects of the relationship.  In the following extracts, this 
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gendered mode of subjectification is illustrated by Anya, who presents men as being 
“satisfied with less satisfaction”, and Clare, who constructs her needs as more 
“complicated” than her boyfriend’s. 
Extract 39:  
“They would be maybe more satisfied with less satisfaction (.) if you know what I 
mean.  Er, lower level of satisfaction would be enough for them to think that’s good 
relationship, “it’s fine”, “it doesn’t bother me” (.) they’re maybe not as picky as us 
women […] maybe for women (.) there’s a larger number of elements than for men.  I 
think men probably evaluate much smaller number of things that (.) maybe important to 
them in a relationship”.   
(Anya: a 37-year-old, Bosnian, researcher, in her relationship for 10 years, and living 
with her partner. Pg 17-18, Lines 840-848 & Lines 853-856) 
 
Extract 40:   
Clare: “[...] it’s not so much different [needs], it’s just mine are more complicated.  […] 
I would say Vince’s idea of our relationship and our satisfaction (.) would be much, I 
mean this interview would be much quicker (.) it’s not that he loves me less (.) it’s just 
not as complicated for him (.) he would have a list of things he always needed, and 
things he needed within a time period. 
Interviewer:  And would the items on his list also (.) shape your views of relationship 
satisfaction?           
Clare:  (.) they’d be very similar, it’s just I would have sub-headings, and mind maps, 
and diagrams, and pictures, and photographs, and feely boards underneath.  It would be 
like that [laughs].  The sub-heading would be like the same thing, just mine would be all 
a bit more complicated”.  
(Clare, a 30-year-old, white British, primary school teacher, in her relationship for 
seven years, and living with her partner.  Pgs18-19, lines 895-933) 
 
Mobilised in this way, women participants produce a “gendered monitor version of 
self” based on a construction of women’s relational needs as including a “larger number 
of elements” and therefore being more “complicated” than men’s less “picky” needs.  
This construction of women’s emotional “complexity” recycles dominant discourses 
that position women as innately more ‘relational’ and ‘emotional’ than men (Jackson, 
2005).  These gendered ‘feeling rules’ (e.g. Hocschild, 2003) produce a gendered 
technology-of-the-self which compels women to engage in a policing-regime of 
monitoring self and other to a greater extent than men.  Hence, the “gendered monitor 
version of self” discursively reifies a gender imbalance in the transactional obligation so 
that women are constructed as monitoring the rules of their relationships to a greater 
extent (e.g. Duncombe & Marsden, 1993; Hocschild, 2003), and are therefore 
constructed as less easily satisfied than men.  In contrast, the formulation of men’s 
‘ease’ of satisfaction with the transactional obligation (based on their less “complicated” 
needs) negates the need for them to engage in the practice of monitoring their 
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relationship as much as women.  This illustrates the process of ‘subjectification-
through-practice’ and the ways in which certain discursive frameworks make available 
and prescribe certain practices which prop up and sustain different versions of self.  
That is, once the subject occupies the “gendered monitor version of self” they ‘sign up’ 
to the gendered imperative that ‘women monitor more than men’ and these practices 
cyclically reinforce that version of self. 
Across the participants accounts, the “monitor version of self” is constructed as being 
made available through interactions and engagements with other people.  In this way, 
others are constructed as being crucial in the practice of self-surveillance, and I argue 
that subjects can be ushered into taking up, and investing in, the “monitor version of 
self” through the discursive practices of others.  Once again, this construction illustrates 
a mode of subjectification-through-practice, and this process is exemplified by Gaby 
and Lisa who present the impact of significant others (friends and family) in them 
taking up the monitoring version of self:  
Extract 41:  
“[…] when you’re talking to friends or family […] it’s really nice, you know, 
compliments about your relationship from people who matter.  (.) that means a lot, and 
(.) you do kind of think “Oh, yeah”, you know, I don’t really see it that way because I’m 
in it, but somebody maybe points it out to you.  Things that you don’t (.) you take for 
granted I suppose, about the way you are together.  Sometimes you need a bit of an 
outside perspective”. 
(Gaby, a 41-year-old, white British student, in her relationship for eleven years, and 
living with her fiancé. Pg9, lines 419-426) 
Extract 42:  
[…] it’s nice for your friends to like your partner and for your friends and family to see 
you as a great couple […] I’ve got other friends (.) who aren’t so sure about him […] 
not that they explicitly say that to me, although (.) some have (.) but I kind of know that 
even though, in some cases they’re pretty good friends, they don’t actually know (.) me 
and Nick together (. ) and don’t know Nick (.) so (.) I don’t think it changes how I feel 
about (.) my relationship.  
(Lisa, pgs7, lines 303-308) 
 
Whilst the “satisfied monitor version of self” is formulated as someone in the habit of 
practicing self-surveillance and self-governance (in light of normative satisfying 
prescriptions for mutual need fulfilment), Gaby’s and Lisa’s extracts illustrate how this 
surveillance and governance is also discursively reified through engagement with 
others
50
.  When either Gaby or Lisa are positioned as being in a satisfying relationship 
                                                 
50 And further reified through my act of producing knowledge through my discursive interpretation presented here 
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by their friends or family, they take up the speaking rights and duties of the “satisfied 
monitor version of self”, and adjust and survey their relationship in light of the 
normalising acceptance of others.  Therefore they construct it as “really nice [to receive] 
compliments […] from people who matter”, and for their “friends and family to see 
[them] as a great couple”.  Thus, the “satisfied monitor version of self” is presented as 
being made available and reified through the broader economic discourses that underpin 
the “Transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” construction.  The ‘existence’ of the 
“Satisfied Monitor Version of Self” is then made all the more ‘possible’ when the 
subject is socially rewarded (through compliments) and ushered into appropriating that 
version of self.  However, when faced with a critical evaluation from some of her 
friends, Lisa can be understood as mobilising a discursive private-public divide between 
her intimate relationship and those outside of it - positioning her friends (even the 
“pretty good” ones) as external to her relational dyad and, as such, do not really “know” 
her partner.  In this way, I construct Lisa as resisting the “dissatisfied monitor version of 
self” and, instead, she reclaims the power of the socially valued “satisfied monitor self” 
from her friends.  Therefore, Lisa is understood as being able to resist the authorising 
power of her friends to position her boyfriend as someone they are not “so sure about”.   
Across the participants’ narratives, this implicit need to work at one’s relationship as 
part of the “transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” also underpins and warrants 
the satisfying practices of ‘articulating’ ones needs to ones partner.  This practice makes 
available the “articulator version of self”. 
5.1.1.2 The “articulator version of self” 
When relationship satisfaction is constructed by lay people as a “transactional 
obligation for needs fulfilment”, producing relationship satisfaction requires individuals 
to occupy a position whereby they articulate their needs, or anything they are unhappy 
about, to each other.  Relationship dissatisfaction is constructed as stemming from not 
talking to one’s partner, and not being ‘open’ and ‘honest’ about how one feels.  In this 
way, what I call the “satisfied articulator version of self” is enabled via the governance 
of the confessional (Foucault, 1978; Rose, 1999) which mobilises broader discourses of 
satisfying disclosing intimacy, and sustains a narrative of ‘relationship satisfaction’ 
based on partners’ ability to manage intimacy (e.g. Cherline, 2004; Giddens, 1992).  
This satisfying process of subjectification-through-practice is put forward in the extract 
below by William: 
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Extract 43:  
“I think in a relationship where you are going to manage it, it is about (.) being really 
open, being honest, actually tell that other person how you feel (.) and as long as that 
other person (.) is wanting to still maintain (.) that relationship, then that should be 
enough (.) in terms of them being able to start thinking about a solution (.) through 
words, through actually discussing it (.) keeping things (.) in the open and not just 
bottling things up and allowing it to become (.) a bigger and bigger issue until 
eventually (.) perhaps the smallest thing sparks it off into erm (.) an un-resolvable 
conflict”.  
(William: a 27-year-old, white British, local authority worker, in his current relationship 
for 18 months, and living with friends.  Pgs17-18, lines 844-854) 
William’s extract illustrates that the practice of self-articulating-to-other through talk 
can be understood as offering a mechanism to deal with relationship dissatisfaction by 
enabling a discursive space in which partners are not being silenced, or “bottling up” 
personal concerns.  Here, the “articulator version of self” is understood as coming to 
the fore in maintaining relationship satisfaction through the practice of making visible 
their needs or problems to their partner, who (under the ‘rules’ of the “transactional 
obligation”) is constructed as having a ‘duty’ to address them.  Within this discursive 
framework the power of the “satisfied articulator version of self” operates through the 
subject’s capacity to talk away dissatisfaction by inviting their partner - the listener - to 
take up the views and practices of the “diligent negotiator version of self”’ (see Section 
5.2.1.3) and thereby instigating the resolution of relational problems via compromise (as 
opposed to “bottling things up and allowing [them] to become (.) a bigger and bigger 
issue until eventually (.) perhaps the smallest thing sparks it off into erm (.) an un-
resolvable conflict”).  This ‘invitation to negotiate through articulation’ reflects 
mainstream research which privilege ‘problem solving’ through ‘intimate 
communication’ (e.g. Ridley et al., 2001; Markman & Rhoades, 2012) and further 
reifies and warrants partners taking up the “Satisfied Articulator Version of Self”.  
However, this mode of subjectification leaves no space for ‘silence’ in producing 
relationship satisfaction, and the imperative to voice one’s concerns echoes the claims 
of theorists (e.g. Rose, 1989) who saw the pervading influence of the ‘psy’ technologies 
and talking therapies in producing intimate life; the confessional of the church relocated 
to the inter-subjective space of the relational dyad so that satisfied couples are 
compelled to be “really open [and] honest” with each other.    However, in the next 
extract John produces an account in which someone may find themselves in a position 
where they are unable to speak because they are constructed as being unable to 
articulate their concerns to themselves first.   This presents a blurring of the monitor and 
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the articulator subject positions, such that the practices of the “monitor version of self” 
are understood as propping up and sustaining the “articulator version of self”:   
Extract 44:  
“It sometimes can’t be [articulated] […] how do you turn round and say (.) “there 
doesn’t seem to be something right between us, and hasn’t been for a while, and I think 
it’s because you’re not putting x, y, and z in”  (.) It’s fine if you can explain the x, y and 
z bit, but if you can’t do that, I think that’s when you’ve got problems you know?  […] I 
mean, how the hell do you resolve something (.) with somebody else if you can’t 
resolve it in your own head?  […] possibly that’s what causes breakdown in 
relationships is that feeling of frustration of whatever, you know, how can I do this?  
[…] I think self-realisation’s the first stage in most things (.) if you can’t articulate it (.) 
in your own head, how the hell are you ever going to make anybody else understand it?  
That’s the thing (.) parity with your own thoughts, and it doesn’t matter if those 
thoughts then prove to be wrong.  So upon being challenged you change those views - 
that’s fine, but if you can’t articulate them in the first place there’s almost no point as 
far as I’m concerned.  
(John, pgs15-16, lines 729-829 and pgs21-22, lines 1039-1055) 
In this extract John constructs relationship satisfaction as a relational process which 
compels partners to firstly engage in a practice of self-surveillance and reflection on 
their needs in order for them to be articulated to their partner.  Here, relational (that is, 
inter-subjective) dissatisfaction is understood as arising when people are unable to 
identify the source of their concerns (“[...] how the hell do you resolve something (.) 
with somebody else if you can’t resolve it in your own head?”).  This extract 
demonstrates the power and the overlap of the “versions of self” that are available 
within the discursive rules of the “transactional obligation”, and illustrates a discursive 
blurring of the practices of the monitor and articulator versions of self.  This blurring 
exemplifies the fluid and dynamic qualities of these versions of self, as well as the 
complex, varied, and multiple ‘realities’ that language makes possible.  Through the 
process of conducting and presenting this analysis, I have constructed these “versions of 
self” as a way of systematically structuring and simplifying the workings of discourse in 
my participants’ talk.  However, these versions of self do not ‘exist’ outside of the 
reifying capacity of the participants’ talk and my subsequent analysis of this talk.  
Hence, the discursive ‘blurring’ of the versions of self arises because everyday sense-
making and self-presentation through talk are complex, often contradictory processes.   
Monitoring and reflection are constructed as empowered technologies-of-self and 
discursively function as the first practices required in rendering relationship 
dissatisfaction manageable.  John constructs individuals as needing to reach a point of 
“self-realisation” (a position from which they can articulate-to-self) before they can 
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occupy a position of articulating-to-other and broach any problems with their partner.  
In John’s extract, the satisfying mode of subjectification that is made possible through 
the “Transaction obligation for needs fulfilment” discourse functions through partners’ 
taking-up the empowered “articulator version of self”, and this is understood as firstly 
requiring the practices of the “monitor version of self”: that is, for partners to have 
engaged in a process of relational evaluation.  However, John also produces a 
discursively dissatisfying possibility: that whilst the position of monitor represents a 
space which allows for evaluation and reflection, it does not necessarily signify a 
guaranteed space from which to speak.  Similar to the monitor position (see extracts 39 
& 40), this potential difficulty in articulating is discursively explained across the 
interviews in gendered terms, which present men as “emotionally introverted” and 
women as able to “express themselves [more] easily or freely”; particularly when 
articulating relational concerns.  This “gendered articulator version of self” is produced 
by Gaby: 
Extract 45:   
“I think that’s where things get difficult a lot of the time because men don’t express 
themselves as easily or freely as women generally (.) men harbour things a bit more, 
they don’t say what’s pissing them off so much (.) in a relationship (.) until it comes 
out, because it’s normally, I find, it’s the woman who kind of brings it up (.) who’ll 
notice that things aren’t going right in the relationship […] women are much more 
active in relationships, definitely (.) men do tend to let things just kind of fester (.) 
They’re much more (.) emotionally introverted (.) than women.  Women will point 
things out and say “Hang on, this isn’t working, let’s talk about it, let’s do something 
about it”, and men don’t generally.”  
(Gaby, pgs19-20, lines 937-945 & 953-962) 
The extract above recycles the view that women engage in more monitoring than men, 
and that they also more readily speak about relational issues.  The production of a 
“gendered articulator version of self” means that, as highlighted elsewhere (e.g. 
Duncombe and Marsden, 1993; Jackson & Scott, 2004), women are constructed as 
occupying a position of being “much more active” and doing a greater share of 
satisfying emotion work (e.g. Hochschild, 2003) within the relationship because the 
resolution of points of tension, or dissatisfaction, is presented as being more likely to be 
initiated by women.  An upshot is that the “gendered articulator version of self” 
presents women and men with a different access to power.  On one level, men are 
seemingly disempowered through their inability to speak.  However, this ‘innate’ 
understanding also absolves them of responsibility for the “transactional obligation” 
compared to women who, as outlined by feminists (e.g. Thargaard, 1997), are 
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responsibilised for the relationship satisfaction through the practice of articulation.  The 
“gendered articulator version of self” is also produced by William who speaks about 
the way in which his tendency to occupy the articulator position is probably “unusual” 
from a male perspective:  
Extract 46:   
“[...] I would be the sort of person that is more willing to talk about things like that (.) 
there’s been a number of issues in the relationship (.) it’s up and down all of the time (.) 
but I certainly have learnt that the best thing to do (.) is to actually discuss some of this 
(.) bring it up, even if it doesn’t necessarily feel comfortable because ultimately (.) it 
will get things out onto the table, but I think I’m more willing to do that and probably 
quite unusual from a male perspective”. 
(William, pg18, lines 875-883) 
In the extract above, as well as reproducing the “gendered articulator version of self”, 
William also re-produces the “articulator version of self” as difficult to occupy (see 
also John’s extract 48).  However, rather than accounting for this in terms of not being 
able to articulate to self (as in John’s extract), William suggests that the difficulty arises 
by presenting the “articulator version of self” as (potentially) subjectively not very 
“comfortable” to occupy (see also Chapter 6, Section 6.1.6).  This produces a discursive 
tension between the imperative to articulate (to ‘correctly’ do one’s transactional 
obligation) and the possibility of feeling discomfort in articulating something that one is 
not happy with.  In the extract above, William deals with this tension by re-emphasising 
the importance of the practice of articulation by presenting it as the “best thing to do” 
because “it will get things out onto the table”.  Implicit here, is a construction of silence 
as a relational threat that prevents issues being resolved and ultimately leading to 
growing resentments.  Thus, once again, there is no place for silence when the 
production of the “Transactional Obligation for mutual need fulfilment” is underpinned 
by broader discourses on intimacy and operates through the governance of the 
confessional.  In light of the participants’ constructing the practice of “the articulator 
version of self” as simultaneously an imperative, yet subjectively difficult to engage in, 
Anya attempts to deal with this tension by mobilising a relational construction in which 
individuals can be ushered into taking up the “articulator version of self” through their 
partners’ actions: 
 
 
Chapter 5.  Laypeople’s constructions of relationship satisfaction 
140 
 
Extract 47:   
“Again, if you don’t want somebody to lie to you then you have to make sure that you 
(.) never behave in a way that can frighten them in telling you the truth you know? […]  
So, when people lie to each other (.) might be, not just because you know, they wanna 
lie to you, but because you go ballistic whenever (.) they tell you the truth”. (Anya, 
pgs15-16, lines 742-750) 
Within the relational rules of the “transactional obligation for needs fulfilment”, mutual 
fulfilment is understood as being facilitated by individuals taking up and sustaining the 
practices of the “articulator version of self”, and also by helping their partner to take-up 
this version of self too.  In Anya’s extract she produces a relational regime of self-
governance, such that the responsibility for one’s partner’s “honest” articulation is 
understood as resting with oneself and one’s own actions (“[…] you have to make sure 
that you (.) never behave in a way that can frighten them in telling the truth”).  That is, 
through one’s actions (i.e. not going “ballistic”) one is constructed as empowering their 
partner who is subsequently constructed as being permitted to occupy the “articulator 
version of self” instead of being silenced.  Thus, in terms of the “transactional 
obligation for needs fulfilment”, responsibility for not silencing the articulator is 
understood as resting with both partners.  Like Anya, Ruth also speaks of this 
facilitation, but her focus is on receiving this facilitation.   
Extract 48:   
Interviewer: “And can partners help each other to open up (.) to talk about what they’re 
not happy with? 
Ruth:  Yeah I think they can.  I think if they are willing to take into account the other 
person’s view, and sort of respect it and acknowledge it, and make an effort to 
understand it, then, yes.  (.) Well there’s always a reason behind everything, it’s just 
whether you’re listening to that reason and then, I suppose it’s trying to negotiate, to 
compromise, and decide (.) what’s the best way to get through that”. 
(Ruth, pg14, lines 652-658) 
 
Beyond Anya’s point about partner’s not going “ballistic”, Ruth produces a facilitation 
of the “articulator version of self” based on the recipient (of the articulation practice) 
demonstrating satisfying “respect” and “listening” to what the articulator has to say.  
This relational practice of making an “effort to understand” and “acknowledge” the 
articulator is understood as empowering for both self and other, and this enables Ruth to 
take up a “satisfied articulator version of self”.  This version of self represents a subject 
who is satisfied not through their needs necessarily being fulfilled, but through their 
needs being heard.  In this way, a “relationship satisfaction of stages” is produced, 
which compels partners to commit to the different versions of self that are constructed 
Chapter 5.  Laypeople’s constructions of relationship satisfaction 
141 
 
as necessary for managing the process of transactional needs fulfilment.  Through 
speaking their dissatisfaction, I present the “articulator version of self” as discursively 
inviting their partner to engage in the process of negotiation and compromise.  Through 
their subsequent, reciprocal practice of “listening”, I argue that the partner signals their 
acceptance of this invitation and takes up the speaking rights and duties of, what I call, 
the “diligent negotiator version of self”’.  It is this inter-subjective practice that enables 
the subject to shift from the “articulator version of self” to the “satisfied articulator 
version of self”.  Again, this relational practice (which is prescribed through the 
“Transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” discourse) illustrates a mode of 
subjectification in which others are constructed as being crucial in the practice of self-
surveillance and governance, because subjects can be ushered into taking up, and 
investing in, different versions of the self through the discursive practices of others. 
5.1.1.3 The “diligent negotiator version of self” 
The “diligent negotiator version of self” is discursively characterised by a specific 
mode of listening and responding.  This practice is presented as a ‘diligent negotiation’ 
which recycles dominant social scripts that construct an ethic of ‘relationships as / 
requiring work’ (Finn, 2012).  Taking up the “diligent negotiator version of self” is 
constructed as warranting a mindful practice of concern and respect for one’s partner in 
order for partners to establish what they can give each other, and what compromises 
they can accept in terms of transactional need fulfilment.  This mode of subjectification 
echoes mainstream accounts of interdependence theory (e.g. Rusbult et al., 2004) and 
presents and compels a satisfying, needs-fulfilling relational practice which involves 
partners simultaneously mobilising the speaking rights and duties of both the 
“articulator version of self” and the “diligent negotiator version of self”.  In the extract 
below Imogen’s narrative illustrates the overlap of these two versions of self:  
Extract 49:   
“[...] a satisfying, healthy relationship (.) there should be a dynamic that allows (.) you 
to say when you’re not happy about something (.) and know that the other person is 
gonna listen […] and then there is a way of having a conversation that helps you to try 
and (.) come to a compromise or at least understand each other, and understand where 
you’re coming from because (.) you need to find ways of getting past that coz obviously 
no two people are always gonna agree on everything”. 
(Imogen, 29-year-old, white British, barrister, in her relationship for 4 years and living 
with her fiancé.  Pg6, lines 250-261) 
Imogen highlights the ongoing discursive tension of the self-and-other dialectic inherent 
in productions of the “the transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” (a tension that 
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arises in both the participants’ talk and in my analytical deconstructions of that talk).  
This tension between self and other’s needs is dealt with via Imogen’s construction of 
relational disagreement as normative (“obviously no two people are always gonna agree 
on everything”).  However, in constructions of the practice of diligent negotiation there 
is an expectation on partners to give something to each other.  This recycles discourses 
of ‘reciprocal gifts’ (Gilfoyle, Wilson & Brown, 1992) - partners are produced as 
having something that the other needs, and they negotiate the conditions under which 
they will give it to each other.  This negotiation is achieved through talk, and so there is 
a discursive overlap between the practices of the “articulator version of self” and the 
“diligent negotiator version of self”.  However, the “diligent negotiator version of self” 
emphasises the practice of “listening” – that is, one of the key responsibilities of the 
diligent negotiator is presented as facilitating their partner’s articulation because it 
enables a “[...] dynamic that allows (.) you to say when you’re not happy about 
something (.) and know that the other person is gonna listen”.  Therefore, for Imogen, 
this practice signifies a relationship as not only “satisfying”, but also “healthy”.  This is 
presented as a relational, circular, satisfying discursive process in which both partners 
cyclically occupy the articulator and diligent negotiator versions of self. The 
transactional obligation of need fulfilment warrants that partners flip between the two 
until a satisfying “compromise” is reached.  In this way, the two positions represent a 
satisfying discursive dialectic, and relationship satisfaction is represented as the upshot 
of partners continually shifting between both versions of self and, as a consequence, 
coming to an agreed compromise.  The practice of compromise represents a way in 
which the normative tension of self-and-other’s needs is rendered manageable.  Ruth 
illustrates the significance of the practice of “compromise” as a discursive signifier for 
relationship satisfaction:  
Extract 50:  
Interviewer:  “(.) as you said earlier, about compromise. 
Ruth:  Yeah, making the effort to do it.  I think even if it doesn’t work out the way you 
wanted it to (.) if the effort has been made and the conversations being there, and you 
feel like you’ve been listened to then, you’d be happier about compromising about 
certain things than if that person said “Well that’s what I’m doing, sod you” kind of 
thing. 
Interviewer:  It’s almost your partner’s (.) willingness to compromise (.) makes you 
more willing to even if you’re the one who ends up doing the compromise.  
Ruth:  Definitely, yeah, yeah.  I think it applies all the way through with everything I 
think.  (.) it’s that whole kind of attention thing, it’s just willingness to (.) listen or to, 
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make the effort to do things  (.) if you can’t reach a compromise or (.) one person is a 
definite “no”, not just a “maybe” I think that can be dissatisfying”.   
(Ruth, pg14, lines 660-692) 
 
In Ruth’s extract, satisfying compromise is understood as functioning as a joint decision 
– and represents a discursive co-production by self-&-other; constructed as being 
experienced as a form of mutual subjectivity that maintains an equality of power across 
the self-&-other dialectic.  Through the practice of respectful listening and 
“willingness” to compromise, the “diligent negotiator version of self” is understood as 
facilitating their partner (the articulator) to also occupy the diligent negotiator version of 
self and potentially do the compromising.  So that “even if it doesn’t work out the way 
you wanted it to (.) if the effort has been made and the conversations being there, and 
you feel like you’ve been listened to then, you’d be happier about compromising.”  In 
contrast, dissatisfying relating is represented via the absence of the diligent negotiator, 
and the refusal, by one partner, to listen to the other’s articulation (“[...] if you can’t 
reach a compromise or (.) one person is a definite “no”, not just a “maybe” I think that 
can be dissatisfying”).  This represents a difference of power, such that the articulator is 
disempowered and silenced through their partner’s inconsiderate rejection (“sod you”) 
of their right to be heard.   Thus, occupying the “diligent negotiator version of self” and 
permitting one’s partner to talk and be heard, is constructed as critical for the satisfying 
compromise.  On the face of it, this mode of subjectification presents a fairer, more 
egalitarian set of discursive practices.  However, this dominant construction of 
‘reciprocity’ (Braun, Gavey & McPhillips, 2003) still ‘adds to the rules’ of what it 
means to be a satisfied subject, and how this ‘should’ be achieved.  That is, this 
discursive framework still operates through a productive power of self-surveillance and 
self governance.  This is illustrated, for example, by William who constructs satisfying 
compromise as a practice that requires knowledge of one’s partner: 
Extract 51:  
“[…] having an understanding of how that other person is going to feel about (.) things 
that you bring (.) it’s about looking at how that’s gonna feel for that person (.) from 
their perspective, and yeah (.) being prepared to resolve it (.)  I think that’s the other 
thing as well, preparedness is quite (.) well I suppose it’s the same point again (.) if you 
want it to work (.) then you’ve got to be willing to make (.) those sorts of (.) decisions 
about (.) things jointly”. 
(William, pg18, lines 858-866) 
In the satisfying compromise, both the “articulator” and “diligent negotiator versions 
of self” are represented as considering the impact of their actions on their partner.  In 
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this way, the “transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” discourse produces an 
empathising, monitoring, self-governance, which discursively compels partners to 
reflect on their actions and consider how these might impact on their partner in order to 
jointly-produce a satisfying compromise.  Moreover, the power of the transactional 
obligation is directed towards the self, and functions through partners policing their own 
behaviour (i.e. being self-responsible) in order to facilitate a satisfying compromise 
(“[...] it’s about looking at how that’s gonna feel for that person (.) from their 
perspective, and yeah (.) being prepared to resolve it”).  However, William also talks 
about the way in which responsibility for the compromise could be understood as 
resting with one’s partner: 
Extract 52:  
“[…] I think compromise is quite an important thing (.) if you’re with the right person, 
then you are willing to make a lot of compromises and a lot of sacrifices in terms of 
your own selfish ends (.) for the greater good of (.) the other person.  […] and that, to a 
certain extent (.) there’s something about that person to make me want to compromise 
for them (.) when maybe (.) I certainly wouldn’t be prepared to make that compromise 
for (.) somebody else”.  
(William, pgs4-5, lines 195-213) 
The transactional obligation involved in satisfying need fulfilment is very apparent here; 
William understands himself as being prepared to negotiate or compromise, but on the 
condition that his partner can “make [him] want to compromise for them”.  Therefore, 
he can be understood as resisting the responsibility of the “diligent negotiator version of 
self” to facilitate compromise by reframing this ‘duty’ in terms of his personal 
“willingness” to compromise, and this “willingness” functions as the discursive signifier 
to him that he is with “the right person” because “if you’re with the right person, then 
you are willing to make a lot of compromises”.  In this way, William draws on broader 
romantic scripts which produce heightened expectations about what partners ‘should’ 
provide each other, and he constructs the responsibility for his own compromise as 
being located in the actions of his partner.  This enables a space in which he can 
‘justifiably’ refuse to compromise based on his partner’s failure to make him “want to” 
(“[...] there’s something about that person to make me want to compromise for them (.) 
when maybe (.) I certainly wouldn’t be prepared to make that compromise for (.) 
somebody else”).  Thus, the “diligent negotiator version of self” is presented as being 
contingent not only on a governance-of-empathising focused on self, but also a 
governance-of-expectations focused on other.  In the event of partners not meeting these 
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expectations, or failing to compromise, the “dissatisfied blamer version of self” is made 
available. 
5.1.1.4 The “dissatisfied blamer version of self” 
When participants mobilise the “Transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” 
discourse, a discursive space is enabled in which partners’ perceived failure of need 
fulfilment makes available, what I call, the “blamer version of self”.  This version of 
self is constructed as a dissatisfied, angry, and disappointed self who blames their 
partner for not meeting their ‘duty’ as a ‘needs fulfilling partner’.  As William outlines 
in the following extract, the “blamer version of self” can be understood as feeling “let 
down” by other.  
Extract 53:  
“[…] there might be times when you feel really disappointed about something that that 
person’s done or said, or hasn’t done (.) I don’t know, their choice of (.) whatever, you 
know, you can feel really quite let down by that person”.  
(William, pg19, lines 935-939) 
Constructed in this way, the “dissatisfied blamer version of self” is a subject of 
discursive power who focuses on ‘other’ (not on ‘self’), and operates through the 
practice of accusing the other of not meeting the relational terms of the transactional 
obligation. Unlike the practice of articulation, which functions as a discursive invite, 
blaming is not an invitation to one’s partner to take-up a version of self, but a means of 
positioning them through a process of objectificaiton.  Understood in this way, I argue 
that the practice of blaming mirrors what Buber (2008) referred to, as an ‘I-it’ mode of 
relating: in terms of processes of subjectification, the “dissatisfied blamer version of 
self” represents a ‘self’ who objectifies their partner and has clear expectations of what 
the partner ‘should’ do.  The “dissatisfied blamer version of self” is constructed as 
knowing and able to articulate (at least to themselves) which of their needs or 
expectations have not been met, and they construct the other as being at fault (through 
failing to uphold their side of the transactional obligation).  In response to being 
blamed, respondents are presented as mobilising different speaking rights and duties.  
They can either accept the blame, or challenge it and counter-blame their partner 
through constructing them as being unfair.  This shifting, dynamic quality of the self-&-
other dialectic in the “dissatisfied blamer version of self” is evident in the following 
extract.  Here, David reproduces the interactions that took place between him and his 
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partner following his unintentional failure to attend the birthday of his girlfriend’s 
sister: 
Extract 54:   
“I knew (.) it wouldn’t be seen as a mistake […] so I was just worried about her reaction 
(.) I tried calling her, obviously she didn’t answer, and then she sent me texts (.) you 
have these, sort of, silly messages (.) “I can’t believe you did this David, I just don’t 
know what to do”. (.) I wanted to open some sort of dialogue, and she wanted to tell me 
that I’d fucked up basically. (.) we’d had this period of every few weeks, some minor 
thing turning into a major thing (.) and then it’s all talk (.) should we be together, what 
should we do, how we gonna fix this?  And it’s just very (.) it’s laborious in some ways, 
and there’s a part of me that just sort of thinks (.) let’s just get over it, let’s just not 
bother going on about it.  It’s just (.) what it is.  […] I have been difficult in some ways, 
and I understood that I needed to (.) make a bit more effort […] so yeah, there are points 
when I realised that the expectations are fair enough, and I have changed my behaviour 
[…] because I see them as pretty fair, pretty normal expectations […] you know, if she 
was a demanding girlfriend then I would just say no, but she’s not at all, I have to give 
her credit, she’s lovely, and she makes a lot of effort”.  
(David, 27-year-old, mixed race British, student, in his relationship for three years and 
living with friends.  Pgs24-26, lines 692-720) 
In this extract David constructs himself as taking up a “blamed version of self” and 
produces his partner as occupying the “dissatisfied blamer version of self”.  Through 
this construction his partner is understood, and discursively enabled, to be in control of 
their interactions and, not only position David as unreasonable, but also effectively 
silence him through refusing to acknowledge his articulation (“I tried calling her, 
obviously she didn’t answer, and then she sent me texts [...] ‘I can’t believe you did this 
David [...]’ (.) I wanted to open some sort of dialogue, and she wanted to tell me that I’d 
fucked up basically”).  His partner occupies the “dissatisfied blamer version of self” as 
a prelude to engaging in the process of negotiation, but this mode of subjectification is 
constructed as being on her own terms and when she is ready.  As a defensive 
manoeuvre David takes up the speaking rights of the “dissatisfied blamer version of 
self” and questions the legitimacy of his partner’s actions by presenting her reaction as 
disproportionate and potentially unfair (“[...] we’d had this period of every few weeks, 
some minor thing turning into a major thing [...] And it’s just very (.) it’s laborious in 
some ways, and there’s a part of me that just sort of thinks (.) let’s just get over it, let’s 
just not bother going on about it.”)   Presented in this way, David attempts to reclaim 
the discursive power of the blamer position by producing a dissatisfaction based on a 
formulation of his partner being unreasonable.  In effect, through his account he makes 
available and takes up a “dissatisfied unfairly blamed version of self”.  He attempts to 
shift the terms of the transactional obligation by presenting his partner’s blame as, 
firstly, a refusal to engage in the practice of the diligent negotiation (e.g. “obviously she 
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didn’t answer”) and, secondly, as an excessive mobilisation of the “articulator version 
of self” (e.g. “some minor thing turning into a major thing”).  This paradoxical 
representation simultaneously constructs his partner as a subject who does not talk 
enough and who talks too much.  In this sense, (and similar to the other ‘versions of 
self’ already discussed) the relational quality of the “dissatisfied blamer version of self” 
is laid bare – not only in terms of the intersubjective process of one partner blaming the 
other, but also because the speaking rights and duties of the “dissatisfied blamer self” 
need to be acknowledged by the partner being blamed in order for a satisfying 
resolution to be achieved.  This becomes evident later on in David’s talk when he 
constructs himself as having “been difficult” and having needed to change.  He takes on 
the speaking duties of self-blaming-self and, accordingly, presents a re-evaluation of his 
partner’s expectations as “fair” and not overly “demanding”.  However, at the same 
time David also mobilises an account in which the process of relational work (through 
articulation and negotiation) can be “laborious”, and he attempts to resist these 
practices.  David’s narrative presents a desire to engage in, what I call, an ‘effortless 
negotiation’ whereby he and his partner can “just get over” transgressions of the 
transactional obligation without needing to “bother going on about it”.  Produced in this 
way, the satisfying “transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” is represented, not in 
terms of the practices and governance of the intimate confessional, but in light of 
broader discourses of romantic idealism which produce relationships as sites of 
effortless fulfilment.  This is the focus of the following section. 
5.1.2 Transactional obligation Part 2: Satisfying Romantic Idealism 
In addition to drawing on broader discourses of ‘disclosing intimacy’ and notions of 
‘relationships as requiring work’, there are times when participants produce the 
economic construction of the “Transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” in light of 
discourses of romance.  This account reflects previous discursive work (e.g. Burns, 
2000; Duncombe & Marsden, 1995) and, in this way, respondents present “the 
transactional obligation of need fulfilment” as a spontaneous, effortless process in 
which satisfying partners are understood as automatically knowing how to react to each 
other’s needs.  This produces an alternative process of subjectification because partners 
are constructed as being free from the responsibility of relational work, and so the 
practices of the “articulator version of self” and the “diligent negotiator version of 
self” are absent from this discursive framework.  In addition, the practices of the 
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“monitor version of self” and the “blamer version of self” shift, such that they are 
compelled to assess their relationship in light of romantic ideals instead of pragmatic 
cost-benefit analyses, or egalitarian notions of working towards compromise.  I argue 
that this discursive framework makes available, what I dub, the “Inevitably dissatisfied 
monitor version of self”. 
5.1.2.1 The “inevitably dissatisfied monitor version of self” 
This version of self is illustrated by Clare who presents herself as frequently engaging 
in the practice of monitoring by focussing outside of her relational-dyad, and 
constructing how satisfied she is in light of other relationships that she views and 
understands in idealised terms.  
Extract 55:   
“[…] it’s how (.) solid they seem, that’s what I worry about, so I’ll see something and 
I’ll think [Gasps] “Oh that’s what makes it perfect”, you know, “he’s never gonna leave 
her because of (.) something” (.) it might be an act […] it might be something that 
they’ve done, he’s done for her, or she’s done for him, that makes me think that they’re 
more stable, or (.) I should be doing something like that (.) the envy is more about (.) 
worrying about (.) the insecurity of my relationship […]” 
(Clare, pg11, lines 506-518) 
When drawing on broader discourses of romantic idealism the “monitor version of self” 
is presented as being compelled  to evaluate their own, and their partner’s relational 
performance, in unfavourable terms.  In terms of subjectivity, Clare understands herself 
as a “monitor version of self” who is anxious and envious because, through her 
preoccupied monitoring of an idealised other she inevitably understands her own 
relationship as lacking.  I present Clare as taking-up the disempowered subjectivity of 
the “inevitably dissatisfied monitor version of self” through her recycling of ‘the spectre 
of the ideal’ and her formulation of other couples’ modes of relating as “perfect”.  
Resistance to this idealised discourse is produced across the texts and respondents 
present monitoring as an inevitably dissatisfying practice if governed by romantic 
ideals.  For example, Martin talks of how he and his partner came through a ‘difficult’ 
time in their relationship which he presents as being exacerbated by him focusing on 
perceived ‘better’ alternatives that might have been available.   
Extract 56:   
“Eventually we had, like, a big talk (.) and that (.) called me back from the edge, and 
made me realise what I had, and to try and stop comparing (.) something real with 
something that’s (.) not real.  Because you can’t go through your whole life comparing”.   
(Martin: a 36-year-old, white British, project manager, in his relationship for eight 
years, and living with his partner.  Pgs13-14, lines 644-650). 
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In light of the spectre of the ideal, Martin’s (and Clare’s) extracts illustrate the way in 
which the “Inevitably dissatisfied monitor version of self” is constructed as promoting 
and sustaining subjective dissatisfaction.  As a way of resisting this disempowered 
subjectivity, Martin mobilises broader discourses of ‘disclosing intimacy’ and 
‘relationships as requiring work’ by constructing himself as being “[...] called back from 
the edge” and “made [to] realise what [he] had” through the relational practice of 
having the “big talk” with his girlfriend.  He rejects constructions of perceived ideals by 
stating that “[...] you can’t go through your whole life comparing”.  Whilst this rejection 
of “comparing” presents a potentially more empowered subjectivity, I argue that the 
practice of “comparing” is inherent to productions of the “monitor version of self”.  
This is because I present monitoring as always being in light of some relational rules or 
expectations, and I argue that these will always be informed by broader social scripts 
which constitute the satisfied subject, and the practices that ‘make them satisfied’ 
(Unger & Crawford, 1996; Finn, 2012).  In the following extract, Lisa also produces a 
resistance of the “inevitably dissatisfied monitor version of self” by mobilising a 
pragmatic negation of the existence of ideals.  However, its discursive power continues 
to operate through her simultaneous, and ongoing, reification of “the one” and her 
production of subjectively desiring to experience the “perfect” relationship: 
Extract 57:  
Lisa: “[…] Other expectations (.) movies (.) “the one”, everybody’s looking for “the 
one”.  It should all be perfect, their best friend (.) best lover (.) best boyfriend, romantic 
(.) listening (.) able to meet all my needs. 
Interviewer:  Does such a person exist? 
Lisa:  No.  I don’t think they do but that doesn’t stop me from thinking “I would really 
like that”.  
Interviewer:  […] do (.) those views and images shape the way you perceive your own 
relationship, or the way you feel about your own relationship? 
Lisa:  I have it in, like, two hands.  One hand is (.) you can have (.) almost what the 
movies will tell that you can have (.) and in the other hand saying “That’s just 
ridiculous” […]  
Interviewer:  So then can it ever be achieved, that sort of ideal? 
Lisa:  […] I don’t think it can be achieved, but […] I would like to think it can be 
achieved but (.) there will always be in the back of my mind I think, in any relationship 
[…] this isn’t that perfect relationship (.) and therefore (.) is it the right relationship?  (.) 
But at the same time I know that (.) it’s not right to have that.   
(Lisa, pgs5-6, lines 245-273) 
 
The heightened expectations of modern coupledom (e.g. Gillies, 2003; Hawkes, 1996; 
Weeks, 2007) are recycled by Lisa when she states “It should all be perfect, their best 
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friend (.) best lover (.) best boyfriend, romantic (.) listening (.) able to meet all my 
needs”.  The tension between this idealised discourse and the notion of ‘relationships as 
requiring work’ is also evident in her narrative.  Lisa presents herself as resisting the 
romantic ideal as “ridiculous” and claims that she knows “it’s not right” to recycle 
romantic discourse.  Yet she can be understood as simultaneously engaging in the 
practice of the “Inevitably dissatisfied monitor version of self” because whilst she 
constructs herself as resisting ideals, she understands herself as still thinking “I would 
really like that”.  In this way, she constructs doubt in the sense “there will always be in 
the back of my mind, in any relationship [...] this isn’t that perfect relationship”.  This 
functions as an ongoing form of self-surveillance informed by the idealised romantic 
discourse of “the one”.  In effect, her relationship is continually monitored and 
evaluated as not fulfilling when compared with culturally taken-for-granted 
romanticised norms.  In this situation, Lisa represents a subject who is locked into 
monitoring the self vis-à-vis dominant romantic discourses, and this disciplinary power 
compels her to always question whether her relationship is the “right one” because it is 
not “perfect”.  This mirrors well documented discursive work on the disappointment of 
romantic objectification (e.g. Segal, 1990).  In light of the romantic authority, 
relationship satisfaction represents an impossible goal because there is potentially 
always something ‘better out there’ and therefore the “Inevitably dissatisfied monitor 
version of self” is sustained and taken-up by Lisa.  Again, this illustrates the multiplicity 
and fluidity of the different modes of subjectification that are enabled through the 
contradictory technologies-of-the-self that are prescribed by the different discourses that 
inform the “Transactional Obligation for Needs Fulfilment”.  Lisa’s co-production of 
pragmatic and idealised satisfactions produces a conflicted relationship satisfaction and 
a conflicted subject.  On the whole, resistance to this idealised authority is produced in 
the participants’ texts, but its discursive power, based on the alluring promise of 
effortless satisfaction and happiness, means that the spectre of the satisfying ideal is 
presented as frequently ‘trumping’ the practices of disclosing intimacy, and this 
manifests in the production of, what I call, the “effortless negotiator version of self”. 
5.1.2.2 The ‘effortless negotiator’ version of self  
When this version of self is produced in the participants’ narratives, they make available 
a subject who expects their partner to simply know what they need, and the negotiation 
of mutual need fulfilment is understood as a process that should not require relational 
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work via talking, listening and compromise.  This is in stark contrast to mainstream 
psychological and therapeutic accounts which privilege and emphasise the notion of 
‘relationship satisfaction as work’ (e.g. Lebow et al., 2012; Markman & Rhoades, 2012; 
Sprenkle, 2012).  The negotiation is constructed as being implicit and not requiring an 
inter-subjective transactional dialogue.  This is illustrated by Lisa in the following 
extract: 
Extract 58:   
“[…] a satisfying relationship does take a bit of effort to (.) just the boring things of 
being mindful of what annoys somebody else and (.) what that other person (.) likes 
doing (.)  Not that you think about it in any conscious standards, just being aware of 
what that other person’s needs are and, to (.) thinking about (.) that, when you’re doing 
whatever it is.  But without having, all of that being done without having to make the 
effort to do any of it. […] me and [my boyfriend] know each other, we love each other, 
and now (.) this is when I expect (.) us to be able to (.) deal with everything, and he 
should be listening to me, and he should be able to (.) understand where I’m coming 
from, and potentially know what I’m thinking without me having to tell him”.  
(Lisa, pg7, Lines 321-327) 
Lisa acknowledges the “diligent negotiator version of self” and presents relationship 
satisfaction as an “effortful” process, but she simultaneously resists it as a “boring” 
practice and takes-up the subjectivity of the “effortless negotiator version of self” who 
can be understood as expecting their partner to know and understand them without the 
“effortless negotiator” needing to articulate their needs to their partner (“[...] he should 
be able to (.) understand where I’m coming from, and potentially know what I’m 
thinking without me having to tell him”).  This is a complex construction whereby the 
“effortless negotiator”  represents a subject who is compelled by an ethic of silenced, 
high expectations which, whilst shifting the responsibility of satisfaction to their 
partner, simultaneously disempowers their partner by expecting them to be psychic and 
refusing them the speaking rights and duties of the “satisfied articulator” and “diligent 
negotiator” versions of self.   In this way, the “effortless negotiation” represents a 
relational practice - of which only one partner is aware.  In the following extract, David 
constructs this practice of silent, effortless negotiation as preferable to the effortful kind: 
Extract 59:   
David: “[…] obstacles are not meeting expectations mainly [...] but I don’t think [that] 
needs to be an obstacle (.) if you’re (.) I don’t know, if you have this unspoken 
understanding 
Interviewer:  So if you’re able to negotiate these  
David:  if you’re able to negotiate that’s good, but, like I said, one better than that is not 
even having to get to where you have to, where you just know (.) like when someone’s 
being grumpy (.) you give them some space, just knowing how to respond. 
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Interviewer:  so you wouldn’t see that necessarily as a form of negotiation? 
David:  No, no, a negotiation is literally talking through it.  […] I still stick with the, 
erm, overly romantic ideal (.) something (.) where it just works.  Where she understands 
me, and I understand her, where if I’m in a bad mood she can (.) change my mood or 
she knows how to react to me.  So she could (.) well, either make me happy or give me 
space, just to, you know, an unspoken understanding”. 
(David, pgs38-39, lines 1130-1149) 
David’s construction of the effortless negotiation mirrors the romantic ideal; if partners 
can negotiate then David states “that’s good”, but not having to negotiate is privileged 
as “one better”.  From this position the “effortless negotiator version of self” tells their 
partner effortlessly and implicitly what they want from them, and they expect their 
partner to do the same.  Unlike the “Awakened Relating Subject” (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4.1) the “effortless negotiator version of self” constructs themselves as 
absolved of responsibility for their own needs fulfilment and positions their partner as 
responsible.  David’s talk clearly illustrates the way in which conflicting versions of self 
are made available when the transactional obligation is produced in the light of 
competing discursive authorities.  Satisfying mutual need fulfilment is constructed as 
coming about either by the effort of the confessional, or the effortless romantic ideal.  
As Daivd states, “[...] a negotiation is literally talking through it.  […] I still stick with 
the, erm, overly romantic ideal (.) something (.) where it just works.  Where she 
understands me, and I understand her [...] you know, an unspoken understanding”.  In 
terms of constructing relationship satisfaction, the former presents the satisfying 
transactional obligation as an artefact of talk whilst the latter renders talk problematic as 
a signifier that the relationship is not “the one”.  Thus, the relational rules of the 
transactional obligation shift in light if these two different authorities, and this once 
again illustrates the multiple, contradictory, and fluid nature of everyday sense-making 
through language.  The overarching rule of the transactional obligation remains (that is, 
‘you meet my needs and I meet yours’), but the discursive practices by which this 
produces relationship satisfaction and satisfied subjects changes.   
In summary, I argue that when the “Transactional Obligation for needs fulfilment” 
discourse is mobilised, different modes of subjectification are made available which 
produce the satisfied subject either through an effortful process governed by the 
intimate confessional, or through an effortless process of implicit understanding 
governed by the romantic ideal.  Productions of partner transgressions (by self or other) 
make available a space for blame which, respectively, is constructed as signifying that 
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one or both partners are not putting in the effort that they should, or that the relationship 
(or partner) is not “the one”.   
These positions of expectations and blame are replaced by unconditional trust in the 
second dominant construction of relationship satisfaction produced by lay people: 
“Relationship satisfaction as heroic, leap-of-faith relating”.  
 
5.2. “Relationship Satisfaction as heroic, leap-of-faith relating” 
In the second dominant construction produced in the interviews with lay people, 
relationships are understood as sites of security and unconditional acceptance that 
facilitate the psychological wellbeing and growth of both partners.  Whilst the 
“transactional obligation” is presented as operating through various dominant 
discourses (including ‘economic utilitarianism’, ‘relationships as requiring work’ and 
‘romantic idealism’), the “heroic, leap-of-faith” construction presents relationship 
satisfaction in terms of mainstream discourses on secure attachment (e.g. Hazan & 
Shaver, 2004), and humanistic notions of an ontologically innate self, constructed as 
achieving its ‘true potential’ through a process of self-actualisation (e.g. Prager & 
Roberts, 2004).  In contrast to the “transactional obligation”, the discourse of 
“Relationship Satisfaction as heroic-leap of faith relating” operates through the 
production of partners’ who focus on each other’s wellbeing.   The satisfied subject is 
presented as the product of a particular relational practice, characterised by, what I dub, 
partners’ mutual ‘heroic’ support, knowledge and acceptance of each other.  The upshot 
of this particular construction of a satisfying mode of relating is that individuals are 
understood as being able to take a ‘leap of faith’ – and experience absolute trust in their 
partner to offer unconditional support and acceptance; a satisfying practice that echoes 
mainstream research which privileges trust (e.g. Charania & Ickes, 2007).  In contrast, 
relationship dissatisfaction is rendered problematic as a state in which partners feel 
unsupported, or feel excessive expectations placed upon them to conform to certain 
prescriptive norms.  Within this discursive explanation, partners are constructed as 
satisfyingly knowable, and two satisfied dialectical versions of self are made available – 
the “Leap of faith version of self” and the “Heroic version of self”.  I present 
relationship satisfaction as the upshot of partners taking-up both versions of self, and 
these are illustrated in the following sections.  
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5.2.1 The “Leap of Faith version of self” 
In this construction, the defining satisfying practice of the “Leap of faith version of self” 
is understood as trusting one’s partner to offer support and to be utterly dependable – 
that is, to engage in a mode of subjectification that constructs one’s partner as ‘heroic’.  
This is put forward by Gaby: 
 
Extract 60:  
“First thing, the most important thing for me is trust.  Above absolutely everything.  I 
could not be in a relationship where there wasn’t trust, I’d just find it (.) you know, 
impossible […] there’s trust obviously in the sense of (.) not being unfaithful. […] but 
there’s also the trust (.) that (.) the other person is (.) is always gonna look out for you, 
and do the for you, and that they’ll, always be there to support you. […] I always know 
whatever goes wrong in life, I always feel, there’s this (.) deep sense of security in me 
that Pete will always try to make it right.  Now he might not be able to do that 
necessarily, but (.) I’ve got that trust in him that he will (.) try and make it right.  […] I 
think it’s important that I can trust that he would always do his very best (.) to make it 
right, and hopefully I’m the same, he feels the same way about me.  […] So, it’s a real 
deep sense of security, and kind of reassurance (.) that helps you get by (.) all the crap, 
when there is crap”.  
(Gaby, pgs5-6, lines 232-258) 
 
Gaby’s extract illustrates a production of the “Heroic, Leap-of-faith” as a dialectical, 
relational practice.  An upshot of this discourse is that, in order for one partner to be 
constructed as taking up the “Leap of Faith version of self”, the other partner must be 
constructed as mobilising the “Heroic version of self”.  That is, each version of self can 
only be meaningfully produced in light of the other.  So Gaby is able to understand 
herself as a satisfied “Leap of Faith” subject because of her construction of her partner 
Pete as being a dependable, satisfying “Heroic” subject (“I always know whatever goes 
wrong in life, I always feel, there’s this (.) deep sense of security in me that Pete will 
always try to make it right”).  In this way, the “Leap of Faith version of self” mobilises 
broader discourses on secure attachment, and the notion of the intimate relationship as a 
safe haven (e.g. stemming back to Hazan & Shaver, 1987) in times of trouble or 
difficulty.  Whilst there is a sense of heightened expectations in Gaby’s narrative – in 
terms of her production of absolute trust in her partner – she does not recycle romantic 
discourse.  The “Leap of Faith” self can be seen as discursively pragmatic insofar as 
Gaby acknowledges that her partner might not “necessarily” be able to make things 
“right”.  Instead, she presents herself as a subject who is compelled to express complete 
trust in her partner’s attempts to “always [...] make it right”.  As a consequence, the 
“Leap of Faith version of self” sustains, and is sustained by, attachment discourses of 
relationship satisfaction as a “reassuring” site of support, security and dependence (e.g. 
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Brock & Lawrence, 2008; Kane et al., 2007); and these operate through a prescriptive, 
psychologised governance in which the satisfied subject has a dual moral responsibility 
to provide and receive ‘correct’ affection and emotional support (Finn, 2012).  However, 
there is also resistance to the “Leap of Faith” self in the talk of some respondents, and 
this discursively manifests through the speakers’ production of doubt.  Such doubt is 
illustrated by Clare and Lisa: 
 
Extract 61:   
“[…] that’s what the tragedy issue is (.) it’s very hard to be strong then isn’t it?  Who 
gets to be strong? (.)  Do you know what I mean?  If one person is making compromises 
in their life, then the other person has to be strong, so like, when we move he has to be 
strong (.) if I have a problem, he has to be the one in charge (.) equally (.) if something 
else came along and he had to make a big compromise I would have to be strong, but 
when something like that hits, when you’re both weak, that’s what I worry about (.) 
who gets to be strong?” 
(Clare, pg16, lines 769-777) 
 
Extract 62:   
“[…] we actually don’t have any (.) worries in our relationship, we don’t have (.) 
money, or children, or job worries, or (.) any family issues.  Haven’t really been (.) 
challenged by anything (.) that really effects how we might go about (.) our relationship. 
(.) What if we haven’t been challenged enough and therefore (.) our relationship hasn’t 
(.) isn’t the right one because we don’t know (.) if we can deal with what (.) major 
challenges or (.) illness, or whatever?” 
(Lisa, pg13, lines 600-606) 
 
In Clare’s talk, her production of doubt manifests as discursive uncertainty about 
whether or not she and/or her partner could take up the “Heroic version of self” in the 
face of a significant challenge (“[…] that’s what the tragedy issue is (.) it’s very hard to 
be strong then isn’t it?  Who gets to be strong?”).  Absent from Clare’s talk is a 
construction of unfailing trust that is the key discursive practice for the “Leap of Faith 
version of self”, and therefore she is unable to fully take up the speaking rights and 
duties of that subject.  Similarly, Lisa expresses doubt about her relationship because 
she presents her relationship as not having been sufficiently “challenged” (“What if […] 
our relationship hasn’t (.) isn’t the right one because we don’t know (.) if we can deal 
with what (.) major challenges or (.) illness, or whatever?”).  In the above extracts both 
speakers construct themselves as engaging in practices of doubt, and represent subjects 
who are not at ease because they question the ‘certainty’ of the “Heroic version of self”, 
or demand proof of its existence.  In this way they enable, what I call, a “Crisis of Faith 
version of self” who is unable to unproblematically do unfaltering trust.  When 
occupying the “Leap-of-faith version of self” the above conversation and doubt do not 
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‘exist’, and the speaker is empowered through their production of total trust in their 
“heroic” partner.  Beyond the notion of support, the other characteristic that is 
presented as pivotal for the “Leap of Faith version of self” is that the subject constructs 
themselves as experiencing unconditional acceptance from their “heroic” partner.  
Anya describes this process: 
 
Extract 63:   
“You know that the person accepts you (.) regardless.  I said, you know (.) that your 
views are similar, but, again, with my partner (.) he might not agree with something I do, 
or, you know, there’s a few things I’ve done and, he wouldn’t, you know, it’s not the 
best thing I’ve done, but yet he’s gonna actually (.) he’s gonna go so far to (.) make me 
feel better (.) about it, and still (.) support me in it, even though he might not really 
agree with what’s been done (.) what’s been said etc. but erm (.) and hopefully you have 
the other way around”. 
(Anya, pg3, lines 102-110) 
 
When occupying the “Leap of Faith version of self” Anya can be understood as 
producing a relationship satisfaction that pivots around her partner’s acceptance of her 
views and actions; even when he is presented as not necessarily agreeing with her.  This 
account mirrors mainstream accounts on ‘supportive personalities’ (e.g. Ickes, 1997; 
Geoff, Fletcher & Lange, 1997) and positions her ‘heroic partner’ as being able to 
provide inter-subjective understanding, validation and caring, in a relationally satisfying 
way. Across the respondents’ accounts, this practice of satisfying acceptance between 
partners draws on humanistic discourses and is constructed as an acknowledgement and 
acceptance of each other’s ‘true self’.  This satisfying mode of subjectification is 
illustrated by Gaby: 
 
Extract 64:   
“I think it’s important that you (.) can be [yourself], and if you can’t be (.) then (.) 
you’re not in the right relationship basically, because that’s quite key to me.  That you 
can show all facets of yourself (.) without, fear of judgement or (.) feeling 
uncomfortable (.) about that”. 
(Gaby, pg1, lines 46-50) 
 
In this way, by viewing Gaby as engaging in the practices of the “Leap of Faith version 
of self”, she can be understood as producing an unhidden, uncensored relationship 
satisfaction of being known and completely accepted by her partner.  This construction 
is in stark contrast to the “transactional obligation” and the “Monitor version of self”.  
The “Leap of Faith version of self” represents a subjectivity that does not feel 
monitored or the pressure of expectations being placed upon it, and therefore they are 
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produced as an empowered self “without fear of judgement”.  The notion of the 
“transactional obligation” and economic discourses about what one is ‘rightfully owed’ 
within their relationship are absent; replaced by an unconditional acceptance.  This 
acceptance inherent in the heroic, leap-of-faith dialect represents a relational practice 
that responsibilises both partners by mobilising humanist discourses which construct 
satisfaction in terms of transcendence and the realisation of partners’ innate human 
potential.  As Freddie and William claimed: 
 
Extract 65:  
“[…] I think you’ve got to be able to be yourself (.) hopefully (.) become, it sounds a bit 
clichéd but (.) better with that person than you are on your own. So that comes back to 
what we were saying earlier on (.) about being a lot more confident in yourself, to go 
and do something you wouldn’t do if you were on your own”. 
(Freddie, 38-year-old, white British, office worker, in his relationship for three years, 
and not living with his partner.  Pg3, lines 132-135) 
 
Extract 66:   
“I think the first thing I said was (.) that in a relationship it’s really important to be 
yourself (.) so never to be false with that person, because the moment (.) you start to do 
that, which is how I (.) reflect back and think that’s how I was in that situation (.) is the 
moment that you’re never truly gonna be happy because you can’t really (.) self-
actualise when you’re (.) playing the part of someone else”. 
(William, pgs8-9, lines 370-399) 
 
Produced in this way, the satisfying relationship discursively functions as the site in 
which the “Leap of Faith version of self” can be constructed as their true self, and 
capable of becoming “better” because they can “self-actualise”.  In this way, the “Leap 
of Faith version of self” represents a subjectivity empowered and socially valued for its 
‘potential’, and this further privileges and warrants the practices that sustain and 
underpin the “Heroic-Leap of Faith” mode of subjectification.  However, this is an 
asocial construction in which broader social prescriptions and injunctions constituting 
relationship satisfaction are absent.  Therefore, the satisfied subject is once again 
produced vis-a-vis intersubjective practices.  In William’s extract the “Leap of Faith 
version of self” is presented as being compelled to open themselves to the other, and 
never censor their true self, or be “false”.  In this way (and similar to ‘the monitor’ and 
‘the articulator’ versions of self), the Leap of Faith self can be understood as 
discursively governed by the intimate confessional (e.g. Cherline, 2004; Giddens, 1992).  
However, the humanistic authority to self-actualise in the “Leap of Faith version of self” 
means that the satisfying practice of being ‘known’ relocates the economic practices of 
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the monitor and the articulator into wider, metaphysical discourses on life-purpose and 
happiness, and these discourses also underpin the “Heroic version of self”. 
 
5.2.2 The “Heroic version of self” 
As already suggested, the “Leap of Faith version of self” is enabled by a satisfying 
mode of subjectification which is presented as functioning through the practices of 
unconditional support and acceptance.  I argue that this ‘acceptance’ is enabled through 
partners being constructed as taking up the “Heroic version of self”.  This represents a 
‘self’ who is engaged in an accepting practice of refusing to place excessive 
expectations on their partner.  Gaby produces this practice when she talks about the 
actions of her partner Pete: 
 
Extract 67:   
“In lots of relationships there are expectations of how you’re supposed to be, but I don’t 
feel that in my relationship (.) I probably did at the beginning, it’s hard to remember 
really, but I think now, I don’t feel that Pete has any (.) he doesn’t put that kind of 
pressure on me to be oh, you know (.) as a girlfriend, partner, you need to be doing this, 
or you need to behave this way (.) I don’t feel that from him.  (.) I feel less expectations 
from Pete than I do from anybody else in my life I think.  He’s very much (.) accepting 
of (.) how I am.  You know, good, bad, whatever”. 
(Gaby, pg3, lines 120-130) 
 
When understood as occupying the “Heroic version of self”, Pete is constructed by 
Gaby as not placing expectations on her and therefore she presents herself as not 
experiencing the “pressure” of normative prescriptions about how partners should be 
within the context of their relationship (“[…] he doesn’t put that kind of pressure on me 
to be oh, you know (.) as a girlfriend, partner, you need to be doing this, or you need to 
behave this way (.) I don’t feel that from him”).  In this way, I argue that the “Heroic” 
partner’s talk can be viewed as being free of ‘inter-subjective demands’, and this 
signifies their total acceptance of their partner.  In addition, the “Heroic version of self” 
can be understood as engaging in a satisfying practice of unconditional support.   Again, 
Gaby produces this support in her account: 
 
Extract 68:   
“I suppose it’s just about getting confidence (.) because (.) if I feel (.) lacking in 
confidence for something, going for an interview or whatever (.) I can be quite (.) hard 
on myself and think “I’ll never – oh I won’t bother going to that.  I’ll never get that”, 
you know?  (.) whereas with Pete it’s always been great because he’s always been able 
to say to me “Come on, why can’t you do it?  You can do it!”, and build my confidence 
and just give me that little bit of a (.) you know I feel him behind me (.) when I go to 
things like interviews, that he’s sort of around somewhere going “You can do it!”  And 
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I think just, somebody who you know really well telling you that is really important for 
that kind of support, confidence.  (.) I know that Pete will support me and he’ll (.) come 
up with suggestions to say right, ok this isn’t working, why not try this?  Let’s try this, 
let’s try this, do you know what I mean?” 
(Gaby, pg4, lines 185-196) 
 
Gaby constructs her partner Pete’s relational practices as “Heroic” in that “he’s always 
been able to say […] You can do it!” and this encouragement is put forward by Gaby as 
enabling her to “build confidence”, and signifies to her that she is able to take up the 
“Leap of Faith version of self” and produce the claim that “I know Pete will support 
me”.  This illustrates my claim that the “Heroic, Leap-of-Faith Relating” discourse 
makes available a dialectical mode of subjectification in which satisfied subjects are 
produced through taking up both the “Leap of Faith version of self” and the “Heroic 
Version of Self”.  In this way, both subjectivities are satisfyingly empowered – the Leap 
of Faith self is constructed as more confident in light of their partner’s heroism, and the 
Heroic self is constructed as unfailing in their support and acceptance.  In line with this 
proposal, across the participants’ talk the “Heroic version of self” is understood as 
being compelled by a selfless ethic of simply wanting the best for their partner. 
 
Extract 69:   
“[…] just a feeling that you want the best for the other person.  (.) that you would do 
anything to actually make them feel happy […] Because he wants me to be happy, and I 
want him to be happy and therefore (.) if (.) there is something that’s gonna make him 
happy, even though it’s not something that I (.) really, really agree with, but I can (.) 
work to it (.) Er, I would still want him to do that because I wouldn’t want him to (.) go 
through his life and feel, and be left short because (.) he was with me, so he couldn’t do 
this, or that”. 
(Anya, pg1 lines 34-37 & pg3, lines 110-116) 
 
In Anya’s narrative, her production of the “heroic version of self” somewhat mirrors 
the “effortful negotiator version of self” in that both represent subjectivities that 
acknowledge and facilitate the speaking rights of their partner, even when there is not 
necessarily agreement.  However, within the discourse of “Heroic-Leap of Faith 
Relating” the “Heroic version of self” is underpinned and sustained through a 
production of relationships as sites of unconditional care and acceptance, rather than 
being understood as a mechanism to facilitate the satisfying “effortful negotiation” of 
need fulfilment (as in the “Transactional Obligation” discourse).  Again, this overlap 
demonstrates the fluidity of discourse and the way in which different meanings and 
subjectivities can be made available through practices that, superficially at least, appear 
the same.  This multiplicity is illustrated by Lisa who constructs the practices of the 
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“Heroic version of self” as, not only satisfying for the “Leap of Faith” partner, but also 
as a satisfying, ‘reinforcing’ mode of subjectification for the “Hero” themselves: 
 
Extract 70:   
I think it demonstrates that you’re still choosing to be in that relationship, and you’re 
making the effort to show that person that you care, that you appreciate them (.) that 
you love them.  (.) It’s almost a conscious reminder to yourself as well (.) of your 
relationship, of its importance.  Not just to tell that other person, but to remind yourself 
that (.) this is why I’m in this relationship and (.) if you do it, if you make a gesture to 
somebody else, and you get a good reaction, which presumably you will, then (.) it’s 
confirming to you as well why you’re there. 
(Lisa, pg1, lines 41-54) 
 
I argue that whilst the participants’ narratives primarily construct the “Heroic version of 
self” as being governed by an ethic of selflessness and concern for the ‘other’, Lisa 
presents the “Heroic” practices as signifying to both partners that their relationship is 
“important” and why they are in it; constructed in this way, making the “effort” to “care” 
is understood as serving to remind both the recipient and the donor of their commitment 
in a mutually satisfying way.  Thus, in Foucauldian terms, individuals’ seemingly 
selfless ‘heroic acceptance’ and ‘leap-of-faith trust’ still function as forms of self-
regulation (Foucault, 1987, 1990) because they demarcate and prescribe what is 
‘possible’ in terms of ‘appropriate’, satisfying inter-subjective behaviours. 
 
5.3 Summary 
This chapter has presented two dominant ways in which relationship satisfaction is 
constructed by lay people and argued that these constructions enable different ‘modes of 
subjectification’ which sustain a range of satisfied and dissatisfied ‘versions of self’.  
Across the lay talk these versions of self are taken up with subjective investment and are 
characterised by specific intersubjective, dialectical practices in which the ‘self’ is 
always in a position of acting on its partner and being acted upon by its partner.  These 
productions present relationship satisfaction as a relational process and this relational 
dialectic also comes to the fore in the following chapter, which presents the IPA of lay 
peoples’ talk and focuses on the subjective lived experience of relationship satisfaction. 
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6. 
 
Laypeople’s experiences of relationship satisfaction 
 
The third and final empirical chapter presents the second half of the twin-focus-analysis: 
an interpretative phenomenological analysis of laypeople’s talk about relationship 
satisfaction.  The review of the literature in Chapter 2 demonstrated that whilst 
mainstream psychological research has conceived of relationship satisfaction as some 
form of subjective evaluation, no research has explored its subjective lived experience
51
.  
Much research has linked satisfaction to happiness, but other research has suggested a 
possibly more nuanced phenomenological profile for satisfaction characterised by a 
range of phenomenological depths and a generalised or pre-intentional focus.  Turning 
to phenomenological work on intimacy highlighted the ways in which intimate relating 
could be a source of anxiety and ontological insecurity, and that the way in which 
partners’ experienced three supra-relational dialectics (autonomy-connection; stability-
change; and openness-closedness) shaped their experiences of their relationship.   Ideas 
from existentialism introduced the notion of authentic relating as a way of managing 
these dialectics in a potentially satisfying way.  In light of this theoretical work the aim 
of this chapter is to explore the ways in which lay people understand and interpret their 
subjective experiences of relationship satisfaction. 
 
An interpretative phenomenological analysis of the twelve interview transcripts 
produced three master themes:  
 The first is ‘Knowing’ relationship satisfaction: A journey of awareness between 
satisfied engagement-in-the-world and dissatisfied preoccupation.  A 
characteristic of this theme is that relationship satisfaction is less 
phenomenologically accessible than relationship dissatisfaction.  Whilst 
relationship satisfaction is understood as a way of finding oneself engaged-in-
the-world, relationship dissatisfaction is experienced as a preoccupying 
distraction.   
 The second master theme is ‘Negotiating Relational Expectations of self-&-
other: The satisfying experience of engaging with self and other as subjects’.  
                                                 
51 This was still the case as of 8th September 2013. 
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Here, the experience of relationship satisfaction reflects a way of intra and 
intersubjective relating in which partners feel that their expectations are 
respected.  In this way, they experience themselves as subjects with agency.  In 
contrast, relationship dissatisfaction is characterised by an experience in which 
one’s expectations are unacknowledged.   
 The third is ‘Relationship Satisfaction as Ontological Security: Balancing the 
Autonomy-Connection Relational Dialectic’.  This theme looks at relationship 
satisfaction as a site of simultaneous autonomy and inter-partner connection.  
Satisfied partners experience both their ‘selves’ and their relationship as existing 
in harmony.  In contrast, the experience of relationship dissatisfaction reflects 
feelings of one’s subjectivity being lost or engulfed by the relationship or one’s 
partner.   
These Master Themes and their sub-themes are summarised below in Table 3. 
 
Table 3:  Summary of the Phenomenological Analysis of Lay peoples’ Talk  
Master Themes of Relationship 
Satisfaction 
Sub-themes 
‘Knowing’ relationship satisfaction: 
A journey of awareness between 
satisfied engagement-in-the-world 
and dissatisfied preoccupation 
Satisfaction as cognitively elusive 
Preoccupied Dissatisfaction – From “outburst” to 
“insidious” uncertainty 
Relationship satisfaction as happiness 
Relationship dissatisfaction as frustration and blame 
Relationship Satisfaction as embodied engagement in 
the world 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as alienated embodiment 
Negotiating Relational Expectations 
of self-&-other: The satisfying 
experience of engaging with self 
and other as subjects 
Satisfying negotiation – experiencing one’s 
subjectivity 
Dissatisfying relating – objectifying self and other 
Relationship Satisfaction as 
Ontological Security: Balancing the 
Autonomy-Connection Relational 
Dialectic 
Relationship Satisfaction as managing the autonomy-
connection dialectic 
Relationship dissatisfaction as losing one’s autonomy 
 
Each master theme is described, illustrated, and discussed in turn, via selected extracts 
from across the entire corpus of interview transcripts.  It should be noted that whilst this 
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chapter is written in a realist tone, I acknowledge that it is my interpretative reading and 
other readings would be equally legitimate. 
 
6.1 Master Theme 1: ‘Knowing’ relationship satisfaction: A journey of awareness 
between satisfied engagement-in-the-world and dissatisfied preoccupation 
The first Master Theme presented reflects the way in which participants describe their 
experiences of relationship satisfaction as a journey of phenomenological awareness 
about their mode of engagement in the world and their relationship.  When participants 
become aware of their being-in-the-world, they describe a phenomenological shift from 
satisfied pre-reflection and engagement in the world, to a state of either dissatisfied, 
preoccupied relationship appraisal, and/or a feeling of inchoate, dissatisfied unease that 
is unarticulated
52
.   
 
Participants differentiate between these qualitatively unique experiences according to 
their different affective and embodied characteristics.  Here, relationship satisfaction is 
understood as a happy experience, in which respondents feel both a temporal and 
embodied engagement with the world and other people.  In this way, their satisfying 
relationships are experienced not as an object of their awareness, but as a 
phenomenologically deeper, pre-intentional mode of being-in-the-world through which 
other aspects of the participants’ lives are experienced in a positive light.   
 
In contrast the experience of relationship dissatisfaction is understood in two distinct 
ways.  The first is as an articulated, intentionally-specific frustration/anger, in which 
aspects of their relationship, or their partner, are the object of their experience.  The 
second account of the participants’ experience of dissatisfaction is as an unarticulated, 
inchoate feeling of unease or anxiety, characterised by preoccupied ‘searching’ and 
embodied feelings of dislocation and burden.  Whilst this latter experience of 
dissatisfaction is experienced as phenomenologically deeper (i.e. less accessible) than 
the former ‘articulated’ dissatisfaction, it is still described as more phenomenologically 
accessible than the participants’ experience of relationship satisfaction.  Thus, for the 
participants, this deeper dissatisfaction is experienced as having an intentional object 
                                                 
52
 Across the participants’ accounts this phenomenological awareness is always experienced in terms of 
dissatisfaction.  At ‘best’, the participants acknowledge that they are satisfied on the whole with their current 
relationships, but this is caveated with specific reservations / points that they are dissatisfied with. 
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(the relationship), but also represents a deeper mode of being-in-the-world through 
which aspects of their lives and their relationships are experienced in a negative light.   
 
6.1.1 Satisfaction as cognitively elusive 
The presentation and discussion of this first theme begins with an illustration of the way 
in which relationship satisfaction is experienced as phenomenologically elusive.  Martin, 
a 34 year old project manager, who is living with his girlfriend of seven years, describes 
the way in which relationship satisfaction is difficult to know. 
 
Extract 75:   
“(.) you can’t put it (.) into a computer and, you don’t get a percentage figure of 
satisfaction out of it do you?  You’ve just got different perceptions of things (.) I don’t 
know how you process that […] I don’t know how to really express (.) how, you know, 
how you measure satisfaction.”  
(Martin, pg15, lines 731-743) 
 
Martin’s understanding suggests that the experience of relationship satisfaction is often 
implied rather than declared.  Here, relationship satisfaction is not an object which can 
be easily “known” and certainly does not reflect the mainstream psychological 
conception of a fixed readily knowable construct variable (e.g. Funk & Rogge, 2007).  
As Martin states, “(.) you can’t put it (.) into a computer and [...] get a percentage figure 
of satisfaction out”.   This uncertainty about knowing the extent to which one is 
relationally satisfied is also expressed by Imogen: 
 
Extract 76:   
“[…] I think it’s possible to be (.) unsure about whether you’re satisfied […] there’s 
nobody telling you or (.) affirming for you that you’re feeling 100% satisfied today, or 
you’re feeling 80% satisfied today, you don’t really know, you kind of feel generally ok, 
or not, and there’s lot’s of other (.) factors effecting how you feel on any given day, not 
just the relationship, so, you can be (.) uncertain about what’s affecting your mood.”  
(Imogen, pg15, lines 716-727) 
 
Imogen expresses a degree of uncertainty in her experience of relationship satisfaction, 
and that it is “possible to be (.) unsure about whether you’re satisfied”.  As Van 
Deurzen (2009) has stated, in the process of their daily lives, individuals “must 
rediscover and illuminate what is actually there for [them] and what makes sense to 
[them]. At the same time [they] must accept that everything that [they] throw light on 
will also cast a shadow and that things will therefore remain mysterious no matter how 
well they [elucidate] them” (p.55).  For Imogen, her experience of relationship 
satisfaction reflects a way of finding herself in the world – a “mood”- which is shaped 
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by the various life-projects in which she is engaged.  These are not distinct, or easily 
delineated; rather, there is extensive phenomenological overlap between them such that 
“there’s lots of other (.) factors effecting how you feel on any given day, not just the 
relationship”.  In this way, Imogen’s relationship satisfaction is experienced, not as an 
intentionally specific cognitive-affective state, but as one aspect of being-in-the-world 
which shapes her experience of the world (including her relationship) as satisfyingly 
meaningful.  This account reflects Ratcliffe’s (2005, 2010) notion of existential feelings, 
and suggests a phenomenological depth to relationship satisfaction.  This 
phenomenological depth is further expounded upon by Martin who talks about the way 
in which his feelings of relationship satisfaction or dissatisfaction act as a 
phenomenological lens through which aspects of his relationship are understood and 
experienced: 
 
Extract 77:   
“[…] like having an argument (.) when you generally feel overall, that everything’s ok 
(.) has much less of an effect (.) If you’ve got a negative view of that relationship 
already, it just adds to that and then it (.) makes a much bigger difference.  The same 
thing, in the bad time, the good things (.) don’t contribute as much (.) as if you’re in a 
good place with it anyway, and then other good things just make you feel better about it 
(.) So yeah, kinda (.) goes back on itself really […] at good times and bad times things 
can be kind of amplified in how important you think they are  […] or (.) less significant 
[…] some things I think matter at one time, but don’t matter at another time.”   
(Martin, pg19, lines 881-899) 
 
In Martin’s account there is a constant cyclical interplay between his experiences of 
relationship satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and the processes which, in turn, shape that 
experience.  For him, relationship satisfaction is experienced as a pre-intentional filter 
shaping his awareness, understanding and experience of his relationship - specifically 
the way in which aspects of his relationship present themselves as intentionally 
significant.  In the background of all his actions, relations and experiences is an 
appreciation (if only implicit) that they are subject to a constant process of change that 
is ultimately finite so that “some things [...] matter at one time, but don’t matter at 
another time”.  Hence, everything that matters to Martin is always fleeting.  In this way, 
I argue that satisfaction or dissatisfaction is experienced by him as an amplification or 
suppression of intentionality.  This phenomenological awareness corresponds to a 
pattern in which satisfaction makes probable (amplifies) positive intentional appraisals 
of his relationship, and negates (suppresses) negative intentional appraisals so that, for 
example, “having an argument [...] has much less of an effect”.  In contrast, 
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dissatisfaction is understood in opposite terms – as a state-of-being in which negative 
intentional appraisals become probable (amplified) whilst positive intentional appraisals 
are suppressed so that “in the bad time, the good things (.) don’t contribute as much”.  
In this way, like Ratcliffe’s (2005, 2010) ‘existential feelings’, the experiences appear to 
involve a phenomenological depth which makes probable certain intentional 
experiences whilst precluding others.   
 
This experiential depth is further articulated by participants when they describe the 
unique phenomenological characteristics of relationship satisfaction and dissatisfaction.  
David, who has been in a relationship with his girlfriend for four years, spoke of the 
way in which relationship satisfaction is not actively reflected upon. 
 
Extract 78:   
“[…] and satisfied is not querying anything I suppose.  […] when you’re not 
particularly happy, when things aren’t going well, you start to (.) analyse and question 
them, so, weirdly satisfaction means (.) there is no analysis.  You just are.  You’re in the 
moment, you’re enjoying it, you don’t have to (.) stop and think is everything alright.  
Satisfied is (.) a lack of assessment.  You don’t need to assess it because you’re happy 
and content and so you don’t have to do it.”  
(David, pg36, lines 1050-1068) 
 
In David’s account relationship satisfaction is experienced as the default experiential 
position of engagement in the world, characterised by the absence of intentionally 
directed appraisals (“a lack of assessment”) about the relationship or other life-projects.  
As van Deurzen (2009) has stated, “there is much that eludes us because we do not 
direct our attention to it and do not reflect upon it.  Much of our living is done by 
default rather than by deliberation […]” (p.56).  Therefore, David’s account reflects 
Heidegger’s claim that one of the ontological capacities of human-being is that 
individuals always find themselves in a state of mind, yet this is rarely reflected upon.  
In line with Ratcliffe’s work on existential feelings, David’s state of satisfied being 
presents itself as a pre-intentional framework through which his life-world is 
experienced as a place of “happiness” and “contentment”, and he feels authentically 
engaged in “the moment” of his life projects.  In this way, his relationship satisfaction is, 
in effect, not known but lived, and appears to be experienced at a phenomenological 
depth akin to Heidegger’s satisfied-for-one53 (Ratcliffe, 2005, 2010) in which, as David 
states, “you just are”.  
                                                 
53
 The deepest of Heidegger’s three levels of experience. 
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6.1.2 Preoccupied Dissatisfaction – From “outburst” to “insidious” uncertainty 
In participants’ accounts, the experience of cognitively knowing satisfaction comes 
about through its absence, characterised by the appearance of a preoccupation with 
relationship appraisals.  This shift in phenomenological awareness from pre-intentional 
satisfaction to intentional relationship dissatisfaction is outlined by Lisa, who is living 
with her boyfriend of seven years. 
 
Extract 79:   
“It can take over from (.) whatever else I’m doing […] my relationship with my partner 
is one of the most important things (.) […]  Yeah, so if, if I’m dissatisfied with what I 
consider is the most (.) important thing (.) then it’ll play on my mind for the rest of (.) 
whatever I’m doing (.) and I find it, difficult to be able to do anything else or 
concentrate on anything else […]”.   
(Lisa, pg11, lines 499-511) 
 
In Lisa’s account, she becomes aware of things ‘malfunctioning’ in her relationship, 
such that her experience becomes an ‘obstacle’ to her being-in-the-world (c.f. van 
Deurzen, 2009), and “take[s] over from (.) whatever else [she is] doing”.  Her 
experience of dissatisfaction makes itself known in her consciousness as she becomes 
engaged in preoccupied appraisals, and therefore the experience is phenomenologically 
more accessible than satisfaction.  Lisa describes an experience that is intentionally 
specific, insofar as she knows the ‘object’ of her dissatisfaction is her relationship and, 
in this way, her dissatisfaction reflects an experience akin to Heidegger’s (1962, 1995 
cited in Ratcliffe, 2005) dissatisfied-by
54
.   However, the way in which her relationship 
dissatisfaction precludes other experiences and “takes over” from her other life projects, 
such that they are experienced in light of her relationship dissatisfaction which “play[s] 
on [her] mind”, reflects a deeper phenomenological experience – one akin to 
Heidegger’s dissatisfied-with 55 .  This phenomenological range of relationship 
dissatisfaction was further articulated by John, who had been with his girlfriend for two 
and a half years, and who differentiated between dissatisfaction which had an “outburst” 
and one that was more “insidious”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 The ‘shallowest’, most phenomenologically accessible level of experience. 
55 The ‘middle’ level of experience.  Deeper than ‘by’ but shallower than ‘for one’. 
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Extract 80:   
“I mean you could have dissatisfaction and make it known (.) like you could be 
dissatisfied that, you know, they never do the fucking washing up, or something like 
that, and you could just like, fly off the handle, that’s one sort.  I think the more like 
insidious one though, is probably the dissatisfaction where it’s like, it hasn’t got that 
outburst, it’s just a probably, it’s just a sort of general feeling that something’s not right 
[…], that is probably more difficult to resolve than […] one that’s been communicated 
(.)” 
(John, pg15, lines 709-721) 
 
For John, there is a clear distinction between relationship dissatisfaction experienced as 
an intentionally-specific affective “outburst” in which an aspect of the relationship 
becomes the object of the experience, compared to relationship dissatisfaction 
experienced as the intentionally unspecific “insidious” feeling that something about the 
relationship is “not right”.  There are clear parallels here between John’s distinction and 
the mainstream conceptual distinctions between specific-vs-global appraisals of 
relationship satisfaction.  However, it is also clear that the mainstream conceptual 
argument remains rooted in a view of human experience as being ready at hand, and 
lacks the nuanced phenomenological distinction to which John alludes.  Whilst it could 
be argued that the difference between John’s “outburst” and “insidious” dissatisfactions 
simply reflects the traditional distinction between an intentionally-specific emotion 
versus an intentionally-generalised mood (e.g. Solomon, 1993; Goldie, 2002), there is a 
sense that the difference goes beyond the intentional focus of the experience, to one of 
phenomenological depth / accessibility.  For John, this difference is experienced as the 
inability to know the “insidious” dissatisfaction through a process of articulation.    It 
cannot be spoken into meaningful existence, and therefore its ontological status is more 
ephemeral and its phenomenological characteristics more elusive.  In this way, the 
“insidious” dissatisfaction occupies an experiential space somewhere between 
relationship satisfaction - which the participants do not even explicitly consider, let 
alone articulate - and the phenomenologically concrete outburst dissatisfaction.  This 
process of knowing one’s dissatisfaction and bringing it forth from the 
phenomenological depths through a process of articulation is also described by William 
who talks about his experience of deciding to end a previous relationship. 
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Extract 81:   
“[…] you’re not necessarily aware that you’re doing it, but in all your day-to-day 
interactions with people (.) particularly where you’re talking about your life, it does get 
you thinking about (.) where you are, and reflecting back on the experience of breaking 
up with somebody (.) once I started having those conversations with other people about 
the doubts that were appearing in my mind, that was the point at which those doubts 
actually became (.) much more of a reality (.) which ultimately led to me being self-
empowered enough to do something about it (.) as opposed to just carrying on 
regardless.”  
(William, pg14, lines 668-676) 
 
For William, the process of articulating his dissatisfaction prompts a qualitative 
phenomenological shift, such that the experience of being dissatisfied with the 
relationship becomes ontologically more real and phenomenologically more accessible, 
such that “once [he] started having [...] conversations with other people about the 
doubts that were appearing in [his] mind that was the point at which those doubts 
actually became (.) much more of a reality”.   Therefore, his experience of relationship 
dissatisfaction crystallises from an experiential ‘glance’ to a ‘deliberate’ reflection56.  
As a consequence, William experiences his being-in-the-world also shifting; his 
articulation prompts a move away from “carrying on regardless” and merely occupying 
his dissatisfying relational life-project, to an authentic engagement with his 
dissatisfaction, in which he commits to the ethics of his dissatisfying experience and 
feels empowered to “do something” – namely end the relationship.  In this way, through 
a process of articulation, William experiences himself as a dissatisfied agentic being 
capable of acting of his own volition.  John and William’s descriptions of their need to 
articulate their dissatisfaction in order to fully understand the experience and “resolve” 
it mirrors the ‘articulator-self’ (see Chapter 5, section 5.1.1.2) and also Heidegger’s 
third ontological capacity of human-being; that of understanding one’s life projects 
through the process of discourse.  However, their difficulties in speaking their (insidious) 
dissatisfaction suggest that the experience signifies and is made meaningful for them in 
ways that sometimes elude talk.  These alternative unarticulated signifiers include 
participants’ affective experiences. 
 
6.1.3 Relationship satisfaction as happiness 
Anya talks about the difficulty in articulating her relationship satisfaction, but explains 
that she “know[s]” she is satisfied through her affective response of feeling “happy”: 
 
                                                 
56 This experience mirrors the stages of reflection outlined by Smith et al. 2009 – see Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
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Extract 82:  
“[…] it’s very difficult actually (.) explain (.) to somebody (.) what makes, you know (.) 
How do you know you’re satisfied?  You just know, and I don’t, I can’t really (.) most 
of the time I can’t explain why, but I’m just happy and you know.”  
(Anya, pg18, lines 876-881) 
 
Whilst difficult to articulate, in Anya’s extract it is clear that the experience of 
relationship satisfaction can be known and made phenomenologically meaningful for 
her through its affective signifiers.  In Anya’s case the primary affective characteristic is 
happiness.  This happiness, as described, is not intentionally specific but appears to be 
felt as a pre-intentional state of being.  That is, her satisfied being-in-the-world is 
synonymous with her happy being-in-the-world.  This affective phenomenological 
characteristic is mirrored by Lydia who has been with her husband for five years and 
married for three: 
 
Extract 83:   
“I mean I would associate satisfaction with something positive, and being happy (.) erm 
(.) but I suppose you could say “Yes, I’m satisfied to a point” on a practical level, or (.) 
“It works” on a sort of day-to-day level, but not really on an emotional level.  (.) but no, 
I would say that satisfaction and happiness go together really.”  
(Lydia, pg9, lines 417-422) 
 
Whilst Lydia also hints at an alternative relationship satisfaction experienced on a 
“practical level”, and where personal happiness is less salient, she personally rejects this 
notion (and it is absent from other respondents’ accounts too).  These descriptions of the 
experience of satisfaction as difficult to articulate, yet inextricably intertwined with 
happiness, can be understood in terms of Ratcliffe’s (2005, 2010) notion of satisfaction 
as an existential feeling; that is, as a pre-intentional framework which makes possible 
(and probable) certain intentional, affective, experiences.  For relationship satisfaction, 
this is happiness.  Lisa and Clare describe the way in which the satisfying intrapersonal 
affective signifier of happiness can be prompted by and communicated between partners, 
and for both of them, this relational process is experienced as gendered: 
 
Extract 84:   
“[…] men perhaps don’t need the (.) affirmation (.) of (.) “We’re in a relationship, and, 
we’re satisfied” (.) going back to what you’d asked me before, how do I know if I’m 
satisfied?  I do (.) it’s a gut feeling, but I kind of (.) want reassurance as well (.) whether 
it comes in (.) seeing that person (.) smiling at me, in a way makes me realise “Oh, he’s 
really happy to be with me” or (.) a gift, or (.) just the fact that he (.) makes the effort to 
speak to my aunty, that kind of (.) external (.) feedback.”   
(Lisa, pg15, lines 726-734) 
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Extract 85:   
“[...] I think I get in a pickle, unnecessarily, because (.) I have an ability to, and I don’t 
have any control over that, or don’t seem to […] I don’t think Vince thinks about our 
relationship at all because I don’t think he ever feels he needs to [chuckles].  He only 
thinks about it when he’s got me going off on one!” 
(Clare, pg17, lines 797-801) 
 
Lisa describes a way of relationally knowing her own satisfaction vis-à-vis her partner’s 
perceived satisfaction.  His behaviours prompt certainty that she is held in high esteem 
and, perhaps more importantly for her, that he is satisfied with her and the relationship.  
In this way, Lisa’s experience reflects Sartre’s being-for-others, in that her experience 
of relationship satisfaction is confirmed to her vis-a-vis the “smiling” look from her 
partner.  For Lisa, she understands this experience as gendered, and feels that men’s 
experiences of satisfaction are less relational – that is, less influenced by their partner’s 
experience of satisfaction (see also Master Theme 2, Section 6.2).  In this sense, she 
feels that her experience of relationship satisfaction is less phenomenologically 
accessible than her partner’s experience, because it involves a characteristic of gendered, 
interpersonal uncertainty that needs “reassurance”.  In contrast, she understands men’s 
satisfaction as less interpersonally-dependent.  This is similar for Clare, who feels that 
her experiences of relationship dissatisfaction are far more phenomenologically 
accessible than her partner’s because she has less “control” over her feelings.  Lisa and 
Clare’s descriptions reflect both mainstream accounts of women as more relational and 
more emotional, as well as feminist critiques (e.g. Greer, 2007) that outline the way in 
which women are positioned as relationally dependent with their stories ending with the 
formation of their relationships.  In addition to these affective characteristics of 
relationship satisfaction, the participants also describe the affective components of 
experiencing dissatisfaction.   
 
6.1.4 Relationship dissatisfaction as frustration and blame 
In the following extract Martin reflects on a ‘bad patch’ that he and his current 
girlfriend experienced, and he describes the “frustration” of preoccupied dissatisfaction, 
as well as a sense of confusion: 
Extract 86:  
“[…] (.) I felt pretty shit, for quite a while.  Confusing (.) I don’t know if it made me 
unhappy but (.) just (.) frustrated, not being able to switch off.  I think I was annoyed, (.) 
for a while I was just quite negative about this relationship (.) it made me feel pretty 
crap”  
(Martin, pg13, lines 638-644) 
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Similar to Lisa’s comments in Extract 79, Martin highlights the pervasive nature of 
experiencing dissatisfaction, and the way in which it demanded his attention.  It is this 
pre-occupied being-in-the-world that he found most “frustrating” as it precluded other 
experiential possibilities (i.e. he couldn’t “switch off”), and made probable the 
experience of feeling “pretty crap”, and intentionally “negative” about his relationship.   
The affective intentionality of dissatisfaction is also described by Lydia, who outlines 
the way in which it can manifest as blame of self or other in the respective forms of 
feeling “inadequate” or “neglected” (See also Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1.4 and the 
‘blamer-version-of-self’).   
 
Extract 87:   
“I think you feel inadequate (.) probably jealous of other people (.) unfulfilled, you feel 
like (.) no one really cares about you (.) and neglected really.  (.) I suppose it’s all to do 
with what you think the other person thinks of you, and if you’re (.) dissatisfied then 
you perceive that they don’t really care.”   
(Lydia, pg9, lines 405-410) 
 
Again, in Martin’s and Lydia’s descriptions there is a phenomenological range in the 
experience labelled as dissatisfaction.  It shifts from a phenomenologically deep 
experience that, in some respects, is akin to Ratcliffe’s existential feelings (or 
Heidegger’s ‘dissatisfied-with’ or ‘dissatisfied-for-one’) because it appears to preclude 
other experiential possibilities.  However, as described by Martin and Lydia, the 
experience can also be experienced as phenomenologically more accessible, to the point 
where it is understood as an intentionally specific affective response, with the object of 
its focus being the relationship and/or self or partner.   
 
Beyond experientially knowing satisfaction and dissatisfaction through their affective 
phenomenological characteristics, the participants also describe the ways in which they 
understand and know their relationship satisfaction through their embodied experiences.   
 
6.1.5 Relationship Satisfaction as embodied engagement in the world 
William speaks of a “warm” relationship satisfaction emanating from the core of his 
being.   
Extract 88:   
“[…] you have that feeling of (.) warmth almost, you know (.) it’s a kind of a bit of a 
cliché but I can understand where it comes from, that kind of (.) really feeling so into 
someone that you do tend to (.) does feel like it kind of comes from your heart, even 
though physically (.) it can’t.”  
(William, pg12, lines 587-591) 
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Whilst he acknowledges that this is physiologically impossible, his satisfaction is felt as 
a radiating energy, generated from the “heart” of his being, possibly directed towards 
his partner.  There is also the sense that he knows that this embodied experience can be 
easily understood within a clichéd, romanticised discourse.  He appears to experience 
some tension between attempting to dismiss this “cliché” and acknowledging it as a way 
of understanding and making sense of his embodied satisfaction.  This sense of 
experiencing an embodied energy when relationally satisfied is also outlined by Imogen: 
 
Extract 89:   
“You’ve got (.) no worries, or if you have any they don’t seem as important anymore.  
You’re quite, it feels (.) like you’ve got lots of energy and enthusiasm for life (.) it feels 
like (.) you’ve got connection with other people (.) it feels like you’re light as opposed 
to heavy and weighed down with worry you know, you’re quite light and you feel […] 
dynamic and (.) interested and (.) kind of future focused.”  
(Imogen, pgs9-10, lines 444-453) 
 
Imogen describes satisfaction in terms of experiencing her own physical mass as 
qualitatively “lighter” and not burdened or “weighed down”.   This is combined with 
her feeling full of “energy”.  In these descriptions her body appeared as the intentional 
object of her experience.  However, her account also describes the ways in which her 
embodiment is experienced as a pre-intentional engagement with the world; that is, 
where her body is the agent of perception, not the object.  This pre-intentional 
engagement manifests in experiencing herself as a relational being-with-others, 
“connected” to other people.  Furthermore, it also leads to her experiencing an authentic, 
committed engagement in her life-projects; a ‘flow’ like experience (Mihalyi, 1990)  
where she feels “interested” and “dynamic”, as opposed to passively occupying her 
position.  This is also experienced as a temporal engagement with her life-projects as 
she feels “future focussed”, which suggests an optimism, rather than anxiety or “worries” 
in the face of her unknown future.  In addition, Imogen’s description of relationship 
satisfaction reflects Ratcliffe’s (2005, 2010) account of existential feelings in the way in 
which her satisfaction is experienced as a pre-intentional, embodied engagement in the 
world.  This theme of satisfaction being experienced as a pre-reflective engaged being-
in-the-world is also evident for John who describes his experience of relationship 
satisfaction as making the extra-relational aspects of his life more manageable. 
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Extract 90:   
“[…] everything seems (.) balanced you know?  If you’re satisfied (.) in yo::ur 
relationship, everything (.) it just makes everything else that bit easier, or (.) makes 
everything else that slightly, er, less relevant, or (.) it just enables you to (.) sort of 
switch off from things”.   
(John, pg11, lines 511-514) 
 
The experience of relationship satisfaction shapes the way in which John relates to his 
other life-projects.  He experiences an engagement with them whereby his embodiment 
feels “balanced” and unburdened; where his life feels a “bit easier”.  Rather than 
experiencing an inauthentic preoccupation, his relationship satisfaction involves an 
embodied shift in his intentional focus whereby the significance of his other life projects 
are felt to be less “relevant”.  This manifests in his acceptance of his embodied being-in-
the-world in the face of potential or actual anxiety.  For both Imogen and John, their 
embodied “attunement to the world set[s] a certain atmosphere, a certain tonality” (van 
Deuzen-Smith, 2002, p.64), in which both feel a wholly embodied engaged unity with 
the world; and in which Imogen experiences herself as the source and process of 
creative change.  In contrast, the experience of dissatisfaction evinced an unsettled, 
preoccupied embodiment.   
 
6.1.6 Relationship Dissatisfaction as alienated embodiment 
The experience of relationship dissatisfaction reflects an embodied ‘dysappearing’; a 
term coined by Leder (1990) to describe the body’s loss of taken-for-grantedness during 
illness.  In this way, the participants’ awareness of their dissatisfying embodiment 
comes about from the ‘dysfunction’ of their relationship.  For some, this is experienced 
as an “inescapable embodiment” (Toombs, 1992, p.134), and this inescapability is felt 
as an alienation from their satisfied position in the world (Frank, 1998).  This is 
described by Clare who, unique among the participants, explicitly described her 
embodied relationship satisfaction in terms of her embodied sexual satisfaction. 
 
Extract 91:   
“Frustration!  Massively, yeah. (.) It’s like being hungry (.) and I can’t sleep if I need 
sex (.) It’s not a (.) choice thing, well it’s certainly not for me (.) it’s an absolute 
necessity, it’s like eating, or breathing, or sleeping (.) you’re dissatisfied if your body is 
telling you, you haven’t had enough (.) and you’re satisfied when you go to sleep (.) so 
satisfaction for me is all about that feeling where you go to sleep”  
(Clare, pgs11-12, lines 552-557) 
 
Here, Clare’s dissatisfaction is experienced as an essential embodied need (“like eating, 
or breathing, or sleeping”) that demands to be satiated; like a somatic reaction in which 
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her body signifies as a spontaneous, unwilled expression of her irrepressible wants or 
needs. In this way, her embodied sensations inform her of her dissatisfaction before she 
cognitively knows.  In contrast to her relaxed embodied sexual satisfaction, Clare’s 
dissatisfaction presents itself as an uncontrollable “hunger”, which results in a pre-
occupied intentional focus on it – one that she can clearly locate and articulate.  Thus, 
her embodied experience is phenomenologically very accessible, and her embodied 
sensations are experienced as both the agent and the object of her sexual dissatisfaction.  
In contrast, a dissatisfying embodied experience that is phenomenologically less 
accessible is described by John: 
 
Extract 92:  
“[…] it’s sort of a general feeling that something’s not right, as I said like a sort of 
dislocation.  So (.) going back to my analogy about the road where you feel like you’re 
walking it together, and that’s fine if you wanna take this path one day and they wanna 
go down this path that’s fine.  It’s whe::n you feel like you’re kind of ten steps behind, 
or you’re ten steps ahead. (.) It’s that (.) it’s very difficult to sort of (.) describe, but 
that’s a more, I would say, sort of insidious dissatisfaction […]”  
(John, pg17, lines 820-827) 
 
John’s intentionally “general”, more “insidious” dissatisfaction (i.e. unarticulated) is 
qualitatively experienced as a spatial “dislocation” from his partner.  Whilst he 
acknowledges that partners can often take different “paths” or life-projects (a focus of 
Master Theme 3, Section 6.3) his embodied dissatisfaction manifests in such a way so 
that even when he and his partner are travelling along the same path (i.e. engaged in 
their relational life-project as a couple) the sense of a spatial inter-personal separation 
remains and he feels “ten steps behind or [...] ahead”.  In this way, the intentional object 
of his experience is his relationship (not his actual body as was the case with Clare), but 
his sense of embodied-being-with-others functions as the agent of this perception.  This 
sense of not fully belonging in one’s embodied being-in-the-world is further described 
by Ruth: 
 
Extract 93:   
“Er (.) sort of uncomfortable in your own skin, if you’re feeling a bit taken for granted, 
or (.) if there’s things that are being done, or aren’t being done, or should be done, or 
you feel like (.) more of an effort could be made.  I suppose that’s for dissatisfied.”  
(Ruth, pg13, lines 614-618) 
 
Similar to John, Ruth describes an embodied sense of knowing dissatisfaction through 
feeling an embodied sense of displacement.  Whereas John’s displacement is 
experienced between him and his partner, Ruth’s is experienced within herself, such that 
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she feels “uncomfortable in her own skin” and ill-at-ease.  In a sense she feels her 
embodied sensations are not the normal ones that belong to her – almost as if she is 
wearing someone else’s clothes.  John and Ruth’s descriptions of losing the familiarity 
of their bodies when experiencing dissatisfaction offer potential explanations as to why 
some forms of “insidious” dissatisfaction are difficult for participants to articulate.  
Firstly, it may be difficult to translate somatic reactions or sensations into words
57
.  
Secondly, Kliever (1995) argued that the loss of familiarity with one’s own body 
impairs individuals’ abilities to experience themselves as beings with the capacity to 
speak for themselves.  This is because they lose their sense of self-coherence, and 
consequently have difficulty in experiencing themselves as the object of their own 
speech, which leads them to struggle in asserting the linguistic ‘I’.  This is no mind-
body dualism – this is embodied being-in-the-world, where the body shifts and can be 
both the object and agent of perception.  In Ruth’s description, her body appears to be 
the agent of perception, intentionally focused on the ways in which her relational 
expectations are not being met (i.e. the rules of her relationship are not being upheld by 
her partner) and she feels “taken for granted”.  It is these ‘relational rules’ that are the 
focus of Master Theme 2.  In particular, the ways in which partners experience their 
relationship satisfaction in terms of their relational ethics-of-expectations. 
 
6.2 Master Theme 2 – Negotiating Relational Expectations of self-&-other: The 
satisfying experience of engaging with self and other as subjects 
This master theme recognises the active relational nature of the experience of 
relationship satisfaction.  Participants describe their fluid, ongoing experiences of 
satisfaction in terms of their ability to negotiate their relational ethics-of-expectations.  
Relational ethics are experienced because, in a relationship, each individual becomes a 
fundamental part of the other’s life project - each revealing, and being revealed by the 
other.  Thus, participants feel an ongoing dialectical tension between their expectations 
to give to one another, and their expectations to receive from one another.  In light of 
this dialectical tension, and the subsequent relational compromises necessary in 
managing it, relationship satisfaction is understood and experienced in terms of a 
partner feeling their individual subjectivity had been acknowledged and respected.  In 
this way, the descriptions of the experience of relationship satisfaction echo Buber’s 
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 Akin to the difficulty one might experience when trying to articulate the sensations of a dream upon 
waking. 
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(2008) I-Thou relating because the satisfied subject does not feel objectified by their 
partner.  In contrast, experiencing dissatisfaction is characterised by a 
phenomenological tendency for participants’ to objectify either themselves, their 
relationships, or their partners – sometimes in light of idealised expectations.  In doing 
so, this facilitates experiences of blame and/or feeling one’s subjectivity is not being 
acknowledged or respected.   
 
The theme begins by illustrating the way in which the whole of Master Theme 2 is set 
against a phenomenological background in which participants’ understand their 
relational ethics-of-expectations as allowing them to expect and “demand” things from 
each other.  As Ruth explains:   
 
58
Extract 94:   
“[…] you depend on that person, and you feel like they won’t let you down, that doesn’t 
mean that they don’t ever let you down but (.) you feel like you can kind of, I suppose 
you can demand something off of them a little bit as well, you know (.) “Can you do 
this for me?”; “I need you to do this for me”, that helps as well.”   
(Ruth, pg3, 114-118) 
 
Ruth describes the process of inter-relating as a transactional experience of partners 
depending on each other to meet each other’s expectations.  One consequence for Ruth 
is that this experience can be understood in terms feeling “let down”, and intentionally-
directed blame towards her partner.  This extract illustrates the way in which her 
experience of relationship satisfaction is a continually fluid, negotiable process of 
relating (a quality under-appreciated in the mainstream psychological focus on intra-
psychic explanations of relationship satisfaction).  Ruth acknowledges that this process 
involves a tension between self and other, which means it is not possible for both 
partners’ expectations to be met all the time.  However, across participants’ accounts, it 
becomes apparent that the phenomenology of relationship satisfaction does not equate 
to a simplistic ‘expectations met = satisfaction’ whilst ‘expectations unmet = 
dissatisfaction’.  Rather, it is the way in which participants experience the process of 
negotiating their ethics-of-expectations that shapes their experience of relationship 
satisfaction.   
 
 
                                                 
58 Extracts 94 and 95 were also used in Chapter 5 (see Extracts 37 and 54 respectively) however they are used here in 
a different context to illustrate different empirical claims. 
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6.2.1 Satisfying negotiation – experiencing one’s subjectivity 
For example, Ruth outlines the way in which satisfying compromises can be facilitated 
by feeling she had been listened to, and appreciated: 
 
Extract 95:   
“Yeah, making the effort to do it.  I think even if it doesn’t work out the way you 
wanted it to (.) if the effort has been made and the conversations been there, and you 
feel like you’ve been listened to then, you’d be happier about compromising about 
certain things than if that person said “Well that’s what I’m doing, sod you” kind of 
thing.”   
(Ruth, pg14, lines 662-666) 
 
For Ruth, experiencing a relationally satisfying compromise rests upon her feeling that 
her subjective position and preferences have been heard and acknowledged by her 
partner.  Feeling that she has been able to articulate her subject position means that she 
maintains her sense of being an agentic partner authentically engaged in her own life-
projects.  In this way, Ruth’s description of satisfying compromise reflects Buber’s I-
Thou relating - her compromise is satisfyingly experienced vis-à-vis her partner’s 
perceived respect (akin to the diligent negotiator-self in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1.3), as 
opposed to feeling her subjective relational rights have been ‘dismissed’ and not 
considered in a dissatisfying way.  The phenomenological characteristics of satisfying 
compromises are further articulated by Clare, but unlike Ruth, Clare’s focus is in 
relation to her partner’s compromise: 
 
Extract 96:   
“[…] try to make sure the compromises you make are even (.) never let that person 
make a compromise that will actually (.) affect them later, never let somebody be so 
self-sacrificing that (.) it would affect us later, never let someone say “Oh no, I don’t 
mind, we can do this, we can do that”, and then eventually (.) you see it (.) sort of, 
sucked them dry.  You can’t let somebody (.) be totally self-sacrificing.”   
(Clare, pg14, lines 679-684) 
  
Clare’s account illustrates the two-way relational characteristics of experiencing 
satisfaction.  Whilst Ruth had highlighted the way in which she experienced herself as 
compromising in a satisfying way, Clare highlights the way in which her satisfaction 
also depends on feeling that her partner is making satisfying compromises.  In this way, 
her relationship satisfaction is experienced in terms of a balance between self-and-
other’s expectations.  As Clare states, the compromises in her relationship have to be 
“even”, such that neither partner is “self sacrificing”.  In this way, she acknowledges the 
importance of her partner maintaining his subjectivity in a balanced I-Thou way of 
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relating.  Clare illustrates this experience of satisfying, mutual I-Thou relating when she 
describes the process by which she and her partner decided to move from London to 
Edinburgh – something her partner has always wanted to do, yet about which she has 
reservations: 
 
Extract 97:   
“[…] he’s (.) said to me so many times since, ‘Is this something you can do?’  […] he 
checks that it’s ok (.) it is a compromise that I’m making, and we both know that, but 
it’s something he wouldn’t let me make if (.) I (.) you know, the fact that he wouldn’t let 
me make it lets me make it.  […] I feel that’s something I can confidently compromise 
in my life because (.) he’s checking (.) coz he’s not doing it lightly, he’s not taking 
advantage of me, he’s not (.) taking something away from me, he’s letting me give him 
something, and he’s checking I’m ok doing it.”   
(Clare, pg15, lines 694-703 & 726-729) 
 
The above extract is an excellent illustration of partners understanding their experience 
as a mutually satisfying negotiation in which both acknowledge each other’s 
subjectivity and show concern for the impact of their shared decision on each other’s 
life-projects.  By feeling that her partner will not allow her to sacrifice her life-projects 
for his, or that he is “taking advantage” of her, Clare comes to experience her 
compromise in terms of giving a “gift” to her partner, rather than something that is 
being “taken” from her. As she says, “the fact that he wouldn’t let [her] make it lets [her] 
make it”.  In this way, Clare is able to understand and experience a significant shift in 
her life-project in a satisfying way.   
 
In contrast to these satisfying accounts, the interviewees also describe the potential 
dissatisfying phenomenological characteristics of negotiating the ethics-of-expectations.   
 
6.2.2 Dissatisfying relating – objectifying self and other 
The experience of relationship dissatisfaction is often characterised by a tension 
between experiencing self and partner as reflective, agentic subjects, and a tendency to 
understand both in objective, pathologised terms – as something that is at fault.  Here, 
the experience of authentically reflecting on, and engaging in a fluid relational ethics 
between two subjects breaks down into an non-reflecting experience of blaming self 
and/or other.  In the background of this phenomenological tension is a tendency for 
participants to feel that they should implicitly know their partner’s experience.  This 
feeling is illustrated by Lydia and Clare: 
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Extract 98:   
“What if I want to be satisfied do I think my husband needs to be satisfied as well?  
Yeah, I think so, yeah.  Because you can always tell if your partner’s not (.) not feeling 
100%, not feeling satisfied, and that (.) and if you really love someone then that, you 
know, wears off on you, definitely.”  
(Lydia, pg11, lines 511-514) 
 
 
Extract 99:   
Clare: “[…] Knowing somebody well enough to (.) maybe making sure you do over and 
above what you should […] Just knowing what that person wants or needs.” 
Interviewer:  “How would you know what you should do?” 
Clare: “I think that’s instinct isn’t it?  When you’re in a relationship (.)you get to a stage 
where you share your life […] you do know what they want and need.”  
(Clare, pg2, lines 76-86) 
 
This unspoken knowing reflects the Effortless Negotiator position presented in Chapter 
5 (Section 5.2.2.1) and represents an objectifying inauthentic way of relating because it 
is experienced as not requiring reflection on the relational ethics that self-and-partner 
have committed too.  Yet this “instinct[ual]” knowing of what each other needs 
absolves each partner of fully, and authentically engaging in their relational life projects 
and simultaneously opens them up to experiencing blame if their relational ethics are 
not being fulfilled as they “should” be.  Lisa illustrates how this could be experienced in 
terms of blaming herself: 
 
Extract 100:   
“[…] maybe my expectations were too great, and (.) actually this is a good relationship 
and (.) you should just quit your moaning and actually (.) just accept that this is a good 
relationship and not every relationship is perfect (.) you know.”   
(Lisa, pg 5, lines 222-225) 
 
Lisa’s account of not having her expectations met illustrates an experience of self-doubt, 
and self-blame as she locates the problem in her ‘unreasonable’ expectations.  The 
extract also demonstrates the ongoing tension between experiencing herself as an object 
and as a subject as Lisa struggles to understand her relational dissatisfaction.  In one 
way she experiences an objectification of herself as a faulty product as her commitment 
to her expectations and subject position faltered – similar to Buber’s relating to self as 
an ‘it’.  However, she simultaneously describes an authentic process of reflecting on, 
and rejecting the spectre of the ideal.   The point here, is not to identify which 
experience is the ‘correct’ one (i.e. whether or not Lisa’s expectations are “too great”), 
but to illustrate the ongoing, fluid phenomenological uncertainty that Lisa experiences 
in her relationship, and the hard work (reflecting on [or monitoring – see also Chapter 5] 
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self and relationship) she does to try and understand and make sense of her experience 
of relationship dissatisfaction.  This experiential interplay between questioning oneself 
in light of a perceived ideal, and attempting to reject that ideal, is further illustrated by 
Clare who talks about this experience at the level of the couple.  She outlines the way in 
which she experiences her relationship as dissatisfying when she perceives other 
peoples’ relationships in idealised terms: 
 
Extract 101:  
Clare: “I’ll see something and I’ll think “Oh my God, that’s what you’re supposed to do, 
that’s how you’re supposed to do it!” and then I need to be told that it’s ok that we don’t 
[…] I look at other people in the club, and I see them laughing, and then I look at me 
and Vince, and if we’re not laughing I think “Oh shit, there’s a problem”, and then I go 
home and cry [laughs] and say that we’re not happy, and he says “What? I don’t 
understand what’s going on!” [laughs]. 
Interviewer:  “So basically, your own opinions, your opinions of your own relationship 
are influenced by seeing” 
Clare: “Yeah, massively(!), by seeing other people, and you shouldn’t do it!  [chuckles] 
I really wish I didn’t do that, I don’t think you can judge your relationship (.) and 
compare it to anyone else’s (.) because you don’t know what’s going on inside their 
lives (.) too often I worry about what we’re doing in a direct comparison to someone 
else, when they might be looking at me and thinking how lovely my life is”.  
(Clare, pgs7-8, lines 339-359) 
 
Clare’s extract illustrates the dissatisfying experience of objectifying both her own and 
other peoples’ relationships.  The upshot is that she perceives other peoples’ 
relationships in idealised terms (“Oh [...] that’s how you’re supposed to do it!”) and 
experiences dissatisfaction, anxiety, and worry about her relationship (“Oh shit, there’s 
a problem”) because she feels that she and her partner are somehow not doing things 
right.  In this way she occupies an inauthentic position in which she does not commit to 
her relational-life-project or reflect on it in an authentic way – refusing to acknowledge 
the subjective reality or her own lived-experience, and the actual (i.e. non-idealised) 
lived experience of others.  This dissatisfying experience, I argue, reflects Buber’s I-it 
relating but at the level of the couple; in effect, an ‘Us-that’ type of relating.   However, 
similar to Ruth, Clare does attempt to engage in a process of authentic reflection centred 
around her lived-experience.  She simultaneously rejects the spectre of the ideal (“you 
shouldn’t do it!”) in order to experience her relationship in an authentic ‘Us-Them’ way 
relative to other peoples’ relationships. 
 
This ongoing, phenomenological tension between occupying an inauthentic relational 
position and committing to one’s subjectivity is further described by David who 
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discusses the two-way experience of partners allocating, accepting, and rejecting blame 
for perceived transgressions of their ethics-of-expectations.  In this particular extract he 
talks about an ongoing tension experienced between him and his girlfriend about 
visiting his girlfriend’s parents: 
 
Extract 102:  
“[…] it’s the weekend, I don’t particularly want to go to Suffolk and hang out with her 
parents. And that is selfish (.) and then sometimes I think is it actually that bad?  I mean, 
she expects it […] and it’s always there, and it’s something she feels particularly 
strongly about […] and I suppose (.) these expectations  […] I probably have fallen 
short of a number of their expectations, but on the flip side I didn’t want (.) I didn’t 
want their expectations [chuckles], and I just think that those sort of create (.) a lot of 
problems”.   
(David, pg20, lines 582-584) 
 
David’s account illustrates the experiential ‘reflective tight-rope walk’ he is engaged in, 
in trying to understand both his and his girlfriend’s experience.  Again, the focus here is 
not on identifying who is ‘in the right’, but to illustrate the ongoing dialectical 
experience of self and other as object-and-subject.  On the one hand, David 
acknowledges his girlfriend’s subjectivity and her ‘relational rights’ to place 
expectations on him, and experiences himself as having been “selfish”.   In that instance, 
he also commits to himself as an agentic subject by acknowledging that it had been his 
decision not to go to his girlfriend’s parents.  However, he also experiences a shift in 
which he objectifies himself and his partner.  Firstly, he talks about falling short of 
expectations as if he is a product that has not measured up.  He subsequently goes on to 
objectify his partner and argue that he does not “want” her expectations – that is, he 
rejects the experience of his girlfriend’s perceived objectification of him.  However, 
rather than an authentic, subjective negotiation, this process reflects an inauthentic 
retreat from relating by both partners.  As van-Deurzen (2009) has argued “it is […] all 
too easy for us to become inauthentic and think of ourselves and others as mere objects 
to be manipulated” (p.57).  David’s extract demonstrates an ongoing, alternating 
experience reminiscent of Buber’s I-thou and I-it relating, and illustrates the 
phenomenological tension experienced by partners as they try to pin down their own 
experience whilst also trying to understand the experience of their partner.  This reflects 
David’s phenomenological uncertainty regarding his dissatisfaction as he flips between 
experiencing himself as being authentically “selfish” and remaining committed to his 
subject position as a partner with rights, to being inauthentically at fault and objectified 
through the unreasonable expectations of his partner.  This provides a nuanced view of 
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relationship satisfaction/dissatisfaction that is missing from the mainstream literature 
which attempts to fix the experience in terms of partners’ intra-psychic characteristics.  
The experience of feeling objectified by one’s partner is described in further detail by 
William when he reflects on a previous relationship in which he felt his partner was 
unwilling to compromise: 
 
Extract 103:   
“There certainly wasn’t a match in terms of (.) compromise and (.) sharing values and 
that lead to me going quite inwardly into my inner shell (.) and deliberately not (.) doing 
the things that I would normally have wanted to do […] I would define myself more or 
less by the relationships I have with other people.  I think that’s how you communicate, 
that’s kind of how you show who you are (.) and therefore if somebody stops you from 
doing the things that you enjoy doing (.) somehow, yeah, that stops you being true to 
yourself”.   
(William, pgs6-7, lines 297-304) 
 
William describes a sense of losing his subjectivity and not being “true” to himself 
because he feels that his preferences and expectations were not acknowledged by his 
previous girlfriend, and therefore he started “deliberately not (.) doing the things that 
[he] would normally have wanted to do”.  This account reflects Young (1990) who 
stated “a subject’s experience or action is alienated when it is defined or controlled by a 
subject who does not share one’s assumptions or goals” (p.168), and in this way, 
William experienced himself as an objectified ‘it’.  He felt distanced from a sense of 
being his “true” self, and no longer authentically engaged in his personal life-projects; 
displaced from the subject position through which he experienced his life-world as 
meaningful.  The interchangeability of partners’ viewpoints is necessary for relating to 
occur, and the inability to negotiate this is a precursor to mutual alienation (Young, 
1990).   Thus, experiencing a sense of being satisfyingly “true” to himself would have 
required a different mode of relating between William and his girlfriend; one which 
would have acknowledged and preserved his sense of subjectivity, as an autonomous 
agentic individual.  This experience of ontological security and managing the 
autonomy-connection dialectic, and its perceived impact on relationship satisfaction is 
the focus of Master Theme 3. 
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6.3 Theme 3 – Relationship Satisfaction as Ontological Security: Balancing the 
Autonomy-Connection Relational Dialectic 
The third and final master theme presents participants’ experiences of relationship 
satisfaction in terms of their feelings of ontological security
59
.  Here, relationship 
satisfaction is experienced as a paradoxical balance between autonomy and connection 
in which participants describe simultaneous feelings of intense closeness to their 
partners and feelings of freedom and autonomy to pursue extra-dyadic life-projects.  In 
contrast, the experience of relationship dissatisfaction is described in terms of feeling 
engulfed and losing one’s own subjectivity or feeling as though one is withdrawing and 
isolating oneself from the relationship.  In this way, these experiences touch upon – on 
the one hand, feelings of satisfying authentic engagement versus, on the other hand, 
dissatisfying and inauthentic occupation of one’s life projects.  The discussion of this 
theme begins with an extract from Clare who describes the inherent tension experienced 
by partners when attempting to manage the relational dialectic of autonomy and 
connection.   
 
Extract 104:   
“What happens is everything gets, like pooled (.)  And actually that’s one, one of the 
hardest things I think, because you’ve started off with two different people doing your 
own stuff (.) and you start sharing something and by the end of it everything is in one 
big barrel (.) and then who does what gets (.) dispersed out again.”  
(Clare, pg5, lines 222-226) 
 
Clare’s comment illustrates the way in which she experiences relating as two distinct 
individuals with their own life-projects having the capacity to come together and 
connect, such that their life-projects are shared and combined in “one big barrel”.  In 
this way, her relational life-world is experienced as a vessel in which she and her 
partner are contained.  However, she also indicates that she and her partner retain their 
autonomy as they experience their life-projects being “dispersed out again” i.e. leaving 
the “barrel” of their shared relational life-world.  She indicates that this is potentially a 
difficult experience, and one of the “hardest things” to manage.   
 
 
 
                                                 
59 The notion of security here is different to that which is outlined in Attachment Theory.   Whereas attachment 
theory understands ‘security’ in terms of individuals feeling that relationships with others are secure and dependable, 
the concept of ontological security refers to the experience of feeling that one’s very being is stable and secure – i.e. 
that one’s own existence as a ‘self’ is coherent, stable and secure. 
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6.3.1 Relationship Satisfaction as managing the autonomy-connection dialectic  
When managed well, participants describe intense satisfaction, and this is illustrated by 
Anya who describes her experience of feeling increasingly connected to her partner as 
their relationship has progressed: 
 
Extract 105: 
“[…] every now and then, you realise that (.) you moved a notch up in the relationship 
and it’s really hard to describe because every time you move up you think (.) you can’t 
have more of this because you feel so close to that person (.) and then again, sometime 
later (.) a month (.) years (.) you move and you just think “God, I feel even closer now.  
How is that possible?” (.) it’s really actually hard to describe the closeness (.) it is an 
amalgam of all these small things that (.) just move a level up (.) the intensity of all 
these things changes, erm (.) either for better or worse (..) but I would say for me, it’s 
always for better”  
(Anya, pg11, lines 504-517) 
 
Here, Anya’s experience of increasing connection and closeness is “always for the 
better”, and therefore her satisfaction is qualitatively experienced as an ontological 
closeness, such that she feels like she and the relationship have ascended to some higher 
relational realm of increased satisfaction.  In this way, the experience also suggests a 
phenomenological stratification of relationship satisfaction – one in which partners are 
unaware of the “level” of connection above until they suddenly ‘find themselves there’.  
This experience comes as a surprise to Anya and, again, reiterates the view from Master 
Theme 1 that the experience of relationship satisfaction is not actively reflected upon, or 
indeed understood in the abstract, but in the lived experience of being it (for example, 
see Extract 78).  While this is experienced in positive terms for Anya, she goes on to 
explain the importance of maintaining a sense of her (and her partner’s) autonomy in 
her relationship and how, paradoxically, feeling connected to her partner fosters her 
sense of autonomy: 
 
Extract 106:   
“I guess if you are very satisfied, then you really enjoy spending time – all the time if 
necessary with that person (.) you know you do feel like a part of (.) the couple (.) but at 
the same time it gives you your individualistic (.) freedom as well, so (.) that you don’t 
feel (.) over [suffocated], you feel (.) satisfied on your own as well (.) happy on your 
own and happy when you’re with them.  […] you have the rest of your life as well to 
live and (.) it’s quite exciting for me to see that George has his own, you know, self, and 
he doesn’t need me to be around (.) with him all the time.  Erm, and the same for him I 
guess.  I think that’s important as well, keeping part of you, it’s not secret, but keeping 
part of it for yourself.”   
(Anya, pgs9-10, lines 406-412) 
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For Anya, relationship satisfaction is experienced in terms of her and her partner feeling 
they are “part” of the couple, yet simultaneously able to differentiate (e.g. Bowen, 1993) 
and maintain their autonomous “freedom” to engage in their own distinct life-projects, 
and therefore not feel “suffocated” by each other or qualitatively smothered by their 
relationship.   This is an excellent example of satisfaction experienced and understood 
vis-à-vis the experience of ontological security (and the phenomenological paradox of 
simultaneously experiencing increasing independence with increasing authentic 
satisfying connection) based upon being acknowledged as an autonomous individual 
with their own unique and separate subjectivity.  In this way, Master Theme 3 shares 
phenomenological characteristics with Master Theme 2, and partners experience 
ontological security through feeling they are able to give themselves up completely – to 
lose themselves in relating, and become “part” of the couple – confident in the 
knowledge that they are simultaneously autonomous, and that their autonomy is 
acknowledged and respected by their partner.  Thus, to experience relating in a 
satisfying way, Anya journeys between the poles of connection and autonomy.  In the 
extract below, Lisa demonstrates the difficulty and tension in finding this balance:  
 
Extract 107:  
“I would hate to only deal with something as a couple.  I don’t even know if that’s 
possible (.) I think about things on my own (.) they come out pretty quickly, I would 
have my own, kind of views (.) but it may be that (.) the way that we deal with 
something as a couple is not how I would deal with it (.) individually, but (.) as a couple 
you have to deal with that [difference], and (.) that’s the most important thing, that you 
deal with it as a couple, and you just (.) accept that there are other things which you 
individually think differently about”   
(Lisa, pg14, lines 659-669) 
 
Lisa feels that it is of paramount importance that she and her partner learn to manage the 
tension between their autonomy and their shared relational-life-project (“as a couple 
you have to deal with that [difference]”).  To do this involves an authentic, 
ontologically secure acceptance of each other’s subjective individuality, and also an 
acceptance by each of them that there may be times where their autonomy gives way to 
their relational project.   However, Lisa staunchly advocates her autonomy and personal 
preferences, and it is clear that this is important for her sense of relationship satisfaction.  
She would “hate” to not experience this and losing her autonomy would be experienced 
as dissatisfying.   
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6.3.2 Relationship dissatisfaction as losing one’s autonomy 
This dissatisfying experience of losing one’s autonomy is described by Anya who 
speaks of a difficult period where she was in a previous relationship with a possessive 
individual who would not tolerate, let alone facilitate her autonomy. 
 
Extract 108:   
“[…] people who are extremely (.) possessive […] another partner, many years ago, 
lasted 8 years (.) it was impossible to be with other people because of extreme 
possessiveness, extreme worry, paranoia.  You couldn’t relax around men, you couldn’t 
relax around women (.) men because obviously he thought that they would try to chat 
me up, and women because he didn’t know what we talking about.”   
(Anya, pg4, lines 187-193)  
 
Anya experienced her dissatisfaction as a result of her partner’s extreme possessiveness, 
and in terms of being refused permission to experience her autonomy, and engage in her 
own extra-relational life projects (“it was impossible to be with other people”).  Her 
partner’s behaviour reflected deep ontological insecurity in the sense that he appeared to 
rely too much on Anya for his experience of being-in-the-world, and therefore he could 
not tolerate the thought of losing or not knowing her completely, for fear of losing or 
not knowing his very own sense of being (e.g. Laing, 1971).  This experience of relying 
on one’s relationship, or on one’s partner, for one’s sense of self is described by 
William when he talks about a previous relationship:  
 
Extract 109:   
“[…] finishing that relationship was something I thought about for a while (.) but (.) I 
just couldn’t see a way out, because I’d got so enmeshed into a situation where (.) bills 
were being shared, we bought a house together, there were even cats! (.) All that sort of 
stuff, which sounds like really mundane kind of things, but actually (.) that was my life 
at that particular time (.) so it’s quite a big decision when you suddenly have to (.) 
wrench your life away again and effectively start from scratch.”  
(William, pg7, lines 336-342) 
 
In William’s account of his relationship dissatisfaction, he experiences a feeling that he 
was “enmeshed” and entangled in the relationship, and he had lost his autonomy and 
become engulfed by it.  His sense of ontological insecurity manifested in a total reliance 
on the relationship – it “was [his] life” – and he felt that he could not leave it, despite 
the fact that he had contemplated finishing the relationship for some time.  This 
experience could be understood in terms of William losing his sense of autonomy to 
such an extent that he no longer felt he had permission to act of his own volition and 
end the relationship.  This mirrors Anya’s account in the previous extract because, 
despite her dissatisfaction, her relationship lasted eight years.  Perhaps, for both William 
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and Anya, the loss of their autonomy might have been accompanied by an uncertainty 
of knowing what they wanted, and a feeling that they did not have permission to engage 
in their autonomous, subjective life-projects.  They experienced themselves in-the-
world in positions of diminished power, and therefore, as William outlined, it required a 
“concerted effort” to remove themselves from their relationships.  In addition, 
William’s description of feeling that he needed to be in the relationship because of the 
shared ownership of “mundane” material possessions, reflected a torpor of normative 
thinking, and mirrors Heidgger’s account of individuals inauthentically occupying life-
projects dictated by the broader social discourse of ‘das Man’ or ‘the they’.  Hence, 
William’s eventual decision to end the relationship could be understood as his rejection 
of ‘das Man’ and a commitment to engaging in a satisfying life-project to which he feels 
authentically committed.  Such interpretations offer an alternative explanation to the 
mainstream investment accounts of why individuals might stay in a relationship 
experienced as dissatisfying: dissatisfied individuals might experience themselves in 
pathologised terms if they attempt to resist normative relational prescriptions, or they 
might not experience themselves as autonomous beings capable of “wrench[ing]” 
themselves away, or resisting such dominant discourses. 
 
6.4 Summary  
In summary, the IPA analysis presented in this chapter has argued that the experience of 
relationship satisfaction is rich, and multifaceted, and does not fit well with the 
mainstream notion of a fixed and knowable construct.  Instead, it appears to be a fluid, 
ongoing relational process with a range of phenomenological depths and qualities, 
which is characterised by individuals maintaining a sense of their own subjectivity and 
authentic engagement in their life projects.  At the same time the experience of 
relationship satisfaction signifies to individuals in affective and embodied ways which 
are sometimes difficult to articulate and ‘know through talk’.  The ways in which this 
analysis links to the FDA of lay peoples’ talk will be discussed in detail, along with the 
other aims of the thesis, in the following final chapter. 
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7. 
Conclusions and Discussions 
The purpose of this final chapter is two-fold.  Firstly, it outlines the thesis’ original 
contribution to knowledge production vis-à-vis the topic of relationship satisfaction.  It 
revisits the purpose, rationale and aims of the thesis and explores the ways in which 
these have been addressed.  In line with the “and/and” philosophy of the thesis, which 
embraces multiplicity and contradictions, this final chapter considers how the thesis 
advances theory by re-conceptualising Relationship Satisfaction in terms of: 1) the  
recycling of normalising discourses which reify certain kinds of relationships and 
practices as satisfying; 2) the interplay between lay discourses and lay experiences of 
relationship satisfaction; and 3) relationship satisfaction as a fluid and ongoing 
relational process shaped by normalising discourses, and experienced as the dissolving 
of intersubjective boundaries.  The emerging interpretative story will be positioned 
within existing literature, and the benefits of re-theorising relationship satisfaction for 
the fields of psychology and couple therapy will be presented.  Secondly, the chapter 
will outline the thesis’ novel contribution to methodological knowledge by presenting 
an evaluation of the methodological approach and the Twin Focus Analysis.  This 
evaluation will draw on selected established evaluation criteria for qualitative research 
(Yardley, 2008), but will be driven by a commitment to the concept of ‘epistemological 
reflexivity’ (Willig, 2012b) and will include a reflexive account of the empirical 
challenges and struggles I have dealt with as a researcher.  The reflexive process will be 
completed in the final section of the chapter where I will draw on Wilkinson’s (1988) 
notions of personal and disciplinary reflexivity as a way of foregrounding my subjective 
relationship with the research process, and reflect on how this impacted both the process 
of knowledge production and me as an individual.  
 
7.1 A return to the purpose, rationale and aims of the thesis 
This thesis set out to reconceptualise the topic of Relationship Satisfaction in order to 
advance theoretical understanding of the phenomenon and also make recommendations 
for couple therapy.  The rationale was that current mainstream psychological research 
on relationship satisfaction: 
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 Would benefit from a fuller, more comprehensive appreciation of the complex 
and pervasive way in which relationship satisfaction is socially constructed 
through discourse, social practices and institutions (of which the discipline of 
psychology and the institution of psychotherapy are two components). 
 Tends to ‘fix’ and ‘define’ relationship satisfaction as a form of “positive” 
subjective evaluation, but has not explored the subjective lived experience of 
relationship satisfaction. 
 Tends to favour intra psychological theoretical accounts of relationship 
satisfaction, and therefore lacks an appreciation of relationship satisfaction as an 
ongoing, fluid relational phenomenon. 
 
To address these gaps in the literature, three research aims were proposed: 
(i) To map out the dominant constructions of “relationship satisfaction” 
produced by lay people and by couple therapists, and the ways in which 
these productions overlap or vary.  In this way, the aim was to draw on 
theoretical claims about the discursive ‘cycle of knowledge’ production, and 
explore whether therapists had an awareness of their role in the norm-setting 
mechanism which sustains certain ways of thinking about, and ‘doing’ 
relationship satisfaction (Nicholson, 1993).   
(ii) To map lay peoples’ phenomenological, subjective experience of satisfaction 
as part of a twin focus analysis designed to explore the interplay between 
discourse and experience. 
(iii) To draw on insights from social constructionist and existential 
phenomenological theoretical accounts in order to shed light on relationship 
satisfaction as a relational process. 
 
All three of these aims involve theory generation in terms of re-theorising relationship 
satisfaction as a socially constructed phenomenon, as an experiential phenomenon, and 
as a relational phenomenon.  In addition, the second aim also involves methodological 
originality in terms of using two different qualitative methodologies to analyse a single 
dataset through a hermeneutic framework.  This allows two distinct, but complimentary 
‘analytical lights’ to illuminate different aspects of relationship satisfaction, whilst not 
violating the epistemological assumptions of either approach. 
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7.2 The Discursive Re-cycling of Relationship Satisfaction 
Twenty years ago Paula Nicholson (1993) presented the discursive ‘cycle of knowledge’ 
to draw attention to the ways in which sex therapists lacked awareness of the role they 
played in the discursive norm-setting mechanism.  Nicholson highlighted that the 
institution of sex and couples therapy produced, reified, and sustained notions of 
‘correct’ and ‘dysfunctional’ sexual performance as if they were neutral categories (see 
also Kleinplatz, 2001) rather than forms of knowledge and power in action which made 
possible certain sexual-subjects and closed-down alternatives.  Applying this theoretical 
account to ‘relationship satisfaction’, the operation of the discursive cycle could be 
represented in the following way (see Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1: The reification of Relationship Satisfaction through the cycle of 
knowledge 
 
 
Presented in this way, the discursive ‘cycle of knowledge’ is understood as functioning 
in the following way: 
 There are dominant discourses available throughout the broader culture, as well as 
psychological research and the institution of psychotherapy (e.g. attachment theory; 
intimacy as an interpersonal process etc.), which the couple therapists draw on in 
order to make sense of relationship satisfaction and position their dissatisfied 
Dominant Discourses: 
Relationship Satisfaction 
(re)established as real and 
factual entities
Dominant Discourses 
informing  Professional 
Practices of Couple 
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underpinning Professional 
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Clients
Dominant Discourses 
Taken up and invested in 
Subject Positions & 
Versions-of-Self 
Dominant Discourses re-
produced by lay ‘romantic 
couples’ /potential clients
The discursive 
recycling of 
dominant 
knowledge(s) of  
“Relationship 
Satisfaction”
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clients.  Through the mobilisation of these discourses, ‘relationship satisfaction’ and 
the ‘satisfied subject’ become reified in certain ways and understood as ‘real’ and 
‘factual’ entities, whilst other types of relating are produced as problematically 
dissatisfying. 
 These dominant knowledges make available and prop up certain therapeutic 
practices (e.g. presenting relationships in terms of intersubjective skills deficits, 
which requires an enskilling, pedagogical approach from the therapists); 
 These discursive practices permit (and warrant) therapists to provide professional 
instructions to clients which compel them to engage in specific, ‘satisfying’ inter-
subjective practices.  For example, ‘talk’ is privileged as a way of making visible a 
fixed and hidden ‘true’ self.  These instructions function as “rule reminders” 
(Hochschild, 1983, p.57) and render the clients as satisfyingly governable (Foucault, 
1987).  Over time these accepted knowledges and practices become normalised, 
diffused and circulated to lay people in the broader society (e.g. through social 
interactions between people, self-help literature, television programmes, and 
depictions of the therapeutic context in popular media). 
 In this way, both clients and lay people take up and invest in the socially privileged 
practices of the ‘satisfied’ subject positions and versions-of-self which are 
prescribed by the institution of couple therapy (and which have become ‘freely 
available’ as taken-for-granted norms in the wider culture).  Certain notions of 
satisfying relating become reified and are gradually accepted and mobilised as 
taken-for-granted norms.  Likewise, other modes of relating are understood as 
problematic and in need of therapeutic intervention.  
 The two-fold consequence is that the broader culture in which the institution of 
therapy is embedded continues to recycle and reinforce the discourses and practices 
of therapy.  In addition, when lay people find themselves in need of therapy, they 
present in terms of well-rehearsed relational scripts which further recycle and 
reinforce the discourses, practices, and prescriptions of therapy (Rose, 1990).   
There are instances in the data which can be understood as fitting the ‘cycle of 
knowledge’ as it is constructed above.  Firstly, there are many occasions where the 
therapists’ and lay people’ mobilise accounts of relationship satisfaction that recycle 
mainstream psychological research.  Secondly, there are commonalities across the 
therapists’ and lay peoples’ narratives and these are presented as points of overlap that 
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illustrate the recycling of dominant constructions.  Moreover, the therapists are 
constructed as uncritically prescribing certain therapeutic interventions.  This enables 
me to reiterate the claim that Nicholson (1993) made twenty years ago – that the 
therapists still demonstrate a lack of awareness of the power of their role in the 
discursive norm-setting mechanism.   
 
7.2.1. The cycle of knowledge in action: linking across therapists’ and lay peoples’ 
talk 
Many links between the therapists’ and lay peoples’ constructions of relationship 
satisfaction can be presented.  These are summarised below in Table 1: 
 
Table 4: Overlap of Couple Therapists’ and Lay Peoples’ Discursive Resources 
Couple Therapists’ Discursive Resources Lay Peoples’ Discursive Resources 
Commonalities and Overlap 
Relationship Satisfaction as a privileged 
discursive site 
Relationship Satisfaction as a privileged 
discursive site 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as simultaneously 
normative and problematic 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as normative 
and implicitly problematic. 
Satisfying Relationships as a site for 
"Psychological Growth" and being “known” 
Relationship Satisfaction as "Heroic / 
leap-of-faith relating" 
Implicit in the monitor version-of-self who 
can “know” self and other 
The discourse of "Relationship dissatisfaction 
as Unfulfilled Needs" 
The discourse of “Relationship 
Satisfaction as a transactional obligation 
for needs fulfilment” 
The Silent Partner Subject Position (also the 
Sexually dissatisfied non-intimate subject) 
The Dissatisfied Articulator version-of-self 
The Hyper Critic Subject Position 
The Dissatisfied Monitor / Blamer 
versions-of-self 
The prescription of ‘satisfying’ practices of 
listening and appreciation / respect 
The Diligent negotiator version-of-self 
Women as “more relational” than men – 
more readily able to articulate 
Women as “more relational” than men – 
more readily able to articulate 
 
The FDAs of the therapists’ and, to a lesser extent, lay people’s talk present a tension in 
the way in which relationship dissatisfaction is simultaneously understood as a 
Chapter 7.  Conclusions and Discussions 
 
194 
 
normative part of relating yet also rendered problematic.  Constructing dissatisfaction as 
‘a problem’ mirrors the binary distinctions (frequently seen in the mainstream 
psychometric literature) between ‘relationship satisfaction as good’ and ‘dissatisfaction 
as bad’ (e.g. Funk & Rogge, 2007), but these dualistic constructions breakdown at the 
intersubjective relational level in which experiences and behaviour are continuously 
constructed and re-constructed (e.g. Shotter, 1993) (See section 7.4.1 for further 
discussion).   
 
This tension is more explicit in the narratives of the therapists who simultaneously 
present relationship dissatisfaction as part of the “natural light and shade” of relating, 
but also as a problem for the couple which can spread beyond them to include broader 
family members (particularly children).  Thus, dissatisfaction is constructed as 
problematic in several distinct ways, all of which recycle mainstream psychological 
research (e.g. Sprenkle, 2012), including: as a state in which the couple cannot ‘function’ 
(e.g.Whisman & Uebelacker, 2006); in which they are likely to suffer poor physical 
health and mental wellbeing (e.g. Shields et al., 2012); and lastly, as a bad pedagogical 
example for the children of the couple which fails to teach them how to relate in a 
satisfying way (e.g. Cummings & Schatz, 2012).  Respectively, these constructions are 
underpinned and sustained by broader discourses of neo-liberal economics and the 
notion of the couple as a ‘functioning’ economic unit of production, biomedical 
discourses, and attachment discourses.  These constructions compel clients to come to 
therapy and warrant the prescription of satisfying behaviourally-enskilling techniques, 
which are primarily designed to help clients express ‘genuine’ intimacy.  These 
practices echo mainstream academic work that has put forward the notion of 
relationship satisfaction as a function of partners enacting ‘correct’ interpersonal skills 
(e.g. Lawrence et al., 2008).  This can be understood as an example of the power of the 
‘psy’ technologies (Rose, 1989) in action with psychological research informing 
therapeutic practice, and the associated (uncritical) prescription and take-up of certain 
‘satisfying’ inter-subjective practices.   
 
For the lay people, the tension in rendering dissatisfaction as problematic is more 
implicit, and manifests in their simultaneous privileging of relationship satisfaction and 
their constructions of relationship dissatisfaction as an inevitable part of relating which 
requires partners to negotiate compromises.  This mobilises a view of ‘relationships as 
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requiring work’ and recycles mainstream theories of intimacy as a key satisfying 
practice (e.g. Prager & Roberts, 2004), centred around the practices of the confessional 
(Foucault, 1976), such that ‘satisfied partners’ are compelled to talk, express and ‘know’ 
their ‘private self’.  This practice presents a further point of convergence between the 
lay and professional accounts.  Across the therapists’ talk, relationship satisfaction is 
consistently put forward and privileged as a site of humanistic growth and secure 
attachment; a discursive site in which partners ‘true’ selves can be known and flourish 
(e.g. Cherline, 2004; Giddens, 1992).  Similarly, across the lay talk it is taken-for-
granted that relationship satisfaction is a privileged and desired relational state.  
Humanistic notions are also mobilised and evident in the lay productions of relationship 
satisfaction as “heroic-leap-of-faith relating” in which individuals’ fixed ‘true’ selves 
can self-actualise and ‘be their best’.  These discursive constructions make available and 
privilege unconditional support and acceptance as key satisfying intersubjective 
practices, and are underpinned by mainstream attachment theories (e.g. Hazan & Shaver, 
2004). 
 
The most obvious commonality across the analyses of the lay peoples’ and therapists’ 
talk is the production of “relationship satisfaction as needs fulfilment” which requires 
inter-subjective ‘work’.  These constructions mirror the dominant mainstream account 
of relationship satisfaction (e.g. VanderDrift & Agnew, 2012) and are propped up and 
sustained by psychological knowledges which include: Interdependence Theory (e.g 
Rusbult et al., 2001); Attachment theory (e.g. Charania & Ickes, 2007); and 
Interpersonal Skills research (e.g. Lawrence et al., 2008).  The “relationship 
satisfaction as needs fulfilment” narrative constructs personal need fulfilment as an 
individual ‘right’ of couples (Hawkes, 1996) and recycles prevalent ‘discourses of 
reciprocity’ (see Braun, Gavey & McPhillips, 2003) which have long privileged 
‘balanced’ relationships (e.g. Goodman, 1999).  In addition, within this discursive 
framework, both the therapists and lay people are understood as presenting a mode of 
subjectification which operates at the level of intersubjective practices, and which 
privileges partners’ monitoring of self and other’s needs fulfilment and subsequent 
negotiation through talk.  Here, the ‘known’ subject functions as the signifier for the 
satisfied subject. 
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Therefore, across the lay people and therapists’ accounts there is little space for silence, 
which is presented as a problematic (i.e. dissatisfying) practice.  This is reflected in the 
therapists’ production of the “Silent Partner” as a disempowered, dissatisfying position, 
and the lay peoples’ privileging of the “articulator version-of-self”.  Thus, both the 
therapists’ and the lay people recycle notions of satisfied partners having to ‘work’ at 
their relationships through the practices of intersubjective dialogue.  This is reflected in 
both the therapists’ behavioural prescriptions to ‘listen’ and ‘respect’, and also the lay 
peoples’ productions of the satisfying practices of the “diligent negotiator version of 
self” who is understood as acknowledging and facilitating their partner’s articulation.    
In this way, these discourses warrant partners’ industrious joint vigilance and constant 
dedication to maintaining mutual needs fulfilment and relationship satisfaction.  A form 
of self-governance couched within notions of free choice (Weeks, 2007; Finn, 2012) 
and reflecting Gidden’s (1991) ‘transformative intimacy’ based on equality and 
achieved through mutual self-disclosure.  However, these accounts of disclosing 
intimacy offer partial accounts which mask the complexity and contradictions of 
couples’ lived experience of satisfying relationships (Jamison and Scott, 2004a). 
 
In contrast to this production of ‘satisfying relating’, relationship dissatisfaction is 
understood in terms of appraisals that partners’ needs are not being fulfilled and/or a 
production of them as being unable to ‘negotiate’.  Thus, an overlap can be constructed 
between the therapists’ presentations of the practices of the “Hyper Critic” (who 
focusses on what they perceived they were not getting and accuses their partner of not 
meeting their ‘duty’ as a need fulfilling partner) and the lay peoples’ accounts of the 
practices of the “dissatisfied monitor version-of-self” and “blamer version-of-self”.  All 
of these represent dissatisfied subjects who are understood as having engaged in a 
practice of evaluating their relational needs as unfulfilled, and this legitimises the 
subsequent practice of (primarily) blaming their partner for not meeting their ‘duty’ as a 
needs-fulfilling-partner.  
 
A further point of convergence can be identified in the lay peoples’ and couple 
therapists’ mobilisation of gender injunctions.  On occasions, both present inter-
subjective practices in heteronormative terms (although the lay people do this to a 
greater extent than the therapists), such that women are positioned as more readily able 
to articulate than men.  This well documented script (Jackson & Scott, 2004) puts 
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women forward as innately more ‘relational’ and in need of more intimacy than men, 
and also renders them responsible for initiating and managing this ‘emotion work’ 
(Gilbert & Walker, 1999). In this way, an asymmetric gendered relationship satisfaction 
(and satisfying practices) is produced, which represents socially ‘permitted’ ways of 
doing gender and satisfying relating, and which is underpinned by post-industrial 
economic assumptions about the ‘proper place’ of men and women in the realms of 
‘work’ and ‘the home’ (Harre-Mustin, 1978; Weeks, 2013).  For the therapists, these 
gendered accounts are most evident in the prescription of heteronormative practices 
aimed at teaching men to recognise and meet their partners’ ‘innate’ needs for intimacy 
so that their partners will then be encouraged to meet the men’s ‘innate’ needs for sex – 
a well-rehearsed script in which women represent the ‘sexual object’ (Hollway, 1989) 
and their desire is produced as a response to men’s (Ussher, 2005).  This represents an 
example of the therapists failing to appreciate or critically reflect on their own role in 
the norm-setting mechanism.   
 
In the FDA of couple therapists’ talk, they are presented as sometimes challenging their 
clients’ ‘dissatisfying tendencies’ (e.g. holding romantic ideals).  However, they are also 
understood as not critically reflecting on their own prescriptions for satisfying relating 
(e.g. for intimate communication, and sexual enskilling).  In their productions of 
satisfied subjectivity, the therapists are framed by their training, and therefore certain 
types of ‘satisfied subjects’ and ‘satisfying practices’ are more likely to be produced in 
the therapeutic context.  For example the governance of the confessional and notions of 
fixed and knowable selves which underpin and sustain their practice are taken up and 
recycled uncritically (Elliot & Lemert, 2006; Plummer, 2003).  Whilst, on the face of it, 
these practices and modes-of-subjectification empower clients (by ‘giving them voice’), 
there remains a risk that such practices could be taken-up and recycled dogmatically 
(Tiefer, 2005).  Through their position of power, the therapists instil the norms and 
practices of therapy in their clients, who are compelled to internalise them and “keep up 
this exploration forever”60.   
 
In summary, I argue that the points of overlap between lay and professional talk that 
have been put forward above (particularly the overlap between the practices uncritically 
                                                 
60 Cited from Extract 33 in Chapter 4 
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prescribed by the therapists and the modes of subjectification produced by the lay 
people) make visible the re-cycling of discursive norms in a way that reflects Figure 1.  
Whilst drawing on well-established theory (e.g. Nicholson, 1993; Kleinplatz, 2001), this 
is an original contribution which highlights that the institution of couple therapy still 
risks silencing clients and ‘satisfying’ them in a rigid, narrow way.  However, taking 
this critique further, I acknowledge that this is one way in which the recycling of 
discourse can be made to operate.  This presentation is itself a form of reifying 
knowledge which can close down alternative ways of understanding the richness and 
complexity presented in the analyses.   
 
7.2.2 Problematising the cycle of knowledge 
The theoretical ‘cycle of knowledge’ presented above serves as a useful heuristic to 
highlight that Nicholson’s (1993) critical claims are still applicable to the ways in which 
‘relationship satisfaction’ is produced in the context of couple therapy today.  That is, 
there is very limited recognition by therapists of the role they play in the norm-setting 
mechanism and their power in re-cycling dominant discourses.   
 
However, these claims are examples of knowledge production and power-in-action that 
must be problematised in and of themselves.  Presented as it is in Figure 1, the 
discursive cycle invokes notions of unidirectional causality, which suggests that the 
recycling of discourse happens in one distinct way.  This is not the case – many 
‘recyclings’ happen in multiple and plural ways, and these points are always open to 
resistance (Foucault, 1978).  The power-knowledge-nexus in action is better represented 
as the operation of a material-discursive network that is held in place by microphysics 
of power.  These can reinforce and recycle dominant knowledges in any direction and 
are always under forces of resistance and destabilisation (See Figure 2 below): 
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Figure 2: The reification of Relationship Satisfaction and opportunities for 
resistance through the discursive power-knowledge network
 
 
If the ‘cycle of knowledge’ (in Figure 1) is taken up uncritically it may shut down this 
complexity and opportunities for resistance presented in the network above (for 
example, lay people could change the therapists).  Knowledge is always provisional and 
is always imbricated with power, not just the therapeutic knowledge of the therapists 
but also the knowledge produced in this thesis.  The knowledge in this thesis, whilst 
destabilising mainstream taken-for-granted norms, nonetheless adds to the ‘social rules’.  
That is, to the academic knowledges that produce relationship satisfaction and 
discursive theory
61
.  By focusing on overlap and uncritically mobilising the ‘cycle of 
knowledge’ my knowledge production could, itself, silence resistance and close down 
variation because the presentation of the ‘tyranny of discourse’ further reifies and 
sustains it as tyrannical.  Yet the analyses presented in this thesis contain lots of 
flexibility and variation across lay and professional talk.  This is outlined below in 
Table 2: 
 
 
                                                 
61 This mirrors the therapists’ prescriptions.  Whilst seemingly more empowering and challenging clients’ taken-for-
granted norms, their practices nonetheless produce Relationship Satisfaction in a certain way and close off 
alternatives.   
Dominant Discourses: 
Relationship Satisfaction 
(re)established as real 
and factual entities
Dominant Discourses 
informing  Professional 
Practices of Couple 
Therapists
Dominant Discourses 
underpinning 
Professional Instructions 
made to Clients
Dominant Discourses 
Taken up and invested 
in Subject Positions & 
Versions-of-Self 
Dominant Discourses 
re-produced by lay 
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/potential clients
Opportunity 
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Opportunity 
for Resistance
Opportunity 
for Resistance
Opportunity 
for Resistance
Opportunities 
for Resistance
Opportunity 
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Table 5: Variation across Couple Therapists’ and Lay Peoples’ Discursive 
Resources 
Couple Therapists’ Discursive Resources Lay Peoples’ Discursive Resources 
Variations and Points of Divergence 
The Awakened Subject: 
Take care of one’s own needs 
 
Focus on not letting one’s partner be 
sacrificing, but absence of focus on 
fulfilling one’s own needs 
The Awakened Subject: 
Reject romantic ideals 
Simultaneous resistance and mobilisation 
of romantic discourses – the ‘spectre of 
the ideal’ 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as Sexual 
Inactivity 
Sexual Satisfaction rarely spoken about 
explicitly 
 
There are variations in the ways in which the lay people and therapists mobilise the 
discourse of “relationship satisfaction as needs fulfilment”.  For example, the therapists’ 
are presented as putting forward “the awakened subject” - a satisfied version-of-self 
who operates through the satisfying practice of acknowledging and fulfilling their own 
needs as opposed to focusing on what they are (or are not) receiving from their partner.  
This form of governance-as-self-responsibility (Rose, 1999) is far less evident in the lay 
talk.  Instead, the lay people are understood as having a tendency to present satisfying 
relating in terms of discourses of mutual reciprocity (Braun et al., 2003) and respect for 
each other’s needs, and not being too demanding on their partner (rather than on 
fulfilling their own needs).  A further point of divergence is evident in the way in which 
the lay people are presented as mobilising discourses of idealised romance in their 
productions of relationship satisfaction (e.g. in the “effortless negotiator version-of-self” 
who has an unspoken, implicit understanding of their partner), whereas the therapists 
are understood as resisting these narratives as ultimately dissatisfying.  The lay people 
also present romantic ideals as ‘unrealistic’ and ultimately dissatisfying, but the ‘spectre 
of the ideal’ remains in their simultaneous productions of desiring ‘the one’ and also the 
“effortless negotiator version-of-self”.  In this way, the lay constructions of relationship 
satisfaction are seen to operate through the simultaneous mobilisation of two ‘ideal’ 
narratives: one of ‘non-gendered equality and reciprocity’ and one of ‘heterosexual 
romance’.  This original contribution echoes Crawford’s (2004) work on productions of 
women’s sexuality.  
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Unsurprisingly, a key difference across the therapists’ and lay peoples’ accounts is in 
terms of what they are doing / achieving through their constructions.  For example, the 
therapists’ productions function more as ‘therapeutic tools’; as a way of understanding 
(and positioning) their clients’ dissatisfactions and subsequently sustaining their 
prescriptions for satisfying inter-subjective practices and modes of subjectification.  In 
contrast, the lay people mobilise these accounts as ways of understanding and managing 
their own relationship satisfactions, practices and satisfying modes of subjectification.  
This original contribution of the thesis demonstrates a subtle but important difference 
across the analyses.  Constructions which, on the face of it, are very similar 
(underpinned by, for example, similar discourses of need fulfilment) are deployed for 
different purposes to achieve different things in different contexts.   For example, when 
considering the position of the “Hyper Critic” and “Blamer version-of-self”, the blamer 
is produced by lay people (who identify as being in satisfied relationships) as a justified 
(or unjustified) practice made available as part of the “transactional obligation”.  In 
contrast, the therapists present the “Hyper critic” subject as a way of positioning and 
understanding the ‘dissatisfying’ practices of their clients.   
 
Beyond the discourse of needs fulfilment, a noticeable difference between the therapists 
and the lay people is that the therapists speak far more explicitly about the importance 
of sex for relationship satisfaction (as presented through the discourse of “Relationship 
Satisfaction as Sexual Inactivity”).   These accounts can be seen to recycle mainstream 
psychological research (e.g. Sprecher & Cate, 2004) in which sexual satisfaction and 
relationship satisfaction are simultaneously produced as synonymous and distinct.  
Sexual satisfaction is either subjugated to relational intimacy (e.g. Byers & Demmons, 
1999; McCarthy, 2002) or understood in instrumental terms of partners’ dysfunctional 
body parts and/or lack of sexuo-mechanical skills.  Thus, the therapists’ productions are 
understood as being underpinned by the heteronormative, coital imperative (Capedevilla, 
2007).  In contrast, apart from one of the lay people (Clare), the lay people do not speak 
explicitly about sex.  I believe that this is probably a result of the research context and 
the therapists’ greater comfort in speaking openly about sexual relationships.  The lay 
people do construct sex as important, but (apart from Clare) they do so to a far lesser 
extent and in more opaque terms (e.g. they talk about the “intimacy side of things” 
needing to be “right”, but only mention sex when asked to explain what they mean).  
Beyond reflecting a possible discomfort in talking openly about sex in the context of the 
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research interview, their responses might also reflect an action orientation outlined in 
previous research (e.g. Tunairu & Reavey, 2007) in which participants have a tendency 
to present their current sexual relationships in un-critical terms. 
 
This level of complexity and variety (in terms of the variation and the overlap) provide 
a glimpse of the complex phenomenon that relationship satisfaction is made to be, both 
across the participants’ talk and the analyses of their talk.  This complexity and 
multiplicity is further illustrated by considering the IPA of lay peoples’ talk. 
 
7.3 Relationship Satisfaction as discourse and lived experience 
The second aim of the thesis was to explore both the lived experience and the discursive 
productions of relationship satisfaction. This is based upon the theoretical proposition 
that there is much to be gained from exploring both the social constructedness, and the 
phenomenology of relationship satisfaction because a sole focus on discourse misses out 
the ‘felt actuality’ of relationship satisfaction, and a sole focus on phenomenology 
misses out on the socio-cultural conditions-of-possibility of experience.  This reflects 
other empirical work which has drawn on discursive and phenomenological approaches 
(e.g. Cosgrove, 2000; Willig, 2011
62
), and required methodological originality (Colahan, 
Tunariu & Dell, 2012 - see Section 7.2 for further discussion) through the 
epistemological route of the Twin Focus Analysis.  This aimed to provide a “fuller” 
theoretical output (in terms of reconstruction) and also offer insight into the relational 
characteristics of relationship satisfaction (see Section 7.1.3 for further discussion).  
Figure 3 attempts to capture these three layers: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Smith & Eatough (2008) state that IPA and FDA have been integrated in the work of Duncan, Hart, Scoular, and 
Bigrigg (2001).  However, upon reviewing this paper I could not see any explicit references to Foucauldian concepts 
or discourse analysis. 
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Figure 3: Reconceptualising Relationship Satisfaction as Lay Discourse, Lay 
Experience, and as a Relational Phenomenon  
 
As with the lay and professional discourses, I interpret a broad range of links between 
the lay constructions and the (accounts of) lay experiences of relationship satisfaction.  
The various points of overlap in the content between the two analytical interpretations 
are outlined in Table 3 below: 
 
Table 6:  The links between Lay Discourse and Lay Experience  
Relationship Satisfaction in Lay Discourse 
Relationship Satisfaction in Lay 
Experience 
Commonalities and Overlap 
The dissatisfied Monitor version-of-self 
Experience of dissatisfaction as frustrating 
preoccupation 
The gendered monitor version-of-self 
Women feeling they are less easily 
satisfied than their male partners 
Dissatisfied monitor or articulator version-of-
self 
Insidious feeling of being unable to locate / 
know / articulate one’s dissatisfaction 
Frustrating dissatisfaction 
Embodied feeling of being weighed down 
Relationship 
Satisfaction 
in Lay 
Discourse
Relationship 
Satisfaction 
in Lay 
Experience
Interplay
Twin Focus 
Analysis: Using 
FDA  & IPA
Relationship 
Satisfaction as 
a Relational 
Phenomenon
Experiencing  
Dissolved 
Boundaries
Recycling 
Normalising 
Discourses
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The articulator version-of-self 
Experiencing an intentionally specific 
‘outburst’ satisfaction 
The diligent negotiator version of self 
Experience of one’s subjectivity being 
acknowledged 
Experience of ‘giving one’s partner a gift’ 
Not taking up the diligent negotiator version 
of self 
Feeling uncomfortable in one’s own skin 
Feeling one is sacrificing one’s own needs 
Feeling dismissed / objectified 
The blamer version-of-self 
Feeling neglected / let down by one’s 
partner 
Feeling frustrated / angry 
Feeling objectified through being blamed 
Feeling inadequate 
Leap of faith version of self 
Deep connection to one’s partner, but 
one’s autonomy is maintained 
Feeling unconditionally accepted 
Happiness 
Embodied being in the world?  Optimistic? 
Light? 
Variations and Points of Divergence 
Satisfied monitor version of self 
Accounts of satisfaction as a state of pre-
reflective being-in-the-world 
 
I argue that the IPA shines a light on the tension, variety, and range of 
phenomenological experiences that participants produce as a way of making sense of 
the shifts between the different ‘versions-of-self’ that are made available through the 
discourses of relationship satisfaction.  For example, when considering the accounts of 
relationship dissatisfaction as a phenomenologically conspicuous (and sometimes 
frustrating) experience, which ‘demands one’s attention’, links could be made to the 
practices of the “dissatisfied monitor version-of-self” and the practice of ‘scanning’ 
one’s relationship in order to render one’s experience knowable.  Moreover, the 
production of the “gendered monitor version-of-self” links to Clare’s and Lisa’s 
experiential accounts of needing reassurance, and feeling less in control / more reliant 
on their  partners’ perceived levels of satisfaction.  Similarly, the “gendered monitor 
version-of-self” can be associated with the gendered experiential narratives of women’s 
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satisfaction as more ‘complex’ and, at times, ‘irrational’.  These productions reflect the 
discourses of the ‘crazy’ woman (Harre-Mustin, 1991) which, when mobilised, discount 
or deny women’s experiences by drawing on traditional gendered accounts of male 
rationality vs female emotionality.   
 
The discursive production of individuals who invest in, and shift between the “monitor” 
and “articulator versions-of-self” can be seen to map onto the phenomenological shifts 
presented in the IPA between experiencing the “insidious” and knowable “outburst” 
relationship dissatisfactions.  That is, when one is unable to take up the “articulator 
version-of-self” (a socially privileged mode of subjectification accomplished via the 
intersubjective practices of speaking) then the experience is presented by some as a 
more “insidious” less phenomenologically accessible form of relationship 
dissatisfaction.  However, at the same time, taking up the “articulator version-of-self” 
is sometimes presented as an ‘uncomfortable’ experience which partners do not always 
find easy.  However, this is resisted as it is understood as potentially leading to 
dissatisfying silence.  This original contribution presents the experiential tension 
associated with the conflicting needs of self and other that operate in the “relationship 
satisfaction as needs fulfilment” discourse.  
 
Failing to “diligently negotiate” is understood as a dissatisfying practice, and echoes 
the experiential narratives (outlined in Mater Theme 2 and 3) of experiencing: in-
authentic objectification (by partner or self), alienation from one’s own life-projects 
which are experienced as being ‘sacrificed’ (Young-Eisendrath, 1999), possible 
ontological ‘engulfment’ by one’s partner or the relationship (Laing, 1971), or feeling 
embodied dislocation (possibly within oneself and/or between oneself and ones 
partners).  In this way, the production of either partner failing or refusing to take up the 
“diligent negotiator version-of-self” opens a space for phenomenological accounts 
which share similar characteristics with Buber’s ‘I-it’ mode of relating63, and Laing’s 
(1971) notions of ontological insecurity
64
.  Similarly, the “effortless negotiator version-
of-self” (who is sustained through a practice in which they objectify their partner as 
someone who ‘should’ implicitly ‘know’ them) also reflects the dissatisfying 
experiential accounts of ‘I-it’ relating.  These experiences can be understood as enabling 
                                                 
63 Outlined in Master Theme 2 – the Ethics of Expectations 
64 Presented in Master Theme 3 – Managing the autonomy –connection dialectic 
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and warranting investment in the “blamer version-of-self’, a subjectivity characterised 
by feelings of frustration, anger and/or feeling neglected or let down (when directed at 
one’s partner), or in terms of inadequacy when directed at self.   
 
In contrast, the “diligent negotiator version-of-self” reflects a practice of relating 
(characterised by dialogue) in which partners feel their subjectivity has been 
acknowledged and respected, rather than feeling that they have been objectified 
(Young-Eisendrath, 1999).  In this way, the practice of “diligent negotiation” can be 
understood as enabling an experience akin to Buber’s ‘I-thou’ relating.  In this 
experience, satisfying compromise is understood as ‘giving a gift’ rather than a 
dissatisfying ‘sacrifice’.  This account of the felt actuality of compromise offers a 
counterpoint to discursive work (e.g. Gilfoyle, Wilson & Brown, 1992) that has 
identified a ‘pseudo-reciprocal gift discourse’.  This discourse challenges notions of 
equality and mutuality because the practice of ‘giving gifts’ is presented as a gendered 
practice with women giving more ‘gifts’ than men (Komter, 1996).  Whilst the 
discourse may not be empowering to women, it is interesting to see the experience 
described as such by the women participants in the study.  This original contribution of 
the thesis demonstrates the strength of the twin focus analysis. It allows a space for the 
participants’ narratives about the felt actuality of their lived experience to be 
acknowledged, whilst also providing a critical counterpoint that highlights discursive 
power in action so that the experiential accounts are not uncritically taken at face value.   
 
Lastly, the practices of unconditional support and acceptance presented in the lay 
peoples’ “heroic-leap-of-faith” dialectic, could possibly be understood in terms of the 
satisfying sense of ontological security (presented in Master Theme 3 of the IPA) and 
the ‘paradox of interdependency’ (Young-Eisendrath, 1994) in which partners’ 
experience the fluid back-and-forth of the autonomy-connection dialectic – that is, 
freedom to be an autonomous, agentic being through feeling connected to one’s partner, 
who is presented and experienced as supportive and accepting of one’s life projects.  In 
addition the “leap-of-faith version-of-self” could potentially link to the 
phenomenological accounts of satisfying relating being experienced in terms of feeling 
an embodied lightness, and temporal and relational engagement in one’s life project. 
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When considering variation in the interplay between the two analyses (notwithstanding 
their different underlying analytic foci) I identify one primary difference and that is 
between the “satisfied monitor-version-of-self” who is presented as engaging in the 
practice of positive relational evaluations, and the phenomenological accounts of 
relationship satisfaction as a  pre-intentional mode of being-in-the-world, or ‘existential 
feeling’ (e.g. Ratcliffe, 2005, 2010) in which appraisals and evaluations are absent from 
one’s experience.  This is an example where the practices of the satisfied subject and the 
experiential accounts of the satisfied subject can be seen as being incongruent.  This 
presents an original view of relationship satisfaction and highlights the limitations 
inherent to mainstream research which attempts to objectively define and ‘fix’  
relationship satisfaction as a knowable ‘state’.  Furthermore, it also highlights how the 
twin focus analysis demonstrates the richness, fluidity and contradictions inherent to the 
process of sense-making. 
 
In summary, the IPA of lay peoples’ talk presents relationship satisfaction as a very 
relational experience shaped by the intersubjective processes and practices between 
partners.  In turn, these relational practices can be seen as being enabled and warranted 
through the satisfying modes of subjectification and versions-of-self presented in the 
FDA of lay talk (both in the “transactional obligation for needs fulfilment” discourse 
and the “heroic-leap-of-faith” discourse).  However, it is important to re-emphasise the 
analytical difference between the FDA and IPA interpretations.  For example, the IPA 
focuses on lay peoples’ accounts of their lived experience of managing the negotiation 
of mutual needs fulfilment, not on mapping the discursive modes of subjectification 
which operate through certain intersubjective practices and make available certain 
‘versions-of-self’.  In this way, where links can be drawn the IPA can be understood as 
mapping the subjective, phenomenological quality of taking up and investing in certain 
versions-of-self presented in the FDA
65
.  In contrast, the FDA focuses on mapping the 
discursive resources (including practices and technologies-of-self) which enable and 
sustain the different versions-of-self in the first place.   
 
                                                 
65 This does not equate to making causal claims between specific practices / versions-of-self and specific experiences.  
Rather, it attempts to illustrate both the socially constructed nature of relationship satisfaction and also the felt 
actuality of the experiences that the participants understood and identified as relationally satisfying / dissatisfying.  
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The twin focus analysis suggests that the ‘experience’ of relationship satisfaction is 
discursively situated and made meaningful through discursive practices.  Yet it also 
makes itself meaningfully ‘known’ through embodied and affective signifiers which are 
sometimes experienced as ‘pre-discursive’ and therefore difficult to identify and 
articulate.   In this way, the twin focus analysis sheds two complementary analytical 
lights on the lay peoples’ talk and presents a richer, deeper account than either analysis 
on its own.  These analyses can also be seen to shed light on the relational qualities of 
relationship satisfaction. 
 
7.4 Reconceptualising the ‘relational’ in Relationship Satisfaction 
The third overarching aim of the thesis is to reconceptualise the relational qualities of 
relationship satisfaction.  Underpinning this aim is the theoretical proposition (See 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2.4) that both social constructionism and existential 
phenomenology present theoretical frameworks that are inherently relational and which 
can offer insights about ‘relationship satisfaction as a relational phenomenon’ that are 
currently absent from the literature.  The mainstream literature is dominated by 
intrapsychological explanations of relationship satisfaction (Gergen & Walter, 1998; 
Duck, 2011).  When ‘relational’ accounts are presented (e.g. achieving satisfaction via 
intimacy as an interpersonal process, see Laurenceau, Barrett, & Rovine, 2005) they 
frequently depict a restrictive view of relating in terms of a sequence of isolated 
interactions between two contained and distinct individuals who unproblematically use 
language as a purely representational medium
66
.  As outlined in Chapter 1, some social 
psychological theorists (e.g. Erbert & Duck, 1997; Duck, 2011) have drawn on 
dialectical theory to present relating as an ongoing transactional process of managing 
contradictions, which is shaped by the temporal and social context of the relationship 
(both of which are also fluid and subject to change).  Whilst this theoretical approach 
offers an account which more readily captures the fluidity and contradictory nature of 
relating, the analyses presented in this thesis offer further insights.  These are reflected 
in Figure 4 below: 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 I imagine this in terms of ‘Newton’s Cradle’ – in which five ball-bearings are suspended from a small frame.  One 
of the end ball-bearings is swung and its kinetic energy is transferred through the middle three ball bearings (which 
stay stationary) and into the one at the other end which consequently swings out. 
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Figure 4:  The ‘relational’ qualities of Relationship Satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
As outlined in Figure 4 (and Section 7.2), the FDAs of therapists’ and lay peoples’ talk 
can be understood as highlighting the role of normalising discourses in underpinning, 
privileging and recycling certain relational practices as ‘satisfying’.   Secondly, the lay 
peoples’ experiential accounts present ‘satisfying relating’ in terms of dissolving life-
world boundaries.  Each have been referred to in the sections above, but they are 
explicitly discussed, in turn, in the following sections. 
 
7.4.1 The power (and invisibility) of relational discursive norms 
As discussed in Section 7.2, both the lay people and the therapists mobilise relational 
discourses of relationship satisfaction that are underpinned and sustained by 
intersubjective practices.  In lay accounts, the “transactional obligation for needs 
fulfilment” presents a relational construction of relationship satisfaction which centres 
on a production of partners having a mutual duty to fulfil each other’s needs 
(VanderDrift & Agnew, 2012).  Again, this functions through a governance of 
expectations and, when mobilised in parallel with discourses of disclosing intimacy and 
egalitarian individualism (e.g. Giddens, 1992), enables a satisfying mode of 
subjectification which is understood as pivoting around partners’ ability to take-up and 
mobilise the practices of three versions-of-self: “the monitor”; “the articulator”; and 
“the diligent negotiator”.   The first operates through a governance of surveillance (of 
self and other); the second through a governance of the confessional (Foucault, 1978; 
Rose, 1999); and the third through a production of ‘satisfying relating as work’ 
achieved through talk and compromise (Finn, 2012).  In contrast to the “transactional 
obligation”, the construction of “relationship satisfaction as heroic, leap-of-relating” 
presents a mode of subjectification which pivots around the inter-subjective practices of 
Relationship 
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unconditional acceptance and support.  In this way, and in contrast to the “transactional 
obligation”, expectations are absent from partners talk and the key satisfying 
characteristic is trust in one’s “heroic” partner.  These productions are propped up and 
sustained by humanistic notions of the satisfying relationship as a site where partners 
can be understood as their uncensored ‘true’ selves and ‘self-actualise’ via their 
partner’s support and acceptance of this ‘true’ self (e.g. Bodenmann et al., 2008).  Thus, 
as with the “transactional obligation”, the satisfied subject represents a self who is 
constructed as being satisfied-in-relation-to-another.   
 
The relational quality of the lay modes-of-subjectification is evident in two ways.  
Firstly, they pivot around inter-subjective practices and each partner is presented as 
always being in a position of acting upon the other, and being acted upon (i.e. the 
dialectic of self-&-other comes to the fore in these constructions).  Secondly, the 
speakers are understood as capable of being ushered into taking up different versions-
of-self through the practices of others (either their partner or family or friends etc.).  For 
example, unconditional acceptance from one’s “heroic” partner can be seen to usher 
speakers into taking up the “leap-of-faith version-of-self”.  In addition, positive 
evaluations by friends are presented as ushering speakers into taking up the “satisfied 
monitor version-of-self”.  Similarly, ‘not going ballistic’ is put forward as a way of 
facilitating one’s partner to occupy the “articulator version-of-self”.  Therefore, both 
the “transactional obligation” and the “heroic-leap-of-faith” emphasised relationship 
satisfaction as a joint production between partners and also their broader social 
relationships, and this is an original contribution to the mainstream intra-psychological 
accounts. 
  
Moreover, these productions demonstrate the power of normalising discourses in 
shaping the conditions of possibility for understanding and doing satisfying relating 
(Rose, 1989).  For example, when the transactional obligation is mobilised in light of 
discourses of romantic ideals, the relational ‘work’ (of “articulation” and “diligent 
negotiation”) is absent.  In fact, they come to be understood in problematic terms 
because they signify that the relationship or partner is not ‘the one’.  This illustrates the 
multiplicity of meanings around productions of relationship satisfaction.  The different 
ways of mobilising the “transactional obligation” enable relational practices which, 
superficially at least, appear the same, but which signify and function in different ways 
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in light of different discursive norms.  Whilst the lay people can be understood as 
explicitly acknowledging and attempting to resist the power and operation of romantic 
scripts, they can also be understood as not questioning the discourses of disclosing 
intimacy which construct relationship satisfaction as requiring ‘work through dialogue’, 
and neither do they question the humanistic and attachment discourses which underpin 
the “Heroic-leap-of-faith” – all of these are seen to be taken up and recycled 
uncritically.   
 
When considering the therapists’ narratives, the relational discourses they mobilise (of 
“relationship dissatisfaction as unfulfilled needs” and “sexual inactivity”) enable them 
to prescribe satisfying relational practices which centre around clients relationally 
enskilling themselves (in particular, their inter-personal communication skills.  Also see 
Section 7.2).  Given the production of satisfying relationships as sites in which partners 
need to be ‘known’ and fulfilled, ‘talking’ and ‘listening’ function as the key satisfying 
inter-subjective practices to be mastered in order to reposition dissatisfied subjects as 
satisfied.  In addition to these practices, the therapists are understood as promoting a 
satisfying mode of subjectification which rests on two ideological propositions: the first 
is for clients to resist mobilising discourses of romantic idealism, and the second is for 
them to take ownership of, and to fulfil their own needs (as opposed to always relying 
on their partner).  The former functions through a governance of ‘realistic expectations’ 
and the latter through a governance of ‘self-care’.   
 
The therapists can be seen to demonstrate some awareness of discourses of heightened 
expectations (e.g. Hawkes, 1996; Weeks, 2007) on modern couples as they construct 
clients’ increasing focus on their ‘rights’ for personal self-fulfilment as problematic.  
However, as outlined in Section 7.2, the therapists’ prescriptions for satisfying relating 
still focus predominantly on clients’ intersubjective processes, a ‘turn to the self’ 
(Furedi, 2004) that frequently fails to recognise the action of other taken-for-granted 
cultural norms and prescriptions about what it means to be in a satisfying relationship 
and (with) a satisfied partner (Unger & Crawford, 1996).  In this way, the analyses 
demonstrate the way in which the ‘relational’ quality of relationship satisfaction 
discursively operates beyond the inter-subjective realm of the couple.  Not only is it 
made meaningful through the interactions with their broader familial and social 
networks (which has been acknowledged within the mainstream literature), it is also 
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made manifest through the socio-cultural norms in which the couple and their 
relationship are embedded (Ussher & Baker, 1993; Tiefer, 2010).  It is this appreciation 
that is missing from the mainstream literature. 
 
7.4.2 The dissolving of relational boundaries 
The relational quality of the experience of relationship satisfaction is also presented by 
lay people when they speak about the way in which they sometimes experience their 
relationship as satisfying.  For example, sometimes the lay people understand their 
satisfaction vis-a-vis their partner’s perceived levels of satisfaction.  This reflects an 
experience akin to Sartre’s (1957) being-for-others in that the experience only becomes 
concrete in relation to the ‘look’ of the other.  Furthermore, the participants’ accounts 
illustrate the ways in which their experiences are fluid and dynamic as they struggle to 
make sense of both their own experiences and those of their partner.  This fluid 
uncertainty presents a range and richness to the participants’ accounts that is absent 
from the mainstream literature which tends to dualistically categorise individuals as 
‘satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’.  The relational quality of the experience of satisfaction 
comes to the forefront in Master Theme 2 of the IPA, which focuses on partners 
negotiating their “ethics of expectations”.  As outlined in Section 7.3, the different 
ways in which these relational practices are negotiated and managed shifts the ways in 
which the participants experience themselves as an acknowledged and respected subject, 
or objectified and alienated from their life projects.   
 
Master Theme 3 of the IPA presents relationship satisfaction as an experience 
understood in terms of managing the tension of the autonomy-connection dialectic 
inherent to relating (Erbert, 2000).  Relationship dissatisfaction is associated with 
descriptions of feeling engulfed, enmeshed, or trapped in the relationship, a sense of 
losing one’s sense of self as an autonomous agentic being.  This experience is 
understood in terms of feeling over reliant on the relationship for one’s sense of self or 
smothered by one’s partner, or feeling that one needs to isolate oneself and withdraw 
from relating.  These narratives echo Register & Henley’s 1992) accounts of intimacy, 
and the radical phenomenological work of Cooper (1972) and Laing (1971) in which 
relating to another can be experienced as an overpowering fusion of selves, or the 
intrusion of another into the self.  In contrast, relationship satisfaction presents a 
paradoxical experience of intense closeness and simultaneous feelings of autonomy and 
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freedom to engage in one’s own life projects.  Here, an individual’s ontological sense of 
self is reinforced through satisfying connection, through the knowledge that they can 
give themselves up to relating and become part of a shared relational life project, whilst 
still experiencing themselves and their partner as separate beings with their own unique 
life projects (Young-Eisendrath, 1994). 
 
Thus, whilst the lived experience of relationship satisfaction may feel private, ‘owned’ 
by individuals and impermeable, through relational exchanges the boundaries of 
partners’ lived experiences can be seen to dissolve.  This is because two separate life 
projects are experienced as coming together as one relational life project (Young-
Eisendrath, 1999).  As each partner becomes part of the other’s life project (Schutz, 
1970) each is experientially revealed as a being-in-the-world by and through the other 
(Sartre, 1957).  This is in sharp contrast to mainstream models of relational processes 
(e.g. Reis and Shaver’s (1988) interpersonal model of intimacy; or Aron, Aron & 
Smollan’s (1992) model of ‘Intimacy as including the other in the self’) in which 
individuals remain distinct and contained.  However, when partners interact they do not 
‘receive talk and actions’ as if these were a ball that was being thrown between them.  
Rather, their actions permeate each other, they impact and penetrate and refigure each 
other’s being and experience.  In this way, the phenomenological analysis presents an 
original account of relationship satisfaction as a relational process, which is experienced 
as an organic and ongoing process of fusion and delineation – not a static, contained 
and distinct cognitive-affective state. 
 
In summary, this thesis and the empirical analyses presented within it expand on the 
dialectical, social psychological version of relationship satisfaction in three ways.  
Firstly, it brings insight from social constructionism in highlighting the ways in which 
normalising discourses shape and delimit what it means for partners’ capacities to be 
and do ‘relational’.  Secondly, the thesis brings insight from phenomenology about the 
tensions that partners experience in relating, and how they make sense of these.  Thirdly, 
there are insights from existential philosophy in the sense that ‘the relational’ is 
understood in terms of two ongoing life-projects that are experienced, understood and 
foregrounded in light of each other.  That is, relationship satisfaction is presented a 
‘process of becoming’ that is always in relation to another. 
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7.5 Re-theorising Relationship Satisfaction Benefits & Applications 
There is multiplicity, variation and fluidity in the productions of relationship 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction across all three analyses.  Relationship satisfaction 
represents a shifting, dynamic, multifaceted process that is always ‘up for negotiation’.  
Moreover, this process (these productions and experiential accounts) operate not only at 
the intersubjective level of the couple, but also at the level of extra-dyadic relationships 
which are salient to the individuals in the couple (e.g. children, family, friends) and also 
at the broader social level.  That is, what is understood and experienced
67
 as satisfying 
and how partners should be satisfied.  Whilst it is subjectively experienced in a very 
private way it is the result of a complex, very active (albeit taken-for-granted) 
combination of assumptions that we continuously mobilise and recycle (Jackson & 
Scott, 2010; Tiefer, 2010; Weeks, 2013).  Furthermore, the experience is dialectical and 
characterised by ongoing and fluid experiences between the poles of subjectification-
objectification (e.g. Young-Eisendrath, 1999) and autonomy-connection (e.g. Baxter & 
Erbert, 1999; Macquarrie, 1972).  There are several benefits to re-theorizing relationship 
satisfaction in this way. 
 
Firstly, in terms of psychological research, this re-conceptualisation could prompt a 
level of theoretical & conceptual engagement that is currently missing from the 
mainstream literature.  When mainstream research fails to take into account the socially 
constructed nature of relationship satisfaction, it misses out the very source which 
creates the shifts and variability in its meaning.  Relationship satisfaction is not distinct 
from narratives of the self.  It is not an independent experience of an asocial, fixed and 
coherent self.  Rather, it is indebted to culture and it gets discursively recycled.  Not 
acknowledging this process can lead to a position where we come to believe that 
relationship satisfaction and satisfied subjects are fixed entities with their own pre-
existing reality.  Therefore, the thesis invites researchers to look at the assumptions that 
are taken for granted, to be open to alternatives, and value individual variation over 
normative definitions of ‘relationship satisfaction’. 
 
In addition, the experiential characteristics presented through the IPA suggest a subtle, 
nuanced quality to the ways in which individuals attempt to make sense of their 
                                                 
67 This theoretical claim echoes theoretical work (e.g. Harre , 1986; Parkinson, 1996) which has outlined the socially 
constructed nature of emotions. 
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experiences of relationship satisfaction.  For example, it highlights a potential drawback 
to mainstream psychometric approaches (e.g. Funk & Rogge, 2007) which focus on 
asking respondents to rate the extent to which they are satisfied and/or dissatisfied with 
different aspects of their relationships.  These approaches assume that this knowledge is 
accessible and reflected upon by respondents and this may not be the case.  Whilst the 
approach taken in this thesis also makes these same assumptions, the qualitative nature 
allows space and time for participants to reflect on their experiences and understandings, 
and to articulate them in all their discursive richness (including contradictions and 
nuances).  This is missed in a questionnaire which limits and pre-imposes categories of 
meaningful responses.  Therefore, the mainstream focus on individual, cognitive 
appraisals appears limited and too narrowly focused.  In the attempt to ‘fix’, ‘define’, 
measure and predict relationship satisfaction, the practices of mainstream psychological 
research silence its richness.  Such research, which treats relationship satisfaction as a 
simple variable, is problematic and misses out on the complexity presented by 
respondents in this thesis.  Research on relationship satisfaction would benefit if this 
complexity was acknowledged, and the content and processes of experience were 
valued, as opposed to trying to measure and fix it via generalised nomothetic 
explanations.  
 
Beyond the benefits for psychological researchers, the reconceptualisation of 
relationship satisfaction has potential benefits for practitioners that engage with the 
phenomenon in a therapeutic environment (as well as anyone who might read this thesis 
as a ‘lay’ person).  Firstly, theorising relationship satisfaction in terms of discursive 
resources helps lay people, clients, and therapists get a better understanding of the 
impact of the assumptions that they are mobilising.  This appreciation of the broader 
social prescriptions is often absent from the respondents’ (both lay and therapists’) talk 
(see Section 7.2 and 7.4).   Therefore it could be beneficial for the therapists and clients 
to reflect on the taken-for-granted assumptions – not only in terms of what constitutes 
satisfying or dissatisfying relating, but also what constitutes the therapists’ prescriptions 
for satisfying relating (Elliot & Lemert, 2006).  Critical therapeutic works have 
highlighted this, but these works are still marginalised, and this is evidenced in the fact 
that mainstream research (e.g. Lebow et al., 2012) is still concerned with ‘discovering’ 
universal laws of successful therapy.  In addition, understanding the power of the cycle 
of knowledge would empower clients because it would give them more awareness of 
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the ways in which their experience is linked to the taken-for-granted assumptions they 
have about relating (e.g. heightened expectations).  This awareness could facilitate 
acceptance and openness to alternatives, as opposed to blindly following and recycling 
readily available social scripts and practices.  However, the thesis also presents variety 
and complexity across couple therapists and lay peoples’ constructions, and therefore 
there are always opportunities for resistance.  Extending the critical lens beyond the data, 
and to my own knowledge production, the thesis highlights the risk in uncritically 
recycling established theories.  These are also forms of knowledge and power-in-action, 
which can limit and close down other ways of making sense of the complex accounts of 
relationship satisfaction presented in the analyses. 
 
Beyond the discursive analyses, a phenomenological reconceptualization of relationship 
satisfaction can help lay people and couple therapists to appreciate the multiple 
dimensions of the experience of relationship satisfaction, and its fluidity and relational 
quality.  Effectively, this could open up a different ‘vocabulary of relationship 
satisfaction’ and potentially remove feelings of blame and guilt.  It could help partners 
to understand and make sense of their own experience, and the ways in which it is not 
always ‘accessible’, but can signify in many ways that will always be in relation to 
one’s partner.  This relational reconceptualization could help partners to anticipate and 
understand their relationship satisfaction as a co-production – not something that either 
of them possesses.  Therefore, whilst their experiential world may be felt as private, 
they will understand that it is always in relation to both cultural norms and to the life-
project of another, that is, an ongoing ‘process of becoming’ in relation to others.  
These conceptual benefits outlined above are made possible owing to the 
methodological approach taken in the thesis, and this approach is the focus of the 
following section. 
 
7.6 Evaluating the Methodological Approach 
Evaluating qualitative research which is underpinned by social constructionism is 
challenging due to its appreciation of multiple and fluid meanings, and its rejection of 
‘objective’ knowledge claims.  Thus, traditional ‘quantitative’ concepts such as validity, 
reliability, generalisability and control are not appropriate concepts
68
.  Several examples 
                                                 
68 These could be appropriate evaluative criteria for qualitative research which adopts a realist epistemological 
position. 
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of qualitative evaluation criteria have been produced (e.g. Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992, 
for Grounded Theory; Elliot, Fischer & Rennie, 1999; Yardley, 2008)
69
, and Smith et al. 
(2009) state that Yardley’s (2008) framework offers a useful way of evaluating 
qualitative research (particularly IPA).  Yardley presents the following four evaluation 
criteria: 
1. The ‘Impact & Importance’ of the analyses 
2. The ‘Sensitivity to Context’ of the research (both in terms of the analytical 
processes and the analytical accounts themselves) 
3. The ‘Commitment & Rigour’ on the part of the researcher 
4. Transparency and coherence (again, both in a methodological and 
epistemological sense) 
 
The ‘Impact and Importance’ of the thesis have already been discussed in Section 7.5 
above.  In the following sections the other three criteria are used as a way of evaluating 
the thesis, but they are tailored in several ways
70
.  Firstly, Chapter 3 has already 
presented a detailed reflection on the methodologies, methods and procedures employed 
in the thesis.  Therefore, the following evaluation will shift focus, and reflect more on 
the knowledges that have been produced (although this will inevitably bring in 
discussions on methodology).  This emphasis will be most evident in discussing the 
criteria of ‘Sensitivity to Context’ and ‘Commitment & Rigour’.  For the most part, 
these have already been addressed and therefore they will only be referred to briefly 
here (and the relevant sections in Chapter 3 flagged).  Instead, the discussions will focus 
on the ‘Transparency & Coherence’ of the knowledges produced, and the challenges 
encountered during the process. 
 
7.6.1 Evaluating ‘Sensitivity to Context’ and ‘Commitment & Rigour’ 
This thesis demonstrates sensitivity to context in several ways.  Firstly it is sensitive to 
the “socio-cultural milieu in which [it] is situated” (Smith et al., 2009, p.180) as it is 
presented within the existing literature: in terms of the rationale/aims (as presented in 
                                                 
69 As outlined by Willig (2008; 2012b), there is some common ground across these criteria including assessing the 
extent to which qualitative analyses are: Systematically and clearly presented; Grounded in the data; Reflexive; 
Demonstrate an awareness of the analyses’ “contextual and theoretical specificity and the limitations that this 
imposes upon [their] relevance and applicability” (Willig, 2008, p.152). 
 
70 Several researchers (e.g. Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000; Reicher, 2000; Willig, 2012b) argue that because there is 
no singular qualitative paradigm, evaluative criteria should always be tailored to the methodological approaches 
adopted by the researcher. 
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Chapters 1 and 2), the epistemological and methodological framework (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3 and 3.4) and also in terms of the knowledges produced (as presented in 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7).  Both the substantive and theoretical literatures were reviewed 
in depth and in instances where material could not be found that was directly relevant, 
alternative literatures were reviewed as a way of offering insight (e.g. when there was 
no phenomenological work explicitly on relationship satisfaction I reviewed 
phenomenological and existential work on intimacy and mental health).  Furthermore, 
the thesis adopts a constructionist stance and is therefore more explicitly sensitive to the 
socio-historical conditions in which these literatures have emerged, and more readily 
acknowledges their capacities, assumptions and limitations. 
 
The ways in which the methodological procedures were carried out also demonstrates 
sensitivity to context.  In Chapter 3 (Section, 3.5) I reflected on the interactional nature 
of data-collection-as-a-joint-production, and demonstrated sensitivity to context through 
the ways in which I prepared for the interviews, conducted them, and reflected on them 
afterwards.  I was conscious of putting the participants at ease and ensuring they were 
‘given a voice’ by reflecting on my own assumptions and interview practice.  I reflected 
on the power dynamics during the data production process, and this ethical concern 
extended to the analyses themselves.  I ensured that the analyses were grounded in the 
data, and reflected on the power that I held through the analytical processes – 
particularly when I was producing the ‘suspicious’ interpretative readings of the FDAs, 
and the presentation of the ‘cycle of knowledge’.  Thus, the thesis engages with, and 
commits to ethical research principles in a way that goes beyond a ‘tick the box’ 
exercise. 
 
The points outlined above also serve to illustrate the thesis’ ‘Commitment & Rigour’.  
Again, these are well illustrated in Chapter 3 which evidences commitment to the 
underlying theoretical principles of the FDA and IPA, and a rigorous engagement with 
them – including the ways in which the interviews and analyses were conducted, and 
the resultant interpretative narratives were situated within the broader literature.  
Furthermore, Smith et al., (2009) outline how the concept of the ‘Independent Audit’ 
can be particularly useful for demonstrating rigour.  The audit involves another person 
(or persons) reviewing the processes undertaken by a researcher, not with the aim of 
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establishing the ‘truth’ of an account, but as a way of assessing how “systematically and 
transparently [an] account has been produced” (p.183).   
 
The level at which this was achieved in the thesis was via supervision.  For example, 
with my Direct of Studies (who was more embedded in the day-to-day aspects of the 
research) I was able to regularly check my progress and understanding, including the 
more intricate details of applying the methods, such as the coding and themes I 
produced.  At a later stage, when I had initial drafts of chapters (which I had formulated 
with my Director of Studies), I was able to get feedback through ‘fresh eyes’ from my 
Second Supervisor who provided a more distanced view of the ‘bigger research picture’, 
and destabilised the knowledge claims I was making.  For example, this included 
discussions on how the three analyses would fit together at the thesis level, as well as 
helping me to apply the Foucauldian discursive concepts in Chapters 4, 5 and 7
71
.  In 
this way the process of supervision also helped to ensure that the research was 
procedurally and methodologically transparent and coherent.   
 
7.6.2 Transparency and Coherence 
The knowledges I have produced in this thesis are social constructions that are imbued 
with power.  They are not ‘truths’, rather, each of them is one of many possible readings.  
I have produced them following the joint production of data that was the interview 
process (a process that was always-already enmeshed and indebted to broader social 
frameworks of meaning).  In doing so, I have made claims about the ways in which the 
respondents produced and reified certain constructions and practices of relationship 
satisfaction.  In turn I acknowledge that my analyses and this thesis are examples of 
power-in-action, which function to further reify these concepts through their status as 
academic knowledge, and these knowledges could themselves be critiqued and 
deconstructed.   
 
However, each of the analyses, taken as a standalone account, is epistemologically valid 
because they are congruent with the epistemological assumptions of their respective 
methodologies.  For example, the Foucauldian discourse analyses of couple therapists’ 
and lay peoples’ talk present a mapping of the discursive ‘conditions of possibility 
                                                 
71 The distinction between the types of feedback I received from my supervisors is a broad distinction, and it should 
be noted that both of my supervisors provided detailed and ‘bigger picture’ feedback during the course of conducting 
my PhD. 
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through which relationship satisfaction (and the satisfied subject) are rendered knowable 
and governable in certain ways.  In contrast, the IPA of lay peoples talk presents a 
thematic reconstruction that emphasises the participants’ subjective lived experience.  
Furthermore, each of the analyses is internally coherent.  I present points of tension and 
variation, but these are placed in the broader contexts of the theme or discourse to which 
they apply.  Therefore, the thesis applies the concepts of FDA and IPA in a way that is 
congruent with their underlying epistemological and theoretical principles.  Whilst 
another researcher might produce analyses with different content, I believe they would 
still make claims of the form (type) that I have.    
 
Beyond looking at the analyses in isolation, I also wanted to integrate them in 
complementary ways by highlighting links between them.  In order to accommodate this 
aim a hermeneutic framework was adopted.  Therefore, the socially constructed 
knowledges that have been produced are also interpretative (hermeneutic) knowledges 
informed by different hermeneutic ‘attitudes’ towards the production and analyses of 
the texts, and the subsequent presentation of those analyses.  As outlined in Chapter 3, 
these attitudes of empathy and suspicion are underpinned by different interpretative 
theoretical frameworks.  The former (empathy) by ideas from phenomenology and 
existentialism, and the latter (suspicion) by Foucauldian and discursive concepts.  
Willig (2012a) states that: “Given the lack of consensus on the question of the validity 
of interpretations, the best we can do to evaluate interpretative research is to scrutinize 
the extent to which the balance between bottom-up (or participant-led) and top-down 
(or researcher-led) input is congruent with the researcher’s declared approach to 
interpretation” (p.156).  This thesis has taken the position that a ‘fuller’ picture of 
relationship satisfaction can be achieved by presenting both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ 
interpretations via the use of the twin focus analysis.  The presentation
72
 of the three 
empirical chapters achieves this by moving from a position of distant suspicion, to one 
of close empathy.  This ‘interpretative continuum’ and the associated empirical steps are 
outlined below in Figure 5: 
 
 
 
                                                 
72
 As outlined in Chapter 3, I actually undertook the analyses in the opposite direction (See Section 3.7) 
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Figure 5:  The Interpretative Continuum of the Thesis 
 
The presentation of the three analyses in this thesis begins with FDA interpretations that 
are more distant and prescriptive, and which problematise the constructions of 
relationship dissatisfaction.  They subsequently move from mapping the technologies of 
power of the therapeutic space, through to the subject positons that are made available 
to dissatisfied clients, and then onto the satisfying modes of subjectification and 
associated versions-of-self that are made available when certain practices-of-the-self are 
mobilsed and invested in (by both therapists and lay people).  These latter concepts 
‘draw the anlayses closer’ to the intersubjective level of the couple, and then the IPA 
presents a close interpretation of satisfying lived experience at both the intersubjective 
level, and the level of the individual life-world.  The thesis then moves on to the final 
mode of knowledge production: a presentation of the interplay between the analyses in 
order to address the three overarching aims of the thesis, and this process represents a 
mixture of distanced and closer interpretations.  Whilst the discussions on the ‘cycle of 
knowledge’ involve distanced suspicious interpretations73, the discussions concerning 
the ‘interplay between language and experience’ and the ‘relational qualities of 
relationship satisfaction’ involve both distanced and closer accounts. 
 
There were distinct challenges in moving from the individual analyses (outlined in the 
separate empirical chapters) to the overarching aims of the thesis which are addressed 
this chapter.  I struggled in presenting the fluid and complex dichotomies that had been 
                                                 
73 Both in terms of the operation of the particpants’ discursive resources and my interpretation of this operation 
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taken on (i.e. mapping the overlap between professional and lay discourse, exploring the 
interplay between language and experience in the twin focus analysis, and drawing on 
social constructionism and existentialism to re-conceptualise the relational quality of 
relationship satisfaction).  Firstly, whilst I wanted to draw links between the lay 
therapists FDAs in order to illustrate the cycle of knowledge, I was conscious and 
concerned that I might slip into causal language.  In earlier drafts of the empirical and 
discussion chapters I had frequently done this, and often defaulted into a realist tone.  
However, following discussions with my Director of Studies and my Second Supervisor, 
I came to appreciate that I was not making traditional causal claims, but reflecting on 
the material processes through which discourse gets recycled.  Furthermore, the claims 
I made were themselves forms of knowledge and power in action which needed to be 
destabilised.  Beyond the discursive work, there were occasions when I began to try and 
interpret the impact of the therapists’ constructions on the lived experience of their 
clients.  In these instances I was going too far beyond my aims by trying to take a 
holistic view of all my analyses.  In a sense, the aim of the twin focus approach (and my 
theoretical claim that a focus on discourse alone was not sufficient) began to slip into 
my aim of mapping the interplay between professional and lay discourse.   
 
Similarly, the ‘philosophy’ of the and-and approach may have influenced my approach 
to gender in the analyses.  Having reflected on the individual analyses I believe that 
gender is in some ways absent.  It does appear in all of them, but only when the 
participants explicitly refer to gender, and so it appears more like an occasional 
‘subheading’.  I am aware, and acknowledge, that I have not pulled ‘gender’ through as 
a theme or as a lens through which to interrogate the data.  When I was conducting the 
interviews and analyses it did not feel like gender was explicitly ‘present’, but given my 
commitment to social constructionism and my acknowledgment that language 
(especially about heterosexual relationships) is always-already gendered, I have 
reflected on what its ‘absence’ in my analyses means. Two possible explanations have 
occurred to me.  Firstly, gender injunctions are so deeply ingrained that we are often 
blind to them and take them for granted without realising. This may be even more 
pertinent to me as a man who has always been embedded in a patriarchal socio-cultural 
context.  I have never experienced being the ‘other’ in the same way as women have 
(e.g. De Beauvoir, 2012) and therefore, whilst I am aware of critical and feminist 
literatures I am probably often blind to the workings of gendered discourses because I 
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occupy a privileged space within them.  This would be an excellent example of the 
tyranny of discourse (e.g. Parker, 1992) and the difficulty in ‘seeing’ the operation of 
the discursive cycle when one is embedded in it.  However, on further reflection, I also 
acknowledge that one of my main interests in this thesis is the ‘humanness’ of lived 
experience.  Some theorists (e.g. Segal, 1994; Tunariu, 2003) have argued that there is 
potential benefit in exploring experience in categories other than gender, and it is 
possible that this analytical outlook was implicitly fostered via the application of the 
twin focus analysis and my turn to existential works. 
 
With respect to the twin focus analysis, I attempted to integrate, somewhat, the two 
different readings by presenting complementary links (and variations) across them 
instead of leaving them ‘side by side’.  In particular, I attempted to draw links between 
the versions-of-self and the lived experience, and I also drew on both analyses to 
highlight the relational quality of relationship satisfaction.  However, I have not 
attempted to integrate them completely and seamlessly (I do not think that is 
epistemologically possible).  Rather, I have highlighted possible points of convergence 
in the separate processes of sense-making which, I believe, shed more light on the topic 
of relationship satisfaction.  Furthermore, the two analyses are presented separately, and 
the integration takes place in this chapter and outside of the two empirical analyses. 
 
Using IPA and FDA presents a twin focus approach which can facilitate the integration 
of analytical narratives
74
.  Furthermore, the “turn to interpretation” and my occupation 
of a less relativistic constructionist position facilitated my ‘simultaneous holding’ of the 
contradictions that arose from the different aims (and the different methodologies 
chosen to operationalise these aims).  Experientially speaking, it was as if this position 
allowed me to bring the different analytical interests a little closer together
75
.  Managing 
the potential ‘complementarity’ of the different interpretations was facilitated in this 
way.  This was a challenge at first, and I kept looking for the ‘correct’ epistemological 
position that would allow me to ‘hold everything’ and ‘find a solution’ for everything.  
                                                 
74 In contrast, other approaches would need to remain more distinct.  If, for example, I had been doing a descriptive 
phenomenological analysis then I think it would have been more problematic (not impossible – given my and/and 
philosophy) to draw links between the two, but they would have stood more distinctly and I think I would have had to 
shift between two (more distant) epistemological positions.   
75 As opposed to them repelling each other in the way that like-poles of two magnets do 
Chapter 7.  Conclusions and Discussions 
 
224 
 
Developing the confidence to ‘allow’ this tension took time (See Section 7.7 for further 
discussion on this). 
 
The two analytical readings for the twin focus analysis are very complementary.  I 
certainly did not aim to produce something that was ‘nice and neat’ with ‘all the loose 
ends tied up’.  I would argue that the complementarity between the FDA and IPA of lay 
talk was in the data, it was not completely imposed.  However, my mindset will have 
inevitably been influenced by the simultaneous early steps of the two analyses, but as I 
explained (See Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2), I could not focus solely on one and ignore the 
other because both were always in my mind.  At best, I could hold one more loosely.  In 
addition, the inherent nature of the analyses, looking for dominant constructions / 
master themes, means that the unique and variable can more easily get overlooked (a 
process I tried to rigorously manage,  see Chapter 3, Section 3.6.3 for example).   
 
Perhaps this is something to learn from in future research which utilises a twin focus 
analysis.  Exploring the tension and conflict between the two analyses could be a more 
explicit objective.  Furthermore, another methodological step could be to re-visit the 
interpretations from the twin focus analyses after a period of time when the researcher is 
less ‘embedded’ in them.  Smith (2007) has done this with an IPA study and he was 
able to further develop previous interpretations.  Thus, in a sense, one could re-visit a 
qualitative analysis (be it empathic or suspicious) at a later date with a more ‘suspicious’ 
interpretative attitude informed by a reflexive framework but this time the focus would 
be on the interpretative readings, not the ‘raw’ textual data76.  Such a process would 
effectively extend the methodological evaluation presented here, and offer a further way 
of operationalising the reflexive theoretical call to acknowledge and reflect on the role 
that the researcher has played in shaping the knowledge produced. 
 
Future research could also extend the twin focus analysis to other relational contexts.  
During the planning stages of this thesis I considered interviewing couples and 
collecting dyadic data, but we moved away from this idea because we felt that there 
could be ethical issues and a greater chance of self-censorship.  I wanted participants to 
feel that they could freely articulate as much as possible.  However, I would still be 
                                                 
76 This is a process that I engaged in when reflecting on the presentation of the ‘cycle of knowledge’ (see Section 7.2). 
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interested in collecting and analysing dyadic data, and possibly map inter-subjective 
practices in action by incorporating micro discursive methodologies.  This would 
require careful ethical consideration for the wellbeing of both partners.  Moreover, I had 
considered interviewing individuals who were currently in couple therapy.  Again, I 
decided against this idea due to the ethical barriers and timescales involved in recruiting 
these participants, but I believe it would be beneficial to interview clients in therapy too.  
As outlined elsewhere, all of the participants identified their current relationships as 
‘satisfying’, and it would be theoretically beneficial to map the subjective experiences 
and discursive resources that individuals identified as ‘dissatisfied’ produce.  
 
I had also considered looking at same-sex relationships too, but chose not to as my main 
interest was on heterosexual relationships.  Since this decision, I have frequently 
reflected on whether or not I made a heteronormative assumption in presuming that 
same-sex relationships would be different.  I think I probably did.  Again, my 
heterosexuality is taken for granted and (in the same way as gender) as a heterosexual 
male I am culturally privileged as ‘the norm’, not as the ‘other’.  However, given the 
large bodies of LGBT academic literatures I appreciate that same-sex relationships are 
embedded in, and produced through, discursive frameworks that I am unfamiliar with.  
Therefore including same sex relationships in this thesis might have been theoretically 
too challenging as it would have required familiarisation with further bodies of 
academic literature such as queer theory, pink therapy (Davies, 1996), and recent 
debates about re-orientation therapy
77
.   
 
Related to this point, my group of participants were relatively homogenous: middle 
class and culturally homogenous.  I believe it would be both ethical and of theoretical 
interest to explore the productions of other diverse groups, perhaps those who are 
marginalised and less frequently given a voice (e.g. different cultural and ethnic groups, 
or those with a disability
78
, or older individuals).  Lastly, I believe the twin focus 
approach would suit further couple therapeutic work, because I see interesting parallels 
between the types of interpretations that go on in the therapeutic context.  The therapists 
described the interpretative process they engaged in with their clients, and in some ways 
                                                 
77 A controversial and discredited ‘sexual re-orientation therapy’ already banned by the British Association for 
Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP) and the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP). 
 
78 This would be of personal interest to me as my sister has a spinal cord injury. 
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it seemed to reflect the process I went through with the data; simultaneously trying to 
understand and empathise with their clients’ experiences whilst also attempting to make 
sense of the underlying assumptions that their clients draw on.   
 
7.7 Final reflections - Embracing openness and resisting foreclosure 
The production of this thesis took place within a broader system of academic 
institutions, discourses and practices, and represents a form of power-in-action designed 
to reposition me as a ‘Doctor’.  Therefore it is important to personally reflect 
(Wilkinson, 1988) on my role in producing this knowledge, and also how the process 
has ‘produced me’.   
 
Willig (2012b) states: “[…] to interpret an account, the researcher needs to bring some 
ideas, some expectations, some conceptual tools with which to approach the text.  At the 
same time, the researcher needs to be open to being changed by the encounter with the 
text […]” (p.156).    In my case, my assumptions were shaped by the theoretical and 
epistemological position(s) I adopted for the thesis.  However, early on in the process 
they were also shaped by a range of other factors.  When I started my PhD I was an 
inexperienced social psychologist, and an inexperienced qualitative researcher.  For a 
long time I was influenced by other theoretical positions that I was previously aware of, 
and also the taken-for-granted realist epistemological position that I had adopted all my 
life until I started doing my PhD.  In addition, I did have personal experience of the 
topic I was investigating, and I certainly took it for granted that relationship 
dissatisfaction was ‘a problem’.   
 
It took time to shake off my own preconceptions which I found easy to mobilise (in the 
interviews and the analysis) and gradually incorporate the new ideas from the different 
theoretical frameworks that I had adopted.  Beyond the mainstream literature on the 
topic of relationship satisfaction I had to collect, review, and become familiar and 
comfortable with: critical social psychology, social constructionism, phenomenology, 
existential philosophy, hermeneutic philosophy, dialectical theory, pluralism in 
qualitative methodologies, and mainstream and critical therapeutic literatures.  This was 
exceptionally challenging but, with the help of my Director of Studies and my Second 
Supervisor, I was gradually able to draw on the contradictory ideas in a way that felt 
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authentically ‘mine’ and I became comfortable with ‘holding’ the tension between the 
different literatures.   
 
This feeling was crystallised for me by an article I saw in The Times in 2010
79
.  It had 
been written by Salman Rushdie and contained three extracts which caught my attention.  
The first was a quote from the Song of Myself by the poet and author Walt Whitman: 
 
Do I contradict myself? 
Very well then, I contradict myself. 
(I am large, I contain multitudes) 
 
The second was a comment by Rushdie: 
 
“Literature has never lost sight of what our quarrelsome world is trying to force 
us to forget.  Literature rejoices in contradiction, and in our novels and poems 
we sing our human complexity, our ability to be, simultaneously, both yes and 
no, both this and that, without feeling the slightest discomfort.” 
 
These extracts helped me to understand the notion of ‘contradictions being ok’.  I had 
struggled with the different knowledges in the early stages of the PhD and had often 
attempted to identify the ‘correct one’.  However, I became comfortable with looking at 
relationship satisfaction from different perspectives and acknowledging that these 
different perspectives did not have to perfectly map in a one-to-one causal relationship.  
It was possible to learn more by looking at a topic in two distinct ways: an ‘and/and’ 
approach as opposed to an ‘either/or’ one.  This became the whole philosophy of the 
thesis and it celebrated the multiplicity and contradictions inherent to the processes of 
sense-making; not only in looking at the participants’ productions and experiences of 
relationship satisfaction, but also in the process of producing academic knowledge 
which often looks for single ‘truths’ or perspectives.   
 
Therefore, whilst my relationship with this thesis has not always been a satisfying one 
and has been challenging on many occasions over the past six years, it has been worth 
celebrating the struggle of opening myself up to alternatives, rather than turning away 
from them when they have destabilised me and challenged my taken-for-granted 
assumptions.  Thus, the main way in which I have been changed by this thesis is in a 
gradual turn from a position of searching for single ‘truths’ and foreclosure to one of 
                                                 
79 It had been left on a train on the seat opposite me and I was flicking through it to pass the time. 
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openness and acceptance of contradictions and multiplicity; a philosophy encapsulated 
by the and-and approach and the third extract from that Times article: 
 
“The Arabic equivalent of the formula “once upon a time” is kan ma kan, which 
translates: “It was so, it was not so.”  […] And in our age of oversimplification, 
this beautiful complication has never been more important.”   (Rushdie, 2010) 
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Understanding lived experience and the structure of its discursive context: A dual focus 
methodological approach 
Matthew Colahan, Dr. Aneta Tunariu & Dr. Pippa Dell 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
In this paper we discuss the methodological framework of the first author’s PhD thesis in order 
to expose the thinking underpinning a dual focus methodology for a research programme which 
sets out to explore both the lived experience, and the socially constructed nature of ‘satisfaction’ 
in long-term, heterosexual relationships.  The proposal is that these two distinct exploratory foci 
can be addressed by conducting two distinct qualitative analyses on a single body of narrative 
data generated via interviews with twelve people from the general population; using 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) and then using Focauldian Discourse Analysis 
(FDA).  This approach presents a theoretical challenge as the two methodologies are grounded 
within different epistemologies.  We propose that by adopting a critical realist position at the 
thesis level, rather than at the individual empirical level of the research, the epistemological 
assumptions of both methodologies can be maintained and the two foci can yield analytic 
insights alongside one another.  By drawing on established hermeneutic theory, we propose that 
the interpretative stories generated from this dual focus approach can come together in 
potentially complementary ways and “bridg[e] the classical dichotomy between distanced 
explanation and close understanding” (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009, p.130) associated with 
FDA and IPA respectively.  The current paper will present and discuss the proposed dual focus 
approach, addressing the benefits and challenges of conducting both an IPA and an FDA on the 
same data set. It will conclude by outlining pragmatic suggestions for undertaking a dual focus 
analysis, including managing the interview structure and process, and the phases of analysis. 
The intention is to contribute to the growing preoccupation within the field of qualitative 
research about the limitations of an exclusive focus on the role of language in shaping realities 
and experience (e.g., Willig, 2007).   
 
Why a dual focus? 
Whilst other researches have drawn on ideas from both IPA and FDA in their work (e.g. 
Chadwick, Liao, & Boyle, 2005; Flowers, Duncan, & Francis, 2000; Johnson, Burrows, & 
Williamson, 2004), in general, the connection between the two methodologies remains implicit.   
However as Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009) point out, since IPA and FDA “appear to come 
to the social world in potentially complementary forms [there may be] value in a more explicit 
articulation of the relationship between them” (p.196).  IPA and FDA are delineated by distinct 
analytic foci and, as such, are able to shed light on the topic of relationship satisfaction in 
different ways.  In IPA, for example, the emphasis would rest with mapping participants’ 
understandings, and gaining a sense of their internal life worlds in terms of their subjective 
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experiences of relationship satisfaction.  By contrast, in FDA the emphasis would be on 
mapping patterns of discursive resources, how these are mobilised by participants to construct 
relationship satisfaction in certain ways, and how certain constructions come to warrant certain 
social practices but not others.   
 
Whilst FDA does attempt to theorise subjective experience, it does so by accounting for it in 
terms of “subject positions” – vantage points, and their associated rights, duties, and power, 
made available when the speaker occupies a discourse.  Discourses are understood as forms of 
structured language that are available to a linguistic community in a historical time, which shape 
and limit what we can think, say, and do, and also what can be done to us. As cultural 
formulations, discourses about romantic relationships construct its subjects as certain types of 
people and not others (e.g. good enough partner, ‘normal’, ‘abnormal’), and open up subject 
positions which cannot be avoided (e.g., ‘the care taker of my lover’s needs’), although we can 
become aware of these, recycle or try to resist them.  Once one accepts, or is unable to resist a 
particular subject position, they are “locked into the system of rights, speaking rights and 
obligations that are carried with that position” (Burr, 2003, p.111).  In FDA, subjective 
experience is thus investigated and understood through discursive concepts and expands our 
knowledge about the close relationship between discourse, culture and subjectivity. It shows 
how discursive constructions and practices play a central, formative role in the ways in which 
we experience ourselves (e.g. as ‘partner’, ‘lover’, ‘satisfied’, ‘dissatisfied’ etc.). However more 
can be explored about the subjective richness of experiencing oneself as a dis/ satisfied 
‘romantic’ partner, beyond the reifying role of language or the tyranny of discourse, to get a 
closer look into the humanness of experiencing these phenomena. There are further nuances and 
dimensions of psychological experience, say of experiencing satisfaction in one’s intimate 
relationship, that are difficult to articulate and, as Willig notes, “seem to involve [one’s] entire 
being, in a pre-reflective kind of way [and] seem to be about more than the use of language” 
(2007, p.210).  
 
FDA permits us to say something important about the contours of experiences that might be 
made available, or limited, by certain discourses and subject positions, but it cannot tell us (and 
does not aim to) about the phenomenologically grounded awareness of an encounter; in other 
words, about the felt actuality experienced by individuals within a given context and time 
(Willig, 2001; 2007).  Several researchers have explored alternatives or extensions to discursive 
work, which allow for the study of embodiment and subjectivity (e.g. Hollway & Jefferson, 
2000; Radley & Taylor, 2003; Gillies et al., 2005).  IPA also offers a potent way forward.  
Through the research process IPA allows the interpretative theorising of extra-discursive 
qualities of subjective meaning making activities.  IPA treats participants’ accounts as 
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expressions of their experience as it appears and signifies to them, and therefore goes beyond 
seeing the structure and nature of participants’ talk in terms of discursive resources.  While 
FDA points out that the discourses we use have direct implications for what we can experience 
(Henriques et al., 1984); IPA can offer a more direct, albeit interpretative, approach to 
articulating these implications from the point of view of the experiencing participant. This is the 
purpose of the dual analytic focus proposed here. 
  
Epistemological Challenges 
Whilst the dual focus approach has the benefit of allowing the exploration of the interplay 
between language, culture and experience, using both methodological frameworks within the 
one research programme (here a PhD thesis) poses epistemological challenges which need to, 
and can be addressed.  These challenges stem from the fact that whilst IPA and FDA both 
concern themselves with the role of meanings, collective meaning (patterns of commonality), 
and individualised meaning (patterns of variability) in constituting subjective realities, they do 
so in different ways.  FDA has a stronger and more direct empirical commitment to social 
constructionism than IPA typically has (Smith et al., 2009).  Amongst other things, FDA 
represents the speaker’s narratives and associated realities as constructed through discourse, and 
seeks to map dominant patterns of collectively shared meanings deeply indebted to a local 
culture.  IPA draws more on ideas from the symbolic interactionsim of George Meade and so 
aims to articulate themes representing the speakers as individuals with hermeneutic agency and, 
importantly, with individualised, psychological life-worlds. The empirical interest of a 
researcher to gain insight into these psychological life-worlds will necessarily encounter the 
conditions of the “double hermeneutics” (Smith, 1996); namely, that IPA knowledge-claims are 
provisionary, relative and always a contextualised function of the researcher’s interpretations of 
the participants’ own interpretations as they reflect and try to make sense of their experiences 
within research settings.  
 
Commonly, empirical applications of IPA principles tend to be sympathetic to social 
constructionism in that there is acknowledgment that meaning-making processes involve the 
speaker taking-up and mobilising certain discursive resources. There is an appreciation that 
participants’ narratives are always already situated within, and therefore shaped, limited and 
enabled, by language and practices (Smith et al., 2009).  The linguistic and social fabric of any 
given community acts as a framework for potentially individualised production of meanings and 
offers socially valued formulations, which, when taken up, are subject to becoming taken-for-
granted “habits of thought” (Parker & Shotter, 1990).  In turn, such psychologically generated 
habits of thought contribute to the very system where they were created; namely to the system 
of dominant discourses, associated practices, gendered injunctions, and so on.  Recycled by 
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speakers within daily interactions, internalised habits of thought prop up reified cultural 
expectations about, for example, the right and responsibility to have a ‘good romantic’, 
‘satisfying’ relationship (see also Tunariu & Reavey, 2003).  The discourse analysis of 
narratives about relationship satisfaction would involve a critical mapping of the “bodies-of-
knowledge that constitute [relationship satisfaction] in a wider cultural environment [that] might 
be accessed” (Larkin, 2006, p.109). On the other hand IPA subscribes to a less singular 
empirical translation of social constructionism than FDA, and does not invest in the same 
critical, deconstructive aims.   
 
One way to navigate contrasting epistemological commitments within the same thesis is by 
adopting a position which moves away from the more relativistic (radical) forms of social 
constructionism, and moves towards a position that can accommodate a notion of reality that 
can be arrived at by “differentiating between the ‘real’ and the ‘actual’ ” (Willig, 1998 p.102).  
Such a position would accept that the experience of relationship satisfaction or dissatisfaction is 
always grounded within prevailing cultural understandings about intimate relationships, and 
these are always already prescribing, but the experience does not become less real to an 
individual once its social construction has been established through theory (e.g., Tunariu, 2003).  
This position also acknowledges that a series of distinct actual conditions are required for 
‘relationship satisfaction’ to possibly unfold in meaning and experience in certain ways.   For 
example, these could include material (embodied), cognitive (inchoate anxiety which an 
individual is attempting to articulate), or social (linguistic access to certain communal views but 
not others) conditions (e.g., Harré, 1998). This position shares, therefore, common 
epistemological ideas with critical realism.  Critical realism theorises “a structural reality to the 
world […] which in some way underpins, generates or ‘affords’ our ways of understanding and 
talking about it” (Burr, 2003, p.96).  Social and physical arrangements can be involved in 
providing the conditions-of-possibility for the emergence of discourses without determining 
them. As Willig (1999) puts it, “[c]onditions of life, as experienced by the individual through 
discourses, provide reasons for the individual’s actions.  It follows that from a non-relativist 
social constructionist point of view, meanings are afforded by discourses, accommodated by 
social structures and changed by human actors” (p.44).  Other theorists have also proposed 
bridges across the material-discursive divide.  For example, Nightingale and Cromby (2002) 
argue for “the ‘co-constitution’ of personal experience by both the nature of material reality and 
the constructive force of language” (Burr, 2003, p.100). In summary, the epistemological 
features argued as necessary for the dual focus approach proposed in this paper are as follows: 
that when spoken about, the experience does not become less real to the speaker once we notice 
the workings of discourse-use (IPA can capture this); and that the actuality and conditions-of-
possibility point to materiality and their affordability of meanings (again IPA can capture this).  
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The proposed dual focus methodological approach encounters the task of co-joining 
epistemological interests as outlined above, and then of integrating findings to serve both sets of 
analytic foci (IPA and FDA), as well as the thesis’ overall research questions.  Two separate 
analyses of the same body of textual data can meet the first challenge and accommodate the 
epistemic criteria of both IPA and FDA.  In order to meet the second challenge (that of 
integrating the findings of both analyses), current discussions on the role of hermeneutic theory 
in research methods need to be drawn upon to guide the treatment of the text, such that the ways 
in which the text is treated under the FDA and IPA paradigms will generate two complementary 
interpretative stories. 
 
Hermeneutics of Empathy and Suspicion 
Hermeneutics refers to the process of interpretation. Whilst the original focus was on the 
interpretation of biblical texts, hermeneutic theory has broadened to encompass a much wider 
range of texts.  Today, social theorists have argued that hermeneutic theory is at the heart of the 
qualitative research process (Rennie, 2007) and can offer much to contemporary psychology 
(Smith, 2007).  Ricoeur (1970 cited in Langdridge, 2007) outlined two broad interpretative 
positions: the hermeneutics of empathy, and the hermeneutics of suspicion.  The former tends to 
focus on the content of talk, and aims to reconstruct the speaker/author’s experience in their 
own terms.  In contrast, the latter takes a more critical view of language and the role of the 
speaker/author, and draws on external theoretical perspectives to deconstruct the social-structure 
of their talk (Smith et al., 2009; Sullivan, 2010).  Recently there have been arguments in favour 
of incorporating both hermeneutics of empathy and suspicion (see Langdridge, 2007; Rennie, 
2007).  Broadly speaking, IPA operates from within a hermeneutics of empathy, whilst FDA 
tends towards a hermeneutics of suspicion, although this distinction is neither as rigid, nor as 
simple as stated. 
 
Smith et al., (2009) state that IPA can take a centre-ground position in relation to the 
hermeneutics of empathy and suspicion (see also Smith, 2004; Larkin et al., 2006) as long as the 
focus remains on elucidating the meaning of experience.  This does not involve adopting the 
critical, deconstructive aim of the hermeneutics of suspicion; but rather, incorporating what 
Smith et al., (2009) call a hermeneutics of ‘questioning’.  So whilst the IPA researcher wants to 
empathise with the participant’s experience, and to ‘put themselves in their shoes’, they also 
want to examine the experience from other angles and ponder the meaning-making of the 
participant.  The IPA research process starts with a hermeneutics of empathy, but may become 
more questioning.  However, this questioning is always driven by the content of the text itself, 
rather than an external theoretical framework (see also Langdridge’s 2007 work on Critical 
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Narrative Analysis).  Thus, whilst IPA may involve a hermeneutics of questioning, it is clearly a 
different interpretative process to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion (Smith et al., 2009). 
 
The hermeneutics of suspicion share common aspects with Foucault’s work which, inspired by 
Nietzche’s genealogical method, attempted to “search for the shameful, fragmented origin 
behind societal phenomena, whose origins have become mythologised, with the passing of time, 
as noble rationality and unambiguous clarity” (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009, p.130).  The 
hermeneutics of suspicion looks beyond participants’ subjective meaning-making to consider 
the social structures through which and for which their meaning-making is made possible.  
Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) articulate this as the injection of “critical social theory into the 
hermeneutical circle to facilitate an understanding of the hidden structures and tacit cultural 
dynamics that insidiously inscribe social meanings and values” (p.288). With the upshot that 
“[w]hat seems natural and self-evident should be problematised via insight (the hermeneutics of 
suspicion) and critique” (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009, p.167).  As outlined earlier, FDA can 
provide this sceptical, critical view of the broader social context, and prevent the researcher 
from falling into the trap of culturally-shared ‘common-sense’ meanings (Tunariu & Reavey, 
2007).  Smith et al., (2009) have argued that “it makes sense to present the two readings 
separately so that the reader can see the different analytic leverage [that] is going on” (p.106).  
The dual focus analysis presented here represents a way of operationalising this theoretical call. 
 
Pragmatic considerations for a dual focus approach 
In applying the dual focus approach, pragmatic considerations and decisions have to be made at 
every milestone typical of deconstructing the exploratory nature of the qualitative research 
process.  These pragmatic considerations require the researcher to acknowledge possible points 
of tension between the two methodologies of IPA and FDA, and make decisions about the best 
way forward to ensure that the epistemological assumptions of both are maintained, and that the 
research questions and interests remain protected.  The initial milestone, once the topic is 
decided (see also Coyle, 2010), is to formulate the research questions from within the 
epistemological and theoretical frameworks of the respective methodologies.  In the case of the 
first author’s PhD the research questions included, for example, ”How do participants 
experience satisfaction in their relationships?” and “How do participants know when they are 
‘satisfied’?” for the IPA focus.  For the FDA, research questions included “How do people 
construct relationship satisfaction? What dominant discourses get mobilised?”; “When does it 
make sense for participants to talk about relationship satisfaction in a certain ways?” and “What 
subject-positions are being created, and what modes of experiencing relationship satisfaction 
(including distribution of power) do these make available?” 
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Overlapping with the process of articulating the two strands of research questions for the 
empirical project are considerations and articulations at the level of epistemology.  Here, the 
researcher needs to remain acutely aware of the epistemological assumptions of IPA and FDA 
and how these inform their respective analytic foci (see earlier discussions for outline).  A third 
procedural milestone requires the researcher to establish the direction in which they wish to go 
in preparing to collect data.  As with any qualitative work, the epistemological position and 
theoretical framework adopted influences the formulation of the interview questions as well as 
the interview style.  In terms of interview structure, in the case of the first author’s PhD, the 
selection of questions emerged from a commitment to remain open and curious towards the 
participants’ voice and aware of the researcher’s own intellectual and personal assumptions, and, 
as much as is possible, keeping these bracketed. The set of questions devised to guide but not 
restrict the interview conversations thus featured open-ended questions which tried to tap into 
the analytic foci of both FDA and IPA.  For example questions such as ‘What do you 
understand by the term relationship satisfaction?’ were followed by ‘How do you know when 
you’re satisfied?  What does it feel like?’.  The aim was to encourage as much narrative, and as 
much reflection as possible, and to prompt the participants to describe their internal life-world, 
whilst noting points of tension in their accounts.  This process required active engagement with 
the interview process and was challenging because of the simultaneous needs to be relaxed 
enough to allow free narrative, whilst also remaining curious and aware of potential moments of 
segueing into novel areas, or contradiction with what had already been said, as these moments 
hold high potential for both IPA and FDA interests.  It required constant reflection by the 
interviewer on what had been covered, and the extent to which the analytic foci and questions 
had been addressed.   
 
The first author found it useful adopting what can be called a ‘relaxed awareness’ style during 
the interviews with the participants; relaxed in the sense of being receptive to and engaging with 
the participants’ subjective accounts, whilst being aware of points of tension in their narratives 
as these often delineate boundaries between dominant discourses employed in the same 
conversation.  Likewise, on the one hand paying attention to participants’ descriptive narratives 
and phenomenological accounts as much as possible, and on the other hand remaining aware of 
contradictions in their talk as a gateway into exploring the simultaneous mobilisation of 
multiple discourses and/or as gateways exposing interpretation and experience arising together.  
Other researchers interested in taking the dual focus approach might take an alternative 
approach.   For example, one might develop an interview style that is active in highlighting 
contradictions and tensions in language and try to invite the participants to take a position in 
relation to this in preparation for the hermeneutics of suspicion later on. 
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The fourth research milestone that has pragmatic implications for conducting a dual focus 
approach is data analysis.  This includes the procedural sequence that the researcher decides to 
use to conduct the two analyses, and also how they balance the different analytic foci whilst 
working through the various phases of the analyses. Outlining the phases of analysis is intended 
for the purpose of transparency and accountability which, alongside reflexivity, are a necessary 
part of ensuring inductive and epistemological rigour in the process of knowledge making. The 
interpretative claims then presented as master themes or discourses, respectively, can stand the 
scrutiny of credibility, viability and transferability applicable to qualitative research. In terms of 
what sequence to conduct the analyses, in the case of the first author’s PhD, the researcher 
decided to start with the IPA.  This is due to the fact that the analytic focus of FDA requires a 
technical understanding of discourse theory, which speaks of language-use as being structured 
into coherent discourses i.e. linguistic packages.  As such searching for these system-like 
linguistic ‘packages’ of metaphors, assumptions, and ideas yields better to a more global look at 
the text, yet with a technical gaze as its deconstruction unfolds as part of the encounter with the 
data. A panoramic view of the prevalent building blocks used to construct objects and events, 
and associated links or contradictions, can raise familiarity and aid the researcher navigate the 
text when deconstructing it through the lens of IPA. In doing IPA first, the researcher sets out 
with a looser, more open gaze towards the complex, initially undifferentiated thematic patterns 
as they emerge as units of meaning, whether these are articulated as concept-understandings, 
phenomenological descriptions or hermeneutic preoccupations that hold personal significance 
for the speaker.  Therefore, the researcher may decide to engage in the IPA analysis of the data 
first then, armed with a detailed understanding of the text, to proceed to interrogate it from the 
analytic vantage point of FDA.  
 
The dual focus approach invites the researcher to subscribe to the idea that language and 
experience are deeply intertwined, and therefore the sequence of the analyses could be 
conducted in either way. The invitation is to suspend the analytic foci and concerns of one mode 
of the analysis while embarking on the other. Starting with a clear outline of the phases of 
analysis derived through principles, and tailored to research questions, can help the researcher 
embrace this invitation. Commitment to engage with the text within the framework of an IPA or 
FDA lens can translate in a disciplined application of de-construction and re-construction of text. 
However throughout the research process the dual focus approach will remain visible to the 
researcher; at times, these will be experience as an ‘and-and’ rather than a clear cut ‘either–or’ 
process. Awareness that this will happen, that the intention to suspend one set of concerns may 
not always necessarily be possible, increases the researcher’s readiness to proceed. For instance, 
while conducting the FDA of a body of text, IPA related ideas, hunches, or reflexions may arise 
and need to be ‘purged’ by noting them down next to the ‘parent’ narrative for later use. When 
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done with purpose and intention, this noting practice can be usefully incorporated as part of the 
phases of analysis step of the dual focus analysis.    
 
The first author, once again, found the approach of ‘relaxed awareness’ to be a useful way of 
managing this challenge. A distinct outline of phases of analysis was developed for each mode 
of analysis. All interview transcripts were analysed individually, either via IPA or FDA 
respectively, and then a collective mapping of the overall body of transcripts, prepared. The first 
phase of analysis for both the IPA and FDA was conducted in parallel. This entailed familiarity 
with the data ensuring curiosity was maintained.  Once familiar, the data were prepared in a 
three column table, with the interview transcript in the central column.  The left hand column 
was then used for the first phase of analysis - the initial, detailed, text vs. interpretation driven 
analysis of the narrative.  Subsequently, in the second phase of analysis, the coding from the 
first phase was revisited (along with the text) in light of two things:  1) a deliberate focus on the 
IPA informed research questions and analytic foci and 2) a simultaneous relaxed awareness 
about the research questions and analytic foci of the FDA.  Thus, interpretative 
coding/structuring of units of meaning and initial themes were noted in the right hand column of 
the table, primarily for the IPA, but also for the FDA.  These were written in two different 
formats to distinguish between them.  From this position the process of ‘relaxed awareness’ 
allowed the researcher to attempt to suspend their attention on one analysis to allow the full 
unfolding of the other analysis.  There was a deliberate focus on one analysis, while the second 
analysis was considered from a position of relaxed awareness.  In this second stage the 
researcher did not solicit the hermeneutics of suspicion, but remained open to allow the 
interpretative stories to unfold.  This allowed the researcher to conform to the IPA process in an 
inductively rigorous way whereby the themes could be interpretated, whilst also facilitating the 
initial stages of the FDA.   
 
Once this second phase was complete, the IPA and FDA analyses became completely separate, 
and the IPA continued through the usual stages of analysis (e.g. Smith et al., 2009).  Recurrent 
themes were pulled out along with illustrative extracts.  These were compiled in a new 
document which was then analysed for higher order themes, guided by three things: i) points 
that appeared relevant and significant to the participant; ii) points that appeared to be highly 
recurrent; iii) points that addressed the research questions.  These formed the basis of a 
diagrammatic representation of the master themes with their associated sub-themes.  The 
process was repeated for all participants and then the researcher looked across the entire corpus 
of data to arrive at an overall IPA mapping of the dominant themes.  Once completed, the 
researcher returned to the FDA, which had been left since the second phase of the IPA.  Thus 
the coding and other purposeful notes from the first phases were revisited through the lens of 
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the research questions set, the FDA foci, and a relaxed awareness of the IPA findings that had 
just been completed.  The researcher was now principally focussed on the FDA, once an orderly 
revisit of the IPA notes took place solely in light of FDA concerns.  The analysis was now 
guided by an attention to i) the various ways in which the topic was constructed through 
discourse; ii) the associated social practices warranted by these constructions; iii) the subject 
positions made available by the mobilisation of these discourses.  Again, this process was 
repeated for all interview transcripts, before an analysis of the entire body of data was 
conducted to arrive at an overall discursive mapping of the topic. 
 
One of the reasons for adopting this approach in the first author’s PhD is that the researcher felt 
he could not simply do one analysis followed by the other because the research questions and 
analytic foci of both analyses were always in his mind.  Thus, the researcher suspended (within 
the parameters outlined above) their attention on each analysis in turn, in order to give equal 
attention to both, yet IPA and FDA were both constantly in their awareness: one deliberate, and 
the other one relaxed, and then vice versa.  The assumptions of one analysis cannot be fully 
bracketed, and a fuller picture can only be accessed by seeing them in action together.  The dual 
focus approach brings the researcher closer to the complexity and dynamics of this interplay and 
allows it to inform the integration of the findings from the two analyses.  To integrate the 
findings the researcher returns to their initial research questions, as these serve as a rigorous 
structure to separate the two interplaying aspects of language and experience before ‘dropping 
them back together’.  As such the dual focus methodological approach proposed here allows an 
‘artificial separation’ of the two aspects that are always already intertwined for the benefit of 
closer examination and interpretative insight. 
 
In summary, in the procedural milestones of the dual focus research project, the IPA and FDA 
phases of analysis run parallel at various points and overlap during others.  They are connected 
at the point of establishing the research topic, but separate when articulating the research 
questions, and remain separate in terms of epistemology.  They overlap during the data 
collection process in some ways, but remain separate in others; together in the sense that the 
data for both analyses are collected at the same time, but separate in terms of what the 
researcher asks and pursues during the interview process.  Similarly, for the phases of analysis 
the two methodologies overlap in the initial, detailed, close-to-the-text analytic stage, where 
both happen at the same time.  Then in the further ‘theory neutral’, or interpretation focused 
phases of analysis, the two analytic foci remain distinct but one set of concerns are deliberately 
in focus, and the other one are monitored and noted. The methodologies then run in parallel 
until they are fully separated for the later phases, and will come together once again in the 
integration of the findings. 
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Both IPA and FDA methodologies emphasise the relative nature of knowing and the role of 
context in participants’ meanings and experiences.  This shared emphasis offers the basis for 
“fertile links” between them (Smith, 2009, p.196). The dual focus methodological approach 
presented here allows the same phenomenon to be analysed at both the discursive, social level, 
and also at the psychological, sense making level.  While the IPA maps out patterns across 
experiential accounts of individual’s meaning-making activities grounded by a cultural and 
inter-personal discursive context, the FDA maps out the structures of the discursive context 
itself.  In the analysis of the same set of data the dual focus approach is able to follow two 
strands of emerging knowledge.  To achieve this in an empirical research project requires 
epistemological reflexivity so that the researcher has transparency and clarity in their approach 
to both methodologies.  To allow the full unfolding of one analytic journey at a time the 
researcher must also temporarily suspend their other empirical interest.  This requires tolerance 
of overlap, uncertainty, and possibly contradiction.  During the process the researcher must 
decide how and when they intend to treat the text i.e. in terms of empathy or suspicion?  They 
must constantly reflect on whether the text is better understood as a discourse or as a 
phenomenological theme.  This requires them to know their interpretative story i.e. what 
interpretative findings do they want to present as viable knowledge?  This is driven by their 
analytic foci, which, in turn, translate from the study’s research questions. 
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Appendix B – The ‘innate human needs’ 
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Baumeisster & Leary (1995) argued that humans were born with survival needs (such as 
food and shelter) and, over time, developed additional interpersonal needs (see also 
Rusbult, Arriaga, and Agnew, 2001).  This view was exemplified by Fiske (2009) who 
proposed that over time humans developed five core social motives (Stevens & Fiske, 
1995): ‘belonging’, ‘understanding’, ‘controlling’, ‘enhancing self’, and ‘trusting 
others’ to facilitate their social group functioning and increase the chances of their 
survival.  Similar to Fiske, Weiss (1974, as cited in Duck, 2011) outlined seven 
‘fundamental provisions’ which produced innate human needs to belong, and feel 
accepted and understood.  These included:  (1) Belonging and a sense of reliable 
alliance, which entailed the need to be accepted and approved by others, and to know 
they were ‘there’ for you; (2) Emotional integration and stability because it was through 
relational, not individual, experience that people made sense of their ‘place’ in the 
world; (3) Opportunities to communicate about ourselves which facilitated feeling 
accepted; (4) Provision of assistance and physical support, both literally and as a 
symbolic gesture which demonstrated that the recipient (and their relationship to the 
giver) was valued; (5)  Reassurance of your worth and value as an individual with 
personal autonomy, rights and freedom of choice; (6) Opportunity to help others to 
demonstrate one’s value to others and also one’s implicit decency to oneself; (7) 
Personality support by sharing intimate details about one’s ‘inner self’ with people who 
shared the same values and thought in the same way. 
 
These dominant constructions were also reflected in the psychological literature on 
close relationships.  For example, Drigotas and Rusbult (1992) claimed that there were 
five categories of needs which were fulfilled within the context of contemporary 
relationships: (1) intimacy needs (confiding in each other, disclosing feelings, sharing 
thoughts), (2) companionship needs (engaging in activities and spending time together), 
(3) sexual needs (including all forms of intimate tactility), (4) security needs 
(experiencing certainty, stability, and security in the relationship and life), and (5) 
emotional involvement needs (corresponding, and influencing each other’s, moods and 
emotions) see also Le & Agnew (2001).   
 
 
 
 283 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C – Further discussion on Attachment Theory and the Satisfied Subject 
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The power of Attachment Theory to produce the ‘satisfied subject’ can also be seen in 
the way in which Bowlby’s focus on cognitive processes and attachment ‘working 
models’ came to be mirrored in the tenets of cognitive therapy [See Section 2.7.2 for 
further discussion], and a number of authors have suggested that attachment theory 
provides a framework for understanding the underlying principles of all relationships 
and effective therapies (e.g. Biringen, 1994; Fish and Condon, 1994; Lopez, 1995), 
without taking the context of the emergence of these ideas into account.  Such 
governance warranted individuals to aim for certainty, stability, and security, whilst also 
fulfilling their obligations for mutual emotional care and support in order to achieve and 
experience stable, satisfying relationships.  Thus, as outlined above, secure satisfying 
relationships were produced as sites of positive, responsive, self-assured interactions, 
and lacking in serious dyadic problems (e.g. Bartholomew, 1990; Bartholomew & 
Horowitz, 1991; Collins & Read, 1990; Feeney, J.A., & Noller, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 
1987) due to partners’ conflict negotiation (Feeney, 1994), emotional expressiveness 
(Feeney et al., 1998), ‘appropriate’ patterns of disclosure (Keelan, Dion & Dion, 1998), 
and sexual satisfaction (Birnbaum, 2007).   In contrast dissatisfying relationships were 
constructed as ‘insecure’ sites of negative affect, characterised by low levels of trust 
(e.g. Bartholomew, 1990; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Collins & Read, 1990; 
Feeney, J. A., & Noller, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Rothbard & Shaver, 1994), and 
low sexual satisfaction (Butzer & Campbell, 2008).  Thus, the psychologisation of 
‘healthy’ attachments meant that the subjects of satisfying relationships were compelled 
by a moral responsibility for their mutual development and contentment via the 
enactment of ‘correct’ affection and emotional support (Finn, 2012).  Such research 
reinforced the attachment theoretical perspective that relationships were satisfying to the 
extent that they meet “innate” needs for comfort, care and sexual gratification in gender-
specific ways (e.g. Shaver and Mikulincer, 2005).   
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Appendix D – Further discussion on Interdependence Theory and the Satisfying 
Relationship 
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Within the discursive framework of interdependence theory, satisfaction effectively 
became constructed as a conscious, cognitive evaluation that one’s relationship was 
either ‘good enough’ or (more pessimistically) ‘better than the available alternatives’.  
In the ‘good enough’ scenario relationship satisfaction occurred when partners’ 
expectations (or ‘comparison levels’ - CL) were met.  Outcomes exceeding CL were 
experienced as satisfying, whilst outcomes below CL were dissatisfying, and people 
were happier with close partners to the extent that the partner met or exceeded their 
internal standards (Sternberg & Barnes, 1985; Wetzel & Insko, 1982).  In the ‘better 
than the available alternatives’ scenario satisfaction was effectively synonymous with 
resigned commitment.  An individual may have been dissatisfied with their relationship 
but there may have been no better alternative available to them, or the ‘cost’ of finding 
an alternative may have been too great.  This is a rather pessimistic construction, which 
discursively privileges dissatisfying relationships over being single, and is a long way 
from the productions of ‘safe havens’ in attachment theory. 
 
Given the basic interdependence premise that constructed relationship satisfaction as a 
close correspondence between relational expectations and actual experience (Fletcher & 
Kininmonth, 1992, Schaefer & Olson, 1981), I argue that interdependence theory 
produces a twin ‘cognitive governance’ of satisfied subjects in the forms of, what I call, 
a ‘governance of expectations’ and a ‘governance of perceptions’.  The ‘governance of 
expectations’ produces subjects that were likely to feel stressed, disillusioned, or 
disappointed when their standards were not fulfilled (Larson, 1992; Alexander, 2008; 
Gordon, Baucom, Epstein, Burnett, and Rankin, 2006), and therefore warranted partners’ 
to hold expectations that were realistic and not irrational (e.g. Arias & Beach, 1987; 
Larson, 1992).   
 
In contrast the ‘governance of perceptions’ warranted a satisfying perceptual process at 
two levels: firstly, the satisfied subject was produced through a mode of subjectification 
that compelled them to ignore (e.g. Smith LeBeau & Buckingham, 2008) or disparage 
(e.g. Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; Van Lange & Rusbult, 1995; Rusbult, Van Lange, 
Wildschut, Yovetich, & Verette, 2000) possible alternative partners; secondly, the 
satisfied subject was encouraged to hold idealised views or ‘positive illusions’ (Murray 
& Holmes, 1993) about their own relationship (e.g. Fletcher, Simpson, & Thomas, 2000; 
Fletcher, Simpson, Thomas, & Giles, 1999; Martz et al., 1998; Rusbult et al., 2000) and 
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their own partner by perceiving flaws as ‘idiosyncratic virtues’ (Murray et al., 1996; 
Sciangula & Morry, 2009).  Again, as has often been the case, the power of this 
governance operated in gendered terms.  Women were compelled to think positively 
about their relationships to a greater extent than men (e.g. Acitelli, Rogers & Knee, 
1999) because their self-identity was represented as more ‘relational’, and therefore 
women’s subjectivities (including cognitions, emotions and behaviour) were 
constructed as more likely to be influenced by their relationship (Cross & Madson, 
1997).   
 
In these cognitive accounts, committed relationships (constructed in such a way as to be 
defined by monogamous, equitable, rational, economic exchanges) become, in effect, 
the signifier for satisfying relationships.  Rusbult’s (1983) investment model further 
extended the economic construction of relationship satisfaction by positing that it 
directly related to partners’ levels of investment in their relationship.  Greater 
satisfaction was presumed to increase relational investment which, in turn, led to greater 
commitment.  Similarly, greater investment in and of itself supposedly increased 
commitment (or decreased the chances of relationship dissolution) and promoted 
relationship satisfaction as committed partners became more likely to engage in pro-
relational behaviours.  They had, in effect, decided to stay together because they had 
invested too much for the relationship to fail, and therefore they might as well make the 
best of things (Rusbult et al., 2001).  This discourse of satisfying investment was also 
mobilised by respondents in a qualitative study on relationship dissolution (Lawes, 
1999).  The participants produced both a discourse of ‘relationship success as luck’, and 
also a discourse of ‘satisfaction as investment’ in which relationship dissolution was 
constructed in terms of partners’ not making adequate investments in their relationship, 
with the implication that ‘sufficient’ investment would lead to relation ‘success’. 
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Appendix E: Sufficiently Skilled Partners: A Gendered Confessional Satisfaction 
of Closeness, Intimacy, and Knowing 
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The Satisfying Relational Skills: Emotional Closeness and Intimacy 
As outlined in Section 2.3.1, some social theorists (e.g. Giddens, 1991, 1992; Weeks, 
2007) argued that the production of intimacy as a form of inter-subjective psychological 
and emotional disclosure emerged in the face of relational uncertainty following the 
sexual revolution of the 1960s, along with the concomitant rejection of sexual 
monogamy as the “mark of true dyadic closeness and authenticity” (Finn, 2012, p.615), 
and the rise of the companionate marriage.  Given this proposed detraditionalisation of 
intimate life, and the subsequent way in which individuals experienced a plurality of 
selves in an ongoing project of self-making, intimacy as a process of mutual knowing 
privileged, stabilised, and satisfied the intimate couple in new ways.  Doing intimacy 
and satisfaction required partners to reveal their ‘real’, ‘private’, yet ‘knowable’ self.  A 
knowable self who was constructed as needing to be known and accepted.  As a 
consequence, the relational regimens of self-disclosure became the yardstick by which 
satisfying intimate relationships could be achieved and demonstrated (Jourard, 1964, as 
cited in Finn, 2012; Giddens, 1991, 1992).   
 
Psychology began to measure partners’ perceptions of intimacy from the early 1980s 
(Schaefer & Olson, 1981), and there was a concurrent rise in therapeutic technologies 
which provided interventions designed to help couples express ‘genuine’ intimacy 
(Christensen & Shenk, 1991; Dandeneau & Johnson, 1994; Jacobson & Christensen, 
1996; Waring, 1988; Masters, Johnson & Kolodny, 1982) and to facilitate partners’ 
emotional expression (e.g., Greenberg & Johnson, 1988).  This governance of 
disclosure, reminiscent of the confessional (Foucault, 1977), dominated contemporary 
research where the couple-dyad was constructed as the context in which partners could 
be truly open and ‘honest’ about themselves (e.g. Hinde, 1978; Reiss & Shaver, 1988; 
Prager & Roberts, 2004).  Despite the discursive categorisation of a ‘type’ of 
relationship that was low in intimacy yet still high in satisfaction (e.g., Fitzpatrick, 1988; 
Raush, Hertel, Barry & Swain, 1974; Gottman, 1993), and feminist scepticism 
regarding the role of self-disclosing intimacy in couples’ everyday lives (e.g. Jamieson, 
1999), it remained a warranted practice for partners’ relationship satisfaction (e.g. Aron, 
Aron, & Smollan’s, 1992; Aron & Aron, 1997; Acevedo & Aron, 2009; Medvene, Teal, 
& Slavich, 2000; Laurenceau et al., 2005; Lipert & Prager, 2001; Patrick, Sells, 
Giordano & Tollerud, 2007; Talmage & Dabbs, 1990).  This was exemplified by Prager 
& Roberts (2004) who stated: 
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“[...] intimacy and connection are the bedrock of human happiness and meaning […] 
psychological theorists and researchers alike have systematically articulated: True 
intimacy with others is one of the highest values of human existence; there may be 
nothing more important for the well-being and optimal functioning of human beings 
than intimate relationships” (p.43) 
 
This psychologisation of intimacy meant the production of the satisfied couple rested, 
not just on what partners did, but crucially on who they were and how they were made 
visible.  As Prager & Roberts (2004, p.44) stated, “relational intimacy both requires and 
touches the self as much as it does the relationship”.  Thus, the discourses of satisfying 
intimacy made possible the satisfied subject of psychology who, under the gaze of their 
partner, was compelled to confess and reveal their ‘true’ nature in the neo-liberal quest 
to self-actualise and become free and fulfilled (Finn, 2012).   
 
This was how the power effects of intimacy operated; satisfied individuals were not 
only compelled to reveal and be accepted, but to also allow the revealing and be 
accepting of their partners; and this power operated in gendered ways.  For example, 
husbands’ relational talk (Acitelli, 1992) and emotional expressivity (Cordova, Gee and 
Warren, 2005) were presented as shaping wives’ marital happiness and adjustment, 
while such talk (by either partner) was constructed as having no link to husbands’ 
satisfaction.  Therefore, demonstrations of emotional engagement by men were 
constructed as highly significant for women’s sense of satisfaction.  The explanation for 
these findings pivoted around a production of women as innately relational with a 
greater need for intimacy for their sense of self compared to men (e.g. Prager et al., 
1989; Uebelacker, et al., 2003).   
 
However, this discourse of intimacy assumed a private, coherent, and relatively static 
self, which could be accessed, spoken, and known; a model stemming from the 
Enlightenment (Foucault, 1990).  This ignored the ways in which the self has been re-
theorised as continually constituted and reconstituted relationally, and is therefore 
always provisional (e.g. Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984; 
Foucault, 1990; Shotter & Gergen, 1994).  Furthermore, the discourse of satisfying 
intimacy also posited an overly simplistic view of inter-subjective communication as 
involving the straightforward, transparent, unmediated transmission of information, as 
opposed to being constitutive of those engaged in the conversation (e.g. Shotter, 1993).  
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These assumptions about intimacy also underpinned the psychological research on the 
relational skill of ‘interspousal support’. 
 
The Satisfying Relational Skills: Interspousal Support 
Research into spousal support has seen a marked increase over the last decade or so (e.g. 
Gable, Gonzaga, & Strachman, 2006; Neff & Karney, 2005; Pasch & Bradbury, 1998; 
Brock & Lawrence, 2008), such that the satisfied subject has been positioned as the 
supported subject (e.g., Acitelli & Antonucci, 1994; Baxter, 1986 Dehle, Larsen, & 
Landers, 2001; Julien & Markman, 1991; Katz, Beach, & Anderson, 1996; Kane et al., 
2007).  Similarly, the supportive individual has been psychologically constructed as 
possessing a stable, knowable, cognitive architecture that facilitated their ability to 
provide support to their partner because they were low in neuroticism (see Karney & 
Bradbury, 1995 for a review; Fisher & McNulty, 2008) and high in empathic ability.   
This positioned them as being able to provide inter-subjective understanding, validation 
and caring, in a relationally satisfying way (Ickes, 1997; Geoff, Fletcher & Lange, 
1997).  This ‘governance of support’ compelled partners to provide each other with 
appropriate support in order to foster greater satisfaction, with inappropriate support 
(e.g. unwanted advice) potentially being experienced as intrusive (Ickes & Simpson, 
2008), patronising or insensitive, and leading to dissatisfaction (Dehle et al., (2001).   
 
Again, for the most part, the literature viewed interspousal support as gendered, such 
that it was more important to women’s satisfaction (e.g. Acitelli & Antonucci, 1994; 
Acitelli, Rogers & Knee, 1999; Julien & Markman, 1991), and the proposed differences 
across gender were, again, understood as stemming from women’s identities, which 
were constituted as more relational than men’s (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997; Markus & 
Oyserman, 1989).   Taking a feminist position, Thargaard (1997) has outlined how 
women were effectively positioned as the providers of care, whilst men were positioned 
to control and use this care (see also, Duncombe and Marsden, 1993; Wood & Lindorff, 
2001). Hence, there was a tendency for men to take their partner’s support for granted, 
and women to not count on their care and support being reciprocated.   
 
In Foucauldian terms, the focus on intimacy (See Section 2.6.1) and mutual support 
produced a satisfied subject who was disciplined via the regimens of confession and 
surveillance.  The practice of confessing revealed one’s inner-most facets in the 
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presence of the other (Foucault, 1978; Rose, 1990), and each individual being aware (if 
only implicitly) of the normalising gaze of the other, was subsequently compelled to 
engage in a process of self-surveillance (Foucault, 1987; 1990) to ensure they were 
enacting their role as a satisfying partner correctly.  Thus, the relationally satisfied 
subject not only revealed, but was also compelled to facilitate their partner’s revealing, 
and this mutual revealing was to be rewarded with mutual acceptance and support.  
Given the emphasis on closeness, intimacy and support for the experience of 
relationship satisfaction, the practices of positive inter-subjective communication and 
successful conflict management became teleologically important, lest partners should 
find their capacity for mutual self-discovery and need fulfilment hindered.  
 
The Satisfying Relational Skills: Communication and Conflict 
The overwhelming majority of relational research has addressed communication and 
conflict management.  In a similar way to intimacy, doing satisfying relationships 
became a function of partners unproblematically doing ‘transparent’ inter-subjective 
communication in specific, correct ways, which privileged positivity and facilitated the 
mutual self-disclosure of concerns and needs (e.g. Emmers-sommer, 2004).  In contrast, 
communicative behaviours such as criticism, coercion, and blame represented predictors 
of marital dissatisfaction (e.g. Smith, Vivian & O’Leary, 1990; Julien, Markman & 
Lindahl, 1989; Noller, Feeney, Bonnell & Callan, 1994; Feeney, 2002; Metts & Cupach, 
1990; Rusbult et al., 1987), with lack of respect (e.g., contempt) being produced as 
particularly harmful to relationships (Baxter, Dun, & Sahlstein, 2001; Feeney et al., 
1997; Frei and Shaver, 2002; Hendrick & Hendrick, 2006), especially for wives 
(Schumm, Barnes, Bollman, Jurich, & Bugaighis, 1986).   
 
Within this discursive framework, ‘positive’ interaction became privileged and 
warranted if partners were to experience relationship satisfaction, with ‘negative’ 
communication regarded as ‘neutral’ at best or, more likely, as detrimental (see Karney 
and Bradbury, 1995 for a review).  Yet at the same time ‘negative’ communication and 
conflict were constructed as normative and inevitable processes in everyday relating 
(e.g. Gottman & Krokoff, 1989; Heyman, 2001; Heavey, Layne & Christensen, 1993; 
Karney & Bradbury, 1997; Woody & Costanzo, 1990).  The production of the 
importance of ‘positive’ communication for relationship satisfaction was exemplified by 
research which theorised satisfying relating as needing a ratio of five positive 
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interactions to every negative interaction (Bodenmann, Gottman, & Blackman, 1997; 
Feldman & Ridley, 2000; Fitzpatrick, 1988, 1990; Fitzpatrick, Follies, & Vance, 1982; 
Gottman, 1993, 1994; Gottman & Levenson, 1992; Cupach, 2000).  This empirically 
quantified construction of satisfying communication represented a ‘communicative 
governance of banality’ which reduced the complex, ongoing, dialectical interpersonal 
process of relating to a series of quantifiable, discreet, isolated interactions. Moreover, 
the discursive demarcation between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ communication operated 
as a normalising practice that privileged certain types of intersubjective behaviour. 
 
Within this prescriptive framework, the way in which conflict was constructed as ‘best 
managed’ became reciprocally crucial for relationship satisfaction (e.g. Berscheid, 1998; 
Cupach, 2000; Gottman, 1979; Metts & Cupach, 1990; Rusbult, Morrow, & Johnson, 
1987; Kelly & Conley, 1987; Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998; Heavey, 
Layne, & Christensen, 1993; Cramer, 2000; Cramer, 2002), with a continued emphasis 
on positive conflict resolution.  For example, in the literature relationship satisfaction 
was seen as being associated with partners’ willingness to respond in positive or 
accommodating ways to potentially destructive behaviour (Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, 
Slovik and Lipkus, 1991), with the use of integrative, issue-oriented, problem-solving 
strategies being key (Canary & Cupach, 1988; Ridley, Wilhelm, & Surra, 2001).  In a 
similar way, relationship dissatisfaction was presented as being associated with negative 
conflict resolution strategies e.g. reprimanding or threatening behaviour, inciting guilt, 
or escaping (Alexander, 2008; Ting-Toomey, 1983), engaging in demand-withdraw (e.g. 
Christensen & Heavey, 1990; Christensen & Shenk, 1991), responding in ways that 
were critical, belittling, demanding and presumptuous, self-oriented, defensive and less 
problem-solving (Ridley, Wilhelm, & Surra, 2001), or in the  invalidating of expressed 
feelings about relationship problems (Gottman, 1994).   
 
Thus, even in the most heated, volatile relational contexts, the ‘satisfied subject’ was 
still compelled to police and control their communicative behaviours.  Again, this 
process involved a policing of self and other’s behaviours, and was something that 
individuals could ‘work on’, or develop, via the respective pedagogic and therapeutic 
technologies of education programmes (e.g. Halford et al., 2003) and couple therapy 
(see section 2.7).  This form of communicative governance was reflected in broader 
political concerns about the high social and personal costs of relationship distress and 
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dissolution, which led to Governments in many Western countries offering relationship 
education in many countries (Markman & Halford, 2005).  In this way, psychological 
discourses constructing relationship satisfaction normalised certain ways of 
communicating and functioned to discipline partners’ communicative practices.   
 
The power of these disciplinary practices operated along gendered lines.  For example, 
and conceptualising women as possessing a ‘relational’ sense-of-self, Duarte & 
Thompson (1999) argued that women were more likely to experience dissatisfaction 
from self-silencing because good communication was theorised as ‘especially important’ 
for women’s experiences of relationship satisfaction (Acitelli, 1992; Davis & Oathout, 
1987).  In line with this, the ‘wife-demand and husband-withdraw’ pattern of conflict 
was theorised as much more common than the ‘husband-demand and wife-withdraw’ 
pattern (Christensen, 1988; Christensen & Shenk, 1991), whilst congruent conflict 
‘styles’ were associated with women’s satisfaction more than men’s (Acitelli, Douvan, 
and Veroff; 1993).   
 
However, at the same time, the construction of women as innately relational also 
warranted that they engage in greater relational ‘emotion work’ (e.g. Erickson, 1993; 
Tingey, Kiger & Riley, 1996) to accommodate their partners, manage the relationship, 
and maintain relational satisfaction.  Thus, women were positioned as needing 
communicative closeness more than men, but the responsibility fell on them to fulfil 
this need.  For example, men’s avoidance was presented as leading to women self-
censuring, and silencing their needs to avoid causing conflict (Jack, 1991; Jack & Dill, 
1992), although Uebelacker et al., (2003) claimed that both men and women’s marital 
dissatisfaction were correlated with self-silencing.  Previous qualitative studies that 
explored partners’ accounts of their marital experiences from a feminist theoretical 
framework (e.g. Dryden, 1999; Lawes, 1999) also found the dynamics to be highly 
gendered, and this gendering came to the discursive forefront in mainstream 
constructions of partners’ satisfying sexual skills. 
 
The Satisfying Relational Skills: Sensuality and sexuality 
Within the mainstream literature, the dominant construction of sexual satisfaction came 
to mirror that of relationship satisfaction, and represented a cognitive-affective appraisal 
“arising from one’s subjective evaluation of the positive and negative dimensions 
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associated with one’s sexual relationship” (Lawrance & Byers, 1998 p.514).  Indeed, it 
was argued by some social theorists (e.g. Weeks, 1995) that sexual satisfaction had 
become the normative conceptual lens through which relationship quality and 
satisfaction was evaluated, and this left little discursive space for alternative 
(marginalised) practices such as celibacy.  The dominant assumption was that partners 
in satisfying intimate relationships should engage in sexual (coital) practices.  This was 
exemplified in the mainstream literature where sexual and relationship satisfaction were 
constructed as cyclically reinforcing (e.g. Hatfield & Rapson, 1993, S.Hendrick et al., 
1988; Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Cupach & Comstock, 1990; Edwards and Booth, 
1994; Henderson-King & Veroff, 1994; Sprecher, 2002; see Sprecher & Cate, 2004, for 
a review) across both ages and cultures (Contreras, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1996; Guo, 
Ng, and Chan, 2004).  There were examples where clinical research produced couple 
‘types’ who presented with only one or the other (e.g., Edwards & Booth, 1994; Kaplan, 
1974), but the implicit construction of these diagnostic categories was one of pathology 
and thus, the relationally satisfied couple were normatively positioned as the sexually 
satisfied couple. 
 
This view was underpinned by an ‘ethics of reproduction’ whereby sexual desire was 
driven by a gendered reproductive imperative (e.g., Buss, 1998; Buss & Schmitt, 1993).  
These hegemonic, heteronormative scripts constructed women’s desire as a response to 
men’s (Ussher, 2005), and this made available a well-recognised narrative for women to 
follow: that of sexual object who was responsible for managing men’s sexual needs and 
vulnerabilities, whilst not appearing too voracious in the sexual realm (Hollway, 1989).  
Male sexuality was privileged over female sexuality, which was presented as 
submissive to the active expert male sexuality, with heterosexual coitus privileged as 
the practice through which the sexually satisfied ‘self’ could be defined and made 
complete.  Within this dominant discursive framework, women’s attempts to resist or 
subvert this narrow prescription for their sexual practice were presented as problematic 
and/or perverse (Ussher, 1997; Kitzinger, 1995).  Therefore, dominant psychosexual 
scripts about satisfying relationships remained coital- and hetero-centric (Capdevila, 
2007), recycled gendered, heteronormative assumptions that produced conflicting 
feminine and masculine sexual satisfactions, and warranted different types of gendered, 
relationally satisfying practices.  Thus, I argue that within the literature on relationship 
satisfaction, a discursive distinction was established between ‘masculine instrumental 
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sexual’ and ‘feminine sexual-relational’ needs, practices, and subjects.  This distinction 
sustained hetero-normative productions of relationship satisfaction that centred on the 
coital imperative and operated through gendered normalising practices. 
 
The ‘feminine sexual-relational satisfaction’ represented a satisfaction of interpersonal-
communication, whereby relationship satisfaction became a matter of partners enacting 
correct sexual communication (e.g. Byers & Demmons, 1999; Chesney, Blakeney, Cole, 
& Chan, 1981; MacNeil & Byers, 1997; Yelsma, 1986); characterised by an expressive 
(Cupach & Metts, 1991) communicative process of mutual self-disclosure and 
appropriate responsiveness (e.g. Banmen & Vogel, 1985; Cupach & Comstock, 1990; 
Wheeless, Wheeless, & Baus, 1984), which allowed for greater sexual-relational 
intimacy and satisfaction along gendered lines (Banmen & Vogel, 1985; Cupach & 
Comstock, 1990; Lawrance & Byers, 1995; Meeks, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1998).  
These sexual-communicative regimens were constructed as especially important for 
women’s relationship satisfaction because women’s sexuality was constructed as 
innately more ‘emotional-interpersonal orientated’ than men’s sexuality (e.g. Birnbaum 
& Laser-Brandt, 2002; DeLamater, 1987; Gagnon & Simon, 2005; MacNeil & Byers, 
2005; Peplau, 2003).  Thus, ‘feminine sexual-relational satisfaction’ represented a 
governance of the confessional (akin to intimacy), such that more sexual talk between 
partners functioned as the signifier for more satisfaction in both sexual and relational 
domains (especially for women).  
 
This discourse of feminine sexual-relational satisfaction came to be reflected in the 
conspicuous division between Couple Therapy and Sex Therapy.  Traditionally, couple 
therapy simplistically viewed sexual “dysfunction” as a symptom of a deeper, 
underlying relational problem (e.g. poor communication, or an imbalance of power), 
which, once treated, would simply result in the ‘sexual dysfunction’ automatically 
resolving itself.  Hence, sexual dysfunction was seen as the symbolic expression of 
disguised relational issues, not as an issue in its own right (McCarthy, 2002).  Whilst 
this simplistic distinction subordinated the sexual to the relational, its treatment of sex 
and the relationship as two separate realms simultaneously mobilised the ‘masculine 
instrumental sexuality’ of body parts. 
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Here, relationship satisfaction was understood in terms of partners satisfying their 
personal sexual needs, which were individualised and constructed as distinct from 
broader relational satisfactions.  This reinforced patriarchal constructions of sex-as-
coitus, such that relationship satisfaction was understood in terms of heteronormative 
sexual outcomes whereby the absence of orgasm (Young, Denny, Luquis & Young, 
1998), or the presence of discursively pathologised ‘sexual dysfunctions’ led to 
relational dysfunction (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 2006; Hartman, 1983; Hassebrauck & Fehr, 
2002), but the regimens of prescriptive ‘sex therapy’ had the capacity to increase 
relationship satisfaction (Wright, Perrault, & Mathieu, 1977).  Within this discursive 
framework, the impact of sexual communication was explained in instrumental 
economic terms (Cupach & Metts, 1991) where increased communication about sexual 
likes and dislikes led to an improved ratio of sexual benefits to costs for both men and 
women (MacNeil & Byers, 2005), although this practice was presented as more 
important for men’s sexual and relational satisfaction than for women’s (e.g. Purnine & 
Carey, 1997; Ross, Clifford, & Eisenman; 1987).  This was because the ‘male sex drive 
discourse’ (Hollway, 1989) constructed men’s sexuality as conforming to immutable, 
innate drives that were relatively immune to sociocultural influence, whilst women’s 
sexuality was constructed as far more malleable and influenced by educational and 
religious institutions (e.g. Baumeister, 2000).  
 
The authorising power of psychological research technologies to position relationship 
satisfaction within a patriarchal sexual framework was exemplified by Baumeister, 
Catanese, & Vohs (2001) who presented “undeniable evidence” that men possessed a 
higher sex drive than women, and this “conclusion was supported by every measure and 
every study” (Vohs & Baumeister, 2004 p.195).  Consequently, sexual conflict was 
explained as generally arising  from men wanting more sex or more specific activities 
than women (Vohs & Baumeister, 2004), and therefore similarity in partners’ positivity 
towards sexuality was related to men’s relationship satisfaction (Cupach & Metts, 1995).  
This focus on biological similarities and ‘sex differences’ between men and women 
resulted in the sociocultural component of satisfying sexual life being largely ignored in 
the psychological literature.  Heterosexual relationships were de-politicised as men and 
women were constructively individualised and understood as distinct from the broader 
social context (Potts, 1998).   
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However, context was always crucial for the ways in which people produced sexually 
satisfied subjectivities, and people could frequently talk about their sexuality in very 
different ways with their partner, friends, therapists, or with a researcher.  For example, 
Peterson and Hyde’s (2010) meta-analysis suggested gender differences in sexuality 
were actually small, with men reporting more casual sex, masturbation and use of 
pornography.  Moreover, Allen (2003) found young couples mobilising a discourse 
which reversed traditional heterosexual scripts, with women positioned as having the 
stronger sexual desire, such that sex was more important for their relationship 
satisfaction than men’s80.  Similarly, in Muise’s (2011) study of women’s sexual blogs, 
she found women resisting traditional feminine discourses of ‘passivitiy’ (Holland et al., 
1994) and adopting masculinised representations of sexuality and positioning 
themselves as active authors of their desire.  However, Muise (2011) also pointed out 
that women’s sexuality was, in a sense, discursively ‘trapped’.  If conventionally framed 
within feminine discourse women’s desire was positioned as passive, morally bound to 
monogamous coupledom, and intimately tied to the production of relationship 
satisfaction.  If represented by masculinised discourses, women’s desire became a 
product of physical responses – thereby preventing any appreciation of social, cultural, 
or relational factors in shaping sexual satisfaction.  Within both discursive frameworks, 
the posited innate gender differences in sexual plasticity warranted women to adapt and 
adjust their sexual behaviours and expectations in line with men’s (Ard, 1977).  This 
‘male in the head’ (Hollway, 1984) positioned women as submissive to the immutable, 
un-bending male sexuality, and therefore women were disempowered and compelled to 
relationally manage and engage in the emotion work of compromise and 
accommodation in the sexual sphere of the relationship (e.g. Duncombe and Marsden, 
1993; 1995).   
 
The Satisfying Relational Skills: Decision making and control 
Productions of satisfying ‘decision making and control skills’ are rare in the mainstream 
literature.  Research has constructed relationship satisfaction as positively associated 
with equality in relational power (Gray-Little & Burks, 1983; see also Aida & Falbo, 
                                                 
80 In a similar way, Vares, Potts, Gavey & Grace (2007) talked to older women who described the importance of 
penetrative sex, and expressed the desire for a partner who could sufficiently satisfy their sexual needs.  Talking to 
women who had engaged in casual sex, Farvid (2010) found participants mobilising ‘permissive’ / ‘liberal’ 
discourses (Hollway, 1984) which constructed their sexual encounters as generally positive, ‘emotionless’ encounters 
with ‘no strings attached’.   
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1991; Whisman & Jacobson, 1990).  Similarly, individuals who have been constructed 
as ‘satisfied’ are presented as feeling greater freedom and less controlled in their 
relationships compared to individuals who have been typologised as being in ‘distressed’ 
relationships (Ehrensaft, Langhinrichsen-Rohling, Heyman, O’Leary, & 
Lawrence,1999).  Taking a feminist perspective, Crawford (2004) argues that 
mainstream research continues to be underpinned by the assumption that there are 
deeply-rooted innate ‘sex differences’ in relational needs, motivations, goals, social 
skills, and ‘personality’.  Therefore this male-vs-female ‘two cultures’ model produces a 
discursive space in which gendered power inequalities are represented as “peculiarities” 
that partners “need to work around” (Dryden, 1999, p11).  However, if partners 
encounter difficulties in ‘working around’ any challenges they can always turn to the 
discursive institution of couple therapy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F –Information Sheet for Lay People 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 301 
 
 
 
 
Understanding relationship satisfaction in long-term 
heterosexual intimacy:  A phenomenological exploration 
into the interplay between discourse and experience. 
 
 
You are invited to take part in the above named research.  Before you decide, it 
is important for you to understand why the research is being carried out and 
what it will involve. 
 
 
The perceived absence of satisfaction in relationships leads to emotional 
disengagement, couples seeking relationship therapy, and/or relationship 
dissolution to the detriment of family life.  Achieving and sustaining wellbeing, 
happiness and satisfaction within intimate, romantic coupledom has been a 
longstanding preoccupation of couple, sex and family therapists alike.  Hence, 
the aim of the research is to examine the ways in which individuals view, 
understand, and experience satisfaction in their relationships.   
 
 
We are asking adults in long-term, heterosexual relationships to take part in 
this study 
 
 
It is your decision whether or not you take part.  If you decide to, you are free 
to withdraw any time and you will not be asked to give any reason. 
 
 
You will be asked to read and sign a consent form, and then take part in an 
interview about your views and experiences of satisfaction in your relationship.  
The interview should take between one and two hours to complete.  You will be 
given an opportunity to ask questions before and after the interview is done. 
 
 
There are no known risks in taking part in this study. 
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The study will provide information on how individuals conceptualise, 
experience, and talk about relationship satisfaction.  You will have an 
opportunity to express your views, and this information will then be used to 
examine the phenomena of satisfaction in long-term, heterosexual 
relationships. 
 
 
All information will be treated with the strictest confidentiality.  The consent 
form, which bears your name, will be separated from the rest of the 
information. 
 
 
It is highly unlikely that the interview method used in this study will have any 
harmful effects.  However, if you were harmed by taking part in this research, 
there are no special compensation arrangements. 
 
 
The results of the study will be written up as part of a Ph.D. thesis and may 
also be written up and submitted as a research paper to an academic journal.  
As part of our confidentiality policy, you will not be identified in any reporting 
of this research. 
 
 
The research is being carried out by Mr Matthew Colahan (B.Sc) as part of his 
Ph.D. thesis in Psychology.  The research is being supervised by Dr A.D. 
Tunariu (Senior Lecturer in Psychology, University of East London). 
 
 
If you have any questions please contact Mr Matthew Colahan by phone or 
email (0208 223 3000 or m.colahan@uel.ac.uk).   
 
Alternatively, you can write to Mr Matthew Colahan at the School of Psychology, 
University of East London, Stratford Campus, Romford Road, London. E15 4LZ. 
 
This copy of the information is yours to keep.  If you agree to take part, then 
you will be asked to sign a Consent Form, and you will be given a copy to keep. 
 
 
      
Graduate Teaching Assistant and PhD Candidate 
School of Psychology    
University of East London 
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interview to be used in the research 
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Understanding relationship satisfaction in long-term 
heterosexual intimacy:  A phenomenological exploration 
into the interplay between discourse and experience. 
 
 
 
 (to be completed prior to the interview) 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Information Sheet for the 
above study, and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my taking part is voluntary, and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and without my rights 
being affected. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the interview. 
 
4. I agree to have the interview recorded on a digital voice recorder. 
 
 
…….…………………………………….. …………….. ……………………… 
Name of Participant    Date   Signature 
 
 
………………………………………….. …………….. ……………………… 
Name of Researcher    Date   Signature 
 
 
 (to be completed after the interview) 
 
1. I agree to the contents of the recorded interview being used in the 
research. 
 
…….…………………………………….. …………….. ……………………… 
Name of Participant    Date   Signature 
 
 
………………………………………….. …………….. ……………………… 
Name of Researcher    Date   Signature 
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Invitation to take part in research 
 
 
Title of research:  Understanding relationship satisfaction in long-term 
heterosexual intimacy – a qualitative exploration of everyday and professional 
accounts 
 
 
 
Who is doing this research? 
I am Matthew Colahan, a PhD candidate in the School of Psychology at the University 
of East London.  I am conducting research on (a) exploring romantic partners’ views 
and experiences of satisfaction in their long-term relationships, and (b) considering 
implications of everyday understandings of relationship satisfaction for the 
management of satisfaction from within a therapeutic perspective. Dr Aneta Tunariu is 
my director of studies. The research details of this project have been scrutinised and 
have received ethical approval from the University of East London (please see 
attached).  
 
 
 
What exactly is the study, in which you are invited to participate, about? 
Over the last thirty years or so there has been a growing trend for dissatisfied couples 
to seek couple therapy in order to address perceived relational and/or sexual problems.  
The aim of the study in which you are invited to participate is to explore how you, as a 
relationship therapist, conceptualise and work with couples who report experiencing 
dissatisfaction in their relationships.  The intention is to try to understand how therapy 
can shape the way in which individuals think about, understand, and act in their 
relationships, and how this can shape the way in which they directly experience their 
relationships. 
 
 
 
What would taking part in the study involve?  
You are invited to join me in a one to one interview lasting approximately 30 minutes to 
an hour.  However, the duration of this interview is flexible according to your time 
restrains and availability.  
  
The interview is guided by a set of open-ended questions concerning your views on, 
and how you engage with, couples seeking your advice regards dissatisfaction. There 
are no right or wrong answers. Your professional experience with regards to this 
presenting issue is what is being sought. You can refuse to answer any question that 
you deem unsuitable at any point during the interview.   
 
 
 
Where will the interviews take place? 
At a location and time convenient to you. 
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What about confidentiality? 
All interviews will be treated confidentially, in accordance with the strict guidelines set 
out by the British Psychological Society. In addition, any information provided during 
the interviews will be anonymised when presenting extracts from the analysis of the 
interview data such that at no point can the speaker’s identity be identified. The 
interviews will be audiotaped and then transcribed. The audiotapes will be kept in a 
locked cupboard, as will the transcripts. Real names of the participants will not be 
disclosed to anyone. 
 
 
 
What will be done with the findings? 
The findings will be written up as part of my PhD research, which you will be able to 
see should you so wish. 
 
 
 
What if you decide to withdraw from the study?  
If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw from the interview at any time. You 
can decide that you no longer want to participate without any questions being asked, 
and without any disadvantage to you at any point.  
 
 
 
Who do you contact for further information? 
If you are a couple therapist, and you would like to take part, or if you would like to ask 
any further questions about the study, I would love to hear from you.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this invitation.  
Kind regards,  
 
Matthew Colahan 
PhD Candidate 
School of Psychology 
University of East London 
Romford Road 
London E15 4LZ 
Tel. 07915 071 145 
e.mail: m.colahan@uel.ac.uk 
 
 
 
University Research Ethics Committee 
If you have any queries regarding the conduct of the programme in which you are 
being asked to participate please contact the Secretary of the University Research 
Ethics Committee: Ms Debbie Dada,  
Administrative Officer for Research, 
Graduate School,  
University of East London,  
Romford Road, Stratford, 
 London E15 4LZ.  
Tel: 020 8223 6274 
e.mail: debbie5@UEL-Exchange.uel.ac.uk  
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Dr Aneta Tunariu 
School of psychology 
Stratford 
 
 
 
ETH/09/18 
 
14
th
 August 2008 
 
Dear Dr Tunariu, 
 
 
I advise that Members of the Research Ethics Committee have now approved the above 
application on the terms previously advised to you. The Research Ethics Committee 
should be informed of any significant changes that take place after approval has been 
given. Examples of such changes include any change to the scope, methodology or 
composition of investigative team. These examples are not exclusive and the person 
responsible for the programme must exercise proper judgement in determining what 
should be brought to the attention of the Committee.  
 
In accepting the terms previously advised to you I would be grateful if you could return 
the declaration form below, duly signed and dated, confirming that you will inform the 
committee of any changes to your approved programme. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Debbie Dada 
Administrative Officer for Research 
d.dada@uel.ac.uk 
02082232976 
______________________________________________________________________________________
____ 
 
I hereby agree to inform the Research Ethics Committee of any changes to be made to 
the above approved programme and any adverse incidents that arise during the 
conduct of the programme.  
 
 
Signed:................................................Date: ..................................................... 
 
 
Please Print Name: 
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5
th
 March 
 
 
Dear Colleague 
 
Research Proposal 
 
I am enclosing correspondence related to a request to conduct research within Relate and as 
you will see, the Relate Institute Research Committee has approved the proposal in terms of the 
criteria set out in the attached guidance. 
 
If you agree to the involvement of your staff in this research it could now go ahead.  
 
If you have any concerns or queries about this do please contact me. 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Nick Turner 
Director of the Relate Institute 
 
Email: nick.turner@relateinstitute.ac.uk 
Landline: 01302 553553 X2588 
Mobile: 07903 935541 
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Understanding relationship satisfaction in long-term heterosexual intimacy 
Interview Schedule _ study 1 v3 
Gender: 
Age group: 
Length of current relationship:  
Date of the interview:  
Pseudonym:   
 
Part 1 – On relationships 
1. How would you describe a close, intimate romantic relationships?  
a. Prompt: What distinguishes it from other close relationships? 
b. Prompt: What functions does it serve for both participating individuals?  
 
2. What does makes a relationship a good relationship? 
a. Prompt:  What ingredients are needed? 
b. Prompt:  How can one tell that their relationship with a romantic partner is a 
good relationship?  
 
Part 2 – On the notion of relationship satisfaction 
3. How would you describe the notion of relationship satisfaction?  
a. Prompt: What does it refer to? 
b. Prompt: Does it involve an appraisal? 
 
4. How can pone tell that they are experiencing satisfaction or dissatisfaction in their 
intimate relationship? 
a. Prompt: What things matter in establishing this conclusion?  
b. Prompt: When / why do they matter? 
c. Prompt:  How does it feel to be satisfied and dissatisfied?  
 
Part 3 – On managing relationship satisfaction 
5. What obstacles, if any, do you think partners are likely to encounter in long-term 
relationships?  
a. Prompt: What does a person seek in their relationship? 
b. Prompt: Can that be achieved and sustained? 
c. Prompt: How do partners manage change and variation in their life together? 
 
6. Can one feel satisfied and dissatisfied in their relationship at the same time? 
d. Prompt: If so, how can this be?  
e. Prompt: If not, why not? 
f. Prompt: Are their gender differences that shape the experience of relationship 
satisfaction? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 314 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix L – Interview Schedule for the Couple Therapists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 315 
 
Understanding relationship satisfaction in long-term heterosexual intimacy – a qualitative 
exploration of everyday and professional accounts 
 
Interview Schedule _ professional accounts_v3 
 
Gender: 
Age group: 
Years/ period of practice as a relationship counsellor:  
Date of the interview:  
Pseudonym:   
 
 
Part 1 – On the notion of relationship dis/satisfaction 
 
1. How would you describe the notion of relationship satisfaction?  
a. Prompt: What is its place within a professional conception of healthy 
relationships? 
b. Prompt: How does satisfaction or dissatisfaction get expressed?  
 
2. What does it mean to be satisfied in one’s intimate, romantic relationship? 
a. Prompt:  Does this change over the course of the relationship? 
b. Prompt:  Are there any systematic differences between women and men?  
 
 
Part 2 – On therapeutic engagement with the phenomena of relationship dis/satisfaction 
 
3. In your experience, how are complains of the relationship dis/satisfaction presented by 
couples seeking your council?  
a. Prompt: How often do you encounter the issue of dissatisfaction in your every 
day practice? 
 
4. What would be the therapeutic goal with regards to relationship dis/satisfaction? 
a. Prompt: What would you regard as a success?  
b. Prompt: What would clients perceive as a target / successful goal? 
c. Prompt:  Are these formulations shaped by the gender of the client? Or by any 
other factors?  
 
5. Are there tensions between your professional and personal positions?  
a. Prompt: Are there tensions between the advice you can offer to clients, and the 
clients’ own views and targets? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix M – Reflections on Conducting the Interviews with Lay People 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 317 
 
The process of conducting the interviews with lay people required active engagement 
and was challenging because of the simultaneous needs to be relaxed enough to allow 
free narrative, whilst also remaining curious and aware of potential moments of 
segueing into novel areas, or contradiction with what had already been said - as these 
moments held high potential for both IPA and FDA interests.  This process was 
challenging and it required constant reflection by me on what had been covered during 
the interview, and the extent to which the analytic foci and questions had been 
addressed.  In an attempt to achieve this, beyond taking extensive notes during the 
interviews, I found it useful adopting, what I now call, a ‘relaxed awareness’ style 
during the interviews with the participants; relaxed in the sense of being receptive to 
and engaging with the participants’ subjective accounts, whilst simultaneously being 
aware of points of tension in their narratives - as these often delineated boundaries 
between dominant discourses employed in the same conversation.  Thus, on the one 
hand I paid attention to participants’ descriptive narratives and phenomenological 
accounts as much as possible, and on the other hand remained aware of contradictions 
in their talk as a gateway into exploring the simultaneous mobilisation of multiple 
discourses and/or as avenues exposing interpretation and experience arising together.  In 
general I tended to follow the participant, and therefore at times it was difficult to bring 
them back to the topic of Relationship Satisfaction as a concept in-and-of-itself.  This 
was because (1) the participants had a tendency to talk more about their experience as a 
dis/satisfied subject (which influenced the subsequent FDA of Lay Talk in Chapter 5), 
and this was probably due, in part, to the twin-focus attempt to capture both lived 
experienced and discourse simultaneously; (2) experiential material was easier for me to 
recognise there and then in the interview; and (3) having no experience of conducting an 
FDA I often wondered if what they were saying was ‘relevant’.  I did not want to 
impose the ‘correct’ way to talk about relationship satisfaction, but I wanted to make 
sure that I was exploring different discursive resources. 
 
For the most part, I enjoyed conducting the interviews and the majority of interviewees 
appeared eager to talk and had little difficulty in responding to my questions and 
engaging in a fluid dialogue with me.  Only on two occasions did I experience the 
interviews as challenging.  In each of these cases the respondents gave rather truncated 
responses.  On reflection, I believe that a power dynamic operated in those interviews 
(either implicitly or explicitly) whereby they perceived me as an ‘expert’.  Therefore, 
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more so than the other respondents, they expressed difficulty in articulating feelings and 
asked me if they were giving the ‘right kind of answer’ and if their response was ‘what I 
was looking for’.  I repeatedly assured them that there was no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer, 
but it appeared that their reticence to ‘go off topic’ remained, and they focused on 
giving direct answers to my questions.  Ironically, this was experienced by me as 
disempowering and I found myself frequently looking to my notes to help me think of 
suitable prompts, and ultimately I felt rather relieved when the interview process was 
over.   
 
This experience highlighted to me that the process of data collection was itself relational 
– shaped by the type of relationship that both the respondent and I thought we were 
having.   Whilst relatively fleeting in the research process, qualitative data is a joint-
production of this relationship.  Therefore my questions “how did it feel? etc.” and my 
attitude that relationship satisfaction was worthwhile being curious about “will have had 
an influence on the type of account that [the participants were] able to produce within 
the context of our interview. And this, in turn, ha[d] implications for the kinds of 
insights that my analysis of the data was able to generate.” (Willig, 2012a, p.104).  For 
example, I had presupposed that my participants were willing and able to reflect on, and 
articulate their experiences to me – to engage and respond to my questioning then and 
there in the interview – i.e. that they were “open to a process of meaning-making in 
collaboration” with me (Willig, 2012a, p.104).  On reflection I believe the participants 
were able to do this and their accounts provided rich textual data for the subsequent 
analyses.  Likewise, I had assumed that the participants had reflected on their previous 
experiences of relationship satisfaction and were “willing to scrutinize it, to interrogate 
it, and to explore how it is constituted” (Willig, 2012a, p.104).  This assumption was 
somewhat challenged during the process of conducting the interviews as it became 
apparent that the experience of ‘relationship satisfaction’ was rarely actively reflected 
upon by the lay participants (See Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1).   
 
Over the course of conducting the thirteen interviews, I became more relaxed because I 
grew more confident in my ability to move away from the interview schedule.  In the 
early interviews, I found myself returning to the schedule structure and asking questions 
that had already been covered.  This became apparent to me when I listened to the 
interviews again for the purpose of transcription, and there were times where I 
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experienced frustration with myself for being repetitive in the interview.  However, at 
the same time I accepted that this was the first time I had conducted in-depth qualitative 
interviews and realised that this was part of my interpretative journey.  Similarly, whilst 
I may have been overly cautious in the earlier interviews, I was conscious that I did not 
want to become complacent in my approach to the later interviews and start ‘taking it as 
read’ that I knew what the respondents would talk about.   There were occasions where I 
‘caught myself’ doing this, and realised that there were two major factors beginning to 
influence my attitude towards the interview process.  Firstly, I felt emotionally engaged 
with the participants’ accounts, many of which resonated with my own experiences, and 
therefore it was easy for me to accept accounts at face value and not question them or 
probe deeper.  Secondly, whilst I was adopting phenomenological and social 
constructionist frameworks in the research, I was still embedded in the mainstream 
psychological and normative cultural frameworks prescribing relationship satisfaction
81
.  
Therefore, I found it was easy for me to ‘slip’ into conducting the interviews in light of 
these taken-for-granted, normative assumptions.  Keeping a reflexive diary (see section 
3.5.5) helped to manage this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 This was somewhat exacerbated by the fact that I was continually reviewing the mainstream literature during this 
period (for Chapter Two), and therefore ‘mainstream’ theories and concepts were often in my mind. 
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Appendix N – Reflections on Conducting the Interviews with the Couple 
Therapists 
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As with the lay interviews, I enjoyed conducting the interviews with couple therapists 
and (perhaps unsurprisingly), all of them appeared comfortable discussing relationships.  
By the time I conducted the interviews with couple therapists I had already conducted 
all of the interviews with the lay people.  Therefore I felt more confident with the 
process of in-depth, one-to-one interviewing and the joint-production of qualitative data.  
However, I still experienced uncertainty in the first interview as to which additional 
avenues of conversation to pursue, and therefore I found myself referring back to the 
interview schedule frequently.   In general, the therapists’ talk focussed as much, if not 
more, on the concept of relationship dissatisfaction and this shaped the subsequent FDA 
that I produced (see Chapter 4).   During the interviews I often summarised and 
reflected back what they had said to me, and this helped to orientate me, and also to 
pick out points of interest to pursue, or (more often than not) prompted the respondent 
to continue.  At times I had to ‘control’ this a little if I felt we had begun to get too far 
off topic.  For example, even though understanding institutional practice was important, 
there were several times when the therapists would start explaining the minutiae of 
Relate procedure, and other times where they started explaining relational theories (e.g. 
of intimacy or attachment) in general, and of which I was already aware.   
There was a different power dynamic in the interviews with the therapists compared to 
those with the lay people.  In the lay interviews, the dynamic positioned me as ‘expert’ 
in terms of the academic knowledge and understanding of the research process.  
Furthermore, whilst the lay people were ‘experts’ of their own experience, it was an 
experience that I had also felt and therefore recognised.  In terms of the therapists, they 
were the ‘experts’ of the topic of therapy, but at times I felt like I had more ‘expertise’ 
in the academic literature, because I was familiar with mainstream and critical 
theoretical works.  On reflection, I think this sometimes manifested in an interpretative 
‘arrogance’ on my part.  Not in the sense of being rude or dismissive during the 
interview, but there were times when I felt eager (and hoped) to hear dominant 
constructions recycled – as if I had an ability to see the workings of discourse when my 
respondents could not.  This was an important ethical point that I had to consider when 
conducting my later analysis (and an important consideration of any hermeneutics of 
suspicion, where underlying processes are attributed to the respondents’ accounts), and 
one that I attempted to manage by using keeping a reflexive diary after the interviews 
(See Section 3.5.5). 
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Appendix O – Example of the Post-interview Reflexive Diary 
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1. David 
 
I felt like it was a great first interview, which went really well (although I have nothing 
to compare it to).  I was nervous at first and thought I might struggle to get 20 mins, let 
alone 45.  However, David was really articulate and had a lot to say.  In particular he 
gave some detailed phenomenological descriptions.  He seemed to have a slightly 
idealised view of what he wanted his relationships to be, and relationships seemed to be 
quite intense for him.  As for me, I found the process comfortable and interesting.  I was 
conscious of not leading David, and I attempted to explore different avenues as and 
when they arose, rather than waiting for the corresponding question.  This required a 
considerable effort to remain focused – and certainly now I’ve had a taste of “active 
listening”.  Ultimately it was a relief to complete my first interview, and it’s spurred me 
on. 
 
Later reflections:  Why did I say “great” and “went really well”?  What did I mean by 
those phrases?  Currently I think the answer is twofold:  Firstly, and more obvious to me, 
is that the methods of analysis I have chosen require rich detailed descriptions.  IPA, in 
particular, requires the ability to articulate complex subjective feelings (a process 
several of the participants have said is difficult).  David was able to do this, ergo, the 
interview was a success in these terms [I was fortunate that subsequent interviews were 
similar, including the two “harder” interviews]. 
 
Secondly, and more interesting to me from a reflexive point of view, is that I think I saw 
the interview as a success because I had got caught up in the twin-temptation to collude 
and verify.  The temptation to collude with dominant discourses on relationship 
satisfaction, leads to the temptation to verify existing theories on the topic.  Yet I knew 
that this was not my approach – my aim is not to achieve a “triangulation of data” about 
relationship satisfaction via a ‘bottom-up’ approach.  I guess I still had my ‘scientific 
hat’ still on, although on the plus side, I was aware of an inchoate feeling of disquiet i.e. 
that I was not looking at the contents of the interview quite in the right way; one that 
meshed with the spirit of qualitative exploration.  This would continue throughout the 
subsequent interviews, and, until I had the opportunity to discuss the interview process 
with Aneta. 
 
Having transcribed Davids’s interview, I noticed there were sections where he clearly 
speaks about the role of consumerism / consumption in the way people live their 
relationships.  Initially I thought “Great!  That’s the discourse of consumerism (e.g. Gail 
Hawkes), and economics discourse underlying it”.  However, I began to question 
whether the analysis was that simple.  Was there anything going on beyond my initial 
gut feeling of the text?  Was I, again, seeing predominant discourse that I am aware of?  
I raised this with Aneta, and she reminded me of action orientation.  What was David, 
the speaker, attempting to achieve during this section of the interview.  This will require 
an analysis of the context of that section of the transcript at a later date.  It will be 
interesting to see whether an (apparent) explicit awareness of certain discourses leads to 
points of tension, contradiction or recycling.  I expect it could well lead to all three! 
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2. Martin 
 
Again, I was a little apprehensive, and I wasn’t too sure how comfortable or easy it 
would be for Martin to discuss my topic.  Martin was a little more pragmatic with his 
views possibly – often referring to work.  He said some good stuff about ideals, and the 
paradox of familiarity.  I thought his views might be a bit more traditional regards 
gender roles, and in some respects they were.  In addition, it struck me how he would 
attribute motivations to his partner’s behaviour that I wouldn’t have.  Occasionally I 
found myself trying to “open his eyes” by probing further.  I need to remember to 
bracket my own assumptions and let the participant’s voice be heard.  However, at the 
same time I don’t think I went too far, and this kind of probing, if done well, certainly 
enriches the data.  I do begin to feel relief when I get near the end – it’s hard work!  
Overall I think the interview was a success, and we once again went for 90mins. 
 
Later reflections:  Again, I use terms such as “good stuff” (see collusion and verification 
above).  Two points jump out at me when I reflect on these initial notes.  Firstly, I was a 
little apprehensive about the interview.  How might this have influenced the experience 
(for both me and Martin?  From memory, the interview seemed to flow well, but how 
did we both view it?  This leads to my second point where I say I wanted to “open his 
eyes”.  The interview is a social interaction, and, whilst it isn’t my analytic focus, 
discursive psychology reminds us that individuals have a stake in such interactions, 
which they manage in order to achieve certain social functions.  What about me and 
Martin?  What were we trying to “achieve”?  For my part, I’m trying to encourage 
participants to talk freely and openly, with a level of introspection they might not 
normally be used to.  Furthermore, I’m bringing “expert” knowledge to the interaction, 
which might shape my ideas about the things participants should say.  Whilst the 
interviews never felt like a therapeutic (healing) interaction, Aneta highlighted that there 
could be an element of counselling (me being a source of knowledge and, potentially, 
advice).  What was Martin doing?  Well, he was trying to respond in “appropriate ways” 
and give me “good” answers.  Perhaps be the “good” participant.  He may have been 
anxious; he may have been more self-aware than usual.  He may have attempted to 
minimise these feelings.  However this is all guess work currently, as he didn’t seem to 
show these signs, and I won’t know till I analyse his transcript in detail.  However, this 
highlights the need to reflect on the interview process, both as an experience 
(phenomenology), and as a social interaction where individuals are oriented towards 
certain types of action (discursive psychology). 
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Appendix P – Examples of how the Reflexive Diary Foregrounded my 
Assumptions 
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The Reflexive diary helped me to foreground some of the assumptions I brought to the 
research process.  For example, after my first few interviews with lay people I had made 
comments such as “The interview went well, he said a lot of good stuff”.   My Director 
of Studies and I discussed what I meant by “good stuff” and it became apparent that I 
was making this comment when the respondents made comments about relationship 
satisfaction which reflected the mainstream literature.   This helped me to realise that I 
was slipping into a mainstream, realist mind-set and, in effect, forgetting my analytic 
foci.  My Director of Studies reminded me that my goal was not to ‘find’ qualitative 
support for existing theories via a ‘bottom-up’ approach.  In a sense, I was surrendering 
and colluding with taken-for-granted assumptions, and seeing this helped me to 
approach subsequent interviews with a more critical attitude and to question 
respondents’ claims in more detail.  Later entries in the reflexive diary included 
comments such as “said the usual point about X” and this highlighted that I was at risk 
of becoming complacent in my attitude towards the respondents talk, and taking for 
granted the process of joint data production between me and the respondent. 
 
An example from the couple therapists was that I made notes such as “They mentioned 
X
82
 discourse!”  The excitement with which I declared this highlighted that I was, in 
effect, trying to ‘trap’ the respondent.  Again, following reflection with my Director of 
Studies, we realised that this potentially stemmed from my own lack of confidence in 
applying a discursive interpretative framework, and therefore I had developed a hyper-
critical attitude towards the respondents’ accounts.   This was an important realisation 
as it highlighted the importance of reflecting on the ethical implications of the 
interpretative process.  In this way, the reflexive diary allowed me to operationalise the 
(potentially abstract) theoretical call to conduct ethical, reflexive research, and in a way 
that foregrounded assumptions that I was previously unaware that I had. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 Details are omitted to protect the anonymity of my participants. 
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Appendix Q - Transcription Protocol 
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Adapted from Edwards & Potter (1992) and Wetherell & Edley (1999) 
 
(.)   = indicates a short pause (0.5 – 5 seconds) 
 
:: e.g. reca::ll = colons used to signal elongation added by the speaker 
 
italics e.g. recall = text in italics shows emphasis added by the speaker 
 
:: & e.g. recall:: = indicates elongation and emphasis added by the speaker 
italics 
 
[…] e.g. […] = indicates text omitted by the author for practicality 
 
[text] e.g. [recall] = indicates text added by the author for clarity 
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Appendix R - Reflections on Conducting the Twin Focus Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 330 
 
One of the reasons for conducting the first stage of the two analyses in parallel was that 
I felt I could not simply do one analysis followed by the other because the research 
questions and analytic foci of both analyses were always in my mind.  Thus, I attempted 
to suspend my attention on each analysis in turn, in order to give equal attention to both, 
yet IPA and FDA were both constantly in my awareness: one deliberate, and the other 
one relaxed, and then vice versa.  I argue that the assumptions of one analysis could not 
be fully bracketed, and a fuller picture could only be accessed by seeing them in action 
together.  Throughout the research process the twin focus approach remained visible to 
me; at times, this was experienced as an ‘and-and’ rather than a clear cut ‘either–or’ 
process. For instance, while conducting the IPA of an interview, FDA related ideas, 
hunches, or reflections frequently arose and needed to be ‘purged’ by noting them down 
next to the ‘parent’ narrative for later use. When done with purpose and intention, this 
noting practice was usefully incorporated as part of the second phase of analysis of the 
twin-focus-analysis.   
 
My awareness and acceptance that this would happen – i.e. that the intention to suspend 
one set of concerns might not always necessarily be possible, increased my readiness to 
proceed.  However, doubts arose for me during the process because I was aware of my 
limitations (and my limited experience) as a qualitative researcher, and I only gradually 
began to realise that what I was attempting was relatively difficult in epistemological 
and methodological terms.  It meant that I felt fraudulent or inauthentic at times because 
I did not feel like the ‘expert’ that I thought I should be.  However, over the course of 
conducting the research this was replaced with a calmer acceptance – a confidence in 
accepting the appropriateness and limitations of each approach - not looking for the 
‘right’ answer, but being comfortable in my ability to produce interpretations that were 
based on my reflexive interactions with the data, and which were within the 
epistemological boundaries of the chosen methodologies. 
 
The twin focus approach brought me closer to the complexity and dynamics of the 
interplay between language and experience and helped to inform the integration of the 
findings from the two analyses (via the hermeneutics of empathy and suspicion).  To 
present the two interpretations in a complementary way I returned to my initial research 
questions, as these served as a rigorous structure to separate the two interplaying aspects 
of language and experience before I ‘dropped them back together’.  As such, from my 
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perspective, the twin focus methodological approach allowed an ‘artificial separation’ 
of the two aspects that were always-already intertwined for the benefit of closer 
examination and interpretative insight. 
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Appendix S – Example of the Three Column Table used for the Initial Stages of 
Analysing the Lay Peoples’ Transcripts 
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: Partners cannot know if they have managed any changes to 
their CIRR  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: Managing change within a CIRR 
a) partners must engage in “honest” communication 
- prevents “misunderstandings” “miscommunication” 
- failure to communicate experienced as an unarticulated 
“undercurrent” 
- felt as “resentment” 
- warrants accusations “not doing this right, not doing that 
right” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: Doing conflict 
- partners “accuse” each other 
 
 
 
: Emotional change within the context of a CIRR allows for 
accusations that one’s partner is “not paying you enough 
attention” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MC:  Well, if you can think of any other 
 
GABY:  (.) Hmm (.) I don’t know, because you can’t even 
know if you do manage it.  Erm (.)  
 
MC:  I suppose as you were saying earlier (.) in some cases, 
some people (.) sort of how you work at the relationship. 
 
GABY:  Yeah, ye::ah (.) yeah, I suppose you’ve got to work 
at it, again it comes down, it does come down to 
communication (.) and honesty (.) really.  Erm (.) because if 
you’re not talking about it.  If there are changes going on, 
and you’re not talking about it (.) you just, it’s always an 
undercurrent isn’t it, erm (.) and that can just lead to (.) lots 
of misunderstandings and miscommunication, a lot of 
resentment.  (.) You’ve got to get it out there I think, you, 
yeah you’ve got to get it out there (.) on the table.  (.) Talk 
about it. 
 
MC:  As you were saying earlier. 
 
GABY:  Yeah, express yourself best you can (.) without (.) 
hopefully getting into big rows, you know, you’ve got to 
kind of, take a step back haven’t you?  A little bit, and not 
get into big rows about things (.) or accusing you know?  
When things are changing (.) emotionally, it’s very easy to 
accuse the other one of not (.) paying you enough 
attention, I’m not doing this right, I’m not doing that 
right (.) very easy to sort of get into that so. 
 
MC:  Ok then, can one feel, actually you’ve answered this 
already, can one feel satisfied and dissatisfied within a close 
long term romantic relationship at the same time?  You said 
 
 
 
Uncertainty in the experience of managing RS 
 
 
 
 
Privileged / Satisfying practices: 
Communicate / talk 
Absence of silence 
 
Experience of Resentment – blame directed toward 
‘other’? 
Experience of ‘undercurrent’ – felt but not articulated? 
 
Undercurrent & Resentment – expectations about 
roles?  I.e. failing to meet one’s duty? 
[NTS – i.e. partners feel the other is not fulfilling their 
role”] 
- accusing evaluated as “very easy” to do 
 
 
 
Satisfying practice – to “express” oneself 
Dissatisfying practice – i) rows; ii) accusing / blaming 
(other and self) 
[NTS – fear of not having one’s need / entitlement for 
“wanting to be wanted” fulfilled within the shifting 
relational context] 
 
Experience / feeling one is falling short – “not doing 
this right” – i.e. one’s role / duty? 
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: Experiencing simultaneous satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
within the context of a CIRR 
a) partners can experience overall / global satisfaction but still 
experience dissatisfaction with specific elements 
 
b) experiencing “dissatisfaction” as always present 
- “always be something you’re dissatisfied with […] could be 
done better” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) experiencing dissatisfaction as fluid and changing over the 
course of the relationship “gonna change at different points” 
 
 
c) specific elements evaluated as  
i) “manageable” 
- allows for feeling overall satisfaction 
ii) not significant “little” elements “rather than anything 
major” 
- experienced as “niggly” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
earlier 
 
GABY:  Yeah, I suppose it does, I suppose you can (.) feel 
both. (.) Erm (.) you know, are you ever going to feel really 
satisfied?  That’s what I’m actually thinking now.  Are you 
ever gonna really?  There’s always gonna be something 
you’re dissatisfied with I think.  Erm (.) and it’s gonna 
change you know at different points in the relationship, it’s 
not always gonna be the same thing.  Erm (.) there’s, there’s 
always something (.) that could be done better I suppose (.) 
but I think you can feel overall satisfaction, like we were 
saying, with the relationship, but there might be little (.) 
elements that you’re dissatisfied with (.) that you’d rather 
were different.  So yeah I (.) 
 
MC:  But those elements that you’re dissatisfied with aren’t 
(.) or they’re manageable? 
 
GABY:  Well yeah, they must be otherwise overall you 
wouldn’t feel satisfied (.) because they’re probably more (.) 
little niggly things (.) that you’re dissatisfied with, rather 
than anything kind of major (.) I would say. 
 
MC:  And (.) and in terms of things that are major, again, 
kind of, the sort of things we’ve spoken about earlier – those 
sort of major things that are important. 
 
GABY:  Yeah, yeah, those, yeah exactly. 
 
MC:  Erm, so my last question then, would you say that there 
are gender difference that shape one’s understanding of 
relationship satisfaction? 
 
GABY:  (.) Hm, do you mean in my relationship or in 
general?  In general? 
 
 
 
 
 
Experience is multifaceted – not dualistic – can be 
satisfied and dissatisfied.  
Dissatisfaction directed / intentionally specific on “little 
elements’ 
[NTS – the spectre of the ideal rears again here.  Begs 
the question, as asked by the participant, ever “are you 
ever going to feel really satisfied?” 
Need to explore further.  Not within a logocentric 
understanding of satisfaction.  The actuality is always a 
shadow of the ideal.  A different understanding of 
satisfaction might be needed] 
 
 
 
 
 
- (dis)satisfaction not homogenous nor static 
 
Unfulfilled as problematic - Framing dissatisfying 
elements as “little” allows / warrants their acceptance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 335 
 
 
 
: Understandings of relationship satisfaction as shaped by 
gender 
a) Communication is more important for women than men 
b) sex is possibly more salient for men 
c) both men and women evaluate partner support as important 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: Women value communication in terms of the ability to 
“express” oneself in an unedited “frank” way 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: Understandings of relationship satisfaction as shaped by 
gender 
d) men do not express themselves “as easily or freely as 
women” 
 
e) men “harbour things” i.e. do not articulate their 
dissatisfaction 
 
 
f) women are attuned to a CIRR not “going right” 
 
 
 
 
MC:  I suppose in general, or first of all. 
 
GABY:  (.) Erm (.) well (.) I think, I do think generally that 
women would put communication at the top of a pot of 
relationship satisfaction.  Erm (.) you know, that’s going 
from just my experience and, you know, my girlfriends.  Erm 
(.) and whereas men (.) I wouldn’t, that wouldn’t be quite as 
important to them (.) possibly as sex, or possibly an (.) erm 
(.) I think erm (.) support from the woman is important for 
the man.  Erm (.) well it’s important for women as well 
actually, support, but I think the communication thing is the 
thing that sticks out in my (.) mind as being, you know, top 
of, top of the women’s list.  Maybe a little bit lower down for 
men. 
 
MC:  Communication in what sort of sense? 
 
GABY:  Erm (.) in just being able to express yourself (.) 
and erm (.) just being able to have frank conversations (.) 
with somebody, with the other, you know, your other half 
basically. 
 
MC:  So for women it’s important (.) to both be able to 
express themselves and also for their partner to express 
themselves? 
 
GABY:  Yeah, but I think that’s where things get difficult a 
lot of the time because men don’t express themselves as 
easily or freely as women generally, I mean that just tends 
to be the pattern, and (.) what you find is (.) erm (.) men can 
kind of harbour things I think a bit more, you know, they 
harbour things, they don’t say what’s pissing them off so 
much (.) in a relationship (.) until it comes out, you know, 
because it’s normally, I find, it’s the woman who kind of 
bring it up (.) and the woman who’ll notice that things 
aren’t going right in the relationship 
Gendered Satisfying practice – communication / talk 
privileged for women 
- heteronormative narratives – women as relational; men 
as needing sex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Satisfying practice – to “express” oneself 
“Frank” (i.e. honest?) conversations  
- self-censuring or silence as problematic i.e. 
dissatisfying practices 
 
 
 
 
 
Gendered roles – women as expressive; men not 
expressive 
Women engaged in the emotion work of the relationship 
[NTS – can men articulate dissatisfaction it?  Do they 
reflect on it?] 
 
 
NTS – women more sensitive to the lived actuality of the 
CIRR, or have a more defined understanding of what the 
CIRR ‘should’ be?  Perhaps, if socially prevalent 
portrayals of what CIRRs should be are aimed more at 
women? 
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Appendix T – Example of the Document Summarising the IPA Recurrent Themes 
with Illustrative Extracts 
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Sub theme 1 Knowing / Being Satisfied 
 
 
Satisfaction as cognitive 
 
Implied rather than declared, hence, difficult to articulate 
Martin:  (.)  Erm (.) I suppose, like (.) peace (.) like safety, (.) comfort (.) erm (.) happiness (.).  I don’t, 
it’s quite, things like that are quite hard to (.) to (.) coz you don’t really, think about it, it’s almost like, 
just, I’m having a good feeling or (.) just, feeling shit, having uneasiness or something that you’re aware 
of, it’s not something you really put into words at the time (.) 
 
Anya: […] how do you know you’re satisfied?  You just know, and I don’t, I can’t really (.) most of the 
time I can’t explain why, but I’m just happy and you know. 
 
Imogen:  You might not feel the need to look for exactly why you’re feeling that way because, you know 
what I mean, you’re not trying to solve any problem.  […] So in a way it might be actually harder to (.) to 
articulate why you feel good about it. 
 
Not a deliberate process but a state of being i.e. the status quo. 
Not thinking about satisfaction 
------ 
Gaby: (.) I suppose it does, it’s not something you do really consciously is it?  It’s not something you, you 
kind of sit and think “Am I satisfied in this relationship?”  Well I don’t, maybe I should [laughs].  I don’t 
know erm. 
 
MC:  Do you think people do in general? 
 
Gaby:  (.) Hmm (.) I think a lot of the time you don’t actually.  I think a lot of the time (.) you just go 
along, you go in the flow, you’re not really (.) you don’t really sit down and ask yourself  “Am I satisfied?  
Is there something else I really need from this relationship?” 
 
---- 
Lydia:  Erm (.) I think (.) I probably more obviously feel dissatisfaction (.) because if I’m satisfied (.) I 
don’t really think about it (.) because I’m just (.) life is good (.) and I’m just getting on with life and (.) 
my, my relationship, is my relationship, a good relationship, and I don’t, I don’t need to think about it. 
 
---- 
David:  […] and satisfied is being happy, it’s, it’s not querying anything I suppose.  […] Yeah, but 
happiness, but also, like I was saying, you know, when you’re not particularly happy, when things aren’t 
going well, you start to (.) yeah analyse and question them, so, weirdly satisfaction means (.) there is no 
analysis.  You just are.  You’re in the moment, you’re enjoying it, you don’t have to (.) stop and think is 
everything alright.  Satisfied is (.) is that, is a lack of that, erm, assessment.  You don’t need to assess it 
because you’re happy, and not just happy, but erm (.) yeah, well, I mean (.) you’re content and so yeah, 
you don’t have to do it. 
 
The act of appraisal / questioning one’s relationship is indicative of something ‘not 
right’ [NTS – For the FDA] 
John:  Am I a good boyfriend, am I a good girlfriend?  Erm (.)  
 
MC:  How would you know? 
 
John:  Well, yeah, exactly – you wouldn’t.  You’d have to (.) I don’t think you’ll ever know that, you 
shouldn’t (.) if you’re asking yourself the question then you’re already in a predicament.  If you’re not 
asking yourself the question then you’re a good boyfriend / girlfriend (.) I would say basically.   Or 
possibly not, maybe, maybe I’m slightly more conscientious (.) no, I don’t think so.  I think, behind that 
kind of genuine relationship (.) I think you pretty much know (.) you know, you know if what you’re 
doing is right or wrong kind of thing […] but on balance, I don’t sit there and question the fact that I’m a 
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bad, or a good boyfriend.  I think it’s just (.) as I say, if something’s wrong that’s when you start asking 
yourself that question. 
 
Variation on ‘Not thinking about Satisfaction’ 
Appraising satisfaction (‘savouring the good times’) as something we should do 
Anya:  […]  So, so, erm (.) you really question don’t you when it’s, it goes down the hill. […]  Which 
may be not good, because you think then (.) maybe you should really, you should explore it when it’s 
good […]  So that you know (.) what, how it has to be (.) for it to go on and be good 
 
Appraising being satisfied (or is this akin to appraising dissatisfaction?)  
Gaby:  I suppose other people’s perspective on it does come into that (.) you know, because I (.) it’s funny 
because when (.) you get (.) you get used to somebody don’t you, you don’t necessarily think “I’m, we’re 
in a good relationship”, you don’t think that yourself because you’re just (.) in it (.) and I think it’s really 
(.) you know when you’re talking to friends or family and (.) people (.) say “Oh, you know, it’s really 
good when I see you two together you know, you obviously get on really well”, and it’s really nice, you 
know, compliments I suppose about your relationship from people who matter. 
 
(Shaped by age?) 
David:  I think everyone does, you know, you look at, you stop and you, you, am I happy in my job, you 
know, […] and we do it a lot now, and I think we do it more so (.) our generation does it more so than 
older generations.  Erm, you know my mum and my dad don’t (.) I’ve asked my dad a number of times is 
he happy, and he can’t answer the question.  It’s like, yeah alright, I’ve got, you know, I do what I’ve got 
to do (.) but you know he’s 68 and works five 12 hour shifts (.) […] so (.) I think that, yeah, it is about 
looking at it, stopping, and I think that is this reflecting, and you do it all the time. 
 
Uncertainty ‘knowing’ satisfaction: How to ‘measure’ satisfaction? 
Martin:  (.) you know, you can’t, you can’t put them into erm (.) into a computer and, you know, you 
don’t get like a percentage figure of satisfaction out of it do you?  You’ve just got different things on 
perceptions of things (.) I dunno how, I don’t know how you process that (.) emotion.  […] there are 
things that (.) I’d prefer were different (.) about (.) about (.) well, about Lisa, and about our relationship, 
but (.) it doesn’t mean I’m not satisfied with our relationship.  So I don’t know how you kind of measure, 
I would say, I’m satisfied in our relationship, but I don’t know how I can, you know, I don’t know how to 
really express (.) how, you know, how you measure satisfaction. 
 
Imogen:  […] I think I would add to that I think it’s possible to be (.) also, unsure about whether you’re 
satisfied or dissatisfied.  […] (.) Because it’s all about how you feel isn’t it?  And how, how, you know (.) 
there’s no kind of like (.) there’s nobody telling you or (.) affirming for you that this is, you know, you’re 
feeling 100% satisfied today, or you’re feeling 80% satisfied today, you know, you don’t really know, 
you kind of feel generally ok, or not, and there all, lot’s of other (.) factors effecting how you feel on any 
given day, not just the relationship, so, know what I mean, you can, you can be (.) uncertain about what’s 
effecting your mood. 
 
Comparisons 
Compare to previous relationships 
Imogen:  there might be two, or there might be two erm (.) (.) two gauges if you like, one is gonna be like 
an absolute, and one is gonna be a relative.  You might have had other relationships before […] and so 
you might gauge it in relative terms to your level of satisfaction that you had with those other 
relationships […] or the relationship that you see other people having, and your perceptions of them […] 
you obviously learn (.) from experience of what you, what you (.) find satisfactory, or, you know, or what 
makes you happy or not. 
 
To other peoples’ relationships 
Ruth:  I suppose you watch other couples, erm (.) try not to make comparisons because I always think that 
you don’t really know what goes on behind closed doors in other people’s relationships.  So it’s easier to 
try and not compare yourself I think.  Doesn’t always work out that way.  (.) I mean you might compare 
yourself favourably or unfavourably I suppose.  But I think that every, what, what I’ve noticed when I 
compare myself, if you like, to other couples is that they have their good points as well as their bad points 
but (.) no (.) I don’t think I know the perfect relationship you know?  There’s always (.) different issues 
within every relationship, everyone’s got something that they have to work at you know? 
 339 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix U – Example of the IPA Master Themes Table with Extracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 340 
 
Master Theme 1 “Knowing 
Satisfaction”  
Uncertainty / lack of cognitive 
Awareness of Satisfaction 
Martin:  (.)  Erm (.) I suppose, like (.) peace (.) like safety, (.) comfort (.) erm (.) happiness (.).  
I don’t, it’s quite, things like that are quite hard to (.) to (.) coz you don’t really, think about it, 
it’s almost like, just, I’m having a good feeling or (.) just, feeling shit, having uneasiness or 
something that you’re aware of, it’s not something you really put into words at the time (.) 
 
David:  […] and satisfied is being happy, it’s, it’s not querying anything I suppose.  […] Yeah, 
but happiness, but also, like I was saying, you know, when you’re not particularly happy, when 
things aren’t going well, you start to (.) yeah analyse and question them, so, weirdly 
satisfaction means (.) there is no analysis.  You just are.  You’re in the moment, you’re 
enjoying it, you don’t have to (.) stop and think is everything alright.  Satisfied is (.) is that, is a 
lack of that, erm, assessment.  You don’t need to assess it because you’re happy, and not just 
happy, but erm (.) yeah, well, I mean (.) you’re content and so yeah, you don’t have to do it. 
 
Anya:  […]  So, so, erm (.) you really question don’t you when it’s, it goes down the hill. […]  
Which may be not good, because you think then (.) maybe you should really, you should 
explore it when it’s good […]  So that you know (.) what, how it has to be (.) for it to go on 
and be good 
 
David:  I think everyone does, you know, you look at, you stop and you, you, am I happy in 
my job, you know, […] and we do it a lot now, and I think we do it more so (.) our generation 
does it more so than older generations.  Erm, you know my mum and my dad don’t (.) I’ve 
asked my dad a number of times is he happy, and he can’t answer the question.  It’s like, yeah 
alright, I’ve got, you know, I do what I’ve got to do (.) but you know he’s 68 and works five 
12 hour shifts (.) […] so (.) I think that, yeah, it is about looking at it, stopping, and I think that 
is this reflecting, and you do it all the time. 
 
Martin:  (.) you know, you can’t, you can’t put them into erm (.) into a computer and, you 
know, you don’t get like a percentage figure of satisfaction out of it do you?  You’ve just got 
different things on perceptions of things (.) I dunno how, I don’t know how you process that (.) 
emotion.  […]  I don’t know how to really express (.) how, you know, how you measure 
satisfaction. 
 
Imogen:  […] I think I would add to that I think it’s possible to be (.) also, unsure about 
whether you’re satisfied or dissatisfied.  […] (.) Because it’s all about how you feel isn’t it?  
And how, how, you know (.) there’s no kind of like (.) there’s nobody telling you or (.) 
affirming for you that this is, you know, you’re feeling 100% satisfied today, or you’re feeling 
80% satisfied today, you know, you don’t really know, you kind of feel generally ok, or not, 
and there all, lot’s of other (.) factors effecting how you feel on any given day, not just the 
relationship, so, know what I mean, you can, you can be (.) uncertain about what’s effecting 
your mood. 
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 Knowing satisfaction as not 
dissatisfaction 
Imogen:  (.) Erm (.) (.) well I think, as, as I said earlier, I mean it’s just to me, it’s whether I 
feel (.) happy or not (.) in a kind of generalised way [chuckles]  You know it’s the, in a way 
it’s the absence of problems (.) the absence of arguments, the absence of dissatisfaction (.) as 
well as (.) a kind of positive feeling of (.) you know (.) I’m happy to, I’m happy (.) to be with 
this person, I want to spend time with them, I’m attracted to them (.) I enjoy their company. 
 
 Affective ‘knowing’ Laura:  I mean I would associate satisfaction with something positive, and being happy (.) erm 
(.) but I suppose you could say “Yes, I’m satisfied to a point” on a practical level, or, erm (.) 
you know “It works” on a sort of day-to-day level, but not really on an emotional level.  (.) 
Erm (.) but no, I would say that satisfaction and happiness go together really. 
 
Laura:  (.) I think you have peace in your heart, you’re not always (.) looking for something 
else (.) or someone else I suppose.  (.) Yeah, you just have that (.) assurance (.) erm (.) that that 
person likes you (.) loves you (.) wants to be with you, that you’re important, that you’re 
special to them.  (.) So I think its em (.) yeah, a sense of (.) erm (.) a sense of peace really (.) 
you know, you’re not trying to be someone else, or be something else, and you’re not (.) 
wishing that they were someone else, or something else as well.  Just being content with each 
other 
 
 Satisfaction as embodied 
 
 
William:  […] you have that feeling of (.) warmth almost, you know, that kind of emotional (.) 
it’s, it’s a kind of a bit of a cliché but I can understand where it comes from, that kind of, 
aspect of (.) really feeling so, so into someone that you do tend to, kind of (.) does feel like it 
kind of comes from your heart, even though physically (.) it can’t. 
 
Clare:  It feels sleepy [laughs]. (.) Or, there’s a, we used to say “Fuck-struck”.  Fuck-struck 
because (.) and I see it round here, I work with women who are between 23 and about 32 
majority (.) like there’s (.) 70 of us, and most people are 23, well, 24 and 33, and quite a lot of 
the girls are seeing someone, or like engaged, or just married, and like, you see it down the 
corridors, when people just s::inging, or (.) whistling for no reason, or grinning, or (.) and you 
think “What the fuck is wrong with them?  It’s Thursday morning at 7:30am, and I haven’t had 
my coffee!”, And you can tell that they’ve just had a shag, and they’re fuck-struck, and you’re 
like “Oh my God! It’s so unfair!”, or (.) sometimes you’re a bit fuck-struck, and someone 
comes in and goes “What’s wrong with you?”  
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During the IPA, the process of interpretation (for me) was an active process.  In fact, it 
often felt like hard work, and I re-encountered the uncertainty that I had felt during the 
initial coding stage as I attempted to produce broader / deeper interpretative analyses.  
With the IPA I kept feeling like I wasn’t adding anything new – just stating the 
descriptive obvious.  I felt myself thinking “So what?”  and I urged myself to ‘see 
something deeper’ than a superficial description.  I kept thinking “How do I move 
beyond stating the obvious? “ (E.g. “the participants felt positive when they were 
satisfied in their relationships”).   During my IPA I was initially drawn to the affective 
and embodied characteristics that the participants described.  However, later on, as I 
began to feel more confident with the ideas from phenomenology, I began to think more 
in terms of intentionality, and object-vs-agent of perception; and object-subject 
experiences.  Eventually, I began to interpret links between the themes I was producing 
and certain ideas from existential thinking (See Chapter 6).   
 
This move to higher order, more abstract interpretations, again, represented a whole 
series of choices by me.  On reflection, my interpretations were influenced by Smith’s 
(2007, 2009) work on the underlying foundations of IPA (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3); 
discussions with my Director of Studies about the existential theorists Martin Buber & 
RD Laing; and also by a talk I went to by Virginia Eatough in 2010 where I was 
introduced to the concept of existential feelings (see Chapter 2, Section 2.8).  As I 
became more familiar with the themes, and then drew links to the broader existential 
literature, I began to feel myself being pulled along by the analysis.  The pull of the 
theoretical interpretation was, as Willig (2012a) stated, “seductive” (p.147), and this 
manifested in feelings of clarity / a sudden realisation that I was ‘getting it’.  In actual 
fact this was the clarity of being able to apply an interpretative framework which fit and 
amplified the meaning in the data.  Although it did feel at times like a clarity of 
‘discovering the truth’, this was when I had to pull back and remember the limitations 
of my interpretative claims.  At times I wondered if I was forcing the data into my 
interpretative framework – I would stop and question possible alternatives but, broadly 
speaking, I felt confident that my interpretation remained grounded in the participants’ 
accounts of their experiences.  That is, the interpretation remained empathic.   The data 
came first, and I did not encounter the existential theories until after my initial analysis.  
Hence, the descriptive analyses of all lay interviews were well established by that point, 
and suddenly the existential concepts (such as existential feelings, ontological security, 
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and I-Thou relating) seemed to expound further on the experiential qualities that I had 
interpreted from my IPA.  Thus I used existentialism as a framework to help expand the 
IPA, but I would not say that I was doing an existential analysis.     
 
In addition, the more theoretical (existential) interpretations of the individual accounts 
helped me to present common ‘themes’ across the body of interviews and to integrate 
these common themes.  The challenge then was not to lose the ‘unique’ because IPA 
takes an idiographic approach to research and is concerned with ‘the particular’; in 
terms of being a highly detailed analysis, and also in the sense of being concerned with 
the contextually situated experience of particular individuals.  Smith et al., (2009) have 
suggested several ways of managing this tension.  For example, the researcher may 
decide that a ‘master theme’ must occur in at least a third, half, or all of the individual 
interviews.  In the case of my research I initially (and, on reflection, arbitrarily) decided 
that if a theme occurred in the majority of the interviews it would count as a recurring 
theme.  However, I kept in mind the potential tension that could arise if a theme was 
mentioned in fewer interviews, but more emphatically than other themes mentioned 
more frequently across the body of data.  In this way, I hoped to balance the constant 
tension between the more-general and the more-idiographic facets of the participants’ 
phenomenological experiences.  As it happens, the master themes that I produced were 
common to all respondents.  This could have been an upshot of pursuing certain 
avenues of conversation during the interviews and not others, or possibly because I had 
a group of participants who were, culturally speaking, fairly homogenous. 
 
Another way in which I tried to remain committed to the individual respondents was by 
reflecting back on the interviews themselves (i.e. not just focusing on the words of the 
transcript).  As outlined by Smith (2007), who drew on the work of Schleiermacher 
(who viewed the hermeneutic process as one of grammatical and psychological 
interpretation, which could shed light on the textual meaning and the intentionality of 
the author), the interview texts produced in my research were contemporary texts, and 
therefore during the analysis, and my engagement with the interpretative process, I was 
constantly thinking back to the actual interviews and the specific contexts of each 
dialogue in which I had actively taken part.  
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Whilst some researchers seek the participants’ input on their interpretations (e.g. 
Williams & Morrow, 2009), I did not.  I took a position similar to other researchers (e.g. 
Langdridge, 2007) that my interpretations were not made any more ‘accurate’ by the 
participants’ agreement or ‘misguided’ if they disagreed.  Hermeneutic phenomenology 
may well produce an interpretation that the participant wouldn’t recognise.  If I were 
focussed primarily on description then I concede that it would have had potential value, 
but I wanted to draw on other theoretical works and engage in a hermeneutics of 
questioning for my IPA (Smith et al., 2009).  
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Relationship Satisfaction as dialectical 
need fulfilment: partners’ transactional 
obligation 
Self-as-monitor / self-as-monitored 
 
John: I feel, that, from just time to time (.) have a few minutes and you kind of 
just reflect on it you know?  And think is everything, you know, is everything 
going well?  Am I putting my (.) my bit into this?  Is there anyway that I could (.) 
improve what I’m doing?  Not by (.) being someone different as such, but just by 
(.) you know, am I putting enough into this?  (.) Is there anything I (.) we should 
be doing that we’re not doing?  
 
Martin: I think eventually we had, we had, like, you know, a big talk and stuff (.) 
and that (.) and that (.) called me back from the edge, and made me realise what I 
had, and to try and stop comparing (.) something real with something that’s (.) 
not real.  Because you can’t go through your whole life comparing (.) and I, and I 
think when I felt like I was settled as well, coz, like, you can be settling for what 
you’ve got (.) but, it was just like, so many different emotions involved (.) I 
couldn’t absorb, it was just too much to process. 
 
Clare:  How stable they are, how stable they appear.  It’s not about sex or 
romance it’s how (.) solid they seem, that’s what I worry about, so I’ll see 
something and I’ll think [Gasps] “Oh that’s what makes a perfect, solid”, you 
know, “he’s never gonna leave her because of (.) something” 
MC:  Yeah. 
Clare:  It’s not about the sex or the romance for me when I compare, it’s kind of 
more about (.) it might be an act which has made me think that’s the (.) you 
know, it might be something that they’ve done, he, he’s done for her, or she’s 
done for him, that makes me think that they’re more stable, or (.) I should be 
doing something like that, but (.) the envy is more about (.) worrying about (.) the 
insecurity of my relationship, if my relationship is insecure, and it’s not about my 
relationship, that’s about my head. 
 
Freddie:  Er (.) the only thing that I would have to go off, erm (.) obviously past 
experiences.  Erm (.) you all have the good and the bad but (.) er, so that comes 
with time I think. (.) Erm (.) and then probably (.) peer examples, you know, other 
people and you know, you’ve got friends, [ask yourself] are they still together? 
Do they bicker? Or whatever, you know, but, it seems to work for them.  Er, or (.) 
at the opposite end of that, people that get on very, very well, and you just look at 
what, well they look to have a great relationship. 
MC:  How do you think that influences the way you see your own relationship? 
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Freddie:  Erm (.) I think it would if you were, were looking around and thinking 
“Well no one else (.) seems to have this”, or, you know, be that good or bad, erm 
(.) you could look and see “Well I don’t see these other people arguing about 
going out for beers” or whatever, I don’t know, small things, but (.) er, so that 
does play a part but (.) 
 
 
 Gendered monitor  
Anya:  Yeah, less, they would be, they would be maybe more satisfied with less 
satisfaction (.) if you know what I mean.  Er, lower level of satisfaction would be 
enough for them to think that’s good relationship, “it’s fine”, you know, “it 
doesn’t bother me”, you know, erm (.) the word picky may be wrong, but they’re 
maybe not as picky as us women, you know, wanting everything to be perfect, 
erm, wanting everything to be romantic, erm (.) And erm, you know, where does 
he throw his pants, where does he do this, his socks and that, you know?  Erm, 
[sighs] “It’s so annoying” or whatever, and where for a guy I guess he just 
doesn’t see that either.  You know, you’re just, whatever, you know. 
 
Clare:  (.) mine are more complicated.  […] I would say James’ idea of our 
relationship, or what we want, and our satisfaction (.) would be much, I mean this 
interview would be much, much quicker (.) and it’s not that he loves me less, or 
(.) it’s just that he doesn’t see (.) it’s just not as complicated for him. 
[…] they’d be very similar, it’s just I would have sub-headings, and mind maps, 
and diagrams, and pictures, and photographs, and feely boards underneath.  It 
would be like that [laughs].  The sub-heading would be like the same thing, just 
mine would be all a, just a bit more complicated. 
 
 Self-as-articulator / self-as-articulated 
to 
 
John:  Goes back to what I was saying before probably, sort it out in your own 
head […] Yeah, I think self-realisation’s the first stage in most things.  So I think, 
as I said before, if you can’t articulate it (.) in your own head, how the hell are 
you ever going to make anybody else understand it?  I think that’s the thing, it’s 
like (.) parity with your own thoughts, and it doesn’t matter if those thoughts then 
prove to be wrong.  So upon being challenged you change those views - that’s 
fine, but if you can’t articulate them in the first place there’s almost no point as 
far as I’m concerned. 
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The experiential quality of conducting the FDA was steeped in uncertainty.  I often ‘lost 
myself’ in the content of the accounts, and wondered if I was applying the theoretical 
concepts in the right way (more so than with the IPA).  I had doubts about what I should 
be looking for with the FDA – that is, the practical application of the concepts did not 
come easily to me, despite the fact that the theoretical concepts provided a clear 
direction to the analysis.  This uncertainty was managed via regular meetings and 
discussions with my supervisors who helped me to engage with the concepts and to 
apply them.  On reflection, I felt that part of the challenge may have been linked to the 
interview structure of the twin focus analysis.  Because I was seeking to elicit 
experiential accounts from the lay people, the topic of conversation and resultant 
transcripts focused far more on the ‘satisfied subject’ rather than the more abstract 
‘relationship satisfaction’.   Therefore, the constructions of relationship satisfaction 
were made visible / mobilised through the satisfying practices and modes of 
subjectification that the lay people produced (See Chapter 5).   
 
During the FDA of lay people the earlier themes and categories from the IPA did keep 
entering my mind.  At times this was useful in that it helped me to interpret the different 
‘versions of self’, but I was concerned about simply repeating myself (by simply 
swapping the term ‘theme’ for ‘discursive construction’).  Again, speaking to my 
supervisors helped me to understand and appreciate the conceptual differences, and 
returning to my research questions also helped re-focus my interpretations.  Moreover, I 
think it was easier to not let the first reading determine the second because I was 
moving from an empathic ‘tentative’ interpretation to a more theoretically prescriptive 
one (Willig, 2012a).   
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Coding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RS as a CIRR that “works” 
- conceptualised as enduring interdependency “togetherness” 
- i.e. prevents two individuals separating 
 
Professional conception of RS as couple specific 
- “couples need different things to be satisfied” 
 
RS requires fulfilment of needs 
- happiness 
- love 
- closeness 
- all formulated within a couple’s specific relational context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doing RS – the “ingredients” 
a) requires intimacy 
b) effective communication 
c) similarity “common interests” 
 
Evaluation of the importance of specific needs as specific to the 
couple 
 
 
 
 
Interview 2 – Joan 
 
MC:  Do you mind telling me your age? 
 
Joan:  Erm (.) I’m 62. 
 
MC:  62, and how many years have you been practising as a 
counsellor? 
 
J: Erm (.) well I‘ve been at RELATE since 1994, as I mentioned in 
my email (.) but I was counselling before then (.) probably since 
1990 maybe. 
 
MC:  How would you describe the notion of relationship 
satisfaction? 
 
J:  (.) When (.) when it works (.) for a couple, because (.) erm, you 
know, couples need different things to be satisfied.  So, you know, 
whatever works really (.) it’s important to know what, you know, 
works for them and what doesn’t work for them.  What do they 
mean by happiness?  What do they mean by love?  What do they 
mean by (.) closeness?  (.) 
 
MC:  So when you say ‘it works’, what exactly is ‘it’? 
 
J:  The relationship (.) erm, what makes, what makes a couple want 
to be together (.) what is it that, that draws them together, and what 
is it that sustains their togetherness? 
 
MC:  And you also mentioned there terms such as happiness, love, 
closeness, and you would associate those with satisfaction? 
 
J:  Yes (.) intimacy (.) effective communication (.) common 
interests (.) but, you know, for some couples some things are more 
important than others, you know, it, it (.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship Satisfaction as a “working” 
relationship 
- Economic construction / couple as the unit of 
labour? 
 
Relationship Satisfaction as needs 
fulfilment 
- Needs privileged – happiness / love / 
closeness 
- Relationships as a site of ‘positive’ 
interactions / intimacy 
(Limiting – no space for being unhappy / 
upset / distant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Satisfying practices: 
- Intimate communication 
 
Relationship Satisfaction as couple-specific 
- a space for variation / alternatives? 
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RS as need fulfilment 
[Who’s responsible?  What are the expectations?] 
 
 
RdS as unmet needs 
- responsibility for need fulfilment placed with partner? 
 
RdS as accumulation of events 
- threshold level of acceptable dS? 
 
RdS as specific crisis point 
a) an affair 
b) a bereavement 
 
 
 
Crisis points / events as changing needs 
- how are ‘new’ needs fulfilled? 
 
RdS as unfulfilled needs 
a) Un-expressed needs 
b) Un-met needs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professional conception of CIRRs as the progression through a 
series of stages 
- Different needs associated with different stages 
- expected / acknowledged “crunch” / difficult times 
 
Motivation / ‘trigger’ for engaging in therapy 
- Moments of significant change within the context of the CIRR 
- disruption to how “the couple” relate 
MC: Well that’s what you were saying at the beginning there, just 
about the different needs (.) 
 
J:  Yes, whether their needs are being met, yeah. 
 
MC:  So (.) what is relationship dissatisfaction? 
 
J:  When their needs are not met! [laughs] (.) When their needs are 
not being met (.) when, when there is a, you know, sometimes it 
might be (.) an event though (.) or a sequence of events, a trauma 
(.) erm (.) you know, it could be things erm, it could be, you know, 
an affair, it could be a bereavement (.) erm (.) 
 
MC:  And so it’s these events themselves (.) that partners find 
dissatisfying?  Or lead to diss 
 
J:  Well they, yes, I mean it depends how the couple manage (.) 
erm I’m saying that there are sometimes events (.) impact on the 
relationship, so, say for example there’s a bereavement (.) well, 
you know, one or other, say the partner who’s been bereaved, you 
know, might need (.) different things, or more of some things than 
they might have needed before.  Erm, you know, and erm (.) or 
say, illness, you know, one or other could become very ill, erm, 
and er, you know, that would be something different in the 
relationship, it then sets up (.) different needs, and the question is, 
you know, are these needs (.) well first of all, you know, are they 
expressed, and are they met?  (.) So (.) 
 
MC:  Ok, so we’ve got about three points there I’d like to pursue a 
little bit more with you.  Erm, firstly, it sounded like (.) so it’s 
changing needs, it’s that, it seems like it’s the relationship 
changing, and partners’ ability to manage that (.) 
 
J:  Yes (.) and of course there is the, sort of, you might say natural 
evolution of, of (.) of a relationship, I mean relationships go 
through different stages (.) and, I mean (.) you know, there are 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship dissatisfaction as unfulfilled 
needs 
 
 
Relationship Dissatisfaction as a state / 
static? 
 
 
 
 
 
Satisfying Empowered Practice 
[warrants partners to monitor / reflect on 
personal level of satisfaction, and to articulate 
this to partner.  Responsibility lies with self in 
the first instance, and then partner in the 
latter] 
- self as knowable and communicable 
- needs as negotiable 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationships as stages  
- implicit acknowledgment of change / 
relational processes? 
– one static stage to the next? 
- ‘stages’ predisposed / produced as RdS 
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- e.g. arrival / leaving of children 
 
RdS as sudden change in relational context of “the couple 
these times that we call crunch times, which are not these 
unexpected things, but the more (.) the more kind of expected 
things, like if there are children (.) well, the arrival of a first child 
for example, erm (.) an then further children, and then (.) it’s like, 
when the children leave home, that’s a crunch time.  This is when 
couples, er, a lot of couples sort of find their way to RELATE, you  
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Therapeutic Construction 
Relationship Satisfaction as the 
fulfilment of needs 
 
 
 
Charlotte:  Erm (.) I think it very much depends on the expectations of the two individuals that make up the couple. 
 
 
Joan:  When their needs are not met! [laughs] (.) When their needs are not being met (.) when, when there is a, you know, 
sometimes it might be (.) an event though (.) or a sequence of events, a trauma (.) […] I mean it depends how the couple manage 
(.) erm I’m saying that there are sometimes events (.) impact on the relationship, so, say for example there’s a bereavement (.) 
well, you know, one or other, say the partner who’s been bereaved, you know, might need (.) different things, or more of some 
things than they might have needed before.  Erm, you know, and erm (.) or say, illness, you know, one or other could become 
very ill, erm, and er, you know, that would be something different in the relationship, it then sets up (.) different needs, and the 
question is, you know, are these needs (.) well first of all, you know, are they expressed, and are they met?  (.) So (.) 
 
Gwen:  (.) Erm (.) I would say within (.) couples it’s about the ability to get your needs met and (.) that implies, in the first place, 
being able to (.) have an understanding of what your needs are (.) and an ability to be able to express them.  I mean that’s just 
very (.) broad 
 
[TO GO WITH AWAKENED SUBJECT] Gwen:  Erm (.) sometimes it’s about getting that balance right, how much can I do 
for myself, and how much, erm (.) can I legitimately expect from my partner?  And sometimes (.) one partner might just be 
suffering from low self-esteem and that can effect (.) their ability to make themselves feel good, and they sort of put all those 
needs out onto their partner, and it’s more, obviously, than one partner can (.) can cope with.  Erm (.) and I think it’s just an 
increasing problem of the way our society has gone, that (.) and the way we conceive of a couple now, that we tend to think that 
this one, this one other person is going to be able to meet all our needs and one, one person can’t do that.  You know, so a lot of 
it is just about being realistic about what another human being can, can actually do for you, and how much you have to do 
yourself, or, you know, get from other means. 
 
Flo:  I think respect is the key (.) erm, I think communication (.) is a very vital key (.) and I think it’s being able to ask (.) to have 
your needs met (.) or be able to have your needs met, and also of you your husband’s needs, so instead of one, you know, it’s all 
about me, this is what I need, it’s about, you know, my husband or my wife are (.) you know, equal partnerships and ‘How can 
we both be happy?’  So it’s very much compromise, but I think (.) you (.) it’s hard to compromise without the respect (.) and 
without the really effective communication. 
 
 
Therapeutic Prescription / Mode of 
Subjectification 
Communication / Articulation as a 
key satisfying practice 
 
MC:  How would you describe the notion of relationship satisfaction? 
Rachel:  Communication (.) would be, I mean if wanted a one word answer it’s communication. (.) And it’s (.) it’s the ability to 
express to your partner and for them to express to you (.) their needs and how you can meet each others needs. 
MC:  (.) So that then, it’s communication (.) and the way (.) specifically it’s that ability of both partners to express their needs (.) 
and then how they go about meeting those needs. 
Rachel:  Yeah, yeah, so it’s to be able to, I suppose, erm, let your partner know about your (.) what your vulnerabilities are, what 
your needs are in the relationship (.) and to be able to meet (.) meet those needs in a way that is (.) erm, you need to be true to 
yourself, you can’t (.) I mean what I often say to clients is “You can’t change anyone else, you can only (.) change yourself, and 
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you need to be true to yourself”, but there are ways of negotiating, erm, solutions if you like, erm, where people can still be 
themselves but actually can provide their partner with what they need as well. 
 
 
Joan:  Yes, because I mean, I guess, er, er (.) er, well, I suppose (.) very often the starting point is erm (.) a breakdown of 
communication, you know, and, erm (.) the issue of communication and whether it’s effective or not, I mean, that’s kind of, I 
would say from my experience, erm, you know, the number one .) thing (.) that er, a lot of the (.) that is common to (.) erm (.) 
most counselling of couples (.) that is brought as an issue. 
 
Joan:  Well I think yes, I think, well (.) if we’re talking about need – alright I mean there are many different kinds of needs.  One 
of the needs we’ll hear over and over again is erm, you know, the need to be heard and understood (.) alright, so (.) that requires 
(.) communication to be effective (.) erm (.) and very often it isn’t (.) in, in our experience, or perhaps I better just talk about my 
experience.  Erm, so, er you know, couples say (.) when we ask them (.) or when I ask “What do you want to be different?” or 
“What is the issue?” communication, being able to communicate better, being able to listen more, to be able to make myself 
understood more (.) all those kind of things is, is, is erm (.) something that I would regard as my role to facilitate, to facilitate 
more effective communication, so that yes, and so, you know, so that needs can be expressed more openly (.) more effectively, 
so that then (.) you know, the partners can respond (.) erm (.) appropriately (.) well that, that’s another matter about the 
responses. 
 
Gwen:  Well often sex (.) er, sex and closeness, erm (.) has (.) not just closeness, but the, the ability to actually share and (.) say 
(.) what they’re feeling (.) honestly and openly to each other (.) has dropped off.  Usually, usually it’s a sign that there’s 
something not being said, usually it’s a sign that one person might be quite angry underneath, but (.) either isn’t acknowledging 
it themselves or feel that they can’t raise it.  (.) So the work then is to try and (.) peel back the layers and, and find out what the 
underlying (.) resentment (.) or issue is (.) and get that (.) aired. 
 
Gwen:  That’s right, to explore it and find it, and bring it out into, into the open.  And that often unblocks their communication. 
(.) (.)  Apart from anything else, I suppose what we’re providing is a safe structure for them to (.) air (.) these feelings, which 
seems so risky, for whatever reason.  Erm, it might feel risky because, you know, in their family those feelings were not aired.  
Erm (.) but because there’s a, there’s a structure of, it’s time limited - you’ve got an hour (.) you know at the end of it you can 
put it all down and go out and (.) resume your life.  There’s another person there who’s going to stop things going off at the deep 
end, which is the counsellor’s role really, to provide a safe, you know, you’re providing safe boundaries (.) for them to explore 
those feelings that it doesn’t feel safe to explore at home.  I think that’s one of the most (.) basic (.) things that counselling 
provides. 
 
Rachel: And so it’s that (.) hearing, listening (.) and then actually making sure that (.) what you heard is what that person really 
(.) meant.   Not putting your own interpretation on it, which is a negative interpretation (.) and then responding on that basis.  So 
people get into this totally vicious circle of (.) erm (.) everything the other person says they’re interpreting as negative so they 
snipe back, and so this person now is defensive back.  And, and it, and what we’re trying to do is break that down, and, and let 
them see what it is they’re doing to each other. (.) And teach them how they can actually say “Oh what do you mean by that?” (.) 
Not confrontational, just like (.) “Oh, what do you mean by that?” 
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I had to consider the ethical implications of my FDA of the therapist’s talk carefully 
because I was only producing a suspicious interpretation and therefore, unlike the twin 
focus analysis of the lay people, I was not presenting an empathic interpretation to 
‘balance’ the discursive interpretation I was producing.  Therefore, ethically speaking, 
the research process that I adopted afforded me greater power over the couple therapists 
than the lay people, because the IPA provided the lay people the opportunity to generate 
their own meanings via the hermeneutics of empathy.  In contrast, a discursive analysis 
“silence[s] participants and interferes with their right to author their account” (Willig, 
2012a, p.40).  As mentioned previously, I was aware of this power ‘over’ the therapists 
manifesting during the interpretative process when, at times, I felt like I was trying to 
‘trap’ them.  However, the FDA mitigated this somewhat in the sense that the focus was 
on the discursive structures of the therapists’ talk, rather than the therapists themselves.  
In this way, FDA could be seen as less ethically problematic (Willig, 2012a) because 
the focus is on the broader discursive structures available in a given socio-historical 
context, and the “research participants are not seen as strategic users of discourse but 
rather as historical subjects who are themselves constructed through and positioned 
within discourse […] discourse analysis is primarily concerned with discourse and not 
people” (p.128).  However, I think it is important to remember that a participant who is 
not aware of the technical, discursive theoretical concepts could well see a discursive 
reading of their text and perceive that motivations were being attributed.   
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Glossary 
Authenticity/inauthenticity – One of the governing norms of Existentialist theory.  
Authenticity refers to a condition of self-making whereby an individual experiences 
themselves as actively committed to their various ‘life projects’ as if they were ‘their 
own’.  In contrast, inauthenticity refers to the experience of merely ‘occupying’ one’s 
being-in-the-world; engaged in different life projects out of a sense of ‘duty’ or broader 
social norms. 
 
Empowerment/disempowerment – in line with Foucault’s claim that knowledge and 
power are inextricably linked, ‘empowerment’ and ‘disempowerment’ refer to the 
processes whereby certain constructions, subject positions, or subjectivities are 
privileged as the norm (empowered) or marginalised (disempowered) within a given 
set of socio-historical material-discursive conditions.   
 
Empowered/disempowered subject position – the ‘empowered’ subject occupies a 
privileged site within a given discursive context such that their speaking rights and 
duties are privileged as the norm.  Occupying an empowered subject position may also 
produce a broader ‘horizon of agency’ for the speaker by enabling a wider range of 
speaking rights and duties (although this will depend on the discursive context).  In 
contrast, the disempowered subject occupies a position of marginalisation in which, for 
example, they are silenced, pathologised or produced as being in need of intervention.  
At any given time a subject is produced through multiple and potentially contradictory 
discourses.  For example, a ‘working mother’ may be produced as an empowered 
position within liberal feminist discourse, yet simultaneously be produced as 
marginalised within a conservative, patriarchal discourse.   
 
Ethic – Referring to the discursive norms which underpin a given mode of 
subjectification.  That is, the ‘rules’ through which the ‘self’ acts upon the ‘self’ in the 
production of the ‘self’.  These ‘rules’ are privileged or warranted within a given 
discursive context and therefore dictate how the self “should” act upon itself.  For 
example, within broader discourses of intimacy-as-an-interpersonal-process, the ‘self’ 
is produced through an ethic of ‘open’ and ‘honest communication’ and is therefore 
compelled to engage in dialogue and forego silence or self-censorship. 
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Governance – the productive discursive norms or ‘rules’ which underpin and sustain a 
discursive framework.  These rules ‘dictate’ the ways in which it is possible for 
different phenomena to be produced.    For example, discourses of mutual need 
fulfilment could be produced through a ‘governance of the confessional’ or a 
‘governance of romanticism’.  The former would produce ‘fulfilment’ and the 
‘fulfilled subject’ in terms of ‘open’ intersubjective dialogue, whilst the latter would 
warrant the production and enactment of romantic ideals. 
  
Neo-liberal subject – Drawing on Foucauldian theory, the neo-liberal subject is 
produced through the discourses, practices and modes of subjectification made 
available through ‘neoliberalism’ – the dominant economic movement of the 20th and 
21
st
 Centuries, which privilege economic growth and individual economic gain 
through the operation of free markets.  The neo-liberal subject is underpinned and 
compelled by an ethic of economic exchange, and individual choice and consumption. 
 
Ontological status – the extent to which, and the manner in which, a phenomenon 
‘exists’.  From a discursive perspective, a given ‘thing’ comes into meaningful 
existence through language and the broader discursive context, and therefore 
ontological status is always fluid and dynamic.  From a phenomenological point of 
view, the ontological status of an experience is shaped by an individual’s felt actuality 
of that experience.  For example, an experience may shift from feeling ‘real’ and 
‘concrete’ to something that is more ‘ephemeral’, ‘transitory’ and ‘less tangible’. 
 
Subjectivity – pertaining to the discursive production or the phenomenological 
experience of ‘the self’, and the ways in which the subject is produced or experienced as 
a particular ‘type’ of self.  From a discursive theoretical position, subjectivity is seen as 
fluid, dynamic, and socio-historically located, and is understood as being produced 
through a set of discursive conditions of possibility (e.g. through the subject positions, 
discursive practices, and modes of subjectification).  From a phenomenological 
theoretical perspective, subjectivity refers to the ways in which an individual 
understands and experiences their sense of self-hood.   
 
